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THE MX MISSILE AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE—THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 27, 28; MARCH 12, 13, 14, AND 20, 1985

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NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

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THE MX AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE—THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 1985.

The Defense Policy Panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

I would like to welcome all the members to our first meeting of the Defense Policy Panel.

The Defense Policy Panel, as all of the members know, is being established to examine some rather broad national defense policy and strategy issues. I hope, after this budget cycle, to get into some really rather fundamental questions about the defense policy and defense strategy.

But we decided what we would best do in this budget cycle is to look at a couple of issues that clearly have some important policy implications because they spill over into arms control and other areas as part of this current budget cycle.

Clearly an issue that is of very paramount importance these days is the whole strategic program; in particular, the MX missile and the SDI Program.

As our first witness, we would very much like to welcome General Abrahamson, who is the person who knows the most about the SDI Program.

I would tell the members that as soon as the part of the general's testimony he is able to do in open session is finished, we will have a vote to close the meeting as soon as we get a quorum here, and at the point where we have gone through what we can do in open session, we will then proceed with the rest of the meeting in closed session.

General Abrahamson, welcome to the meeting here this morning. Why don't you proceed, sir?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

General ABRAHAMSON. First of all, Mr. Chairman, and members of the panel, I applaud the establishment of this panel. I really believe that there are a great number of issues that can only best be explained by looking very carefully at the connection between fundamental policy and strategy and in the programmatic elements.

I do know that last year, as we attempted to explain the program, there was, in fact, a great deal of confusion and a great deal of trying to reiterate and to tell that story. So, I congratulate you on the panel. I am very pleased to be a first witness before this group.

I do have a written statement. Rather than deal with all of the portions of the written statement, just for emphasis, sir, I thought that it would be most helpful to extract a few paragraphs. That is primarily a matter of emphasis and to provide a point of departure for your questions. I will be brief with that. However, of course, the entire statement is available to all of the members.

The United States has based its concept of deterrence on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict.

Our approach has been to reinforce that strategy through restraint in the deployment of offensive forces and strict limits on defensive forces. But our approach to deterrence is being eroded through a relentless Soviet program to strengthen their offensive nuclear forces, especially ballistic missile forces. This erosion could be accelerated further as a result of their continuing and substantial program in ballistic missile defense.

The basic idea of deterrence was based on the conclusion that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system that could effectively deter the other side.

Today, we feel the situation is different. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and compliance with existing agreements will, over the long term, increasingly call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. Of equal importance, new technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before.

Skipping over to those opportunities on page 2, in the near term, the SDI Program should be seen against a backdrop of the ongong and extensive Soviet and antiballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty, as well as a violation, a probable violation, and other activities that undercut the treaty.

SDI IS A POWERFUL DETERRENT

SDI provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ballistic missile capability beyond that permitted by current agreement. This in itself is a critical task.

However, to the United States and our allies, the overriding importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of radically altering today's dangerous trends by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in nuclear arsenals.

To further illustrate that, I would like to skip over to program goals, because there has been a great deal of confusion about those goals. You mentioned that in one of your speeches, sir.

Since the President's speech in 1983, we have seen many interpretations of what his vision entailed and what the SDI was expected to accomplish. In spite of what would appear to be many conflicting reports, I would like to emphasize that our goal has not changed and has, in fact, remained consistent with the direction outlined by the President.

The driving force behind his concept is freeing the world from the fear of nuclear conflict. An ultimate goal is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. To move toward this objective, then, the SDI has been structured as a program of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies.

I would again stress that the SDI is a research program geared to provide a future President and Congress with the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems.

The United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard, deployments of defensive systems would most usefully occur in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive deployments of the United States and Soviet Union.

We are, of course, aware that when a shift is made to a different and enhanced basis for deterrence, careful consideration must be given to preserving a stable environment. While the SDI research is proceeding to identify defensive options, we are doing so with this in mind.

At this time, the U.S. Government is examining ways in which the offense/defense relationship can be managed to achieve a more stable balance that includes offensive arms reductions.

If the promise of SDI is achieved, we will have the opportunity to enhance deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance on defensive systems, systems which do not threaten anyone.

We see as our chief purpose the opportunity to offer a high confidence basis for decisions to pursue a defensive option. To do so, our research and technology program must do several things.

It must conduct a broad-based research effort that expands and accelerates the progress of the relevant technologies. It must identify and evaluate the potential effectiveness of candidate ballistic missile defenses that could be assembled and deployed from those technologies. It must show how those defensive options could be operated and maintained to do the job.

Our current program does not harbor a preconceived notion of what an effective deployment would contain. It proceeds from an initial identification of promising technologies and related concepts molded into a defense architecture. It includes a wide range of such concepts with emphasis on non-nuclear technologies. It has no single design or construct identified as the best or the most appropriate.

To provide the technological solutions needed, we are exploring all facets of a layered defense. Experience with strategic defenses has taught us that a layered defense offers the best chance of achieving the required effectiveness against a broad range of existing and potential future threats and attacks.

With that, I would like to close by skipping to page 9, commenting on the arms control and R&D program.

IMBALANCE IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES

The United States currently faces an imbalance in strategic offensive force capability and a much greater imbalance in deployed defensive capability. The Soviets have spent roughly as much on strategic defense as they have on significantly expanding their strategic offensive force capability. In addition, they have a substantial defensive research program exploring many of the same technologies covered by SDI.

I have made this statement earlier, but it is worth repeating for emphasis: "We are conducting the research and technology program of the SDI in compliance with the ABM Treaty."

Finally, I would want to observe that since the Government is currently preparing for the upcoming round of negotiations, it would be improper for me to speculate about the U.S. position.

I do feel confident that the U.S. position is sound and has always had elements of flexibility. This does not represent a change. It does represent an opportunity for some progress if the Soviets will join us in this activity with the same measure of flexibility.

I thank you for your attention. I apologize for reading those parts, but I do feel that that emphasis could provide a point of departure. I do submit for your consideration the overall statement.

If and when you would like to proceed further into some of the technology and some explanations, I have an open briefing which will give you a better understanding of some of these points as well.

At this point, you may wish to open questions, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON

INTRODUCTION

The United States has based its concept of deterrence on the basic idea that, if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our approach has been to reinforce that strategy through restraint in the deployment of offensive forces and strict limits on defensive forces. But our approach to deterrence is being eroded through a relentless Soviet program to strengthen their offensive nuclear forces, especially ballistic missile forces. This erosion could be accelerated further as a result of their continuing and substantial program in ballistic missile defense.

This basic idea of deterrence was based on the conclusion that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system that could effectively deter the other side.

Today, the situation is different. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and compliance with existing agreements will, over the long term, increasingly call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. Of equal importance, new technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before.

Concerning offensive forces, the Soviet Union's continual improvement of its ballistic missile forces has steadily reduced the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces. And, concerning defensive forces, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active and passive defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces.

These trends indicate that long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability and deterrence effectiveness. Should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will seriously undermine our ability to deter aggression against ourselves and our Allies. It is crucial, therefore, that the United States and the West as a whole, keep options open in both the offensive and defensive area. But as you know, the U.S. is taking steps necessary to underwrite deterrence and stability in the near term through the President's strategic modernization program and arms reductions negotiations. But even as we do so, we must consider the nature of a stable deterrence in the future.

For the longer term, the President announced his decision to take an important first step by directing the establishment of a research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), with the aim of exploring the potential of defense technologies to support a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening strategic stability, increasing the security of the United States and our Allies, and eventually eliminating the threat posed by ballistic missiles.

THE OPPORTUNITIES IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE

In the near term, the SDI program should be seen against a backdrop of the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty, as well as a violation, a probable violation, and other activities that undercut the treaty. SDI provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ballistic missile capability beyond that permitted by the current agreement. This, itself, is a critical task.

However, to the United States and our Allies, the overriding importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of radically altering today's dangerous trends by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in nuclear arsenals.

We cannot neglect the possibility that the Soviets want to and may reach a potential for a first strike wherein they can reduce significantly or eliminate our ability to retaliate effectively. An effective defense has the potential for discouraging their striving toward such an achievement. If they perceive that the incremental cost of more offensive capability to overcome an effective defense is unattractive, such a defense will have a stabilizing impact on the building and deployment of offensive ballistic missiles.

Today I would like to describe for you the goals of the program and what is required to meet those goals; our approach to achieving the technical capability to support defensive options; the planned research pace; what our research program is designed to do and how it is structured; the current program status and plans for FY 1986; and the resources required.

PROGRAM GOALS

Since the President's speech in 1983, we have seen many interpretations of what his vision entailed and what the SDI was expected to accomplish. In spite of what would appear to be many conflicting reports, I would like to emphasize that our goal has not changed and has, in fact, remained consistent with the direction outlined by the President. The driving force behind his concept is freeing the world from the fear of nuclear conflict. An ultimate goal is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. To move toward this objective, then, the SDI has been structured as a pro-

gram of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our Allies. I would again stress that the SDI is a Research Program geared to provide a future President and Congress with the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. Such a deployment would enhance and strengthen deterrence while also providing critical leverage for truly meaningful reductions in nuclear ballistic missiles.

Soviet reaction to our initiative already demonstrates that they have taken seriously the impact of the emergence of these technologies on their own strategic plans. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI-equivalent program of its own for some years. They obviously appreciate the vast potential of the technologies and the bold objectives. It seems both prudent and necessary that first we fully understand the potential of such a defense and, second, that we use our best talents to bring these technologies along for what they may bring to the higher purposes of peace. The challenge to the SDI is to provide viable defensive technology options that permit a future decision on whether or not to implement an effective defense against ballistic missiles.

The SDI research seeks to provide future decision-makers with technologies which could:

Improve significantly the stability in the nuclear balance;

Create a future environment that would serve the security interests of the Soviet Union as well as those of the U.S. and our Allies;

Enhance prospects for negotiated reductions in nuclear arsenals; and

Help improve the chances for survival of humanity.

The United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard, deployments of defensive systems would most usefully occur in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive developments and deployments of the United States and Soviet Union. We are, of course, aware that when a shift is made to a different and enhanced basis for deterrence, careful consideration must be given to preserving a stable environment. While the SDI research is proceeding to identify defensive options, we are doing so with this in mind. At the same time, the U.S. Government is examining ways in which the offense/defense relationship can be managed to achieve a more stable balance that includes offensive arms reductions. We seek above all to ensure that the interaction of offensive and defensive forces removes the potential for destabilizing first-strike options.

As we look to the future, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of nuclear ballistic missiles, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. If the promise of SDI is achieved, we will have the opportunity to enhance deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance on defensive systems—systems which do not threaten anyone.

ACHIEVING A TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

We see as our chief purpose the opportunity to offer a high confidence basis for decisions to pursue a defensive option. To do so, our research and technology program must do several things. It must conduct a broad-based research effort that expands and accelerates the progress of the relevant technologies. It must identify and evaluate the potential effectiveness of candidate ballistic missile defenses that could be assembled and deployed from those technologies. It must show how those defense options can be operated and maintained to do the job.

Our current program does not harbor a preconceived notion of what an effective deployment would contain. It proceeds from an initial identification of promising technologies and related concepts molded into a defense architecture. It includes a wide range of such concepts with emphasis on nonnuclear technologies. It has no single design or construct identified as the best or the most appropriate.

To achieve our major goal, we must bring along the emerging technologies in a logical, timely way. The overall research task is expected to bring the technologies to maturity in three developmental thrusts. First, we need to validate the most mature technologies to provide the opportunity for our national leadership to decide whether or not to pursue initial defense options based on those technologies that are affordable, survivable, and effective. They could decide on an initial step which implements a defense against the threat we believe will be in place at least until early in the next century; or they could decide to reserve the options as a simple hedge

against Soviet breakout and development of a defense against U.S. ballistic missiles. Second, we need to ensure the long-term viability of future defensive options by demonstrating by the early 1990s the feasibility and readiness of technologies to support the validation of more advanced defense options. And third, we need to conduct research that encourages the innovation of the U.S. scientific community in response to the President's challenge to aid SDI research in identifying exciting new approaches for eliminating the threat of ballistic missiles.

THE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

To provide the technological solutions needed, we are exploring all facets of a layered defense. Experience with strategic defenses has taught us that a layered defense offers the best chance of achieving the required effectiveness against a broad range of existing and potential future threats and attacks. In pursuing the technology for such defenses, we seek to:

Capitalize on the synergism derived from repeatedly engaging enemy ballistic missiles with a mixture of weapons, enabling the progressive layers to work together to mitigate any weaknesses of the individual elements;

Exacerbate the uncertainty of a potential attacker in his ability to succeed in his attack by presenting him with a complex defense suppression problem; and

Deny damage from limited ballistic missile attacks and limit damage from full-scale attacks should deterrence fail.

In pursuing defense-in-depth options, a broad range of technologies must be developed in order to perform the five basic functions of any defense:

Detection of the threat and alerting the defense elements;

Acquisition and tracking of the threat to locate it in time and space;

Identification of the threat and discrimination against decoys to ensure efficient allocation of the defense resources;

Interception and destruction of the threat; and

Assessment of the results of the engagement.

These five functions are performed repeatedly in the separate engagements of the ballistic missiles in their four phases of flight (boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal).

To focus our efforts we have grouped our activities into five program elements. These elements are designed to (1) advance the technology base, (2) conduct experimental demonstrations that validate the technology, and (3) conduct concept and development definition efforts which focus the overall technology development on those critical issues that must be resolved to establish feasibility.

The Sensors Program includes a mixture of some of the most and least mature technologies being developed by the SDIO. It includes technology base efforts to support surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment that provide data on the observables from ballistic missiles and their warheads; new radar and optical sensors capable of obtaining detailed imagery of warheads and warhead deployment; and on-board signal and data processing capable of performing necessary computations right at the sensor. The experiments include three general classes; boost-phase surveillance, midcourse tracking, and terminal-phase tracking and discrimination. Space-based surveillance experiments are planned for the early 1990s to demonstrate survivable means of detecting and tracking boosters from very high altitudes in space. Other space-based sensor experiments are to be conducted in the same timeframe to explore our ability to track tens of thousands of objects during midcourse. Such platforms may ultimately include active sensors to aid in discrimination. An airborne sensor experiment will determine whether forward-based aircraft can perform as an adjunct to ground-based radars to aid in target discrimination. A terminal imaging radar experiment is planned to demonstrate rapidly evolving ground-based radar capabilities.

The Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) technology program is advancing the state-of-the-art in the technologies for (1) high powered beam generation; (2) optics and sensors for correcting and controlling the high powered beam; (3) large, lightweight mirrors and lightweight magnets for focusing the beam on the target; (4) precision acquisition, tracking, and pointing to put and hold the beam on target; and (5) fire control to capitalize on those unique features of directed energy weapons such as the ability to measure and control the energy delivered to the target. The DEW technology program includes major demonstrations at the subsystem level in the four concepts currently being examined: space-based lasers, ground-based lasers, space-based particle beams, and nuclear-driven directed energy. These concepts are candidates for boost and post-boost phase intercept and for discrimination functions in the other phases. In addition, selected subsystems for these concepts will be inte-

grated in on-the-ground experiments designed to test interface approaches and resolve technical issues arising from the integration. The work on nuclear-driven directed energy is largely pursued by the Department of Energy and is designed to establish its technical feasibility. Equally important, the work ensures that the U.S. understands the potential impact of these emerging concepts on future military capabilities.

The Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW) technology contains some of the most mature technology, and its efforts include interceptors and hypervelocity gun systems for midcourse intercept, terminal intercept, defense of space platforms, and boost-phase intercept. Technology base efforts include developments needed for fire control, guidance and control, warheads and fuzing for guided projectiles, hypervelocity launchers, and high performance interceptors. The program calls for hardware demonstrations of kinetic energy weapon systems capabilities.

The Lethality, Survivability, and Key Technologies Program provides critical supporting R&D. Understanding the vulnerability of ballistic missiles to the various kill mechanisms is fundamental to assessing their effectiveness against current and responsively hardened targets. Survivability to mission completion, particularly of any space defense assets, is fundamental if defensive options are to be viable. Economical space transportation, on-orbit logistics and maintenance, kilowatt/megawatt sources of power, and multi-megajoule energy storage and conversion are potentially key needs in an affordable defense deployment. Lethality and target hardening efforts will provide the basic theory underlying kill mechanism/target interactions, the resulting damage, the response of the target to damage, and fundamental limitations in hardening countermeasures.

The survivability problem includes substantial technology development, particularly in the case of space-based components. It also includes identification and assessment of innovative survivability hardware and tactics and evaluations of the survivability of conceptual designs. Space transportation, logistics, and space power efforts are designed to take advantage of existing DoD and NASA definition efforts and to expand them into the definition and satisfaction of the more demanding requirements of a defense-in-depth.

The Systems Concepts and Battle Management Technology Program is designed to allow intelligent choices among competing approaches to defense architectures and to develop the technologies necessary to allow eventual implementation of a highly responsive, ultra-reliable, survivable, endurable and cost-effective battle management/command, control, and communication (C^3) system. We will perform threat analyses, mission analyses, conceptual design of defensive architectures and performance requirements definition, and system evaluation for all levels of a layered ballistic missile defense. The battle management/C^3 efforts will provide the tools, methods and components (1) for development and eventual implementation of the system and (2) to quantify risk and cost of achieving such a system.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE R&T PROGRAM

The U.S. currently faces an imbalance in strategic offensive force capability and a much greater imbalance in deployed defensive capability.

The Soviets have spent roughly as much on defense as they have on significantly expanding their offensive force capability. In addition, they have a substantial defensive research program exploring many of the same technologies covered by SDI. In an attempt to avoid such conditions, we have entered into treaties and agreements that limit both deployed forces and development and demonstration activities that provide a posture for either side to break out of the agreement and quickly gain a significant advantage.

How to limit development and demonstration has been one of the thorniest problems. Clearly, these limits are largely driven by our ability to verify compliance. To be verifiable, research must (1) emerge from the laboratory; (2) be clearly associated with the applications that are subject to control, not only to avoid ambiguity, but also to avoid unwarranted constraint on technology base developments that are applicable to a broad range of DoD problems; and (3) be observable in testing by sources that would enhance the confidence of the nation seeking verification. These limits were carefully crafted in the ABM Treaty for the class of weapons being limited. In addition, a requirement was included to discuss weapons based on new physical principles when they reached certain levels of development. A forum for such discussions was established. Any negotiations of additional limits on development and demonstration of new weapon forms could only take place after their development was mature enough that the negotiated controls would be verifiable.

These conditions gave new emphasis in arriving at definitions of the various activities in research and development that were acceptable to both sides. The definition of such words and phrases as "development" and "testing in the ABM mode," were difficult points of negotiation. The fact that we were not totally successful is reflected in the points of contention on compliance that are raised from time to time. Nevertheless, we have a commitment that we have worked with and complied with for over a decade, and we understand its strengths and weaknesses.

I have made this statement earlier but it is worth repeating for emphasis:

We are conducting the research and technology program of the SDI in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Further, as a research program, the SDI is not a weapons development program, nor is it a program with preconceived notions of what a potential defensive system against ballistic missiles should entail. Emphasis in the program is being given to nonnuclear weapons for defense. The defense that might evolve from the SDI will not be intended to defend only our strategic weapons systems, nor should it lead to an arms competition in space. In general terms, we are considering ways to defend both ourselves and our Allies against the ballistic missile threat. As the work moves ahead, we will continue to hold extensive discussions with our Allies. It is a research program designed to answer a number of scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the promise of new technologies can be fully assessed. An appreciation of these tenets is essential to an understanding of the SDI.

Finally, I want to observe that since the Government is currently preparing for the upcoming round of negotiations, it would be improper for me to speculate about the U.S. position. I do feel confident that the U.S. position is sound and has always had elements of flexibility. This does not represent a change. It does represent an opportunity for some progress if the Soviets will join us in this activity with the same measure of flexibility. Given the complexity of the arms negotiations, we are prepared to move forward in the areas identified. We will give due consideration to any proposal the Soviets wish to make. But, for our part, the U.S. stands committed to pursue the SDI research program for the reasons we have already discussed in detail.

Thank you for your attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we have our vote to close, as long as we have a quorum.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Chair be authorized to close the meeting today and for 5 subsequent days in order to receive national security information.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a recorded vote.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Aspin.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Dickinson. [No response.]

Mr. Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Skelton.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye by proxy.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Ray. [No response.]

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we proceed with some questions in open testimony, if we can. If we come to something that you can't answer, just say so. Why don't we do 5 minutes and go a couple of rounds and then maybe a little less formally.

Let me start the questioning, General Abrahamson, with when does the SDI Program bump up against the ABM Treaty?

SDI AND THE ABM TREATY

General ABRAHAMSON. Actually, it is flexible in the sense that we have to, right from the very beginning, structure our test program within the limits that were identified. We have done that.

In addition to that, we have an external committee, a compliance review group, that is quite external to my program office, that looks at it to assure that there is an independent view and that we don't get carried away with enthusiasm as one goes ahead.

Now, in each of the programs there will be with progress a natural point where it would become inefficient or I think a waste of taxpayers' money to proceed with that particular program without moving in such a way that you would then say we would have to have a test which would then bump up against the treaty and move to noncompliance.

We have tried to lay out many of the concepts and the areas in such a way that we can see with a moderate assumption about our progress in the research program when we might run up against some of those points.

Frankly, none of those points really become significant until the turn of the next decade. There are some modifications and some opportunities that we could take earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. So you anticipate that for the remainder of this decade, the next 5 years, in any case, that you can conduct research into the SDI Program without running up against questions of violations in the ABM Treaty?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me further ask the question, is it possible to determine whether SDI will work, and leaving aside what that means for a second, whether SDI would be an effective population defense without testing?

General ABRAHAMSON. First of all, let me not give the impression that we are not testing. We are indeed testing. It is a series of laboratory tests and tests that do fall within those that are acceptable by the treaty.

I believe that we can indeed demonstrate technical feasibility because I think that that is a clear requirement that a future decisionmaker would need to be able to be satisfied with.

Furthermore, I think it is important that we be able to assure any decisionmaker as one embarked on a true development program, if we had reached that point, that what we are doing is something that would be affordable for our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Leave that aside. Let me just ask the question on testing. At some point the ABM Treaty—and I haven't got it in front of me—talks about testing components. Is it not necessary to test components in order to answer the question as to whether SDI works? We have got a situation where the administration is saying,

"Why don't we just proceed with the research and see whether SDI can develop into a population defense?"

My question is, can we conduct the research and are we able to do that without violating the ABM Treaty? It seems to me at some point, in order to answer the fundamental question, we are going to have to do some testing of components, and that comes up against the question of the ABM Treaty.

General ABRAHAMSON. The definition of components in the ABM Treaty is a fairly stylized one. I think that that is an important element. The components were really defined primarily as full up, important elements of what in those days was considered to be the key elements of an ABM defense. For example, a component was a missile, an interceptor missile, the whole missile. It could have been a radar that was part of such a system.

We can, for some of the devices that are based on other physical principles, do I believe convincing laboratory tests. Sometimes we are going to have to ask, obviously, or somebody in the future is going to have to be able to show that to a Congress and you are all going to have to be able to make a judgment on whether or not that is convincing evidence, but I think that in many cases it can be done.

There is a point where if one proceeds into development, you must depart from the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but let me lay out my concerns and let you address them.

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have something called an ABM Treaty. The treaty exists and the treaty is in law. We are now, under the administration's urging, conducting research into an alternative way, as you pointed out in your opening statement, of defending the United States in the nuclear world, which is basically to go to a defensive system.

General ABRAHAMSON. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. The question that I have is we don't know whether it works. You admit that you don't know and we don't know, and the question is should we proceed with research into finding out. I think most Congressmen would say it is worth spending some money because clearly what you are seeking would be a better world.

The question that I have, though, is does not the question come up that don't we bump up against the treaty in order to answer the question? In other words, what I am saying is here is where we are now, here is the world in which we have a certain situation in which the ABM Treaty is to a certain amount—a good thing. It is not perfect, as the President has pointed out, but it is a world which has kept us safe for 40 years. We shouldn't throw that system aside lightly.

General ABRAHAMSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is we can conduct some research into some alternative systems, and I agree, but the question is, can we find out whether the other system is good enough, works well enough to replace the old system without destroying the old system?

Suppose we conduct the research which would invariably involve some tests in order to see if it works. Suppose at the end of all of that process we find out that it doesn't work, that in fact it doesn't. Having spent the money, it was worth a try, but we found out that it didn't work, but in the process we have destroyed the ABM Treaty, and we would be in the end, worse off than we are now.

General ABRAHAMSON. I do understand the point that you are making. Perhaps I can best answer it by showing you a short tape and showing some unclassified examples, if that would help, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go.

TESTING SDI

General ABRAHAMSON. What I have set up here is the test that we conducted last June, which I thought was a very dramatic test, where for the first time we essentially hit a bullet with a bullet. We demonstrated that we could destroy a warhead by nonnuclear means.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you show that, are you saying that all of the tests that we can conduct to determine whether the SDI works can be done without violating the ABM Treaty, which you claim that one did? Can all of the tests be done without violating the treaty?

General ABRAHAMSON. No; I think that we can do substantially enough kinds of tests that we can present a compelling case to the Congress. I don't know that every one of these systems will work, but I do believe that a compelling case can be made.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be in a position to judge whether SDI can protect populations sufficiently so that we could ask the country to spend that kind of money without conducting tests that would violate the ABM Treaty?

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe that it will not be a perfect case. It won't be. For example, you cannot take—I developed the F-16. Well, I didn't develop it. I had a marvelous team that developed the F-16, and I was privileged to be a part of that team. We have never taken that warplane and demonstrated that it could survive in a European full battle.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, but that is not what you are trying to do with that.

General ABRAHAMSON. I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. A plane is different from an SDI. The SDI, if we are going to deploy it, it has got to defend the population. We don't know whether it is going to defend the population. We have tried to conduct the research to find out whether it defends the population.

The problem, it seems to me—and it is probably not, as you point out, a problem that we are going to face right now—a problem that we face in this—and somebody has got to explain to me how we are going to deal with it—is how do we make sure we don't destroy the system we have? We have an ABM system. It is better than nothing. It is not terrific. The President points out all the flaws of it.

We live on the edge of a nuclear precipice. If we could have a defensive system, a defensive system that would protect the population, that would be better. We would have a better system. That is

true. But in order to find technologically whether we can build that better system, the danger is that we destroy the system that we have now.

In the end, we end up—suppose that the results turn out negative, that it can't protect the population sufficiently? How do we restore the status quo ante? How do we restore the system that we have now, which I believe is better than nothing?

General ABRAHAMSON. The point that I was trying to make to that, and I think that the brief answer—and obviously it is a matter of judgment on my part—is that I believe that we can present on the basis of tests which could be conducted within the treaty a compelling case to the Congress. It will be a complex case. There is just no question about it.

Perhaps behind your question, since you raise the question of population defense, there may be some confusion—and it may be worthwhile before I show these three examples showing you two slides that comment on the importance of the layered defense, and that may help as well. May I do that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not important to the question, but if you want to show it. Why don't we hold that, General Abrahamson, and go to other questions because I think other people would like to ask some questions.

Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, first of all, thank you for coming before us. It is a very important issue that we do face together. Let me commend you for a job well done when you were on loan to the Space Shuttle Program. I think you have done a great job, and we want people to know you have done a great job.

General ABRAHAMSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MAVROULES. I have a number of questions, Mr. Chairman. Just shut me off if you think I am going too far, but I would like to get into this, if we can.

Secretary Weinberger's posture statement and budget outlines a program of $3.7 billion, an increase of approximately 166 percent in 1 year. Certainly our responsibility here as a committee, and certainly reporting to our full committee, is whether that money can be used effectively, equally, and how will those SDI systems support American national security. I will just get into a couple of questions, General, at this point.

President Reagan has stated his goal for the strategic defense initiative is to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Is the President's plan a promise to repeal deterrence or are the technicians correct when they state SDI is to be used to enhance deterrence?

Could you answer that question for me?

SDI AS A DETERRENT

General ABRAHAMSON. It is clearly I think often misunderstood, and I think it is misunderstood because of what has been the accepted definition of deterrence. All too often deterrence has been used in a way that is synonymous with offensive deterrence, or it

has been used in even a more limited way, using the concept of mutual assured destruction.

I believe that the essence of real deterrence is that there is obviously a risk involved for the Soviet Union, or anybody, to embark on a military adventure. The question is, you want to insure that they cannot gain by embarking on that adventure. Obviously, you want to deny them the ability to have that military victory.

Now, if you can deny them that by threatening them with an unacceptable risk, as we have had to do in the past, that is one method. However, if that deterrence fails, since we could not stop any of those warheads on the way, there is a terrible consequence.

On the other hand, if you can deny them the certainty that they can achieve their military objective and you can do so by nonthreatening means and by defensive means, that is deterrence as well. But it is a defensive deterrent.

The profound difference between the two is that if defensive deterrence fails—because remember in both cases this is something that is in the mind, it is a subjective evaluation, and it probably changes with the level of crisis in the world—but if defensive deterrence fails, then the profound difference is that we will save lives, if there is any measure of effectiveness at all.

Mr. MAVROULES. Given the budget constraints that we do have, budget deficits around $200 billion, our committee has to report to the full House eventually, and you have asked—when I say "you," Secretary Weinberger has asked for $3.7 billion, which is an enormous increase—if we gave you $3.7 billion, can you spend all of that in fiscal year 1986 or are you going to put some of that money in the bank?

General ABRAHAMSON. First of all, we are not going to spend it just to spend it, I can assure you that. We have tried to put together a responsive management system that would indeed allow us to make sure that the money that is spent is effectively spent, if properly obligated, and that will be responsive to a fast moving type of research program.

I am not calling this a Manhattan project or anything like that; what I am saying, it, is an aggressive program with sufficient flexibility that we can take advantage of opportunities as well as be able to conduct these programs.

Once a team is started—and this is perhaps the most important element—right now we have thousands of some of the best minds across this country that are working on specific concepts, many of them in parallel, many with different degrees of promise, and they are started.

The one thing that would, I believe, waste the money, and most assuredly guarantee a waste, would be to take these teams, to get them started on something and then cut it back. I can use an example from the space shuttle of exactly that.

In 1979, when I was the F-16 Program Director, I was asked to come with a group of other consultants and consult with NASA on the management of the space shuttle. That was a time when the space shuttle was having some severe problems in terms of being able to keep the development program moving forward toward their initial launch date.

They had ceilings that were just inappropriately low. As a result of trying to manage in that kind of an operation, it became very clear that teams were being turned on and off, sometimes three times a year.

Perhaps the most telling and sad tale of all was that as part of that effort to save only a few million to stay under those ceilings, one of the most important teams that was turned off was the Lockheed team that was putting together the tiles for the space shuttle.

The assumption was that they had indeed made sufficient progress and understood how to mount those tiles. Later on, the implication of not being able to proceed with that particular effort was a slip in the launch date of nearly 2 years that cost billions of dollars. It was primarily because of the inability to have a developed and reliable means of putting on those particular tiles.

That is perhaps the most telling example that I know of waste on the order of billions of dollars because of the old proverb of trying to save a penny at a time. It was difficult.

I am not trying to denigrate at all the very serious resource problem that I know the Congress is struggling with this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome General Abrahamson and look forward to working with you closely as we go down this particular path.

I would also, Mr. Chairman, ask unanimous consent to be recorded as voting in the affirmative on the motion to close.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. DICKINSON. We are happy to have you aboard and we look forward to working with you, General Abrahamson.

General ABRAHAMSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Dave McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ray was here for just a moment and gave me his proxy and asked if he could be recorded as voting aye on the motion to close.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. MCCURDY. General Abrahamson, I, too, would like to welcome you. I have a number of questions. I appreciate the chairman especially for convening this panel. You have taken the very first opportunity to look at the very broad questions of policy certainly as they relate to SDI and our nuclear deterrent posture.

There are a number of things, of course, that we are talking about. We are talking about deterrence, and we are talking about the program goals. I would like to spend just a moment, if I could, and get a clear impression of what your personal views are as to the ultimate goal of SDI.

We have heard a lot of talk about point target defense, terminal defense. We have heard a lot about population defense. The President's speech has been interpreted to develop some kind of an Astrodome over the entire continent that is going to protect the entire population.

Where do you see the initial phases and where are we going on SDI?

GOALS

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, I think that particular confusion arises out of a misunderstanding of the technical goal. I commented in my opening statement on the policy goals of trying to increase safety, to enhance stability, those efforts through defensive means.

But to translate those into a technical goal, we are working in what we call a layered architectural concept. We have not selected at this point which of the various weapons or which of the surveillance systems are the right ones to be most effective and to be least able to be simple countermeasured by the Soviets. That is what the research program is about.

What a layered defense really offers—and again, what it is——

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, maybe I can ask it better. I have had the BMD briefing. I have been to Huntsville. I have seen some of the arguments for that long before the President's SDI speech.

How much money was actually spent on SDI-related research prior to the President's speech? Where has he taken it from there?

General ABRAHAMSON. I have tried to put together some of that history, and it is a little difficult to assemble as a history. The one element of it that we can track through is the amount of money over the last decade that has been spent at the Ballistic Missile Division for various kinds of research associated with ABM systems. Of course, those varied from terminal defenses to an attempt to try to find ways to improve survivability for the racetrack version of the MX, so there were several kinds of programs.

Essentially, over the last decade in constant dollars, that ABM program was about between $600 and $700 million. I have a specific briefing that I will present to you that gives that.

However, the technologies that we are now looking at are going well beyond those specific technologies. I think that it is nearly impossible to begin to try to trace back the development of some of the advanced computer systems, the advanced detector systems for surveillance and these ideas that we are trying to impact.

What we can research is the ABM system. As I say, that is between $600 and $700 million a year for over the last decade.

Mr. MCCURDY. What are the estimates for the total cost of SDI that you have today?

COST OF SDI

General ABRAHAMSON. We laid out a research program—and there is only a research program; there is no approval, of course, to go beyond that—and have tried to structure it so that we should have sufficient answers to make the compelling case that I talked about with the chairman, within about approximately a 5-year time frame.

We laid out what we thought would be an appropriate amount for those 5 years. That is approximately $26 billion. That is the research program itself.

Mr. DICKINSON. Would the gentleman yield, just to amplify on that?

Mr. MCCURDY. Certainly.

Mr. DICKINSON. I attended a conference where Chancellor Kohl made the statement that he wasn't sure about the program, but if there was going to be an extensive R&D effort, that they wanted a piece of it. Mrs. Thatcher, in effect, said the same thing.

What accommodations and how do they figure in your going forward with the total program and is this a part of the money figure that you are looking at?

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, we have been looking at proper ways within the limits of the treaty that we can involve the allies. The Secretary of Defense has been responsive to the allied interests. We do not have at this point a specific target goal in cost or cost sharing or those kinds of things. I don't think we are that far along in that process.

I think we are all hopeful that we can find a constructive way in which allies can participate. However, that final policy decision and what the limits are and the way in which to proceed is in work and has not yet been finalized. So, I can't give you a dollar variance.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oklahoma can ask another question.

Mr. MCCURDY. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I think what I would ask is that after perhaps the first round of questions and everyone has the opportunity in the open session, I have a series of questions that I think would be classified regarding intelligence functions and would suggest that after the first round that perhaps we could go into closed session to get into some of the things that the Soviets are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you.

General Abrahamson, it is good to see you again.

My first question—the answer of which may lead to some classified information, also, so you may feel more comfortable in answering it in the second go-round—I have a question having to deal with which elements and which subprograms of the whole SDI effort do you feel are achievable in a short period of time and which of those which may take the full 5 years to achieve.

Which are basically the utilization of online capabilities, state-of-the-art capabilities, which are necessary, which will not be achieved unless there is some sort of technological or scientific breakthrough? I wonder if you would help on that.

SHORT-TERM ACHIEVABILITY

General ABRAHAMSON. I can best answer that in several ways, but let me try to give you a short answer now, sir, and then I will give you some examples later, both in the classified session and in some open pictures because, again, I think pictures show better what we are about.

There are some technologies which in the short term are more mature, and most often people think of the weapons technologies. We talked about the demonstration of the Army homing overlay experiment. That was a very, very significant demonstration that

we can indeed intercept things in space with the accuracy required for a nonnuclear missile.

It does not mean—and I think this is one of the points that I had wanted to make and we can make with the tape, but let me make it now—that we have not only demonstrated the capability for a terminal defense system.

The important issue—and I believe this goes back to your earlier question, Mr. Chairman—is that what we have demonstrated with that particular demonstration without any kind of a development program, only an experimental program, is that a nonnuclear kill device can intercept at incredible speeds, at the speeds coming head on for a warhead.

Now, that interception could be made off of a rocket used in a terminal kind of area defense. It could also be made from a platform in space at the end of a boost phase just as the rockets are beginning to come out of the atmosphere. It could be made in the midcourse, launched from a submarine, and intercept some in the midcourse.

So, the demonstration was not just a simple demonstration of terminal defense. We have proved that feasibility already in this program. Now the question is for that kind of technology, can we get to the size and the weights and the cost elements that one might need. They don't require breakthroughs.

In those areas I am talking about what we would consider to be the more mature technologies in a weapon because they are based on years of research at the Army ballistic missile effort, but also years of research in terms of tactical weapons fired from airplanes and in tactical situations on the ground.

There are also the technologies in the weapons area that are much more advanced and will offer us significant different kinds of advantages. Here, for example, this is where we always get this star wars business, where we are talking about the potential of laser systems or neutral particle beam systems, systems that would strike at the speed of light.

I think that there is still additional work that needs to be done in some of those areas, but the startling thing is that in some of these areas it is already happening at a rate that I believe many of you just cannot appreciate.

Some of those I am anxious to be able to have the resources to be able to fund so that we can encourage that rate because they represent in the weapons area the more powerful set of technologies and a different set of problems for a system that can't be countermeasured.

But I would caution you all not to think only of the weapons. My own judgment is that the long pole in any tent in terms of not only the research part of the problem but later, if there were a decision to develop and deploy, it is in the very difficult problem of insuring that we have a full capability to track, to provide surveillance and point and track weapons, and assure ourselves that we have a very positive command and control system.

For any of the weapons, I believe, the long pole is in that nonweapon area, so that requires an extensive effort as well.

What I have tried to indicate is that there are mature ones and there are others, but please do not focus only on the weapon.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. General Abrahamson, the President amazingly has seized the initiative on the SDI concept, as he has done most frequently on domestic issues. I am troubled by that, even though the President is your boss and my former employer, from the standpoint that while advancing the argument in most parts of the country on moral, philosophical, and perhaps even theoretical grounds, perhaps we have diverted attention from another part of our national defense strategy; in other words, we have diverted attention away from the strategic value of just what strategic value the SDI is going to give us.

Most of the armed conflicts in the last decade or so—in Korea, in Afghanistan, in Lebanon, in the Falklands and El Salvador—have required not a solution which is held in SDI, but a solution which involves approaching the problem from the standpoint of more conventional arms.

I guess my question to you is why should I be persuaded that my money is better spent on SDI as opposed to being spent on more submarines or more M–1's or, from your standpoint, more B–1's and more MX's given the fact that really the tension seems to be in conventional forces or conventional war and not so much from an overall strategic standpoint?

WHY AN SDI?

General ABRAHAMSON. I am not sure that I am the one who really ought to be answering that kind of question. Let me just provide an assurance, sir, that that question has been the fundamental question, not just for SDI, but for each of the tradeoffs between weapons in the entire Pentagon budget development process.

That is not an easy process, it is a difficult one, and it is one, of course, that is led and guided right from the very top, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and certainly by the Joint Chiefs.

The budget that the President presented represents the outcome of that process. It is the best attempt that the Pentagon can put together to present a balanced program representing all of the risks that the Nation faces.

In terms of the SDI itself, I would only comment that we are talking about questions of survival of the human race and the idea that the SDI would only be looking at something less than 2 percent of the overall budget over that 5-year period, and that $26 billion that I talked about does not seem to me to be an inappropriate expenditure. Clearly, that was the decision of not only the Secretary of Defense but the President.

Mr. SWEENEY. But is there any dimension of the SDI Program that minimizes the potential for conventional conflict, in your view?

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe that the technologies that we are developing will have many serendipitous kinds of applications, not only in the strategic defense initiative, but certainly in the Department of Defense.

Let me give you an example. I will show you a picture of rail guns and progress that we are making on rail guns. The reason

that this concept of a rail gun is at the maturity point that it could be looked at for the SDI was because both the Army and the Air Force saw that there was a tactical application for rail guns.

Now the SDI is taking the principal burden of bringing that technology forward. I suspect that at some point it will be looked at very carefully to see if that can be used in a tactical arena, only in the sense that some of the technologies can be applied on a broader basis.

Frankly, that goes well beyond Pentagon and military applications. We are trying to drive the computer capability forward in dimensions that people I think will find hardly conceivable. That will have broad applications across our entire economy; certainly our National Space Program, the Commercial Space Program, and many areas.

So, the technologies represent some of the very best in the Department of Defense, but it would be wrong for me to imply that the SDI as a system, as we now see it, and what we know about it now, can help us in every little type of conflict in the world. I think that would be going too far.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. General Abrahamson, thank you very much for your testimony. I read your testimony last night. At the same time I read a statement by Harold Brown and a speech by Mr. Nitze.

Both of them recognize the possibility, if not, indeed, the probability that a likely countermeasure by the Soviets if we were to succeed in putting together an SDI or if they hear we are making breakthroughs there would be to increase their offensive forces, particularly if they were not on a parallel in the development of their own SDI technology.

You didn't address that in your statement, I don't believe. In fact, you indicated that you felt that this would be an initiative leading toward the reduction of offensive forces.

Isn't that a possibility, if not a probability, that the Soviets would respond by increasing their offensive missile forces?

SOVIET REACTION TO SDI

General ABRAHAMSON. I think clearly it is a possibility. Obviously it is. It is one that we all have to be very aware of and have to be concerned with. Therefore, a very central—actually there are two possibilities.

One, as any good military man, and if I were sitting before a Soviet body at this point of time as a military man, I would be recommending that we look very carefully at countermeasures and if there is a simple way to defeat this or a nonexpensive way to defeat it.

However, if the technologies—and that is why, again, there is a research program—can really demonstrate that we have the kind of potential to make the nuclear missile, take it from the omnipotent weapon that it really is right now, it is clearly out of proportion with any other weapon system that is available. It distorts every aspect of both our political and strategic relationship be-

tween nations. If that can be restored down to something that is reasonable, then what happens, of course, is that it has less value.

I would like to use—well, I will use it just because it is simple. When the machinegun became a very important and recognized weapon with great power, there weren't any other countries of the world that said let's buy more horses for our cavalry. It became pretty clear that it was the wrong thing to do.

That is one of the reasons—and I don't offer that in a flippant way. What I am trying to say is that it is important that we demonstrate that we can develop a very, very great and powerful potential.

That is the importance of the President's goal, of being able to go all the way to a very, thoroughly reliable kind of defense. If we can demonstrate that to the Congress and also to the Soviet Union, then those weapons just don't have the value that one would like. Of course, we would hope that then you could be induced to want to give up these powerful weapons.

I don't think that it is a given at all that you would go for are more offensive weapons, particularly as you are convinced that it is just a waste of resources.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPRATT. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the analogy, though--you are saying that they didn't buy more horses, but what they did buy is more tanks—goes back to John Spratt's case——

General ABRAHAMSON. That is the countermeasure.

The CHAIRMAN. [continuing]. Is not the offense going to try to overcome the defense.

General ABRAHAMSON. Of course, and that is what I indicated, that they will try to deal with more countermeasures. But what we are trying to do is obviously stabilize the world as such and hopefully to survive in such a way that we can stabilize and bring down what is the most dangerous and most destabilizing of all of the weapons at this point. That is the one that can strike and wipe out either a city or, in accordance with our targeting philosophy now, sir, the military capability of a nation in just a matter of minutes. So that is why, of course, the focus is on the ballistic missile.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me follow that up and ask this. Assuming that we cannot develop a completely leakproof national defense system, which seems reasonable to assume at this point, can you foresee the situation in which a less than leakproof system would work without a substantial reduction in offensive weapons held by our adversaries?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir; I believe at each level of buildup, because you couldn't just suddenly put this system in place and have it suddenly be 99 percent reliable, it will build up over time if there are, obviously, the decisions and if the promise is there so that development decisions are made to go ahead.

I think that it will be a difficult process of maintaining a stable relationship in that transition, but in the very beginning, particularly with the layered concept, I believe that it can contribute and it can offer the hope that in an arms control environment we can persuade people to begin to give up and bring down the level of offensive forces.

Please note I am not saying that it requires an arms control reduction in order to be effective. I think what has to happen is exactly the opposite. As they are convinced of the power of our technology, they will be inclined to reduce. As they reduce, then our partially effective system will become more effective, and you start on a cycle which is a very good cycle.

I can show you an example of that in a slide later, if I might.

Mr. MCCURDY. General, on that very point, some people have proposed that the best time to make the interception would be in the boost or the immediate post-boost phase. What about the threat of Soviet bombers, cruise missiles, the depressed trajectory submarine-fired ballistic missiles?

You may have had that question while I was out, but how do you respond to those? You make the statement that the most destabilizing weapons are the heavy ICBM's, but to me a cruise missile or a submarine-launched ballistic missile off the coast of the United States is a more destabilizing because of the short timeframe.

How do you propose to address that?

General ABRAHAMSON. Let's remember the timeframe, sir. A submarine-launched ballistic missile, whether it is a depressed trajectory or not, even a depressed trajectory would go up to the top of the atmosphere if it is going to have any kind of accuracy whatsoever. We believe that we could destroy, with the techniques that can reach into the upper atmosphere, a depressed submarine-launched ballistic missile.

But what is that timeframe? We are talking about 6 minutes; 5 minutes, maybe, if they wanted to move in closer. If they wanted to move out a little further, maybe 10 minutes or a little longer, but we are talking about that kind of timeframe, where the President of the United States—at that point he has to decide, "Am I going to respond with a ballistic missile attack, or am I just going to try to flush the bombers and then hold and ride out that kind of an attack or not?"

A cruise missile doesn't arrive for many, many minutes, if it is close, and hours if it is longer. We are not ignoring the cruise missile problem, but let's go back in history. We built a defense against bombers in this country, and we spent a lot of money to do that back in the sixties.

We gave it up. The reason we gave it up was because it was very clear that long before the bombers arrived there would be nothing left because the ballistic missiles would have destroyed both our capability to fight a war and perhaps even a segment of our society.

Mr. MCCURDY. I beg to differ. I think that we gave it up because the Soviets didn't put the emphasis on the long-range bombers.

General ABRAHAMSON. No; they did put the emphasis on the bombers.

Mr. MCCURDY. They put the emphasis on the ICBM.

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe that the proper perspective on that history is that they didn't put the emphasis on the bombers so long as we had a defense. They have since put emphasis on bombers after we gave up the defense.

By signing the ABM Treaty of 1972, we left ourselves deliberately naked and tried the idea that now with restraint on our part,

they would restrain themselves in terms of offensive missiles. The history shows that they didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abrahamson, it is a pleasure to see you. I can see you have a tremendous challenge, not just in running this program but in working with Congress. That leads me to one question. I would like to ask you about your own power to get things done, not just in getting dollars from Congress but running the program.

You are dealing with the services, of course. They are going to have—the Air Force and other services—are going to have a piece of the program, and you are known as a guy who has produced things—the space shuttle, the F-16—and you have the capability of coming to Congress and letting us know how important these programs are.

I would hope that you in that capacity don't become simply a financier or the bank, so to speak, for the services, where they can go off and essentially run the programs the way they want to run them.

In that regard I would ask you, what is the scope of your power to really keep a handle on these things? I guess you have a memorandum from Secretary Weinberger that essentially lays out what your powers are and your responsibilities.

Do you think you can keep a handle on this thing and keep the services from running away with the program while you are up here getting the money for them?

General ABRAHAMSON. Sir, it depends on how much time I have to spend here getting the money for them. [Laughter.] If I have to spend 100 percent of my time, then I just can't pay attention to the management of the program. However, that has not been the problem.

The way one can succeed in running one of these kinds of programs, particularly a research program, is that one must have, obviously, the resources, and one must be able to back up decisions which are, in fact, research objective decisions with prompt response in terms of money. Obviously, then they have to be willing to carry those out.

I believe that the combination of what the Congress has given us last year in terms of putting the program in the five program element numbers and centralizing that is adequate, so long as there is not an attempt by a lot of good friends in Congress—and they are friends, and they are people with good reason, who want to say, well, this one is better than this and this is better than this—so long as it doesn't become an attempt to micromanage much of that program. I do have the authority, clearly, and the cooperation in the services to conduct it.

It is the combination of what the Congress has provided and the clear authority and the support that the Secretary of Defense and the chiefs of the services have given us that allow us to go ahead.

Mr. HUNTER. General, I think the previous questions have indicated there is a concern as to whether SDI will ultimately protect people or protect weapons. If it is not leakproof, will it still be sufficient to protect our deterrent force.

I think it is obvious that although we have got ABM, the Russians have proven that ABM can't possibly be broken. Really, it seems that the Soviets have essentially done, by improving their offensive force, what they were proscribed from doing under ABM; that is, to render our deterrent force essentially vulnerable.

If, in fact, SDI shows us that we have the capability of protecting that deterrent force against that first strike, which I think is the big problem of the 1980's, will you consider it to have been successful? Do you think that that is a legitimate goal for SDI?

General ABRAHAMSON. Obviously, I think it is a legitimate goal. But I think the important part here is that we are under a layered defense concept. Our objective is to destroy as many of the ballistic missiles as we can as early as possible.

We don't know whether that ballistic missile is aimed at New York or London or at one of our Minuteman fields out in North Dakota somewhere or at an airfield that has C-5's ready, standing by to supply Europe in terms of a conventional conflict in Europe.

We don't know where that is. While it would be nice for us to know and we could pick out which ones to shoot at, there is an interesting reverse problem; that is, the Soviets don't know which one they are going to get through, either.

I will show you a slide that shows that that is a very profound problem for a Soviet target and war planner. It is clearly a very significant one. So, the key is if we can destroy those missiles and destroy the warheads, we are protecting both. We are protecting both people and certainly we are protecting our own capability to respond to a crisis.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Abrahamson, let me discuss a matter with you that you may not want to answer in open session. This is an entirely new dimension in warfare. The President came before the Congress some 16 or 18 months ago, as I recall, and described this SDI Program as strictly a defensive system, a system to shoot down SS-18's, SS-20's, before they ever reach this country.

From a layman's point of view, the people in my district are asking me that if we have a force, a nonnuclear force, as you described it, that has the force to shoot down a missile, wouldn't that same force have tremendous offensive capabilities as well.

If you can discuss it in open session, fine, or if you would prefer to wait until the closed session, I understand.

OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

General ABRAHAMSON. Let me give you a brief answer now, and then I can show you some additional things that I think make it quite clear.

Although the technologies are very powerful in terms of their ability to destroy missiles and there is at least some potential that some of the technologies may aid eventually in that it would require further exploitation in being able to perhaps destroy high flying airplanes or at least to pinpoint and identify, and contribute to other air defense, those kinds of things——

Mr. NICHOLS. I had in mind cities and people.

General ABRAHAMSON [continuing]. It is not the kind of thing that you would use to destroy a city.

Mr. NICHOLS. It does not have that capability?

General ABRAHAMSON. No, sir. Let me give you an example.

The warhead on the homing overlay experiment—there isn't a warhead. There is no explosive in that kind of a system. It pulverized the warhead that was coming in, the simulated Soviet warhead, just absolutely pulverized it, but only because it hit it going very, very fast. If that happened against the ground, it would dig a deep hole somewhere, but not a very big one.

Mr. NICHOLS. What if it happened to a 30-, or 40-, or 50-story skyscraper in Leningrad or Moscow?

General ABRAHAMSON. It would probably dig a pretty deep hole down through it about 1 foot or 2 feet in diameter. If somebody happened to be under that, it would cause a problem.

Lasers are the same kind of problem. I think it is because of some of our science fiction, that people envision that lasers are the kind of system that are indeed powerful, and they are, but they are terribly inefficient.

The power involved in a laser as a strike weapon is that if you can point it absolutely accurately, you might be able to put on a ballistic missile body the explosive force of two or three hand grenades or a couple of sticks of dynamite. That certainly would wreak havoc with a ballistic missile.

But that is not the way you would destroy a city. No military man would say the way to destroy a city is to take that laser and to march up and down Fifth Street three or four times and then go down to Sixth Street and do that. It is not an effective weapon for that kind of thing.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Charlie Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Following on with what you just said, is there a way to prevent, by arms or by treaty, the Soviet's aggressive use of space.

General ABRAHAMSON. That is a very interesting question and one I haven't been asked.

Mr. BENNETT. When you get to the last person, you are bound to be asked questions like that. I was just thinking of your answer. I have only one other thing to say, and it is not a question, but you might want to respond to it.

In my opinion, the most disturbing factor, the most destabilizing factor, against peace in the world today is the NATO and U.S. inability to prohibit or postpone Soviet conventional war in Europe. I would like to have your opinion of that statement.

That is all I want to ask, those two questions.

General ABRAHAMSON. Let me try on the first one, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. I can repeat the other one later.

SOVIET USE OF SPACE

General ABRAHAMSON. That, by the way, is, of course, the question and, therefore, I think it is very appropriate for you to ask. The Soviets keep asking and bringing out in the newspapers that we should stop this terrible thing of putting weapons in space.

You will notice they haven't said anything about let's not defend ourselves or certainly let's not limit defenses of the kind that they are talking about. So, I think that a better question is can—or I would like to rephrase the question in the context of can we all enhance our security by a defensive system. I am sure that elements of that defensive system may be in space and there may be, in fact, weapons in space.

Mr. BENNETT. If I could just interrupt at this point, I think it is a very noble thing that the President has suggested to try to emphasize defensive weapons. I think he should be heartily congratulated for that. I hope it will be catching throughout the world.

General ABRAHAMSON. Thank you, sir.

There may be some rules of the road if we and they both had a system which was not threatening but enhanced the security of both nations in a defensive way, as we proposed here. There could be some rules of the road, just like the Navy has some rules of the road that aren't always adhered to, that allow you to conduct operations at sea and to try to prevent these things from beginning to escalate improperly.

So, there are those kinds of possibilities that might exist which would enhance whatever the character of a future system's ability is to survive and to work. But, of course, that means that both sides do need to accept the idea that our real objective is to defend our Nation and to achieve stability through defensive means as opposed through threatening offensive means.

Now, the second question, having to do with the problems of NATO, the conventional problem remains a conventional problem. As just has been indicated earlier, there does have to be a proper balance of conventional forces.

However, I do believe that the willingness of the Soviets to embark on an adventure of some particular kind, one that might be the start of a series of escalation crises that build up more and more to a point where it becomes difficult to control, relies a great deal on their confidence that they can in the end retreat to nuclear blackmail or using the offensive nuclear capability of the Soviet Union in a way that they could always control that escalation.

If they were deprived of the confidence that they could always control that even right up to the last stage, then I think they would be less inclined to take the first step.

Mr. BENNETT. Wouldn't we be better off if we could postpone our necessity for nuclear weaponry within a matter of days, if you could postpone that to a matter of months or perhaps even a year. Wouldn't we be likely to prevent a holocaust if that were true?

General ABRAHAMSON. I believe that that is the case, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. Those are all the questions I have, sir.

Mr. MAVROULES. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BENNETT. I will yield.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much.

General, while we are on the subject of strategic weapons, in my opinion, I think on both sides—the United States and the Soviet Union—this thing is just uncontrollable and perhaps unmanageable relative to the escalation of strategic weapons, nuclear weapons.

In view of what you are saying to us—and of course, in a couple of weeks we are going to have a very crucial vote coming up here on the MX missile. It is no secret. Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger were talking with the Senate yesterday, pushing for the MX missile. I am appalled to think that that one missile system is going to be the success or failure of the arms control talks, which I just simply cannot buy at any distance.

In view of what we are doing, and doing some real good work in SDI and the developments in such a rapid fashion, is it wise to continue with an MX system and then have the Soviet Union escalate? Of course, they are going to do that. You know they are going to do that. As you have stated, they will find other defensive systems if they can get into it.

Or, can we buy enough with what we have right now, considering what you are doing in your area, with the present systems that we have? Would you care to take a shot at that?

General ABRAHAMSON. The best answer, of course, was given by the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee 2 days ago. I offer that as the primary one, but then I will give you my own opinion as well.

His statement—and I think it is appropriate—is that, "We must maintain our deterrent while we perform the research"—and that is the key element here. This is a research program. We don't have all of the final answers yet. We have not been able yet to present to the Congress that compelling case that one can go ahead and develop and deploy this kind of a system.

Even when I am optimistic about the outcome, because I see what these marvelous teams are doing and the progress that we are making, but even when that compelling case is presented, there will be a time, a transition period as one goes through both the development and initial deployment and the buildup to a level that goes ahead. So, I think that is behind the Secretary's statement, that this is a research program for tomorrow.

He says: "While we perform that research, we need to continue effectively to deter attack. Once a decision to pass beyond research to development is made, we will still need to deter effectively. And as defensive systems are deployed over a period of years, we will need to insure that this 'transition' period is a stable one. A strong and modern triad will provide the deterrence we need to move down this road. I am sure that General Davis will have a comment on that this afternoon. In the Secretary's words, "A strong and modern triad must have a strong ICBM leg. And a strong ICBM leg must include 100 Peacekeepers."

The MX is a program for today. This is a research program where the answers aren't in yet, and it is for tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Ike Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill, do you have any other questions?

Mr. NICHOLS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask one final question on this part. It is just a followup to maybe Mr. Sweeney or Mr. Hunter.

We are conducting this research into this thing to find out whether it works. Have you got a definition of what works; in other words, what is the goal against which we are working? I have a

horrible feeling—there are a lot of weapons that come out of the Pentagon that some of us would say didn't work but somehow can be made the case it works.

Will this work better than Divad? Is the test of what works the Divad test? I have a horrible feeling that in some sense this thing is going to work. It is bound to work in some sense, but is that going to be the argument to proceed, or have we got some kind of a test that it must work to a certain level in order for us to decide that it is worth proceeding with?

General ABRAHAMSON. No; I think we have very clear criteria in the general sense.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you laid those out?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we see what those are?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be important for us before we get into it to know where we are going with it.

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MCCURDY. Let me follow up on that same point. Is the technology driving the policy or do we have a policy that requires certain technology? I just recently read a book on the development of the A bomb. Many of the scientists who were involved with that got so wrapped up in the marvelous teams, as you call it, in the development process, that they didn't look at the overall policy.

When they got to the next step of developing the further hydrogen weapon, then a lot of those same scientists who were involved in the original process said: "Now, wait a minute, we shouldn't be doing this," because they had time to assess where the technology had driven them.

Is that a proper analogy today? Are we sure that we are containing the technology? Who is driving whom here?

General ABRAHAMSON. I think that this time we have a very clear answer to that. I believe that the President outlined a policy and a strategy goal right from the very beginning with his speech. The immediate response after that speech was to establish two teams. One team was the Fletcher Commission, which looked very carefully primarily at the technology. Obviously they had to have policy discussions while they did that.

But they looked at that technology and they provided an initial technology roadmap for how to proceed, but they had a single important overriding conclusion; that was that the technologies that are emerging—notice are emerging—if developed properly in a research and technology program, do really have the potential at some point in time—they didn't try to put a specific time schedule on it—to reach that goal that the President stated, which was a strategic goal as well as a policy vision.

There was a second team that started out at the same time, and that second team is referred to in several different ways. It is the future security strategy study or sometimes it is called the Hoffman report. But that group looked at it and said if the technologists are indeed successful, does this make sense, can it contribute to stability, can it do these kinds of things, and the answer is kind of the same kind of equivalent, that the real potential is there to

provide a defensive deterrent, a strategy that can offer stability. I think the fact that those two teams came forward at about the same time means it is exactly the opposite situation from the one you described.

Now the important trick—as we go forward with the specific technologies, as we make progress in these—is to insure that we have military strategy and overall political policy that can work as the specific ones come forward as well. In fact the program is working very hard to assure that we do that, and obviously the Congress is as well, and you can tell that by the majority of the questions here that are indeed policy strategy and strategy questions. So, I think it is the opposite of what you describe, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

Could you provide for the record some information about what you would consider acceptable goals for this program before you would want to go ahead with the development of it; in other words, how good would this program have to be, what kind of milestones would it have to meet?

GOALS

General ABRAHAMSON. There are several overall goals that not only have I commented on but after discussion with Ambassador Nitze—he commented on it in his speech—I believe that they are very simply these—now, that has to be developed in a very effective way, so I am not stopping at this simple statement, but I think there are three that these future decisionmakers will look to.

The first one is have you proven that you have—and this goes back to your question—the technical capability to counteract the kinds of offensive missiles that one might face. So technical feasibility is the first goal.

But that would not be enough. It must also be an affordable system. All of us, these teams that are so inspired and working out there now at this point in time, if we gave you and your successors—and may it all be all of you someday—if we gave you something that was not affordable or had a cost, a price tag that just was unacceptable, then that wouldn't work, either.

In fact, there is a corollary. The corollary that Mr. Nitze highlighted, but we have talked about even in the last year, is what I call the fundamental cost inequality. This goes back to your question, Mr. Spratt; that is, that we must be able to show that the costs associated with destroying an offensive system, a ballistic missile, is going to be substantially less than the cost that it is for the Soviets to build a few more offensive systems to overcome it. So, it is, in fact, a cost-imposing strategy on them rather than on the U.S. taxpayer.

Then, of course, the last and perhaps most difficult judgment is the political criteria and the one that says—because we can't assume that if this thing promises at the very end when you achieve the very high levels of effectiveness to be stabilizing but we have to go through an unstable period first—and I don't think that is the case, by the way—I think at each step of the way it has to show that it is going to make the world safer. That is perhaps the toughest one of all.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have spelled out—we don't want to take time now—particularly the technically feasible and affordable. Those are judgment calls. But I think we ought to have some goals in the program and some percentage of effectiveness or something that we are aiming for.

I think it is important to set those out before we start because I know that once that research program has been completed, and particularly if you haven't done any tests—and I think you are going to have to do some tests to find out if this is going to work—there is going to be enormous argument as to—we can all agree we will wait and decide later whether it has worked or not, but if we don't have some goals now, then we are going to be back in the argument with the person saying, "Oh, this is good enough to proceed," and somebody else saying it isn't.

[The following questions were submitted to the witness to be answered for the record:]

QUESTION: What are the SDI-like areas in which Soviets have conducted research in recent years? What breakthroughs have they achieved? What obstacles do they face?

ANSWER: The Soviet Union has always considered defense to be a central and natural part of its national security policy. The extensive, advanced Soviet air defense network and large civil defense program are obvious examples of this priority.

But in addition to this, the Soviets have for many years been working on a number of technologies, both tranditional and advanced, with potential for defending against ballistic missiles. For example, while within the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union currently is upgrading the capability of the only operational ABM system in the world today--the Moscow ABM defense system.

The Soviets are also engaged in research and development on a rapidly deployable ABM system that raises concerns about their potential ability to break out of the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM defense system within the next ten years should they chose to do so.

In addition to these ABM efforts, some of the Soviet Union's air defense missiles and radars are also of particular concern. The Soviet Union already possesses an extensive air defense network. With continued improvements in this network, it could also provide some degree of ABM protection for the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies--and do so all nominally within the bounds prescribed by the ABM Treaty.

Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union also has been pursuing a substantial, advanced defensive technologies program--a program which has been exploring many of the same technologies of interest to the United States in the SDI program. In addition to covering a wide range of advanced technologies, including various laser and neutral particle beams, the Soviet program apparently has been much larger than the U.S. effort in terms of resources invested--plant, capital, and manpower. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughtly as much on defense as it has on its massive offensive program.

The SDI program is a prudent response to the very active Soviet research and development activities in this field and provides insurance against Soviet efforts to develop and deploy unilaterally an advanced defensive system. A unilateral Soviet deployment of such advanced defenses, in concert with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for twenty years.

SDI

Question: The U.S. concept of deterrence is based on the ability to retaliate against an adversary's nuclear attack and impose costs on the aggressor that clearly outweigh any potential gains. The justification for SDI is that this concept of deterrence is eroding.

-- What kind of retaliation is or has been required to maintain deterrence and why is it eroding?
-- ability to hit a certain number of countervalue targets in a retaliation?
-- ability to hit a certain number of counterforce targets in retaliation?
-- Would not mutual reduction in the number of offensive weapons reverse this trend and maintain deterrence?

Answer: That aspect of current deterrence doctrine which is most troubling is the potential instabilities introduced by modern, accurate ballistic missiles. Such missiles--if deployed in sufficiently large numbers relative to the size an opponent's force structure, as the Soviets have done with their ballistic missile force--could be used in a rapid first strike to undercut an opponent's ability to retaliate effectively.

Our deterrence policy requires forces capable of retaliating effectively against the full range of assets valued by the Soviet Union. The Soviet deployment of over 5,000 prompt, hard target capable nulcear ICBM warheads has undercut that retaliatory capability. By reducing significantly or eliminating the ability of ballistic missiles to attack military forces effectively, and thereby rendering them "impotent and obsolete" as a means of supporting aggression, advanced defenses against ballistic missiles could remove this potential major source of instability.

Arms control can help ease these instabilities. In fact, the U.S. START proposal, if accepted by the Soviets, would represent a significant step in that direction. However, so far the Soviets have been unwilling to agree to such a measure. In addition, arms control cannot substitite for effective defenses, since unlike effective defenses, it cannot, by itself, eliminate the military utility of ballistic missiles.

Question: How would SDI deployments, especially if we begin with terminal defense of missile silos and/or defenses of 50 percent, 75 percent or 90 percent effectiveness, support the countervailing strategy?

Answer: The purpose of the SDI program is to explore the potential of defensive technologies to support a reduction in our dependence for deterrence on offensive force retaliation and not [redacted] to enhance our retaliatory capabilities. Mutual U.S. and Soviet deployments of effective defenses against ballistic missiles could stabilize the current strategic environment by eliminating the military utility of ballistic missiles forces.

Question: Will the nature of our retaliatory strikes depend on the level of effectiveness of our strategic defenses? In other words, as our SDI system becomes more effective, but still is less than say 90 percent, will we be less tempted to retaliate? Will the U.S. need to develop even more selective response options then currently exist in our SIOP (single-integrated operational plan)?

Answer: During the period of transition from an offense-oriented to a defense-oriented force posture, we would need to maintain a credible offensive deterrent force that would leave no doubt concerning US ability to respond to an attack on the US or its allies. It is difficult to predict now whether in 10 or 15 years hence the US would need to develop more selective response options than currently exist in the SIOP, particularly since future SIOP adjustments would have to take into account changes in both US and Soviet offensive and defensive forces.

Strategic defense has been proposed as a means of shifting the basis of deterrence away from reliance on the threat of retaliation. The purpose of the SDI <u>research</u> program is, according to General Abrahamson, "to provide viable defensive technology options that permit a future decision (early 1990s) on whether or not to implement an effective defense against ballistic missiles."

Ambassador Paul Nitze said that the purpose is "to determine if new cost-effective defensive technologies are feasible that

could be introduced into force structures so as to produce a more stable stragegic relationship."

QUESTION: General Abrahamson, is cost-effectiveness as important a criterion as technical feasibility? Will we be able to judge by the early 1990s decision point the relative costs of our defensive system versus the cost to the Soviets of potential countermeasures?

ANSWER: Technical feasibility will, in part, be determined by whether the technologies are cost-effective. One of the major criteria in determining cost effectiveness will be the cost exchange ratio. Costs to add additional defense capability must be such that the Soviets have little incentive to proliferate current ballistic missile forces to overwhelm the defense.

Cost estimates of both our defensive system and potential Soviet countermeasures should be available by the early 1990s decision point. By that time, promising concepts will be selected, systems level development will be defined, and a thorough examination of responsive offensive countermeasures will have been performed.

QUESTION: How do you define "a more stable strategic relationship?"

ANSWER: A more stable strategic relationship is one which significantly reduces the military utility of ballistic missiles and thus the destablizing threat that derives from their first-strike capability. Should it prove possible to develop a highly capable defense against ballistic missiles, we would envision enhanced mutual security for the United States, our Allies, and the Soviet Union and greater international stability.

QUESTION: How confident must we be about the probable survivability and lack of effective countermeasures before we decide to move out of the research stage into the development and deployment stages?

ANSWER: Before a decision is made by future decision-makers to move from research into development and possible deployment, we envision that they must be satisfied that technical feasibility of a layered defense system has been proven; that is, it could be effective, survivable, and affordable. Survivability is a major concern in the research phase as is system effectiveness in the face of passive and active countermeasures. We think we can deploy an affordable defensive capability to deny the aggressor the attainment of meaningful objectives and make attempts to overcome the defense unacceptably costly. Pursuit of the research program will give us high confidence in selecting the right systems to make up such a defense should we choose to do so in the future.

QUESTION: Why is deterrence by punishment (the status quo) inherently less stable than deterrence by denial (the SDI concept)?

ANSWER: Today we depend primarily on a policy of offensive force retaliation to maintain deterrence--a policy in which ballistic missiles form an important part. Because modern, accurate ballistic missiles carrying multiple nuclear warheads--if deployed in sufficiently large numbers relative to the size of an opponent's force structure, as the Soviets have done with their ICBM force--could be used in a rapid first strike to undercut an opponent's ability to retaliate effectively, they have potential to increase instabilities in the strategic balance. By reducing or eliminating the ability of ballistic missiles to attack military forces effectively, and thereby render them "impotent and

obsolete" as a means of supporting aggression, advanced defenses could remove this potential major source of instability.

QUESTION: Worthwhile goals could be achieved with a less than perfect SDI system, e.g., rendering the current generation of heavy, slow Soviet missiles (SS-18, SS-19) less offensively useful, pushing the Soviets to single RV missiles or removing incentives for the Soviets to initiate limited nuclear strikes, for example, in a European conflict. However, it must be recognized that these goals are suggestive of the war-fighting uses of SDI. How might the achievement of limited goals by a less than perfect system affect its objective of changing the basis of our deterrent?

ANSWER: Our goal is to change the basis for deterrence by drastically reducing the military effectiveness of nuclear armed ballistic missiles and making their use unreliable and unlikely to achieve the military and political objectives sought by an attacker. You described a set of potential uses which make a substantial contribution to this goal

- Rendering SS-18s and SS-19s incapable of delivering a crippling first strike against our strategic forces.
- Possibly pushing the Soviets into single reentry vehicle missiles.
- Providing highly effective defenses against limited attacks designed to achieve limited objectives (and we would add, highly effective defenses against massive attacks).

These kinds of capabilities are not "limited" in our view but solid additions to deterrence of attacks at any level. They are ways which we hope will move any potential adversary away from the perception of the possibility of achieving their objectives in an attack using ballistic missiles.

We, therefore, agree that there are clearly worthwile goals that can be achieved with a "less than perfect" ballistic missile defense. This is not to say, however, that we are not pursuing the most capable defense technology can yield. Not the "leak-proof" defense that opponents frequently use as evidence of our inability to achieve our goals, but very capable defenses that can hold out the promise of dramatic change in the present approach to achieving international stability in the presence of nuclear armaments.

Question: How dependent is a successful transition period on cooperation with the Soviets?

Answer: Should such a decision be made, we would prefer that the Soviet Union join with us in a cooperative effort to move from an offense-oriented to a defense-oriented strategic force posture. The thorough discussion of this possibility with the Soviets is one of our primary purposes in Geneva. However, while this transition period could be made easier by Soviet cooperation, it does not require cooperation.

Question: If SDI is phased in over time during the transitional phase, why should we expect that the Soviets will not <u>try</u> to beat our defenses with more numerous, more capable offensive weapons?

Answer: We obviously cannot discount the prospect that the Soviet Union will try to beat our defenses by adding additional, more capable offensive weapons to their arsenal. Before the US proceeds with deployment of an SDI system, however, we will have to satisfy ourselves that the effort the Soviets would have to undertake to defeat our defensive system would not be acceptable even from their standpoint.

Recent advances made in essential technologies of ballistic missile defense hold out the promise that it may be possible to develop defenses that can maintain their effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive countermeasures or to increase the number of deployed ballistic missiles sufficiently to overcome the defense. Such technologies would create powerful disincentives against the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Question: Can the transition be made successfully if the Soviets choose not to cooperate, i.e., if they continue to build new generations of offensive weaponry?

Answer: We believe that the Soviets will find it in their own best security interests to work with the US in shifting emphasis from an offense-oriented to a defense-oriented strategic force posture. Nevertheless, in designing a strategic defense system, the US would have to take into account a wide range of possible Soviet countermeasures, including the continued introduction of new generations of offensive weapons. We would have to be confident that our strategic defense system would remain effective in the face of such Soviet force improvements in advance of any actual deployments. Hopefully, the Soviets would become convinced of the prudence in shifting emphasis from the deployment of new offensive systems to defensive systems. In any event, we believe that the transition to a defense-oriented strategic force does not depend exclusively on Soviet cooperation.

Question: By what criteria can we judge this?

Answer: We will be judging the success of a possible transition to a strategic defense in terms of whether our strategic defense system could withstand the potential challenges of various Soviet countermeasures. At present our scientists are not only pursuing a host of new technologies that offer promise as part of a strategic defense system but also are examining possible countermeasures that could render these new technologies ineffective.

Question: Would the U.S reduce its offensive forces if the Soviets deploy less than perfect defenses?

Answer: In the event of mutual defensive deployments, we would anticipate reductions in both U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces.

Question: It has been suggested that, despite the defensive intentions of a future SDI system, that it could conceivably play a role in an offensive nuclear strategy. In such a mode, the function of SDI would be to defend the U.S. against those Soviet missiles which survived an American first strike. Ambassador Nitze has stated that we must avoid a mix of offensive and defensive systems that give this kind of capability. Is it desirable to avoid such capability?

Answer: The US historically has not sought a disarming first strike capability nor will we seek such a capability in the future. SDI research was prompted in large part by our own concern about the destabilizing effect of the Soviet capability to deliver a successful first strike with its ballistic missile forces and by Soviet efforts to develop advanced ballistic missile defenses. The US is seeking no strategic advantage in pursuing the SDI program.

Moreover, the purpose of SDI is not the exploration of technologies that could support a defense that would only be effective against offensive forces that were reduced by an initial strike. To maintain a high level of stability, such defenses would have to be effective against all possible levels of attack -- without any assistance from a prior offensive attack.

Question: If so, what are the possible mixes of offensive and defensive systems that would give us this capability?

Answer: First strike potential is purchased not with defensive forces, but with offensive forces of sufficient accuracy and number as to threaten the bulk of an opponent's offensive forces. Our strategic modernization program will provide the U.S. with no such capability against Soviet forces.

Moreover, an effective defense against ballistic missiles would not require a prior attack by offensive forces to enable it to function properly. An effective defense would remove incentives for first-strike attacks by eliminating the military utility of such attacks -- without assistance from offensive forces.

Question: How do our decisions now about the MX missile, or other new offensive nuclear weapons affect our chances of developing such a capability?

Answer: There are no assurances at this juncture that the US can make available the new technologies needed to produce and deploy an effective defensive system against ballistic missiles. Consequently, we will have to maintain a robust deterrent force posture in the coming years by modernizing our offensive weapon systems.

QUESTION: How much did the U.S. already spend on SDI-related research before the President's March 1983 speech?

ANSWER: At least $11.2 billion was spent in research and development directly related to ballistic missile defense between FY 1962 and FY 1983. This includes at least $6.7 billion for development of the Army Sentinel/Safeguard System and related technical efforts spanning the same time period. Additionally, emerging technologies encouraging the President to call for the Strategic Defense Initiative grew from numerous technological developments whose cost cannot be directly attributed to ballistic missile defense. Generic research in electronics, computers, communications, base activities, survivability and related efforts have contributed to the present store of knowledge. Because no specific SDI-like program existed prior to SDI, exact figures cannot be explicitly identified.

QUESTION: What are the estimates for the total cost of an SDI system? How is this figure derived?

ANSWER: It is not possible, at this time, to provide an estimate of the total cost of an SDI system. SDI is a research program to examine a wide range of newly emerging technologies to determine whether they could support the development of an effective defense against ballistic missiles. As a broad research program, the SDI is not based on any single or preconceived notion of what an effective defensive system would look like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies, are being examined. No single concept or technology has been identified as best or most appropriate.

QUESTION: What are the implications for available funding to other--especially conventional--weapon programs?

ANSWER: Since we cannot forecast, at this time, the total cost of an "SDI system", it would be presumptuous to anticipate what the impact on other weapon programs might be. There is no expected impact to other programs from funding the SDI research program. In fact, the research program may yield technologies which, to a large extent, could be applicable to other DoD needs. For the longer term, one needs to know what is to be developed and deployed, what are the costs, and over what length of time the

costs will be incurred to begin to have a feel for any potential impact. None of these things will be known with any confidence until the research is completed and we approach the decision point on whether to proceed to development and deployment. As part of that decision by the U.S. and its Allies, any impact on other defense programs must and will be assessed.

QUESTION: What will be the magnitude of follow-on costs, due to countering Soviet countermeasures, etc.? (Estimates ranging up to "at least $1 trillion" would have profound implications).

ANSWER: The magnitude of development and deployment costs are not known at this time. Cost estimates of a defensive system and the post impact of potential Soviet countermeasures should be available by the early 1990s decision point. These cost estimates will form the basis for determining whether a stategic defense can be cost-effective. We are seeking defenses with sufficient effectiveness as to create disincentives against offensive force proliferation. Therefore cost estimates of an "SDI system", when available, will include consideration of follow-on costs within the context of the cost exchange of an offense/defense interaction.

Although we do know that, the trillion dollar estimates you cite have no credible basis.

QUESTION: The SDI research request (for FY 1986) is for $3, 722 billion for expenditures in five program elements consisting of 73 tasks, according to General Abrahamson (see attached figures).

How are such increases related to annual research objectives?

How efficiently will the increased investment be absorbed by the relevant research community?

What milestones have been achieved to justify increases in the rate of investment? If none, what milestones in essentially the same time frame with less of an increase in research investment?

ANSWER: The Defensive Technologies Study (DTS), commonly referred to as the Fletcher Study, was used as a general guide for initiating the SDI. The DTS after identifying the technology activities to determine the feasibility of a robust ballistic missile defense recommended the pursuit of a technology limited pace. The FY 1985 budget request limited this effort to $1777 million and the Congress limited the effort to $1397 million. The FY 1986 request will bring SDI to the DTS recommended pace.

The scientific community has demonstrated great interest in and has been responsive to SDI request for information, assistance and proposals. Presentations to industry and members of the scientific community have drawn large responses. The competition within both and the relevant technical communities for a role in SDI research has been vigorous. The increased expenditures in SDI research are expected to be readily executed.

The notional SDI schedule for research and possible development and deployment comprises four phases:

- o The research program, conducted within current treaty constraints, would run into the 1990s when a future President and Congress could decide on feasibility of systems development.
- o The full scale development phase, beginning as early as the 1990s would design, build and demonstrate prototypes of defensive system components.
- o A transition phase of sequential deployment designed so each additional component would enhance detterrance and reduce risk of nuclear war.

o A final phase during which a multi-layered defensive would be deployed.

The near term program accomplishments and projected plans for SDI research will be incorporated in the 15 March Report to the Congresss on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The SDI research efforts and their planned accomplishments are geared toward near term objectives for major national decisions on full scale development and deployment in the 1990s. Such decisions will require confidence in the ability to meet far term objectives. To drop or delay promising development paths will prematurely limit the technical information available and increases the risks of the decisions that will be required.

SDI-ASAT

Question: Does the survivability of an SDI system depend on an ASAT Treaty?

Answer: The survivability of an SDI system cannot rest on an ASAT Treaty, especially when a comprehensive ban on ASATs would be impossible to verify.

While it might be possible to agree to selected limits on specific types of space systems or activities in space, we must concern ourselves in SDI research with the threat posed by current and projected Soviet ASAT capabilities and provide defensive options that can counter such capabilities, independent of potential ASAT restrictions.

Question: Would an ASAT Treaty now be a desirable hedge against future Soviet threats to an SDI system, even if we later decided to equip our satellites and SDI assets with maneuver or defensive capabilities?

Answer: No, an ASAT Treaty now would not be a useful hedge against future Soviet threats to an SDI system. Much more work needs to be done in the US ASAT program and in the SDI research and technology program before the impact of an ASAT Treaty could be fully understood, but it would appear that potential ASAT restrictions would be too limited to have major application to an SDI system.

Question: If we reject an ASAT settlement now, does that imply a less than candid attitude on our part toward the development of a survivable Soviet space-based strategic defense?

Answer: No, not at all. We are prepared to work in cooperation with the Soviet Union toward the establishment on both sides of a survivable strategic defense.

SDI-ABM Treaty

Question: The ABM Treaty of 1972 prohibits development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based systems. It allows development and testing of fixed land-based systems and for their limited deployment.

Under SDI, interest seems to be focused primarily on space-based and fixed land-based alternatives. Although unrestricted deployment would not be permitted in either case, testing of fixed land-based systems might take place within agreed test ranges. Space-based systems may not be developed or tested in either case. Research, however, would be permitted in both cases.

What definition does the Administration employ to demarcate between "research" (which would be permitted under the ABM Treaty) and "development" or "testing" (which would not be permitted)?

Answer: The Administration definition of these terms is provided by the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty which was

summarized in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972 by Gerard Smith, the U.S. negotiator of that treaty, as follows: "The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed."

Question: At what specific stages in the SDI program will the United States be faced with withdrawing from the ABM Treaty or successfully negotiating a change to the treaty with the Soviets?

Answer: Because SDI is a program of research that is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, we do not envisage any need in the immediate future to address this issue. By the early 1990s, we would hope to be in a position to make an informed decision on whether to proceed with system development. The SDI research program will be consistent with all US treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty.

Question: Assuming the Soviets refuse to negotiate the requisite changes, what impact will the restrictions in the treaty have on the SDI program as currently envisioned?

Answer: Once again, we envisage no near-term implications for the SDI program since it is one confined exclusively to research activities sanctioned under the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Question: Which aspects of the SDI program could be completed without a change to the ABM Treaty?

Answer: There are no impediments in bringing the entire SDI program to a conclusion within the terms of the ABM Treaty.

VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY OCCURRENCE

Question: With regard to the current SDI program plans, when would the first violation of the ABM treaty occur? Please indicate the date of the first definite violation and the date of the first possible violation. Also indicate the nature of the test and of the likely possible violation.

Answer: The current SDI is a research and technology program. All planned tests and experiments are compliant with the ABM treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some things that you want to tell us in closed session. Why don't we adjourn the open session now, begin the closed session, and let you present things to us in the closed session.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, may I be recorded as voting aye on the rollcall vote to close the session?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Defense Policy Panel proceeded into closed session.]

[COMMITTEE NOTE.—The closed session portion of the hearing will not be printed because of the security classification but an unclassified statement by Gen. B.L. Davis, commander in chief, Strategic Air Command and director, Strategic Target Planning, will be printed at this point.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. B.L. DAVIS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AND DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING

PEACEKEEPER, STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, AND ARMS CONTROL

Mr. Chairman and members of the policy panel, I am pleased to be here today to share my views on our common goals of maintaining the freedom and security of this great nation. I appreciate the interest and concern of the Congress and I am confident that we will continue to make the decisions necessary to ensure these goals are preserved.

As a nation we are indeed fortunate to possess the inherent strengths that allow us to realistically aspire to a peaceful and free existence. Our economic and political strength as well as a strong national will to defend our vital interests combine to ensure we are able to meet our fundamental national security objective—preserving the U.S. as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact.

As commander-in-chief Strategic Air Command I am responsible for the day-to-day operational control of two-thirds of our triad of nuclear forces. As director strategic target planning I am also charged with planning for the execution of the entire triad. It is from this perspective that I shall discuss the operational capabilities necessary to ensure our strategy of deterrence remains credible. For indeed, the cornerstone of our deterrent strategy—strategic nuclear forces—must have a capability that leaves no doubt in a potential aggressor's mind that he could not succeed by threatening or initiating aggressive acts against this Nation.

Today, the primary challenge to our national security is the vast military arsenal of the Soviet Union. Through a massive military build-up encompassing qualitative as well as quantitative improvements to both offensive and defensive strategic systems, the Soviets are now significantly altering critical components of the overall strategic balance. This unprecedented build-up clearly exceeds legitimate defense of the Soviet homeland. If this build-up is allowed to continue unchecked, there is a real danger that the Soviets will come to perceive that they have the strength to pursue their political objectives through military means.

Clearly, any altering of the strategic balance in the Soviet's favor poses a significant threat to stability and peace. Not only does this increase the risk of nuclear coercion, it also allows the Soviets to feel more secure in using their already superior conventional forces to achieve their goals.

Fortunately, the President, the Congress and the American people recognized the risks inherent in a strategic imbalance and in 1981 embarked on a comprehensive strategic modernization program. I cannot emphasize enough my full support for this program which has already produced significant improvements in our strategic retaliatory capability:

We have now equipped five B–52G squadrons with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and have armed one B–52G squadron with Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

The effectiveness of our minuteman force has been enhanced through accuracy and connectivity improvement programs.

Ongoing deployment of trident submarines continues to strengthen the capability of our sea-based deterrent force.

It is absolutely essential that we continue this effort to modernize our strategic forces—all three legs of the triad as well as our strategic command, control and communication systems and strategic defense capabilities.

As the President has noted, effective command, control and communication systems are a vital element of our strategic deterrent posture. Put simply, these systems enable our strategic forces to do the job. To that end, we are pursuing programs to ensure that the capability of our command, control and communications network is commensurate with that of the modernized forces we will soon deploy.

We are also now pursuing long needed programs to bolster our capability to detect and defend against attack. Modernization of tactical warning systems and air defense forces is certainly vital, especially in light of Soviet efforts to deploy an expanded, fully modernized long-range bomber force complemented by air-and sea-launched cruise missiles.

Additionally, I applaud the administration's commitment to pursue research on new defensive technologies through the strategic defense initiative. Over the long term, this ongoing research could yield new opportunities to enhance deterrence.

Turning to our strategic retaliatory forces, the sea-based leg of the triad will be even further improved through continued deployment of the Trident submarine. Additionally, development continues on the new D–5 missile. When deployed, the D–5 will improve the counterforce capabilities of the SLBM fleet and enhance the planning flexibility of future directors of strategic target planning.

Our efforts to modernize the bomber leg of the triad are progressing quite well. We are currently planning to modify the B–52H's for ALCM carriage and our two-bomber program to develop and deploy the B–1B and ATB is well on track. Together, the B–1B and ATB will present a formidable challenge to Soviet air defenses well into the 21st century. Furthermore, an advanced, state-of-the-art bomber offers the best potential for dealing with the growing threat posed by Soviet relocatable weapon systems.

To ensure the effectiveness of our current ICBM force, we are pursuing a number of initiatives that wi'l keep Minuteman reliable, responsive and supportable. In accordance with the Scowcroft Commission recommendation, a sequential ICBM modernization program is also underway. The program is centered on the deployment of 100 MX missiles beginning in 1986 as well as development of a small ICBM to be deployed in the next decade.

Concerning the first phase of our ICBM modernization program, I join the positions of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in urging your support for the immediate and continued deployment of the MX. Clearly, MX is an urgent military requirement that is absolutely essential to reduce the current disparity between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. It will counter the Soviet's superiority in prompt counter-military capability and keep their most valued strategic systems out of the sanctuary they are striving to develop. Furthermore, MX will undergird our efforts to achieve equitable and verifiable arms control agreements. I will expand on these points in a moment.

Research continues on a small ICBM with emphasis on missile design and basing configurations. Together with MX, the small ICBM will insure a balanced ICBM leg into the next century.

In sum, our strategic modernization program is generally well on track. We have made much progress since program initiation four years ago and are now on the verge of achieving significant goals established in our overall objective to modernize the key components of our strategic deterrent force. To ensure these goals are reached, it is vital that we sustain the momentum we have worked so hard to achieve.

No where is this more true than in the case of MX deployment. It is extremely important that the Congress release the FY 85 MX funds, approve the FY 1986 funding request, and allow us to complete this critically needed program.

Today, we face a highly destabilizing situation. The Soviets can significantly threaten our ICBM force while we have only a limited capability to place their ICBM's and other key hardened assets at risk. This Soviet advantage, more than any other factor in the current strategic situation, undermines stability and threatens peace. If not redressed, it may lead the Soviets to believe their political objectives can be successfully attained through the use of coercion or force.

MX represents the best—and only near-term—solution to redress the present imbalance in prompt, time-urgent capability against hardened targets. As I stated in a previous appearance before the Congress, "A fundamental precept—and paradox—of nuclear deterrence is that in order to avoid a nuclear war, we must possess weapon systems with the requisite yield and accuracy to promptly threaten what the Soviets hold most dear—their own hardened strategic assets and command facilities." The current disparity in military capabilities will not be redressed, nor will stability be returned to the strategic equation, until we possess the prompt retaliatory capabilities inherent in a system like the MX.

Let my emphasis on the need for a prompt, hard-target capability not be misunderstood. Deterrence—not fighting a war—is the overriding reason for MX deployment. The military capability of MX represents the safest and most effective means available today to achieve our desired goals of stability and lasting peace.

Deployment of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads each raises doubts in the minds of Soviet war planners as to the success of their initiating an attack. However, it does not represent a destabilizing preemptive potential because the proposed deployment cannot place the majority of high value Soviet targets at risk. Still, MX will convincingly threaten enough of these targets to deter.

For over a decade, we searched for a perfectly survivable ICBM. While survivability is a vital concern, the essence of deterrence is capability, not vulnerability. We must recognize that the collective strengths of an effective, fully modernized triad reduce the requirement that any one leg taken in isolation must be impervious to attack.

One example of how our strategic systems work in concert to promote one another's survivability is the timing problem involved in a simultaneous Soviet attack against our ICBM and bomber forces. A simultaneous Soviet launch of SLBM's and ICBM's would provide approximately 15 minutes for a retaliatory launch of U.S. ICBM's between the time of confirmed SLBM detonation on U.S. bomber bases and arrival of Soviet ICBM's. An attempt to achieve simultaneous impact would require early launch of Soviet ICBM's, thereby providing tactical warning for U.S. bomber escape. The timing problem posed by our triad serves a very fundamental purpose—our SLBM's, together with a large complement of bombers and ICBM's, will be able to hold at risk the full range of Soviet strategic assets.

The MX should not be seen as a revolutionary new weapon system. Rather, it should be viewed for what it is—a logical, modern ICBM complement for the aging Minuteman force that builds on over 20 years of experience. MX presents all of the valuable characteristics inherent in Minuteman—low operating costs, high alert rate, redundant command and control and rapid retargeting capability.

It is important to note that the MX program will continue within schedule and budgeted cost. We are well into the testing phase of the program and I am happy to note that MX continues to perform exceptionally well, achieving accuracies which are better than our design requirements.

In my opinion, nothing could be more detrimental to our efforts to redress the current strategic imbalance than canceling the MX and concentrating our efforts on developing and deploying a new small missile. While research on a small ICBM must certainly continue, the Nation cannot afford to wait five years for promising technologies to be realized. Technology—no matter how promising—does not deter. Only a visible, deployed capability deters.

There is one final point that should be addressed concerning the need for the MX—as well as the requirement to modernize our strategic forces in general. That is the influence modernization will have on arms control negotiations.

MX deployment is a key factor in achieving success in upcoming and future arms negotiations. It will demonstrate national resolve and convince the Soviets we are taking steps now to protect our vital national interests. In short, MX deployment represents the primary near-term incentive for the Soviets to negotiate.

In our commitment to far-reaching nuclear arms reductions that are equitable and verifiable, overall strategic modernization will clearly provide increased leverage at the negotiating table. Through past experience, we have learned that entering arms talks from a position of strength is a fundamental prerequisite for serious, meaningful negotiations. We learned this lesson in the early 70's when renewed U.S. interest in strategic defense resulted in the ABM Treaty. More recently, with continued NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviets are now coming back to the negotiating table.

Today, there are many challenges before us. We are faced with making some very difficult choices to balance limited national resources against many competing and important priorities. In my mind, the greatest challenge we face is to prevent war and preserve national security by maintaining the credibility of our deterrent posture.

To meet this challenge, it is vital that we continue to modernize our strategic forces. A strong deterrent is essential to maintain peace. With the continued support of Congress and the American people, I am confident we will strengthen our deterrent posture and promote a safer, more stable world.

I thank you for this opportunity to share my views and will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MX AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 28, 1985.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome to the continuation of our hearings today about the MX and the star wars initiative.

Yesterday the Defense Policy Panel got a briefing from General Abrahamson and Gen. Bennie Davis about the star wars, SDI Program, and about the MX. This morning we are beginning a series of hearings with some people who are well qualified to advise us about how Congress should deal with these issues in this budget.

Essentially, what we are interested in is, in the light of the arms control initiative that has begun, what is the proper role for Congress here, what should Congress do with SDI, with the MX—given the budget constraints, given the program that the President has presented to Congress, and given the fact that the talks are beginning on March 12. To help us answer that question, we have two witnesses this morning, and one witness this afternoon.

Secretary Schlesinger, who had a conflict come up at the last minute, could not come here this morning. He will be here at 2 o'clock this afternoon. But this morning we have two of the best witnesses to help us that I can think of.

Of all of the people in this business, this defense, arms control business, the two gentlemen at the witness table today I think are the people that I admire the most and whose judgment and opinion I respect the most. I welcome both of them here today.

Secretary Brown, General Scowcroft, welcome to our panel. Let me ask Bill Dickinson if he has some introductory remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join in your statement, and thank both of these gentlemen before whom I testified in the Scowcroft hearings, and both of whom we have had testify before us previously. Thank you very much for your attendance here.

As I said facetiously before the meeting started, but I mean it, too, you come here without compensation, you give of your time, you do this out of a feeling of patriotism. Really you get nothing out of this.

We very much appreciate the sacrifices that you gentlemen make on behalf of the country, and your expertise and background and prestige that you lend to these hearings is very much appreciated and mean a lot to us.

Thank you very much for your appearance here.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Courter.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COURTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. COURTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to commend the Chair for establishing the panel in the first place. I think it is a very important panel to discuss some of the larger policy issues.

I think it is important also that we start out with the questions that we are starting out with, the strategic defense initiative, MX, and arms control. I think it is something that the Armed Services Committee should look at in its broadest scope.

I would hope—and I am sure this will be the case—as time goes on, Bill Dickinson and the minority will be able to suggest witnesses for the panel because there might be a difference of opinion as to what witnesses should be chosen.

Also, I would like to suggest four points for the panel to study during the course of this Congress. First of all is the near-term use and viability of the strategic defense initiative and its technology to defense the land-based leg of the triad, particularly the newly deployed—if we ever deploy any MX missiles in their silos.

Also, second, the near-term use of the SDI concept and technology in a wider ABM system, defending not only silos, but perhaps submarine bases, air bases, command centers, and other critical military technology. Third, a critical view, a constructive, I should say, and critical view and review of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, a review as to why it was entered into the beginning, the rational basis for it in 1970, 1971, and 1972.

What was it intended to do? Has the ABM Treaty served its intended purpose? And also the logical question, does it make great sense to preserve it in view of alleged Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty that may have significant military consequences.

Finally, I would hope that this panel looks into a question which has been discussed more in public than it has in Congress, and that is Soviet violations of arms control agreements, Soviet noncompliance. I know that people are well aware of the two reports that came from the administration on Soviet violations of arms control agreements.

I have written to Chairman Fascell urging that his committee or a subcommittee in the Foreign Affairs Committee hold hearings on

the potential military consequences of Soviet violations of arms control agreements and the general issue of noncompliance by the Soviet Union.

I am not sure—so far there has been a reluctance, I understand, for that committee to hold hearings on that. I would urge the chairman to hold a day of hearings on that subject.

Once again, I would like to thank the chairman for initiating this panel. I think it is going to be an excellent initiative. I know that—and Bill Dickinson, my leader, knows that I lobbied hard to get on this panel, and I did so for a reason. I look forward to the topics.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courter.

And we will certainly be doing something about those issues you raise.

Let me now turn to our witnesses and see if any of them would like to begin with an opening statement of some kind and then we can go to questions.

Dr. Brown.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the high opinion you have expressed of both of us. I hope we don't do anything to change it today.

I don't have a prepared statement, but I think it might be useful to open up with 10 minutes or so of remarks on MX, SDI, and arms control. And let me deal first very briefly with MX.

IMPORTANCE OF MX

The reasons that MX was included in the program of the past administration—and I would judge of the present administration, too—were several. First, to give the United States more of a quick, hard target destruction capability, both as a deterrent to an attack and as an incentive to the Soviets to reconsider the value of their advantage in ICBM warheads.

The number was set with the idea of giving them an incentive to move to a different kind of basing, but not to provide an overwhelming threat of the kind to fixed ICBM's that we fear that the Soviets have with their ICBM's against our ICBM's.

Related to that was the possible use of MX in arms control negotiations. And I will come back to that in a minute.

Third, to modernize one leg of the triad. That is important so as not to allow the Soviets to concentrate on making the other legs vulnerable and just forget about this one because they are able to destroy it.

And finally, to show that the United States, having said it will carry out programs, can indeed carry them out in the absence of arms control or other reasons or agreements not to.

But there are also some problems with the MX. One is that there is no solution planned now for survivability. To some extent, as the report of the Commission chaired by General Scowcroft pointed out, that defect is mitigated by the difficulty of an attacker simul-

taneously attacking the bombers and the land-based missiles. That is one point.

A second is that as Mr. Courter suggested, ballistic missile defenses surely are more useful for hard point defense than for population defense.

At the same time, without some multiple protective shelter basing scheme, those defenses may not be cost effective. There is a big advantage to a defense of having a deceptive basing scheme so that you can carry out preferential defense.

The offense then would have to shoot at empty holes which they do not know are empty, but you know are empty, so you need not bother to defend them. And because they may be defended, the offense has to shoot at them several times.

It seems to me a much better case could be made for strategic defense of hard points, therefore, if there were some sort of multiple protective shelter system. It needn't be the original one proposed by the Carter administration; there are others.

Increasing hardness to some degree reduces the required acreage for basing and also improves the effectiveness of defenses if you deploy them. Still, without a more effective basing scheme, that is a black mark against MX.

Second, the very high costs. Of course, all defense systems cost a lot. But this one, I think, clearly has a cost that particularly concerns the Congress. It competes with other things, and so forth.

And third, there really has been very little evidence of the usage of MX in the arms control setting, except the statement that greater U.S. military capabilities and new programs make the Soviets more eager to try to get us to not do them.

But there has been no specific trade offered. And in my judgment, I think the administration would be wise to offer some sort of a trade, not necessarily publical. It is not a good idea for the administration to say publically what its various positions might be under certain circumstances.

But at least some sort of discussion of principles with the Congress would be in order. For example, something along these lines. If the Soviets would reduce their quick hard target kill capability of their ICBM's to the U.S. level that would exist without the MX—and we might have to also discuss the D–5 in that connection, then the United States would forego the MX.

Now, that I think is at least a fair offer, and I think would give evidence that the Administration is serious in its argument that MX is a useful bargaining chip. The Soviets might very well not accept this, because it would require them to give up an advantage that they have now, but as I say, I think it would be a fair offer.

ADMINISTRATION'S ARM CONTROL POSTURE

Finally, there are concerns about the administration's arms control posture overall. Again, I am not talking about negotiability, which I think is a much abused term, but at least the question of apparent equity, which is a rather important political characteristic of arms control proposals.

Separately, there is the whole issue of the Strategic Defense Initiative, which I will spend 5 minutes on separately.

The past general derogation of arms control in administration statements is also a problem. I think those statements are now muted, but perhaps still display insufficient appreciation of the value of the arms control agreements that exist, and that we need to shore up. Specifically there seems to be no clear position of the administration on abiding by SALT II.

Well, where do I come out? I guess I come out that if Congress gets some sort of assurance that MX numbers could be part of a deal with the Soviets, numbers including zero, if the deal were right, and if the administration says it will observe SALT II providing that the Soviets don't completely abandon it, I still support the MX Program continuation.

How many, over what time and so forth, are very important legislative details that should depend in my judgment on future plans for MX basing, the state of arms control and so forth. But I would include two cautions.

One, this Congress should not in my judgment do anything that gives the Soviets a veto on U.S. military programs, either by their walking out of the negotiations or by their dragging out negotiations.

And second, Congress should be cautious about writing the details of test programs and development programs, simply because it is hard to do legislatively.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Let me turn to SDI now. One's view on strategic defense initiative and strategic defense in general should, I think, be based on the objectives that it could potentially serve, on the technical possibilities, on its potential costs, and also on judgments on what is possible in terms of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let me address these briefly in turn, and by so doing suggest that this is perhaps how the debate should be framed.

There are a variety of different potential objectives that have been raised. Let's look at two of them—there are actually three. I will dismiss one, not because it is not interesting or important, but it is pretty complicated.

The first is the objective of replacing the strategy of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation with the strategy of deterrence based on defense of the American people, so that the American people need not worry about a Soviet attack, because it would not cause the enormous damage that now would face us in a thermonuclear war.

That, I think, is desirable in theory. It would certainly be more comfortable if you could do it than the deterrence based on the threat of retaliation, and would avoid some of the very real ethical and moral problems posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, the strategy of deterrence by the threat of retaliation, and the lack of defenses.

But it is not realistic, given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the potential countermeasures to defenses that the Soviets could undertake. Those have been rehearsed at enormous length, and we can come back to them if you want.

That is my own judgment at least. While it is understandable to hold out dreams and hopes of such an objective, policy needs to be based on what is realistic, and I judge that it will not be feasible to replace the strategy of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation for the foreseeable future—many decades, perhaps forever—and even then only if there is an unforeseeable change in the political complexion of the world.

The second objective would be to enhance deterrence by the threat of retaliation, by ensuring the survival of the U.S. retaliatory capability in the face of a preemptive attack. This is, in a way, exactly the opposite objective. And just as I judged the first one not feasible, I judge the second one feasible. But there is a question about how desirable it is and how it compares with the alternative ways of enhancing the assurance of U.S. retaliatory capability.

Proponents of SDI have suggested that defenses would increase the uncertainty in the adversary's mind about the potential success of a nuclear attack on our retaliatory forces, specifically, ICBM's, but as Mr. Courter points out, other things too—command and control facilities, for example, have at least as great an importance in this respect.

In any event, all this is defense enhancing deterrence by improving the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.

Now, we have sought to do this in the past in other ways. I think we have succeeded by having a Triad of forces, by moving toward more survivable basing modes when costs and political constraints allowed, by seeking limits on Soviet offensive forces. And I want to emphasize that last one as being extremely important, too.

A defense that intercepts 50 percent of the incoming warheads will have roughly the same effect as, although it will be much more expensive than, an agreement to reduce the number of warheads by 50 percent on each side.

The question is whether the United States needs to deploy an ABM defense in addition to these other methods in order to assure survivability of forces, and what are the potential gains and risks in doing so.

I think we need to look at the requirements for assuring retaliatory forces in the future, not just seek more uncertainty in the calculations of an attacker as an end in itself. It may be a way to improve assurance of survivability, but it is not an end in itself.

The answer as to whether we should add ABM defense of retaliatory forces to these other ways of assuring survival depends on what the Soviets do in offensive and defensive forces, what the United States is able to do unilaterally to enhance survivability, and what the possibilities are for arms control.

Judgments are going to differ on this, and a great deal more work and calculation has to be done in order to make those judgments informed. But that is what we should ask ourselves before deciding whether to proceed with a Deployment Program to this effect.

I have left out a third objective of SDI. That is reducing damage in case deterrence fails, damage and limitation. It is complicated and we can come back to it to the degree that you are interested in it. I happen to believe that in the face of likely countermeasures, the damage limitation would probably not be very effective.

But the real question is if you concentrate too much on damage limitation, how much do you take your eye off the ball, which is assuring deterrence and keeping the chance of nuclear war as small as possible. Reducing the effects of nuclear war is not likely to be a very effective approach, and it is certainly much less important than whatever you do to do that increases or decreases the chance of a nuclear war.

Let me talk to the technical possibilities for a minute. I, myself, am prepared to judge that it is very unlikely we would be able to move to a perfect defense of populations. I think it is possible to deploy systems to protect retaliatory capability. They don't have to be that good.

If 50 percent of the retaliatory capability survives, that is a great success. If 50 percent of the population survives, that is no success at all.

In looking at the technology, you cannot just look at what the United States can do. You really have to look at the ladder of measure, countermeasure, counter-countermeasure, and so forth. You need to establish the criteria that you would want to see before judging the technical possibilities, that you want to see met.

I think Ambassador Nitze has mentioned what the right ones are. It needs to be cost effective in terms of the offense/defense race—for example, with respect to protecting retaliatory forces—and also it is very important that the defensive systems not be so vulnerable themselves that they won't survive and won't be able to do their job.

So in addition to deciding whether SDI is necessary to meet our strategic objectives, we need to establish criteria for judgments about the technical feasibility of the defenses.

We cannot say what the dollar cost can be for sure by any means. We cannot be realistic, because it depends on what the purpose is, what the new technologies are that have not begun to be developed. But you can make order of magnitude estimates. A week after the President made his speech on Strategic Defense Initiative, almost 2 years ago, I published an article in which I said this might be the first trillion dollar system, and I think that that has gained wide currency.

But it cannot be a very accurate estimate. The trillion dollars really goes with a population defense, defense of offensive forces might be ten or tens of billions of dollars.

But in any event, such expenditures have major effects on defense budgets, resources for other nuclear and conventional forces and, of course, other nondefense expenditures. And Congress inevitably has to look at those issues, too.

ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES

There are a lot of issues we need to think about which ones we have to keep in mind. First, what role can SDI play as bargaining leverage. And I would have to say that there is not much to put on the table here.

After all, the ABM Treaty bans everything except research and some kinds of development. And neither side is going to be willing to give up research and development. Partly that is because you

cannot verify it, but even if you could verify it, you need it as a hedge against breakout by the other side. You need to keep some of these options open about protecting offensive forces.

So what is this as a bargaining lever? Well, you might at most be able to get something from the Soviets for reaffirming the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and I think that is worth trying to do.

But that does not give up SDI research in its forms as permitted under the ABM Treaty, and some forms are. I would note that as a realistic outcome of arms control negotiations, if both sides remain uncertain about the future of defenses, and think that defenses may come in in a big way in the future, you cannot expect very much in the way of arms control results on offensive forces, only modest constraints along the lines of SALT II or maybe some small reductions from that.

And I hope that the administration appreciates that their objectives of major reductions simultaneously with movement to defense, or even with a phased-in move to defense later, aren't really going to be acceptable to either side. I think the United States should be and would be extremely cautious about making deep reductions of our offensive forces, of whose retaliatory capability we are now sure if we had a grave apprehension that the Soviets are going to deploy big defenses either by agreement or by breakout.

The second point. What will we need in terms of an arms control regime if we move to defenses without creating serious questions about stability and so forth? I think the answer is that a transition in that case would have to be very carefully done, and very lengthy and extensive probably or else it could be very dangerous.

All in all, arms control is going to play a critical role. If it fails, we might decide that we have to move to defenses to protect retaliatory capability. If it succeeds in getting major reductions we may not need active defenses of retaliatory capability. If we move to defenses, we will need an arms control regime to aid in the transition.

My overall conclusions. One, I hope that the administration can back off somewhat from the rhetoric and objective of changing the fundamental strategy. Second, I think we need to pursue modernization programs on offensive forces including the MX.

I think we need to continue the R&D that is permitted under the ABM Treaty. And then I think we have to decide whether to move to defenses only after looking at whether we need it for our strategic objectives, whether it is technically feasible from the cost effectiveness point of view.

And finally, I think we need to pursue arms control negotiations. My own choice would be the aim of making major reductions in offensive forces. My own judgment is to do this will require reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Brent Scowcroft.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, FORMER ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE SECURITY AFFAIRS

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and the other members for the kind remarks that you made.

It is a pleasure to be here to discuss these issues with you. Secretary Brown has made his usual thoughtful analysis of the issues, so I will be very brief and just make a couple of points.

The first point is that I would like to reaffirm broadly the conclusions that the President's Commission on Strategic Forces made on this area in the two reports that they issued. The one really new element since that report has been the emergence of strategic defense as a major issue. I think insofar as it affects the MX, as I see it, it is on the lines that if we should proceed to a hard point defense, a MX is a more cost-effective system to defend because of its value as a weapon than a smaller system would be. Otherwise, I think the conclusions that the panel reached are still broadly applicable.

Our objective is to maintain, enhance, deterrence and stability, both in the forces we procure and in our arms control negotiations. This is not simply a unilateral task. It requires strenuous interaction with the Soviet Union.

Now, the Soviets have built their force posture for reasons which they think compelling in their own right. We are not going to influence future development or the characteristics of that force posture without being prepared to offer them, in exchange, things that they consider at least of equal value if they are to modify both their force posture and their objectives.

Strategic defense has arisen again, and is, whether for good or ill, I think remains to be seen, a complicating factor in all of our calculations. I would certainly underscore what Secretary Brown said, that is each of our force elements and our arms control proposals should be measured against each other in terms of their contribution and the costs of that contribution to both deterrence and stability. And for that reason, I think we need analysis, not emotion.

I congratulate the committee on establishing this panel to do exactly that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We will have a chance for people to ask some questions.

Let me just start out and ask a few questions. I have a lot of questions, so we will go several times around. Let me start with the MX. I take it both of you, if the choice is yes or no, 21 MX's or no MX's, if that is the choice, both of you would vote yes; is that correct?

General SCOWCROFT. I would.

Dr. BROWN. I would say yes. But I think you need to get some sort of discussion and commitment from the administration that these are negotiable if the Soviets are prepared to give up something for it. Now, the Soviets may be unwilling to do so at all. But they are certainly unwilling to do so if the Congress deletes them.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned, Secretary Brown, something about the SALT II. Would you hold your vote hostage to a continuation of the SALT II to a no undercut policy?

Dr. BROWN. Well, the MX, like any weapons program, is a long program. So you don't have to hold it hostage to a lot of things all at once. You can do them sequentially.

The CHAIRMAN. So we start out and hold it hostage this time to negotiability, and next time to the SALT II extension.

Let me pursue the SALT II issue a second with you. Do both of you believe that it is a good idea for the United States to continue to a policy of saying that we will continue to observe SALT II provided the Soviet Union continues to observe—and then there are arguments about violations—but would you continue the policy beyond the 1985 original expiration date of SALT II?

OBSERVANCE OF SALT II TREATY

Dr. BROWN. I would, subject to some sort of satisfaction on adequate compliance. You know, there are questions there. But subject to that, I would say yes.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes; I would concur. And I think broadly the administration, at least up to this point, has come to acknowledge the utility of some aspects of the SALT II Treaty without regard to their rhetoric about it.

I do think there are issues that need to be discussed with the Soviets on compliance. But I think that, by and large, the treaty is useful, and in the absence of something different, which could be renewed negotiations, in a way, to incorporate the SALT II Treaty in a broader framework which might deal with compliance issues and so on, yes, I would support extending it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you make your vote, General Scowcroft, would you make a vote on the continuation of the MX or funding of the MX contingent upon an extension of SALT II?

General SCOWCROFT. I think it would be useful to find out what the administration has in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know, the administration is being crosspressured on this issue. There are several people over on the right wing who are pushing it, in fact, the other way, and would like, in fact, and maybe are asking for their vote for MX, that the administration pledge not to continue SALT II. So it is going to be a rather hot issue.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a little bit about MX as a bargaining chip, and before my time runs out, and I would like to come back to it.

One possibility is that, of course, MX has been a bargaining chip in connection with the Scowcroft Commission Report. Now that SDI has come along, and you have got a defensive system, possibility of defending missiles, one possibility, of course, is to use that as the main bargaining chip with the Soviet Union.

In other words, make some kind of a proposal which says that it is our intention to make sure that we have a survivable land-based missile force and with our SDI Program we can do that either with defensive missiles or through an agreement.

And if you were willing to restructure your forces in such a way that—Minuteman is survivable—we would then be willing to forego our defenses. And in that regard it is argued that SDI is a better bargaining chip than MX, which as a bargaining chip just threatened, in effect, to put the Soviet forces, or at least some of the Soviet forces at risk the way our forces were at risk.

Would you comment on this idea that maybe we don't need MX as a bargaining chip now? We ought to use the bargaining chip of the SDI. And it is put forward, I would say, by people who are worried that the administration won't use the SDI as a bargaining chip, and that the argument is if we take away MX, they will be forced to use SDI as a bargaining chip, whereas if you continue MX, they won't be forced to.

MX AS A BARGAINING CHIP

General SCOWCROFT. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we will never be in a position where we have an embarrassment of riches in bargaining with the Soviet Union. That would be my first remark.

I think we have to look at all of our forces. The bargaining chip phrase bothers me. I don't think we build or should build any forces for the purpose of trading wampum or what have you.

We build them to fulfill certain national security needs that we perceive. Now, if we can achieve those needs a different way through arms control by giving them up—then everything in that sense is a bargaining chip.

I do not myself see the MX and SDI as competitive in the sense of bargaining chips. The timeframe is very, very different. I think the Soviets, while in the broad sense, may actually be more worried about SDI, MX is a program that they can now see the dimensions of.

There are tests that have been highly successful, and this is something that they can actually do something about. As Secretary Brown said, SDI is fairly amorphous at this point anyway, and exactly what you would agree to do or not to do is not so clear.

So I don't see them as competitive at all.

Dr. BROWN. I would agree with that. I think that on SDI, we are not going to and shouldn't give up the research and development. Deployment, even deployment of a defense of our retaliatory forces, is so far away, and, of course, any substantial deployment would be contrary to the ABM Treaty. Therefore the Soviets don't feel under that kind of pressure from it.

Whereas the MX, if deployed, would begin to pose the same kind of threat to some of their forces as we already feel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My time is up. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before Easter both Houses—it is my understanding—will be called on to vote whether or not to give the money for the 21 additional MX missiles.

The 12th of March, as I understand, is the first date set for the arms talk negotiations in Geneva. So these two dates have a relationship to each other.

Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned—you stated your opinion on this earlier, but just by way of underscoring, let me ask you what

is perhaps a simplistic question. Do you both agree that if the Congress, by voting down the MX issue, and taking away this option from the United States, that this would do irreparable harm, if not wreck, the negotiations talks about to begin in Geneva? What effect do you predict this would have?

Dr. BROWN. Irreparable harm is a stronger phrase than I would use. I think it would make it more difficult for the United States to bargain about restraints on offensive forces.

General SCOWCROFT. I would maybe be a little stronger than that. It seems to me that one of the things it would demonstrate to the Soviet Union is that there are substantial advantages in talking but not doing anything at Geneva—to wait to see what else we may do to ourselves that they would not have to pay a price for.

If you turn the question around a little, Mr. Dickinson, and say what are the Soviets in this for now, and I think it is a hard question to answer. They have come off a period of—maybe not unparallelled, but substantial antagonism. The last year has been really a very tough one.

From the Soviet standpoint they have been extremely negative. Now, what are they coming back for? Are they coming back because they really want to do something or are they coming back because they think their antagonistic policy has failed and they want to smile and still try to separate the Europeans from the Americans and the American people from the administration and so on.

I don't think that is clear. And I would say one of the ways that we could make it clear that they cannot succeed if, in fact, they want to use SDI or anything else just to make trouble, a ringing affirmation of the MX by the Congress could demonstrate to them that those kinds of games, if that, in fact, is their objective, are not going to work.

Mr. DICKINSON. One other question.

Mr. Secretary, I believe that you were in the previous administration in a different capacity when the doctrine of MAD, mutual assured destruction, was enunciated. I am not sure about the time there, but I think it was when Mr. McNamara was Secretary of Defense.

We have come along way now. The capability or the philosophy of a defense was at one point considered destabilizing—if we went all out to build a defense, and we are going to have mutual assured destruction to make it so costly that no one would attack us.

Now, this administration has come full circle, it would seem. I wonder what both of your thinking is. Is it, in fact, destabilizing now or is it not destabilizing now where it was considered to be destabilizing before, and has technology come to the point where it is doable, and we could not do it before?

Could you give us a little discussion as to before and now?

POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Dr. BROWN. In the first place, Mr. Dickinson, the doctrine that the United States would deter a nuclear attack on itself by the threat of retaliation didn't begin in 1961. It goes all the way back at least to President Eisenhower.

As has always been the case, it is not necessarily retaliation on cities and on industry. It could be retaliation on military forces. But I think most of us who have looked at this believe that that would inevitably—or at least very probably—either by collateral damage or by escalation into city attacks, produce mutual destruction. And that, I think, has been the strategy, and it remains the strategy now, whatever the hopes and dreams of the future may be.

Now, the question is, is it possible to change that strategy? The administration, I think, has made a serious intellectual effort to devise phased steps that could lead to a situation in which you would not be depending upon the threat of retaliation anymore.

You would rest on the assurance that nothing could get through to damage your cities or, in a very different way that nothing could damage your military forces. And I say very different, because it produces the opposite strategy. That is still a strategy of deterrence by the threat of retaliation.

I have seen nothing that convinces me that the technology exists or is in sight that would allow a strategy abandoning the threat of retaliation as a way of deterring a nuclear attack. Now, it is certainly true that if you reduce the number of nuclear weapons to a small enough number by an agreement and you believe in verification and don't worry very much about breakout, that defense then becomes more feasible—less through new technology, then through a constraint of one side of the defense/offense balance.

I believe that is the way the administration is thinking of some ultimate achievement of a change in strategy. But that, as I say, is not principally a change in technology.

I don't think the situation has substantially changed with respect to defending populations. It is possible to conceive of circumstances where existing or new technology could handle a very small number of nuclear weapons that had been reduced to that number by an agreement.

But I don't believe that is useful in policy decisions in the near term, however useful it may be or however inspiring it may be as an ultimate dream.

General SCOWCROFT. I think it is hard to generalize about strategic defense, as to whether or not it is stabilizing or destabilizing, because there are a number of different kinds of strategic defense one can envision, and I can think of at least five variations on SDI.

I think that it depends on what it is you do and how you do it. If you go back to the ABM Treaty and the discussions about stability and instability there, the basic argument was that, especially in terms of population defense, however effective any defense is, it is bound to be more effective if it is accompanied by a first strike which would greatly reduce the size of any retaliation, and, therefore, it is an inducement to a first strike.

I think those are the traditional destabilizing arguments about the deployment of strategic defense. But that applies only to a particular defense, and I would not want to be categoric about it at all.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I find the testimony here this morning just tremendously interesting. Like you, I value

the judgment of the two witnesses here at the witness table this morning.

Mr. Chairman, you talked about the possibility of laying on the table the MX issue, in view of the tremendous cost. You said the Soviets might not accept it, but at least it ought to be discussed with them as a possibility.

This seems such an elementary question. It would seem it had already been put on the table. Has that never been discussed in prior talks with our adversaries?

Dr. BROWN. I am not privy to the details of what our negotiators have discussed with the Soviets. I have seen what our proposals have been and the ones that I have seen have left the nature of the U.S. force structure within numerical limits up to the United States, so that they don't include giving up the MX. Now, it is also true that the restructuring of the Soviet forces put forth in the U.S. proposals do not in every case specifically say you have to give up all the SS–18's and so forth, but if you look at the numbers, they turn out to have that sort of effect on the Soviet forces. Therefore, the proposals so far have struck me as being more restructuring of the Soviet forces than a limitation on U.S. plans. The answer that the administration could well give to that is: The reason for that is that the Soviets are the ones who have built up these large forces of land-based missiles which are the most dangerous.

Be that as it may, I don't think that a specific proposal along the lines of the general statement I suggested has been made to the Soviets.

Mr. NICHOLS. My other question, General Scowcroft, and Mr. Secretary, involves the SDI Program. All of us, of course, were present when the President first addressed the Congress on this and said wouldn't this be a great idea, if we could embark on this program here. In both your testimonies, I sense somewhat of a lukewarmness, certainly apprehension about the SDI based on what I believe to be cost and timeframe that could be involved, and technology and so forth.

Now, we authorized some $1.4 billion in 1985 fiscal year. The Department is asking $3.7 billion in 1986. I would like to ask both of you gentlemen if you were in our shoes up here, knowing the constraints on military spending that we are going to face this year, strong supporters of the MX system that you are, how would you vote on this appropriation? Is that a fair question?

Mr. BROWN. It is a fair question. It is one of the things that makes me pleased I am not a Member of Congress, to have to face such issues with a vote.

Mr. NICHOLS. That is just one of the things that makes you glad, isn't it?

Mr. BROWN. One—just one. I think that the effectiveness, the stability, the vulnerability of all these forces that would be involved in a SDI deployment depends a great deal on what the other side does, and, therefore, it is connected with arms control.

That is one reason, I think, for going very cautiously. We need to see what the effect of arms control is on all these things. We need to see what the likely outcome of Soviet force posture is.

We need to look much more carefully at what the Soviets can do to undercut such a system, which you would expect them to do.

Now, that said, the appropriations requested are only for a research and development program. The administration is not now proposing deployment of anything.

I must say that going from a $1.4 billion to a $3.7 billion R&D program in 1 year strikes me as a recipe for very rapid progress in an unclear direction. And so I would, if I were you, scan that line item breakout, line item by line item, and try to find out just what objective each of these contributes to, and then I guess I would be really rather parsimonious. I would not start out with the view that because this is a noble goal a progress from 1.4 to 3.7 to 4.9 for a total of $30-odd billion is justified.

I would look at it very carefully. And I would be surprised if I would approve all of it.

General SCOWCROFT. I would be a little more positive. Whether or not that kind of acceleration in 1 year can efficiently be accommodated, I would refer both to Secretary Brown and to technical administration witnesses. I think there are a couple of reasons why we need to proceed vigorously.

First of all, one of the national effects of the ABM Treaty was for the United States essentially to give up on strategic defense for around a decade, understandably so it got very, very low funding. Most of the good people left the field because there wasn't any challenge there.

The Soviets, on the contrary, have proceeded very vigorously. I have no idea how much money they have put into it, but it is a very, very vigorous program. We need a defensive research program—whatever we decide to do with deployment itself.

There are a number of unanswered questions about what, if any, kind of strategic defense makes sense. I do believe that one of the ways that we can narrow the range of possibilities is to have as vigorous a research program as one can usefully accommodate within the Pentagon's procedures.

I think it is very important. It is not going to go away. It involves very large issues, like, for example, questions about the whole future of deterrence. So I think it is very important, and, therefore, I would be inclined to support it at this point.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one quick follow up to that, because I think Bill has hit on a very important point here. You would slow it up only to the extent that the money could not be spent effectively.

Harold Brown, you are suggesting that maybe you ought to cut it in a slightly different way. What philosophy would you use to cut it? Would you, for example, slow up the population defense research and go a little faster with the missile defense research?

Dr. BROWN. I would lean toward funding the research on ground-based systems and the defense of retaliatory capability somewhat more heavily, and until some of these other questions were answered, I would go more cautiously on the space-based boost phase and those parts of the program.

I would not cut them out. I think that they are the most far reaching. I think they are also the most unlikely to work, and, therefore, I would not fund them fully until I was more satisfied with the answers to some of these questions than I am now.

So I would impose that as an additional screen on top of the one of how fast can you usefully spend the money from a technical sense.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

I guess this is a basic question to both of you, if you can answer it fairly shortly, because I have a couple of other questions.

If the strategic defense initiative, after a 4- or 5-year period of research and development proved to your satisfaction—this is a hypothetical—proved to your satisfaction that it was, in fact, survivable, cost-effective, accomplished its stated goals, would, therefore, the changing of the doctrine be receptive to you?

Dr. BROWN. If it met all those criteria—in the face of Soviet countermeasures—then I think it would be sensible to go ahead with. It would have to meet those criteria—stability, arms control, and all the other things. But under those circumstances I think you could make a very good argument for going ahead.

General SCOWCROFT. The ABM Treaty is not the Holy Grail. It served a very useful purpose when it was agreed to. But if there are better ways now to secure the peace and U.S. national security, then we should adopt them.

If, in fact, SDI could do that, we should be receptive.

Dr. BROWN. You must see I have considerable reservation about the criteria.

Mr. COURTER. I wanted to know whether you had some doctrinary concern about the idea. Yours is basically a pragmatic one. If it can accomplish the stated goals from a scientific and practical standpoint, you are in favor of it?

Dr. BROWN. Military and national security standpoint.

Mr. COURTER. Correct me if I am wrong. The concept of mutually assured destruction was based on a number of things, two of which were the premise that our population centers and civilian targets would be at risk, and that our retaliatory forces would be secure.

That is, each side would keep a retaliatory force that was not threatened by first strike. That was the case in 1970's—early 1960's, 1950's. And I guess that concept was ratified or codified in the ABM Treaty.

It is my understanding that those two assumptions, one of those two assumptions has changed because of Soviet advancement in accuracy and in yield with regard to their land-based leg of their triad, and, therefore, they have put at risk our land-based retaliatory force, and, therefore, the assumptions that led to the conclusion that mutually assured destruction was logical are no longer the case. Am I wrong in that?

Dr. BROWN. I would come to a different conclusion, Mr. Courter, because I don't believe that it was ever the requirement that each leg of the Triad be able to survive and inflict unacceptable damage by itself. And I would say that when you look at all of the U.S. strategic forces that they can survive and retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage.

That hasn't changed. There are some future risks, and there are some trends that need to be worried about. But Minuteman is not the total U.S. strategic force, and the vulnerability of Minuteman

does not mean the vulnerability of U.S. national security all by itself.

General SCOWCROFT. I would go at it somewhat differently. I am uneasy with mutual assured destruction as a targeting philosophy that could well be the result of any exchange with the Soviet Union.

I think it not necessary the case, and I applaud developments, starting from NSDM 242, going into PD59. And I do not believe in assured destruction targeting.

I believe that we should use our forces, if we should have to use them, against the opposing military forces, command structure and so on, not simply to destroy cities.

Therefore, that puts a different perspective on the security of the ICBM force. If all you are after is to destroy x percent of the population and x amount of the floor space, you have a different view of how much you need in the different legs of the Triad.

So I would answer it differently.

Mr. BROWN. I would say that, indeed, the U.S. targeting doctrine has always been to target primarily opposing military forces, and that land-based missiles have a special capability there. How unique it is is a matter of argument.

But they do have a special capability there. And that hasn't changed. That has been the case again since the early 1950's.

Quite aside from that, however, I think one has to recognize that whoever is losing such a contest is going to be very strongly motivated to begin threatening populations and urban industrial facilities directly. And that is why I have always considered that it was unlikely that a nuclear war would be confined to counter force targeting—quite aside from the collateral damage—that attacks on military targets, particularly command control targets which are generally located in cities, would cause to populations.

General SCOWCROFT. I am not prepared to accept that that is necessarily true. But that is a different argument.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We have got a vote on. There is also a picture. If people don't want to bother with the picture, we will come right back.

We will be right back.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my thoughts to the comments already made this morning regarding the worthiness of your testimony. We always do enjoy both of you gentlemen.

It is amazing, as private citizens, how the answers grew sometimes shorter and more direct than they were when you were Government witnesses. It is less of an encumbrance of having to give the administration line or whatever it is we in Government sometimes have to put up with.

But I appreciate your candidness and most importantly your expertise and knowledge. We really do owe both of you men a great deal for the service that you provide for our country.

Secretary Brown, first of all, I have read the recent article that you wrote on the SDI. You make some very interesting points. I share many of your concerns.

What I would like to do today, even though we don't have a lot of time, is raise a couple of points and maybe you can amplify—you have answered some of them already.

First of all, I would have to agree totally that the purpose of this panel—if the chairman would permit, I think I was the one who recommended it first in a paper to the chairman sometime ago—that the idea was to look at the broad picture, and look at the scope and the direction, and what is the objective of our policy vis-a-vis national security as opposed to the green eyeshade game we sometimes play up here on Capitol Hill—I will trade you one MX for one B-1, or a farm bill for a housing bill, or something of that nature.

And that we need to look at the overall policy. And I would endorse the statement made earlier that we need more analysis and less emotion. If you have read the book "March of Folly," or a number of books like that, sometimes people don't want to have facts confuse their ideology. And I think that is what we need to be concerned about today. That is both sides, the left and the right, and most of us generally fall toward the middle.

First of all, as far as a question, Secretary Brown and General Scowcroft, my impression from the hearings that we have had and some of the committee work I am involved in on SDI is that it appears that technology again is driving the debate. That our recent advances in technology have re-awakened this potential giant, and that it appears—and you have been in this service far longer than I have—that this is merely an old theme or argument packaged in a new way, and that perhaps those advocating today are better marketers than some have been in the past.

And if you disagree with that statement, I would certainly like to have your comments.

Second, that most of us have supported the research and development and will continue to do so. But the statements you made earlier, Secretary Brown, about starting with some realistic defense of retaliatory forces versus strategic offensive forces may be the most realistic approach.

But isn't that going back to the old ABM, and isn't that again recycling this argument?

Second, on the MX, General Snowcroft, I think, kept the MX Program alive with your commission report, because I think you went a step further than required by looking at the total doctrine questions. I think you put the issue of survivability to bed, or the vulnerability, the window of vulnerability everyone was talking about in the early eighties that we are no longer debating.

My feeling today on the MX is that we jump from 200 missiles at one point—dropped to 100 missiles, and now there is some question whether even 100 is sacrosanct.

What is wrong with the possibility on a MX—I don't know of anyone—there are a few that have been fighting it for some time—that really just want to kill the system right now, with the arms control process that we have.

I have supported the MX in the past, but I have no love for the system and I think there are a lot of those in my position. What is wrong with the possibility of unfencing the 21 missiles that are

currently in the budget, go with production there, but to look at some limited number in the future.

They have programmed 123 missiles as spares, tests, et cetera, et cetera. So we are not talking about a hundred missiles, we are talking about 223 missiles. What about the possibility of going with a number such as 50 or 75?

Is a hundred a perfect number? And what was the basis for that number?

So those are some broad points that I wanted to raise and maybe get those out before—and let you answer on your own.

One last point. Let me raise this.

I have been involved in some negotiations at State level and other issues. It appears to me that the only way the Soviets are going to negotiate is if they have something in their interest, if it is in their interest, or they are threatened.

A lot of people say—MX opponents say the MX doesn't scare the Soviets, that they don't have anything to gain by that.

General Scowcroft, what in your opinion do the Soviets have to gain today by going to the table and honestly negotiating? If you could frame for us, and I know Secretary Brown will comment also, what both sides have really to gain.

And don't just say stop the threat of holocaust. From a specific standpoint, what do both sides have to gain today from realistic arms control negotiations?

That is a whole menu. But take them as you may.

SOVIET AIM IN ARMS CONTROL

General SCOWCROFT. I would say broadly, the Soviet objective in arms control is principally to keep some kind of control over what they fear most in the United States, and that is our technological and productive capability.

And that arms control they use as a kind of Governor, because I think the one thing they are quite conscious of—they could not do—is compete in a full blown arms race with the United States, and they don't want to.

So they try both to protect their own programs, but basically to control what the United States might do if it were really aroused.

There isn't anything magic about the numbers of MX, but I think what the MX does that the Soviets worry about, and that nothing else does at the present time, is to put in jeopardy the forces that they have—their star forces that they have invested the most in.

It makes their SS–18's and 19's wasting assets. That is the only way we can do that now and for some time in the future. That is expensive for them.

They have to either then move out of those silos, which they eventually will do, but it makes it much more urgent, or they have to be prepared to pay an equivalent price or some price still to be determined in order to avoid that and to be able to keep some, so that they can transition on a more gradual basis.

The hundred is somewhere in between what would constitute a first strike, and people can differ on that, but it is probably upwards of 200, and a number which is really an expression of impo-

tence or irresolution rather than a militarily useful force that the Soviets have to take seriously.

Mr. MCCURDY. Part of that question I asked on the numbers was the 123 they have programmed as spares and tests, they have had incredible test results. I mean far better than I think they even envisioned.

Do we need to program 123 missiles for the life of the system to keep this thing going?

General SCOWCROFT. I will defer to the former Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, for that. What I would say is we need the normal component of spares and tests and what have you. Whether 123 extras are the right number, I don't know.

HOW MANY MISSILES ARE NEEDED?

Dr. BROWN. One thing you have to remember is that the number of tests is independent of the deployed force. The number of tests both for development, which, as you say, has gone quite well, and for operational testing over a period of 20 years, is not going to depend very much on whether you deploy 100 or 200 or 400.

You need the same numbers of test vehicles. And whether that is 123, I don't know. But I would not at all be surprised to know that the number would be 123 for 100-deployed force, 123 for a 200-deployed force, and 123 for a 250-deployed force.

So I think you ought to look at the number, but you should not be surprised that it doesn't depend very much on the size of the deployed force.

I think General Scowcroft has very clearly expressed what sort of lever the MX might be on the Soviets, who I think are looking to arms control for predictability, particularly on numbers and new systems from the United States, and stability is another way of saying that.

They don't want surprises. They like to be able to plan ahead. Then, of course, both sides want equality, but they define that rather differently.

What the Soviets may mean by equality may not be what we mean by equality.

On technology and the SDI, I think technology should be a factor. We need to look at new technology, but we shouldn't be driven by it. We should look at the policy issues and our objectives.

That is why I think we need to decide what we want to be able to do if we were to deploy a defensive system. That will depend on what it can do. It will depend even more on what the Soviets are able to do.

Our improved discrimination capability and improved data handling capability are reasons to look at these things again but not necessarily reasons to change our conclusions about them.

And the same goes for space-based components of the SDI. We shouldn't think that they are important parts that should be included simply because we have got new technology.

The CHAIRMAN. Nick Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me also thank both gentlemen for testifying this morning. It has been a very good meeting up to this point, and I hope we can continue.

I think up to Nick Mavroules, I think you have been singing to the choir.

Relative to the MX missile, let me see if I can turn it around a little bit and see if I can get some more meaningful exchange.

Secretary Brown, I remember when you were testifying before this committee under President Carter, you referred to the vulnerability factor of the Minuteman III. Today we admit we are going to put the MX missiles back into those silos.

The question I ask is has anything changed with regard to the vulnerability factor in putting the MX missile into the same silos we have with the Minuteman III, even if we have hardened to a small extent to improve survivability.

Let me just get a couple out, then we can probably exchange some views.

I appreciate very much your restrained responses to what it would do to negotiations, because others would have us believe that we are totally impotent and without the MX missile we are not going to have any success in Geneva, which I think is absolutely absurd.

How can we compare—let me go back to, I believe, 1977. We were in SALT II negotiations and we canceled the B–1 bomber. Did that deter agreement with the Soviet Union on the SALT II agreement? And how does that compare today with the Soviet Union on the MX missile?

We are talking also about a missile, 223 of them, that will cost about $17 billion, maybe $20 billion. We have not even talked about hardening.

Will it be another $20 billion? Would it be $40 billion maybe? We have not even talked about that.

Those are the questions I think that must be answered before we can make a meaningful voting issue, Mr. Chairman.

There are an awful lot of questions that have not been answered. I just wonder if we can respond.

Maybe we will have a second time around.

VULNERABILITY OF MX

Dr. BROWN. Mr. Mavroules, I believe I mentioned myself most of the points that you did in my opening remarks. I think that the vulnerability issue has not been adequately addressed by the administration.

At the same time one has to admit that the MX serves a purpose even if it is vulnerable, just as the Soviet SS–18s serve—although they too are already somewhat to Minuteman III—and would be more so to a MX.

I think that it would be very desirable to move towards a more survivable basing system. I think the hardening helps, but not very much. The big advantage of hardening, I believe, is that it allows you, depending on how hard you can get, to reduce the size of the real estate especially in a multiple shelter mode and thereby the political problem that go with it.

With respect to negotiations, it is indeed true that an agreement was obtained—although the B–1 was canceled. I happen to feel strongly that was a correct decision. It is hard to argue either way on the issue of whether the United States might have gotten a better agreement, more favorable to us, if the B–1 had not been canceled. I doubt it, but I think one can make an argument for it. I did mention the costs for the MX, which I think are very substantial, though not out of line with the costs of any other retaliatory or strategic system.

If you made the MX less vulnerable, as you could by a multiple protective shelter system or multiple silo system, it probably would cost about the same as the Trident D–5 per warhead.

So there are arguments on both sides. You have to make your own judgment. I don't think the arguments on either side are enormously overwhelming. But I come out where I come out.

General SCOWCROFT. I think, Mr. Mavroules, what I would say is that we did recognize the vulnerability aspect of the MX and we decided at that time, and I think it is still valid, that given the circumstance that we were in, we had to divide the problem into two parts.

And that being the MX for the near term and the small missile for the long term. They are integrated in this sense. That is if the Soviets are relatively unrestricted in the force that they can use against the small missile, it could require a deployment in order to provide that survivability which we would find very onerous, both in terms of cost and real estate required.

And one of the purposes for the MX was hopefully to come to some arms control—you can always get an a agreement with the Soviet Union. The question is what are they prepared to do. What are they prepared to give up. And whatever else you think about them, they are not philanthropists, and they are only going to give up things if they don't get what they consider to be equal in value.

That would be one of the reasons for the MX. In a sense, if you will, to make the small missile a reasonable deployment.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman.

General, the point I am trying to make is that we are talking about hardening. We do not have a system in place. We don't know what the costs are.

Will that be vulnerable? We don't know that. What is the total cost of this system, the program?

Or maybe we could better utilize these funds in another area perhaps. Have we given thought to that?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General SCOWCROFT. I would echo Secretary Brown's comments about hardening. I would not invest a great deal in hardening fixed silos for the MX. In the race between accuracy and hardening, eventually hardening has to lose. I think the MX serves a number of purposes which Secretary Brown pointed out. And I think the deployment that is planned is a sensible deployment at the present time, and I frankly would look skeptically at additional funding for hardening which might be fairly marginal in terms of solving the problem which you rightly address.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to follow up just a second, before we go on—just on the point Nick Mavroules is raising about the bargaining chip aspects of the MX. In one sense the argument about whether we should unfence the money in March, a couple of things. One is, the greatest progress this administration has made in terms of arms control has, of course, occurred during the 6 months that the money was fenced off.

Is that not an argument for continuing the fencing or doesn't it matter to the Soviets that—what the MX is about?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, Mr. Chairman, your definition of progress is different from mine. I don't really think we have made much progress. I think what has happened is that the Soviets have seen the bankruptcy of the strategy they followed. They walked out of negotiations still with the goal in mind of reversing or preventing U.S. INF deployment. They thought by walking out they could scare the Europeans to death, scare part of the American people and we would back down.

It didn't work. Deployment went ahead, the steam went out of the peace movement, and they found themselves sitting on a failure, and they shouting and rocking the cage and being belligerent.

It was bringing the Alliance together and not dividing it. I think they are back to the table because their strategy failed and they are taking a different tack.

Dr. BROWN. I would agree with that judgment. I think it is a mistake to think of a single congressional vote as affecting the Soviets enormously in either direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Then let me.

Dr. BROWN. There are other factors.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you the obverse of the question.

What does it do to the negotiating milieu, and negotiating incentive, if we approved the whole Reagan Administration Program?

Suppose we go ahead and vote 21 missiles and another 48 in May. That is 69 missiles. That is a pretty good chunk of the program.

What signals are we sending? They come back to the bargaining table and we hit them with a big bunch of missiles.

Do you think that has any effect?

Dr. BROWN. As I indicated earlier, you get more cracks at this program. You have not only the 21; you have the 48.

And the other thing to remember is that the money doesn't get spent out for quite a long time. And therefore, an agreement, at least in principle, is possible that prevents them from being deployed.

General SCOWCROFT. I think what you get is what I indicated before, and that is, if one of the Soviet goals is to play around in U.S. domestic politics or NATO alliance politics, what you do is demonstrate right off the bat that that is a losing game and that they are going to have to have a different strategy. They are going to have to do things differently.

Dr. BROWN. A way to put it, Mr. Chairman, is that the Congress can affect the administration to some degree by negotiating on these matters.

I think the chance that the Congress can affect the Soviets substantially is pretty small.

The CHAIRMAN. One final question on this.

One of the things I have always been concerned about, about the MX and bargaining chip, is that none of the delegations that come back from talking to the Soviets ever mention the MX.

I mean, they come back saying that the Soviets are all talking about the Pershing II's, ATB, SDI. I should never talk to anybody coming and they come back talking about the MX.

Is that disinformation on the Soviets' part or an indication that it is not a bargaining chip, or that they should have accommodated whatever we are going to do in the MX in their mind?

How do you attribute that?

Dr. BROWN. I think it is a combination. I have not thought carefully about this. But I think it is a combination of two factors. They are already expecting some deployment, which is part of the reason I think that they are moving toward mobile missiles to some degree. And it is partly because they don't want to be asked to pay too big a price for a cessation of the MX program.

General SCOWCROFT. I think that is true. I don't think the MX scares them in a certain way. It is a predictable kind of missile. They will know how to respond to it. It doesn't scare them like cruise missiles do. They don't have a handle on cruise missiles.

In a sense, it doesn't scare them the way the D-5 scares them. Those are unknown. This is a known system.

But in terms of bargaining chips, if we go to them and say, "OK. We really need you to reduce your big, heavy missiles." And they will say, "OK. For what?"

And then you get to a tough question. And there the MX is important to them, because then it relieves some of the pressure on their redeploying, if you will, to mobile systems or something which would avoid targeting the silos.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, one last followup, and I will give whatever time I have to whoever wants it later. But this is a very meaningful exchange here.

I just want to go back to why we are here today.

Back during the Carter administration, I think Dr. Brown at that time was recommending a racetrack version. I stand to be corrected. Or at least some form of it, which I felt was pretty good.

Dr. BROWN. The Congress approved it, you may recall.

Mr. MAVROULES. That is right. Then it became a political issue in 1980.

The CHAIRMAN. We just didn't vote against it.

Mr. MAVROULES. The President ran against it, and therefore, that system went out the door.

We keep getting other testimony from people within the administration—I am not pointing to the President, but they are the ones testifying—and from our negotiators, and this is most damaging, who stated, "I need that for a bargaining chip. I know it. I need the MX missile for a bargaining chip."

On the other hand, that entire tune has been turned around now. They don't want the MX missile. It is not a bargaining chip—in the words of Secretary Weinberger, Mr. Shultz, and others who have testified before this committee.

The inconsistencies related to the MX missile really, I think, have added to the problem of the MX missile. If it were a new ver-

sion of the Minuteman III, perhaps, maybe Minuteman IV, maybe today we would not be sitting here talking about the MX missile.

Dr. BROWN. If it had been called Minuteman IV, we might not be sitting here worrying about it.

General SCOWCROFT. And if we could start over again, I don't think any of us would want to end up where we are.

I supported the race track deployment. I think it was not a classic solution, but a manageable solution to the problem.

I think one of the problems of people not saying publicly the MX is a bargaining chip is that if in fact you tell the Soviets it is a bargaining chip, the value of the chip goes down substantially.

Unless Cap Weinberger says, "I have to have that thing, it is the cornerstone of my national security," then you are not going to get as much for it.

Mr. MAVROULES. Our negotiators stated it was a bargaining chip. We did not.

Dr. BROWN. Negotiators of course take a somewhat different view from Secretaries of Defense.

I think that it could well be that if you spoke to administration policymakers and put the question to them another way, you might get a more forthcoming response, at least in private.

Suppose you put it to them as General Scowcroft did. If you could achieve the goal, in terms of United States-Soviet force balance that you seek through MX deployment by instead of having an agreement that didn't eliminate MX and canceled a lot of existing Soviet forces, would you do it? You might then get a different answer.

But that is not precisely the same thing as saying that it is a bargaining chip.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If we don't adopt a policy of first strike, and if we indeed don't have enough MXs deployed to constitute a first strike force, how do we put at risk the SS–18's and 19's?

FIRST-STRIKE POLICY

Dr. BROWN. You don't have to put at risk the entire force in order to have some sort of effect on Soviet military planning.

It is a continuum. It is not a sharp discontinuity.

And that is why I would say that you don't need a full coverage of two warheads on every Soviet aim point in order to get their attention.

You also, of course, have the fact that if you have a production line in being, they would have to worry in case of an abrogation of SALT II or breakout or whatever, or an all-out competition, that you would just keep going and get to the point where you did have that capability.

General SCOWCROFT. I think on a first-strike aspect, Mr. Spratt, it is true we do not have a first-strike policy. Any scenario for nuclear war is unlikely—a first-strike bolt out of the blue of either side is the less likely scenario.

And what the Soviets have to calculate is in any more normal approach to a crisis, that those forces are in fact there; they have to take account of them; they have to calculate on all the alternatives open to the United States.

It does have an effect on their planning and what they are willing to do to defend.

Mr. SPRATT. There was an ambiguity in the Scowcroft report, or several, and one was whether or not the MX was a bridge to the time when the Midgetman and the D–5 would be operational.

If the D–5 and the Midgetman were operational today or in the very near future, would we need the MX still as a component of our strategic forces?

MIDGETMAN

General SCOWCROFT. I am not sure I can see that clearly at the present time. It could depend on a number of factors: How many Midgetmen we deployed, to what extent we really want to rely on the D–5 as our primary responsive force, rather than the submarines as they are the sort of last step.

Because if you are relying on them as the hard target force, for example, you need a kind of command and control, including two-way communications that we might be reluctant to do with the submarines.

So there are a number of questions relating to this, especially integrating the D–5 into the force posture, that I think require more thought than we have given so far.

Dr. BROWN. There are different kinds of questions on both other systems. With respect to Midgetman, the question would be, what will the size of the Soviet forces be; how will we be able to deploy the Midgetman, and so forth.

If you look at the 10,000 square miles or so that might be available to military bases and take some expected degree of hardening on a mobile Midgetman, you find that something like 3,000 1-megaton warheads will destroy it.

If you have an arms control regime that makes 3,000 1-megaton warheads a large part of the Soviet force, that is pretty good for Midgetman. It serves a substantial purpose. If you get into a situation where there are 15,000, you may want something besides Midgetman.

The D–5 question is really one of the balance between land-based ICBM's and SLBM's. If one thinks out into the late 1990's, and we have to do that, you have to ask about improved antisubmarine warfare, and whether that would put at risk the submarines, which in my judgment are not at all at risk now and won't be for at least another decade. You have to ask about the accuracy of the D–5 as a hard target-weapon and command, control, and communications.

So none of these quite serves exactly the same purpose. That doesn't mean you need everything. But it does mean none of them is a simple substitute for all the rest.

Mr. SPRATT. I thought I heard you say a minute ago that the MX was our lever to induce the Soviets to develop their own mobile forces and without it, we wouldn't have that leverage.

Dr. BROWN. It certainly is a factor. That is one of its characteristics.

The Midgetman certainly does not do that. The D–5 may at some point have the accuracy to do it, but it is not clear that it could be integrated into the force in a way that would do it for the reasons that General Scowcroft said.

General SCOWCROFT. Moving the SS–18, for example, out of the silos means probably the SS–18 has to go. It is an enormous beast and to try to make something that large mobile, it would be very difficult.

So they would have to change the characteristics of their force, making perhaps more likely that a smaller force on our side would be adequate.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Gentlemen, glad to have you this morning. I apologize for being late.

It is my understanding that the Midgetman mobile missile is not going to be traveling by itself. It will probably be traveling with a whole battery of computers and trucks and things to make it work, is that correct, if it moves around?

Dr. BROWN. The designs that I have seen don't require an enormous battery of things with it.

You would have to have some sorts of things in addition in the truck. But I think it could be one or at most two trucks.

Mr. RAY. I know the weapons we have right now, including the cruise missiles, don't operate without a lot of people and equipment.

Dr. BROWN. Midgetman is far enough in the future that at least the design is expressed as being less simple.

Mr. RAY. So we have a lot of guess work.

Dr. BROWN. For any system that won't come into being until the 1990's, that is right.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. I apologize for being in and out. I have another committee meeting as well.

I have a question for each of you. If we have time, other questions.

Mr. Secretary, let me ask you to take a long-range view. I am concerned, as all of us are, about where in the world we are going in the arms race, what will there be to moderate the Soviet Union in this arms race.

You have been quoted as saying when we build, they build; when we don't build, they build. Where are we going?

For you, General, I would put the question regarding arms violations. What do we do in the event of arms violations?

There has been a recent book by a gentleman by the name of Shevchenko, who I am sure you are familiar with, who revealed that the Soviet minister of defense, after our agreement not to produce biological warfare weaponry, told his people as well as all of the leaders to continue to produce it.

What do we do about violations, whether it be minor or large?

Recently the administration has come forth with some disclosures of violations. What do we do? Do we say shame on you? Where do we go from there?

Mr. Secretary, would you answer your question first, please?

ARMS VIOLATION

Dr. BROWN. The influences that may moderate the Soviet competition, Mr. Skelton, are: economic pressures that they feel; diminishing returns at least on some of their military systems, although not on others; the institution of U.S. countermeasures in some cases, which will push them away from certain systems, as I think a hard-target kill capability is likely to push them towards mobile and away from fixed systems; and arms control agreements.

Now, whether all together those will be enough to create at least a slackening, and one would hope a reduction of numbers of warheads, is not clear. But those are forces that go in that direction, and I think we ought to try to exploit them as much as we can.

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Skelton, you have put your finger on one of the most vexing problems I think facing us in dealing with the Soviet Union. We don't know really how to respond to violations.

I think you have to separate them into two kinds. First of all, there isn't any question that whatever the Soviets have in fact done, their tendency is to test limits of any agreement, to probe for loopholes, to see what our response to be maybe in some cases.

The real purpose for verification is to be able to identify in a timely fashion any violation which would have significant impact on the strategic balance. In other words, which would really destroy the purpose for which the arms control agreement remained.

I don't think that has happened. It may. I think we could detect it. And that in a way is the easiest kind to deal with, because there it is clear that our basic national interests are at stake.

It is the niggling violations or ambiguities or what have you that are the most difficult to deal with. What do you do about them?

Do you respond, for example, to the Kresnayarsk radar by saying, OK. We are going to test two devices in space. You have one violation; we will have one. That tends to be destructive of the whole agreement process.

We don't have an answer to it. We can refuse to negotiate new agreements. That tends also to be self-defeating.

I think that some of these things happen because of the structure of the Soviet system.

I would say that the first thing we need to do at a serious and a very high level is to point out to them that the accumulation of these things is in serious danger of jeopardizing their own interests in terms of the public reaction that it will cause in the United States.

I don't have an answer to this problem. I don't think the administration has an answer. It is a terribly difficult question.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, may I be indulged for one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. One more question.

Mr. SKELTON. I would like for each of you to pull your crystal ball out on this one.

It was brought to our attention the other day by the minister of defense that the Soviet view of SDI, should we put our layers of defense up against incoming missiles, the Soviet view probably would be to build an enormous amount of missiles so that any leakage at all getting through the safe would still be a great threat to us.

In other words, we build an SDI defensive system, they build more to get through the holes.

Or the opposing view, as espoused by some in this administration, that we build this network, SDI layered defense against incoming missiles, and the Soviet Union would be more apt to do what they did in the late 1950's when they saw their bomber force could not get through our defensive system, so they stopped making bombers and went to the ICBM system.

Would they be inclined, then, to slow down or stop their ICBM production and go to conventional type of armament?

What does your personal crystal ball tell you about, should we have a good SDI system?

Mr. Secretary.

Dr. BROWN. The Soviets didn't abandon their bombers. Indeed, some of the same people making the argument that you mention are among the foremost advocates of how dangerous the Backfire bomber is to the United States.

I think the Soviets saw ICBM's as a way of gaining an advantage. It didn't really work that way. But that is the reason I think they did it.

It certainly introduced a new dimension, and not a terribly pleasant one, into the arms competition.

What do I think the Soviets would do if they saw us at some future time deploying nationwide defenses, defenses of cities—let's say for the moment defense of offensive forces?

I think, indeed, they would do what U.K. Defense Minister Heseltine may have suggested: They would increase their offensive forces. But I don't think that is the only thing they would do, because it is probably not the most effective way to counter defenses.

The most effective way to counter space-based defenses is likely to be a direct attack on the system, since the system is probably more vulnerable than the missiles that it is trying to shoot down.

So I think they would do both of those things. And I think it would probably accelerate their efforts, which are already not inconsiderable, on strategic defenses of their own.

The most cost effective is a direct attack on the system. The surest is just increasing the numbers, because if they can build 20,000 warheads for the cost of our strategic defense, and only 10 percent leak through, that is 2,000 warheads; if 2 percent leak through that is 400.

And human nature being what it is, they probably would also respond by accelerating their own defensive program of the same kind.

General SCOWCROFT. I think one has to hypothesize. I think the bomber example is not a good one.

I agree with Secretary Brown that the Soviets really thought they were doing an end-run on us, rather than competing in the area where we are very, very strong. That is the whole practice of strategic bombing, building big airplanes and so on which they did not have. They went to missiles.

I think if you look at other examples, you come out rather differently, and that is when we were faced with the possible Soviet ABM deployment in the late 1960's, early 1970's, we did not abandon the ICBM; we MIRV'd.

When we have been faced with increasingly sophisticated Soviet air defenses, we have not abandoned the bomber. We are now looking at two new bombers and cruise missiles.

The basic requirement of each side I think at the present time, with the strategic forces, is to be able to penetrate to the other side, to be able to accomplish whatever their objectives are in the use of those forces, and whether it is replicating offensive forces, attacking the defense, whatever, I think just looking at history, the least likely response would be to acquiesce in a deployment which would render their forces impotent.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you both very, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me ask a followup question. We touched on the silo hardening among some of the members. Is your view, both of your view, that silo hardening is not likely to be a very intelligent way for us to spend money?

I mean, if you are hardening only the MX silos.

SILO HARDENING

Dr. BROWN. I think it could be a useful component. I have seen some schemes for hardening that breaks down the problem into different pieces and so forth.

But I conclude that hardening by itself, without some degree of multiple-protective shelter or other sort of mobility, is going, as General Scowcroft said, to lose out to accuracy, if not in the next 5 years, then in the next 10 or 12 years.

General SCOWCROFT. I would agree with that. But I think it makes a difference what kind of system that you are hardening.

The MX would be a valuable target, and hardening it might be less effective than hardening a small missile so that you could move the deployment closer in. It being a less valuable target, they would be inclined to spend less on trying to defeat it.

So hardening may perversely have more attractiveness for some kinds of deployment of the small missile than it really does with the MX.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question about SDI here. Maybe Secretary Brown is the one I have to ask this question of.

If you believe that the world—and I think you both believe this—that the ABM system, the system, the antiballistic missile system, the treaty we have, leaving aside the question, including the question of to what extent the Soviets are violating it, and recognizing the kind of reservations that the President has about that system as the basis for the defense of the country that we are essentially mutually vulnerable and all of the drawbacks, but that basically

that system is better than nothing, that in fact that system has probably been useful and preserved the peace, or been a contributing factor to preserving the peace for some decades, and should not lightly be tossed aside; agree, disagree?

Dr. BROWN. I would agree, and I think the President also has on occasion said you shouldn't throw away what you have until you have something else.

He has a different view of how likely the something else is, but I am sure he would agree that even though you are exploring something else, you shouldn't throw away what you have.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. What I want to ask is, could we find out whether we have something better without destroying what we already have?

In other words, he has a program of spending some money here to find out. But it seems to me that in order to find out whether you can have something better, eventually you are going to have to test systems of that system that you are trying to get that is better, which is going to end up, it seems to me, destroying what you have.

The problem is, what happens if you come to the testing point?

You test the systems of the SDI. We therefore undermine and do away with the ABM regime that exists now. And then you find out in fact SDI cannot protect populations sufficient that you want to go ahead with it. Where are you?

What you have ended up with is you are worse off than you were, because you have destroyed what you have now without coming up to a satisfactory answer of the thing to replace it.

TESTING OF THE SDI

Dr. BROWN. I think there is a risk that testing which would violate the ABM Treaty would destroy the ABM Treaty. But it is deployment that really affects the balance.

I cannot rule out forever the possibility that you could modify the ABM Treaty so as to allow testing, but not to allow deployments without further agreement. So I don't worry quite so much about that.

I worry about what happens in the meantime, because you are not going to get to tests. You are not going to know enough for years, I don't think, to be able to carry out significant systems tests.

Now, there is a lot of room for the lawyers to argue about what is a component test, what is a system test, what is development, what is research.

I worry about something more immediate, however. I have a concern that the present agreements are eroding because the Soviets clearly have pushed up to the edge in many cases on the ABM, and in one case almost appear to be in process of pushing over the edge.

It is eroding also because in the case of the United States, the administration is talking about a post-ABM Treaty regime, and a wish to change the strategy, and a wish to go to defensive systems in a way that when you deployed them would be incompatible on the ABM Treaty.

There are similar things on the SALT II front. What I am afraid is if we go into the upcoming talks with a position that values too

lightly what we now have, and tries for a big change that in my judgment is unrealistic, the present agreements may just erode even without any SDI tests. One thing will lead to another. Both sides will either denounce and abrogate, or else just stop obeying the agreements. The agreements will either explode or crumble, and then we will be left with no regime for arms control.

You would still be left with, in my judgment, the strategy of deterrence by threat of retaliation under those circumstances, because it is not a strategy, but a fact of life. But we would have lost in that case one of the ways of stabilizing the present situation, which as you say at least has not seen any nuclear war for 40 years.

General SCOWCROFT. I would only add that there is a fair amount of testing, component testing, that can validly take place under the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty only bars testing of certain kinds of components, and many of the things that have to be tested are multipurpose in the sense that they can either be for ABM systems that are permitted by the treaty, or prohibited.

I think Secretary Brown's worries are perhaps the most valid one—not that we will run right up against a violation in testing. We may be able to learn quite a bit done legally.

But in stressing the ABM Treaty, which has not been stressed up to now, except in minor by the Soviets, we could undermine the whole process. I think that is something that we need to be concerned about, because I think it is absolutely true—we have to be as certain as one can in this uncertain world that we are moving towards something better and not something worse.

The CHAIRMAN. I take both of your comments very—I think it is very good, because I had not thought of that other dimension of the dynamics of the thing over the next 5 years. And I think that probably is—you are both probably right—that probably is the greatest threat to the current system.

But on the technical point, Secretary Brown, is it possible—I am asking a question of a former DDR&E, I guess, rather than a Secretary of Defense—is it possible to come to any kind of judgment—how much testing is going to be required to come to some kind of judgment about this SDI system, and is that degree of testing likely to mean enormous changes in the ABM system or abrogation of the whole ABM system in order to answer that question?

Dr. BROWN. You need not only an Under Secretary for Research and Development, you need a general counsel, because of the question of what you can do under the treaty. I know the Defense Department and the State Department are looking at that very carefully.

I believe that a considerable amount can be done by laboratory simulation. One of the things that makes it possible to predict, and for me to make a judgment, that in the end defense of populations won't work is that these operate on laws of physics which operate in the laboratory as well as in space.

So you can do a lot of laboratory testing of components and even some subsystem testing. However, what you can get that way is more difficult to judge.

It is clear that you would not make any decision to deploy without doing rather extensive systems tests that would probably not be allowable, but that is a premature judgment.

There are a lot more things that you need to learn that you can learn by calculation and in the laboratory before you even come up to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. I said that was my last, but it is not.

Is it within the realm of possibility from the research that is at least planned, that you know about, to have a secure SDI system? One of the things that you mentioned is that there is a possibility you go after the system itself.

But what have we gained if it is not secure? Not being a physicist or a scientist, I have no feel for this. But is it within the realm of possibility of having such a secure system where it could not be destroyed early on.

SECURING THE SDI SYSTEM

Dr. BROWN. I would say it is conceivable, but where you end up in such considerations is how much does it cost to get what degree of invulnerability as compared to what it costs to create the corresponding degree of threat.

My own judgment, based on what I have seen so far, is that the system will be much more expensive to defend than to attack. I am talking about a largely space-based system to defend populations.

I come to a different conclusion about terminal defense of ICBM's. That may be a better way to put it than is it possible to have a system that is absolutely invulnerable. I think the answer is no, but it is conceivable you could have a system that is more expensive to attack than to defend. I think it is going to turn out to be the other way around.

General SCOWCROFT. I think in conjunction with the Fletcher panel on the analysis of whether SDI made any sense, they did look at possible countermeasures, including defense.

I would only add to what Secretary Brown says that it is easier to use a system as an ASAT than it is to use it as SDI. In other words, it is harder to attack missiles that are moving than it is predictable systems in space. In that sense, one can intuitively say that the attacker may have some advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else have any questions?

We thank you both very, very much for coming. It has been a very interesting and very helpful discussion. Thank you.

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the panel recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The afternoon hearing will begin.

We welcome as our witness this afternoon the former Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger, who is a person I am sure is known to

all of the members of this panel as a very thoughtful and very articulate person on the issues of defense.

As I was explaining this morning, Mr. Secretary, we face a couple of issues here in Congress, in particular a couple of votes on MX, or maybe more than that—a request for 21 MX missiles, unfence the money. And then a request, of course, for 48 missiles in the 1986 budget, plus, of course, the big jump in the research and development budget for SDI. Essentially, we are interested in your advice about what we ought to do about that, and what other observations you might have on the MX, SDI issue, in the light of the following things:

A rather severe budget crunch; pressure to reduce defense spending; new arms control talks beginning; and the general state of the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Why don't we let you begin in any what ever you would like, Sir, and then we would like to ask some questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start with some observations on the three subjects that you have directly or indirectly raised. The first is the subject of the MX. I trust that the Congress will see fit to continue the MX program. I think that the merit of that program on defense grounds is substantial, and I believe that, particularly now that the Geneva talks are starting, for continuity in arms control merit also exists.

IMPORTANCE OF MX

That is not to say that the MX is purely a bargaining chip, as is sometimes said. The MX was designed, laid down in 1973, after a burst of R&D activity by the Soviet Union that demonstrated that their second generation or third generation of missiles, depending on how you counted, were going to include some very large throw weight missiles with substantial number of RV's. That meant that the United States ultimately would be at a disadvantage in terms of counterforces.

The MX was laid down on two bases. First, that if the Soviets failed to curtail their counterforce development, the United States should proceed with the deployment of the MX.

Second, if the Soviets were willing to curtail their counterforce development, that the MX should be offered up to them at the bargaining table.

Twelve years later, Mr. Chairman, it is evident that the Soviets have not curtailed significantly their counterforce developments and for that reason, if we do not wish to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviets in terms of counterforce, we should, I believe, proceed with the deployment.

However, any indication of an appropriate trade by the Soviet Union should lead to a curtailment of the MX program.

Mr. Chairman, while I would encourage the Congress to provide a program for MX that has continuity, that does not have much in the way of starts and stops, in order to have an economical and efficient program, I would emphasize if a choice has to be made that

it is far more important from the standpoint of the Geneva talks to have an open production line for MX than the specific number of MX's that the Congress wishes to authorize. I am not encouraging the Members of Congress to go in that direction, but if that is the choice that they do make, it is more important to keep the production line open for bargaining purposes.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Mr. Chairman, your second topic was the subject of the strategic defense issue. I shall say just a few words on that subject. I have been billed as something of a skeptic on the SDI, so I should make it clear at the outset that I favor research funding for this program. I shall come back to that in a moment.

I think that we should understand with regard to the SDI that it consists of two programs:

One is an older program that has been going on for 30 years and for which research has gone ahead since the ABM Treaty of 1972. That is an investigation into ground based ballistic missile defense. That investigation has gone on steadily since 1972 in order to monitor Soviet progress in this area, to provide us with the capability against a Soviet breakout, and possibly, if needed, to provide us with the capability of dealing with an attack on the United States.

Since 1983, there has been added to that program the President's version of strategic defense, which is the hope for an impenetrable defense of the United States that would provide protection to America's cities and America's people.

Those two programs are to some extent inconsisent one with another in ways which I shall show later. But in any event, they are sharply separate, and as important, whatever dispute with respect to the so-called star wars that the Congress continues to fund those programs that it has funded in the past. Those programs involve considerble research and development on ballistic missile defense.

As I said, Mr. Chairman, I am something of a skeptic with regard to this area. I do not think that the goal that the President has set out in his initial speech of an astrodome defense of the United States, of an impenetrable blanket, low leak or zero leak, is indeed attainable.

However, Mr. Chairman, whether or not that is attainable—and that must be carefully examined in itself—we should be aware that there are powerful reasons for us now to reconsider the decisions of 1972. The decisions of 1972 in the ABM Treaty said, in effect, that neither side was going to deploy substantial numbers of ballistic missile defense interceptors. I think that that deserves national review. I think it deserves national review first, because since 1972, the Soviet Union has enormously expanded its counterforce capabilities so that now its apparent counterforce capability provides a substantial threat to ICBM silos of the United States.

In addition, the technology has changed, Mr. Chairman, so that the United States is in a position to deploy a hard point defense that is better than the Safeguard system that we initially began to deploy in 1969. Because of these things, I think that the subject deserves careful reexamination. But I emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that it is only reexamination. It is not a foregone conclusion.

I think that under the circumstances the burden of proof that the United States should begin to deploy ballistic missile defenses should rest upon the advocates of such deployment. It is true that deployment of ballistic missile defense in our missile field might strengthen our deterrence by assuring survival of our ICBM's, or at a minimum, creating sufficient uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet leaders about an attack against our ICBM's that they would continue to be deterred from such an attack. I think it advantageous to review, for that reason, those questions. Those are the strategic benefits.

Against them must be set both the political and the strategic costs of moving against the ABM Treaty. Those are substantial costs, I do not think that they should be underestimated. The subject should be addressed carefully in and of itself, and it should not be addressed primarily in the role of transition to the all out star wars defense in the 21st century. The transition may never arrive. The political costs, as well as the strategic benefits, should be examined here and now.

EFFECT OF DEFICIT ON DEFENSE SPENDING

Mr. Chairman, you talked about the budget crunch. I will say a few words about that. I have supported a substantial buildup in the military expenditures of the United States, but I believe regrettably, that the growth of defense spending will have to be curbed significantly. I say that without providing you with any specifics as to where to curb defense spending.

But the situation that the country today faces is the following: We have a deficit of $220 billion in fiscal year 1986. That deficit is largely structural. The deficit will continue to grow through the balance of the decade and the structural component of that deficit will grow disproportionately. Under the circumstances, I had hoped that there might be a political meeting of the minds after the election of 1984 that would provide additional revenues to the U.S. Government. That apparently is not going to take place, and we face deficits stretching as far as I can see—as David Stockman has stated. Consequently, you are going to have to cut, and cut defense among other things.

As we know, the Social Security benefits have been placed off limits for a variety of reasons. The additional tax revenues have been placed off limits, at least for the time being, for a variety of reasons.

On the nondefense side, interest payments are growing more rapidly than nondefense expenditures can be cut. And since there is pressure to reduce the deficit, to move towards a balanced budget, the only conclusion that one can come to—I say with regret because I have endorsed the buildup program—is that the rate of increase of defense expenditures must be reduced.

Mr. Chairman, those observations on those three points constitute my opening statement. I would be happy to take any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me just ask a question. Would you venture a number, a percent real growth of defense that you think would be appropriate for this year?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We are faced with a dilemma, and we must recognize it. There are real needs of the Department of Defense. Sometimes when one reads the press one does not always gather that there are genuine needs for the Department, and that would point to a significant rate of growth—four, five, up to the rate of growth that the Department of Defense plan is based on, which is a real rate of growth of 8 percent.

However, as one looks at the overall budget, one comes to the contrary conclusion. I had hoped, as I indicated, that there would be a tax increase that would alleviate our fiscal problems. If that is not the case, it seems to me that the Congress will have to consider a rate of nominal growth that matches inflation and little more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us this afternoon.

One of the problems that we are faced with, of course, is when we receive testimony from those who are presently serving, they would have you believe, of course, if we don't give them everything they ask for, then our national security is jeopardized. And, of course, that is a legitimate question. In view of the budget deficits today, tomorrow, and into the outyears, as you have stated, we have got to do something about that without the additional revenue. There is no question about that.

I think that was a good question posed by the chairman, because we get the other side of the story, that if you cut one dime it jeopardizes our security, and of course, we all know better than that. It just is not so.

I want to talk about the MX for a moment. Were you involved in the SALT II negotiations, Mr. Secretary, at all?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No sir, I was not.

Mr. MAVROULES. If you recall, back in 1977 when the B–1 bomber was canceled by President Carter, that did not deter at all from the agreement we were able to put together with the Soviet Union, a SALT II agreement. There are those who would have you believe, and it is a fact, because you read the same newspapers that I do, without the MX missile the arms control talks certainly are not going to be very beneficial. I would like to put that one to sleep. Certainly, if you have more weapons, more weapon systems, you have more to offer, but I don't hear anyone talking about our submarine force. I don't hear them talking about our bomber force. I don't hear anyone talking about the D–5 coming on line in a couple of years, as weapon system that could be used in negotiations. Why do we continue to key in on one issue—that is, the MX missile? And yet if we were to target accurately with a D–5, in my judgment that would be even a more devastating weapon than the MX missile.

Do you know, Mr. Secretary, that if we at any time, or if the Soviet Union for that matter, at any time wanted to talk about the

MX missile during negotiations, do you have an answer to that? I know you talk with people at that level.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You are dealing with the most complex issue, Congressman, of the negotiating process. What moves the Soviets from time to time is an open question, and that changes from time to time. I can well recall during the SALT II process that the Soviets displayed a very high degree of sensitivity with respect to the B–1, which seemed to be their leading item in terms of killing that particular program.

In later years they were less interested in the B–1—perhaps because there was a ceiling on the program of 100 bombers. One other point on the Soviets. The Soviets bargain—and my experience is largely in the context of SALT II—in terms of what have you got to offer. Not in terms of abstract capabilities, but what are your on-going programs you are prepared to sacrifice if we sacrifice our own programs.

I think that this negotiation in Geneva will be unique in that the Soviets will be emphasizing an R&D program rather than a deployment program or projected deployment program. Nonetheless, the more on-going programs we have, the better, from the bargaining standpoint. You will point out, and quite rightly, that the more programs we have, the less cost effective are each of the programs. But from the bargaining standpoint, it helps to have more programs underway.

Now, specifically with respect to the MX missile, that seems to me to be more critical to the bargaining process than the normal program. And the reason for that is that it constitutes pressure upon the Soviet Union to avoid a direct counterforce threat against their own silos.

D–5 PROGRAM

You mentioned the D–5 missile. I think that there have always been problems in the past with respect to the eagerness of the Navy to undertake the counterforce mission. I think that that probably has not been wholly resolved. Indeed, the D–5 Program was laid down when I was Secretary of Defense. The Navy was very reluctant to move away from the countercity mission. This is not to say that the D–5 Program will not be a success at the time of deployment in the late 1980's.

I, myself, would prefer to have the evidence in hand that we can indeed achieve a high degree of accuracy in that program before I would be prepared to abandon the MX missile.

We do not have that evidence as yet. If one follows the prudent policy of fly before one buys, one recognizes while we have hopes for the D–5 Program, that unlike the MX missile, it is pushing the state of the art.

Mr. MAVROULES. I just have enough time to I think ask one more question. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me just follow up on that. It was indicated here this morning by Secretary Brown and General Scowcroft, who were here before us, and it was a very, very interesting conversation, that maybe the Soviet Union is not so worried about the MX as they would be about a cruise missile, which I happen to think is correct also.

Why wouldn't they be talking about cruise missiles rather than having the MX missile hanging over their heads? I know you don't have the answer, but can you share with us part of their thinking, perhaps, in this process?

CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the cruise missile is worrisome from the Soviet standpoint because of the verification problem. Whereas the cruise missile provides no quick counterforce capability, and that the MX would be more worrisome from that standpoint, in terms of the residual threat to their own silos.

If the Soviets have watched the history of the MX Program, I think that they will conclude that that program has slipped gradually over the course of the decade since the middle 1970's, that a program of deployment by President Carter for the deployment of 200 missiles was reduced by President Reagan to 100 missiles.

That that program of 100 missiles has not enjoyed universal and enthusiastic support on Capitol Hill, and that consequently there may be a cap on that program, and that they should look more carefully at a program obviously open-ended, and that is the Cruise Missile Program.

That is to surmise about what the Soviets might be thinking.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you. I would like to reserve any questions I might have, but would just add my welcome to the Secretary. It is good to see you again. We hope you are as comfortable in that chair now as you were before. We will try to treat you as gently now as we did before, maybe even better.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. President Reagan has advanced his argument in favor of SDI, with the proposition that SDI will end the arms race. Do you think it is that simple?

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No; I think that it is alluring. I think that the President, in some sense, has ditched the left, as it were, by coming up with his own way of getting rid of nuclear weapons and deterrence, and that has its ironical quality. But I don't think that there are any answers to this.

We are going to depend as a Nation for our own lifetime—for the lifetime of our children—upon deterrence. I think that that is a point that I should have made in my opening remarks, that it is ill-advised for anybody in this country to talk about the immorality of deterrence. We have heard some of those comments of late in support of the SDI. I hope that that comes to an end.

Mr. SWEENEY. But what exactly, what kind of deterrence are we talking about here? Let me ask the question differently. Do you think that the pursuit of SDI, and the eventual success of that program, will result in a fundamental change in the so-called arms race from an offensive-offensive race, mutually assured destruction essentially, to an offensive-defensive race?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that it is plausible but unlikely, and I think it is unlikely for the following reason: That the natural response of either of the superpower competitors to the deployment of defenses will be to expand offensive forces. That expansion of offensive forces is relatively cheap, has been relatively cheap, and as yet there is no clear evidence that it will not continue to be cheap relative to defense.

The only reason that we believe that defenses may be cheaper, relatively speaking, than they were in the 1960's is that there is the hope of catching a missile during its boost phase, with all the leverage that comes from that. But, generally speaking, we still think that defenses are far more costly than the offense for general purposes, and as a consequence the natural response will be to expand the offense. Unless there is a mutuality of interest and agreement in advance, the Soviet Union, in my judgment, will react to an American deployment by expanding their offensive forces.

I point that out because Secretary McNamara [illegible] the 1960's, when the Soviets began deployment of their defenses around Moscow, took as his policy that he would add one RV for each interceptor that the Soviet Union deployed. And when I was at the Rand Corp. in that period we were already projecting our way up to 50,000 warheads.

One should understand, I think, that the natural response will be to expand offensive capabilities, and that therefore, while there is some interesting rhetoric about constraint on offense, as yet nobody has pointed to a good reason why that constraint should occur. We should not expect the Soviet Union to be any less offensive-conservative than we have been.

Mr. SWEENEY. One more question, Mr. Chairman, if my time allows.

Do you think that the SDI itself changes the direction in which the offensive forces will be expanded?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, quite likely, and that is one of the reasons that the Soviet Union may be prepared to pay a higher price to head off development of these technologies. There are means of delivery of nuclear weapons other than by ballistic missiles, and the natural response of the Soviet Union to the deployment of the so-called star wars defense will be to expand their forces of air-breathing vehicles. Most particularly, I think that the Soviets would, under those circumstances, place a large number of submarines off the American coast, armed with cruise missiles, and that there is no way that we can seriously hope to head off intrusion into American airspace of such cruise missiles.

Indeed, the United States has taken the lead in the development, first of the sea-launched cruise missile, and second, of Stealth, and consequently, the Soviets' ability 10 years out to penetrate American airspace will be, to say the least, impressive.

The natural tendency of the Soviets, if we were to move in the direction of a generalized ballistic missile defense, not solely defenses in the missile field, will be to move in the direction of an air-breathing threat, but that would cause a disorder, disruption in the Soviet military and industrial establishment, and would also cause disruption within the power structure of the Soviet military.

The Navy, which historically has gotten about 10 percent of the Soviet defense budget, would under those circumstances get a higher allocation, and therefore the admirals would have a larger place in the sun.

This is a military establishment that has been dominated by the Army since its inception. I don't think that they would like that redistribution of power, even if Soviet capability to attack American cities were left unaffected.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Secretary, I found your remarks here very interesting, because I have given considerable thought to the line of questioning that my colleague just undertook. It seems to me that part of this SDI concept gives with it the same thinking of, I remember as a young boy, of the Maginot Line concept of defense, an impregnable type of a defense that cannot be penetrated by the known forces of the day.

I felt that exactly, it was true what was said. Intercepting, say, a cruise missile coming under the Brooklyn Bridge, or will it do much if the Soviets want to continue to build and are building a Backfire-type bomber and a larger version of that aircraft, and I think you have clarified it.

As you see it, they would perhaps just shift gears or shift in the development of an Air Force cruise missile-submarine force, to counter there, and perhaps defeat it?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir; may I add to that that this is a country that finds the provision of an impenetrable air defense very difficult. We have a great deal of ground clutter, even compared to the Soviet Union, and of course we have a history of open borders.

Some years ago, you will recall that a Cuban defector landed a Mig at the Miami Airport, and we did not know that the Mig was there until the plane was on the ground. That is, I think, an indication of not only the porousness of current air defense but the difficulty that the United States will have in a region in which we have literally thousands of aircraft moving simultaneously, to deal wth the air defense threat.

Our present air defenses are very weak. They are a skeleton force, designed to deal with a small attack, and it would probably cost us on the order of $40 million or $50 million a year just to build the air defense capability that could be associated with the canopy for ballistic missile defense.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you.

In the area of the MX and the B–1, I remember Senator Tower stating, having been in Geneva at the time of the announcement of the cancellation of the B–1, he placed a question with some of the negotiators for the Soviet Union now: What are you prepared to give up?

And the answer was: "Nothing. We are neither pacifists nor philanthropists."

I take it we would get about the same response, such a reaction, if we were to now say we were not going forward with the MX Program. Is that your opinion?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is certainly my view, as I indicated in the response to the prior question. The Soviets take the very tough at-

titude of nothing for nothing, and when we have bargained with them in the past, they say, "We are not interested in hypothetical programs. We are interested in on-going programs and curtailing those programs." If the job is done, in a sense, for the Soviets by the U.S. Congress, they are not going to pay any further price.

Mr. HILLIS. In your opinion, should the MX even be a bargaining chip, the Soviet Union putting on operational status, as I understand it, the 17-, 18- and 19-type missiles, and are flight testing a couple more, is it realistic to believe that they will take those type of missiles out of the ground versus older—standdown, their older, as such—classes, as our Titans or Minuteman or something like this? Can we afford not to build the MX? I guess is the question. Do we have that good a backup force?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we can afford not to do that, but we live with a higher level of risk than I would prefer to live with.

I did not fully respond to Mr. Mavroules' question. He said that the country would be in jeopardy if the defense budget were cut, our security would be jeopardized. The answer is you live with a somewhat higher degree of jeopardy or risk at lower defense levels, and the difficulty is to make that calculation, what risk is correct.

It is perfectly true that those of us who have been associated with the Department of Defense like to have a lower level of risk on defense issues, and I would think that failure to proceed with the MX would be a level of risk I would prefer not to live with.

I should emphasize that it is important for us, if the Soviets fail to bring down their counterforce capabilities, to deploy the MX. It should not be a bargaining chip in that respect, in my judgment. I think that we should have a counterforce capability that is roughly equivalent of that of the Soviet Union, and that is the role that the MX has played.

If the Soviets were prepared to offer something serious, a plan by which both sides would avoid or reduce their counterforce capabilities, almost anything in my judgment should be put on the bargaining table. Your question suggested that the Soviets are unlikely to do that, and if that is the case, we should proceed with the MX Program.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. One of the questions, one of the issues that has come up, is the question in the light of your skepticism and others, skepticism about how effective a population defense might be. You know the President is fond of citing this cartoon that I guess Cap Weinberger showed him, which has somebody, a couple sitting in front of their TV set, and one of them says to the other, "Well, if the critics are right and this SDI star wars doesn't work, why are the Russians so afraid of it?" What is your response to that? Are the Russians worried about a hard-point defense, or do they have a different view about the ability of a population defense? Where are they coming at this thing from?

SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT STAR WARS PROGRAM

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the Soviets have four or five reasons to be deeply concerned about the star wars proposal. The first and not an inconsiderable one, is the fact that the Soviets have a high degree of respect—and some might regard it as paranoia—about American's technical capacity, and they may be skeptical about our ability to provide such a defense, but they don't know. The Americans have fooled them before.

If one looks at Soviet reactions to either Minuteman deployment in the early sixties or the Safeguard deployment in the later sixties, the Soviets have rightly got a very high degree of respect for America's technical capabilities. That paranoia on the part of the Soviet Union may lead them to pay a price that is substantial.

Second, as I indicated in response to Congressman Sweeney's question, for the Soviets to respond to this kind of system would require considerable gyration of their industrial economy. They will be forced to expand rapidly their ability to produce submarines and cruise missiles. They will be curtailing other segments of their industrial economy.

The Soviet industrial economy is very sluggish. It lacks flexibility. Our own economy has much greater flexibility, and the Soviets may be apprehensive about the costs of such an adjustment of their economy, and fearful about the slowness of their reaction.

I also indicated, as a third point to Mr. Sweeney, that this will cause a readjustment of the bargaining power within the military establishment. The Navy will come up under these circumstances, the traditional sources of power in the Army will have to recede. That is not something that will be welcome by those who are the present incumbents in power, as it were.

A fourth point is this. The Soviets may well appreciate the fact that if defenses are deployed on both sides, both sides will tend to expand their offensive forces, and that will be costly to the Soviets. To divert resources from other activities, in addition to its being costly, will tend to make the international climate a little bit more fragile.

I think that the Soviet Union prefers a relatively settled international climate insofar as it may impact on the production and deployment of strategic forces. That is not to say that the Soviet Union is not prepared to make a grab in Central America, if it offers itself, or in East Africa. But the Soviet philosophy for the last 15 years has been a quest for stability in the central strategic relationship while at the same time leaving the Soviet Union free to pursue gains in the third areas of the world.

All of these reasons I think would lead the Soviet Union to be prepared to pay some price at the bargaining table.

Mr. HILLIS. Is it your view that the principal reason that the Soviets are back at the bargaining table is SDI, or do you see other reasons?

REASON FOR SOVIET RETURN TO BARGAINING TABLE

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that that is the principal substantive reason for the Soviets to have returned to the bargaining table. I stress substantive reason. At the time of the President's speech in

March 1983, I must confess that I felt that it was premature, and that it caused some apprehension on my part, but the Soviet response to that was a much greater willingness to talk seriously. Therefore I think that there was a payoff, even though so early an announcement by the President. That payoff, of course, depends upon our willingness to bargain.

The other reason the Soviets are back at the bargaining table is that they had a dreadful year, from late 1983 until the end of 1984. There was the walkout from the two ongoing negotiations in Geneva, which left them with a black eye; their heavyhandedness in dealing with the Europeans on the deployment issue, particularly with the Germans; the shootdown of the KAL airliner in late 1983, which made them look like clumsy bullies—the Soviet reputation through 1984 was quite poor.

By going back to the bargaining table, they have acheived a considerable political gain. Much of the difficulties of 1984 are now behind them, and in addition they are in an enviable position from the standpoint of dividing the Alliance. Our European allies are generally opposed, emotionally opposed to SDI, and they are wholly opposed to deployment as opposed to research on SDI, and that is on the part of governments.

The European publics are much more jittery. Unlike the deployment of the Euro-missles that brought the Alliance together, the issue of SDI is likely to divide the Alliance, despite the best efforts of the governments involved. As a consequence, the Soviets will be in a position in which they continually can prey upon European concern about the SDI; not only the structure of the deliberations. The three tables at the Geneva negotiations lends itself to such exploitation. It lends itself because the Soviets can say to the Europeans, "Here we are at the INF negotiation. We are prepared to stop deployment of SS–20's. We are prepared to give you what you need for your own security, but remember, unfortunately we have to make progress at all tables, and the Americans are being very obstinate about SDI."

They are in an enviable position, as I say, with regard to the propaganda and political aspects. The principal substantive reason, as you indicate, for their return was the SDI, but they are prepared to play it either way. If they can get propaganda advantages, they will be satisfied with those.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Secretary, you made a comment prior to my coming into the room, and I wanted to ask you to expand on it, when you mentioned the defense budget for this coming year. You said that you felt that it should be increased to keep pace with the cost of living or inflation.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I was talking budget authority, Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Budget authority?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. You will have a higher rate of growth of outlays, of course.

Mr. DICKINSON. Were you advocating then, would you support the concept of a freeze, and only add to the budget the amount of inflation for this coming year, or do you have a——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am not advocating anything, Mr. Dickinson. From the defense standpoint, continuation of real growth, and sig-

nificant real growth, is desirable. From the overall budget standpoint, looking at it from your perspective, not particularly the members of this committee, but from the standpoint of the Congress as a whole, the pressure to reduce the deficit, and given the constraints on the other areas, is such that with defense having 80 percent of the controllables, if I were a Member of Congress, not necessarily on this committee, I would find it very tempting to try to hold real growth closer to zero.

Mr. DICKINSON. But at least build in whatever inflationary factors there were?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, yes.

Mr. DICKINSON. So you wouldn't have a negative growth?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would not. I would lean towards positive growth, if I could possibly achieve it.

Mr. DICKINSON. And as much positive growth as you could get?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is right. But I look at these things from the defense standpoint, as does this committee. I am not neessarily looking at this from the standpoint of the budgeteer. In my judgment, my ex cathedra judgment, if you will, the only way we are going to deal with our budget problems ultimately is through a tax increase. I would like to see that early on.

Mr. DICKINSON. One other thing that you said——

Mr. SCHLESINGER. And it would alleviate the downward pressure on defense.

Mr. DICKINSON. When you are locked into a position where you can't have a tax increase, it doesn't give you much wiggle room, does it?

Let me ask you if you could expand just a little bit on another statement that you made, that you feel that the SDI might tend to fracture or to cause severe strains on the Western Alliance, NATO in particular. When I attended the Racunda conference a couple of weeks ago, and Chancellor Kohl was the keynote speaker, and the thrust of what he said, as I understood it, was that they did not object to the strategic defense initiatives as they understood them, didn't know that they were ready to endorse them, but if we were going forward, they wanted a piece of the action.

They wanted their portion of the R&D. Then last week, as I recall, when Mrs. Thatcher spoke to the joint session, that in effect I understood, she said she supported the concept, and they too wanted a piece of the action. So those two things would make me think that this would not be a divisive thing within the alliance.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Not with the principal governments.

Mr. DICKINSON. But do you think that it might be with some of the small ones?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It would certainly be with some of the smaller members. The attitudes of the Benelux countries and the Scandinavian countries have been consistent over the years in this respect. The Netherlanders, the Danes, probably the Norwegians, the Luxembourgers will see this as another phase of the arms race. I am not suggesting that you pay much attention to that, but I think that that can be expected.

We will not have difficulty with the governments of our principal allies. We will have difficulty with the publics.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that depend in any way on whether the defense applies to the European countries or not? In your calculation of making those statements, are you thinking that this idea also will be used to defend the populations of our allies?

EUROPEAN ATTITUDE ON SDI

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If we look at the European problem with SDI, it is very complex. You start with the attitude of the British and the French. They possess small independent nuclear forces. The British are about to invest a very large proportion of their defense budget in deploying the next generation of the independent nuclear force. If the United States proceeds with the deployment of a general strategic defense capability, the Soviets will match it in some way.

If the American defense is capable of knocking down thousand of warheads, the Soviet defense will be capable of knocking down at least hundreds of warheads, and that means that the British independent nuclear capability disappears. In short, under those circumstances, we wind up with the end result that the British Labor Party has advocated over the years, the neutralization of the independent nuclear capability of the United Kingdom. That is not an outcome that Mrs. Thatcher can very much wish.

The French are much more outspoken in their opposition to SDI. As has just been indicated by Mr. Dickinson, if there are any expenditures in this area, they just might like to have a piece of them, but in general they oppose it.

There has been a formula that is now accepted, in which Chancellor Kohl, Mrs. Thatcher, and next Prime Minister Mulroney will say that they are in favor of research on SDI. What you are hearing from our allies is that they support, with some degree of reluctance, the activities in this area, if and only if it remains a research program.

You will remember Mrs. Thatcher's astonishing reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev when he was in London some weeks ago when she and he talked from the same sheet about avoiding an arms race in space. Compared to her reaction on that occasion, her endorsement of the SDI has been much more limited, and was limited directly to the research phase.

Your question goes beyond that. Can we provide an SDI for Europe. I think that that is a secondary issue, because if the United States could have this impenetrable defense, indeed we would have restored the American strategic dominance of the 1950's and the 1960's, and if we had that strategic dominance, the Europeans would have an awful lot less to worry about than at the present time. The European reaction against SDI, if they believe that we can achieve it, has been overstated.

As to the deployment of the umbrella over Europe, I think that the chances for that are even more miniscule than they are here 3,000 to 3,500 miles away from the European continent. Flight times are very short in Europe. They are short not only for ballistic missiles, which have much shorter times, but they are short for cruise missiles.

The air defense problem for protecting European cities is nigh on insuperable, and therefore it is not conceivable. It is even less conceivable that we can protect European cities, and publics, than that we can protect our own.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that we are prohibited under the ABM Treaty from exporting or sharing our ABM technology. If that is in fact the case, how could we share R&D efforts with our allies for SDI without abrogating the treaty?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that—this is not something I am advocating, Mr. Dickinson—there has been some stretching of the treaty—what Secretary Shultz has referred to as the erosion of the treaty. Bending the treaty in this respect would be a lesser, as it were, assault on the body of the treaty than some other things that have gone on, and notably in that connection, the Soviet deployment of the phased-array radar at Krasnoyask. It is awfully hard to define that as the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody else have questions? Let me ask a couple of other questions on related issues, if not directly to the issue here, Mr. Secretary. Do you think there is any advantage, cost advantage, to hardening the silos for the MX? Is that something that you think we ought to spend money on?

SILO HARDENING

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, and I would generally advocate that. New technologies are available, and a reexamination of the hardness of those silos shows that they are immensely harder than we had originally thought. There are very great advantages in the hardening of silos, and that is that the hardening of silos creates uncertainty on the part of a hypothetical foe who hypothetically might be contemplating a strike against our land-based missiles.

One does not understand that fully, I think, with the kinds of calculations we normally do, which are based upon some assumptions about the accuracy levels that have been achieved by our forces and by their forces. Accuracies remain very uncertain.

We know that there will be significant degradations in accuracy in any operational attack. The Soviets should understand that as well. No one has ever exercised a nuclear force against a target set in the United States or the Soviet Union. Because I believe that it is inevitable that there maybe substantial degradation in accuracy that no one can ascertain in advance, the hardening of silos means that the hard target kill sometimes ascribed to a force may not in fact exist.

In this connection, the hardening of our own silos will significantly reduce the level of confidence that the Soviet Union could have in a hypothetical first strike against our silos, and I would be willing to pay a significant price to reduce that level of confidence.

I believe that, even though confidence in accuracy will rise over the years, it will never rise so much, because of the absence of operational experience, that it would be without value.

Mr. Chairman, some years ago I testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to the balance between the two forces, and I touched

upon this issue. If I may, I would offer my testimony at that time regarding this accuracy question, to the committee, for inclusion in the record or not, as you may choose.

The CHAIRMAN. One other question, Mr. Secretary. An issue is going to come up about what we should do when the expiration date of SALT II has to be ratified, it will come up at the end of the year. Is it your view that we ought to continue to adhere to the SALT Treaty, or that we ought not to continue after that date?

SALT II TREATY

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The general answer is yes, we should adhere to the treaty. As you will recall, there was considerable debate about the treaty at the close of 1979. To the extent that that debate did not involve the response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it involved primarily, I believe, the protocol, which has now lapsed, and that was in my judgment the part of the treaty that caused the greatest concern.

Second, there was concern about, what shall I say, the style of Mr. Carter, and a fear that if the protocol were included, that after 5 years he would be inclined to extend it. Those issues are now moot.

Third, there was a concern about the level of defense expenditures in this country. That issue has now been resolved. I think that, on balance, our advantages continue to be to observe that treaty, particularly since negotiations are starting in Geneva. If the United States is seen in the outside world just as those negotiations start, to be deliberatly upsetting an arrangement that we have followed now for four years under President Reagan, with the Soviets, I think that that would incur a substantial political cost, which is not offset in any way by a few extra Poseidon missiles.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. I pass for the moment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Schlesinger, could I shift over to another subject just briefly, and that is chemical warfare and the weak deterrent that we have in this country. As you know, the Russians have been steadily building and perfecting their chemical warfare system since World War II. We are told they have some 30,000 vehicles poised on the Eastern border which could operate in a chemical warfare environment. They probably have missiles that have that capability, and we may very well approach that subject again in the Congress this year. I wonder if you could comment on that?

SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I should point out at the outset that these will be comments based upon impressions, somewhat obsolete impressions. But, in general, I would believe that the Soviet Union has pressed ahead in the area of chemical warfare, and that the United States should have an appropriate deterrent to Soviet initiation with chemical weapons. I am not sufficiently familiar, at the moment, as to the state of the U.S. capability, which in the past has been quite weak, but it may have to be strengthened. I simply

offer those as impressions. I am not as familiar in detail with that area as I have been with the strategic forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

I apologize, Mr. Secretary, for being late; I have been in another committee hearing.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Good to see you again, Ike, under any circumstances.

Mr. SKELTON. It is nice to see you again. Are you concerned about the Strategic Defense Initiative that the Soviets might have at this time?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we must be very careful about that. The Soviets seem to have been expanding their capabilities in the Moscow defense. At this time I am not concerned about our capacity to penetrate such a system. I think that we must be alert to the possibilities of a breakout.

I do not think we should get neurotic about the possibilities of a breakout, for the following reason. The Soviet Union has historically had so inflexible a production system that they move more slowly during a breakout than we do during normal performance, and the Soviet Union, I don't think, is interested in racing. Nonetheless, we must be wary both of the breakout possibility and the expansion of Soviet capabilities in the Moscow system.

I should stress, however, that what we see the Soviets doing has been primarily ground-based activities. They have not been looking at the kinds of space activities, to the extent that we are now talking.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Are you in a position to comment on the Soviets' having gone above the SALT II warhead limits?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is, of course, the usual area of ambiguity, and the Soviets will stretch ambiguity. I believe that they have gone above the limits modestly. I do not think that we should be prepared to tolerate any activity on the part of the Soviet Union. We should make very clear our protests on this issue through the existing channels. At the same time, I would recognize that their exceeding the limits by a small number is important in a strategic and leading sense but is not important in terms of the overall balance of power.

Mr. SKELTON. There have been, as you know, a number of reported violations through the years, and some made public recently by the administration, about the Soviet violation of various agreements. What can you do? What do you do about these, as a practical matter, other than shake your finger at them?

SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That depends on the circumstances. The Soviets keep telling us to take the most glaring example, as we see it, of violation. Once they turn on that Krasnoyarsk radar we will see, indeed, that it is intended for other purposes than space tracking. We may reach that point. Indeed, it is just possible that the Soviets may be correct, and that we will see that it is for some other purpose, although I very much doubt it.

At that point, we should say, "That is unacceptable to the United States," and diplomatically, as it were, go to the mat. That is not to say that we should not be protesting vigorously now, as we have been, but the Soviet response is one that we cannot gainsay out of hand.

The Soviets have a major interest in maintaining some degree of common purpose with the United States. My responses to the discussion of SDI and why the Soviets might be prepared to pay a price to curtail our technical developments in this area were based upon the assumption that the Soviet Union does not want to give the United States an excuse for an all-out race.

The Soviets, in the technological area particularly, are very much concerned about American advantages, and while the Soviets will cheat—and we should not expect any agreement to be signed with the Soviets in which they will not be stretching the limits—they will not, I believe, stretch those limits so much as to foreclose the possibility of future negotiations. It is for that reason I think that steady diplomatic representation will at, least in severe cases, bring the Soviets to account.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. I appreciate your being with us today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have several questions which arise directly from your very informative responses to all the questions submitted today, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me an opportunity to ask these additional questions.

You have stated, Mr. Secretary, that you are pro MX, pro SDI, albeit with some reservation.

The CHAIRMAN. Pro research, yes, sir.

Mr. SWEENEY. And yet you are advocating cuts in defense spending. God and this committee know that you have a heck of a lot more experience dealing with defense budgets than I do. Recommend for me, if you would, or identify, if you would, for me, programs generally where you think we can suffer cuts.

RECOMMENDED PROGRAM CUTS

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I wish you put that word "recommending" in quotes. Because of what I regard as the calamity that we have not faced up to the size of the deficit, and therefore be prepared to agree on an increase in taxes, perforce I must say that we must cut defense. Where should we do it? I have tried to avoid those specifics, but let me point out a few areas of possible cuts.

I think that the buildup of our European capability should be to some extent geared to what our allies are doing. That refers to ammunition stockpiles in Europe. It refers to the number of division sets that we pre-position. I am an old Atlanticist, and an old Atlanticist who favors the buildup of conventional forces, but those forces must be relatively balanced, and there is no reason for the United States to build to 75 or 80 days of supply, if our European allies are at 5 or 10 days of supply. There is some money to be saved.

I think also that while I have long been an advocate of readiness, that both budget pressures and recent developments would permit

us to have a slightly lower level of readiness than we have been aspiring to, and the reason for that is that the Soviet Union at this time—at this time—is preoccupied with its problems in Afghanistan. It is preoccupied with the situation in Eastern Europe, and the unsteady state of political stability in Poland. And above all, it is preoccupied with the continuing power struggle in the Kremlin associated with the third succession crisis in 2 years. The Soviet Union is looking elsewhere at the moment, and I think for that reason, though I never like to do it, that if I had to trade off, I would reduce our aspirations for readiness somewhat.

Some of our fighting units cannot be employed quickly, and therefore I would look at 90 percent manning of some of those units, not those that are to be ready for combat. I spell these out as areas of possible reduction, without giving you any specifics, because you and certainly your staff will have clearer ideas with respect to specifics. I think that the R&D budget probably is on the generous side.

Mr. SWEENEY. Just a brief followup on that. I understand your point that we should suffer cuts in those areas that leave us least vulnerable in terms of what our adversaries are doing, but do you really feel that we can determine what those areas are, prior to the conclusion of strategic talks in Geneva?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No, I don't. I think that we can look at the vulnerabilities in the general purpose force area, and I would put in that regard the highest priority on what we are doing to strengthen our deterrent in the Persian Gulf, which is still the Achilles heel of the industrial world, but elsewhere we can look to something of a slowdown.

With regard to the strategic forces, indeed that will be shaped by any agreements that are achieved in the START talks or the continuation of the SALT II agreement, if we and the Soviets continue to observe that more or less.

I think that although I have been an all-out defender of the MX, and although I advocated a number considerably higher than the 100, I must accept the realities of congressional views, and I know that we are not goiong to get 48 missiles in fiscal year 1986, and that some money will be taken out of that program. I am not advocating that. I am simply recognizing reality.

What I have said earlier is that it is probably more important for the United States to have an open production line that the Soviets can see in these bargaining arrangements than the specific number of missiles that are purchased. I hope the Congress will allow a relatively efficient program, however, to continue.

In the R&D area, of course, the area that you are adverting to is strategic defense. The number for strategic defense in fiscal year 1985 was $1.4 billion. The number that the administration has requested in fiscal year 1986 is $3.8 billion. That is an increase of 150 percent over the fiscal year 1985 base. That is a very generous rate of increase.

I have found that an increase of 30 to 40 percent, at the most, is all that most research and development programs can use efficiently. It occurs to me that the administration just might be including some cute insurance in that $3.8 billion number. I don't want to leap to that conclusion, but it seems just possible, and

therefore if you want to deal with a very generous rate of growth, you can still reduce that number significantly.

The CHAIRMAN. Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to Mr. Sweeney, if he has a followup there.

Mr. SWEENEY. No; I just wanted to thank the chairman for the additional time.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a privilege to be here, and I apologize for having three subcommittees going on at the same time, and Mr. Schlesinger, what a privilege to listen to you.

Let me say I have looked at the classified numbers of Soviet production of weapons, and it appears to me that there isn't a substantial slowdown of that production, and that the Soviets are going on with the 24's and 25's, essentially. They are looking to the mobile systems now, in essence the same type of reviews we were making a couple of years ago, and they like that idea. I think they like the idea of rail-mobile missiles, and I think it is going to be very difficult in the future to keep tabs on all these missiles. In fact, it may be a little tough to keep tabs on all the SS–20's right now.

You know, I have heard a lot of my colleagues talking about the necessity of spending more money in the conventional area, raise the nuclear threshold, and yet it seems that the history in the last couple of years has taught us that perhaps the relationships of the West to the East is almost a direct function, it would appear at least, of the relative strategic power of the United States and the U.S.S.R. And I would suggest and ask you to comment on the proposition that perhaps we are spending too much in the conventional area, and not enough in the strategic area.

If you look at the numbers of weapons that we have produced under the so-called massive buildup, what have we got, five Tridents in the water now? Not more than a couple of B–1s have rolled out up in the desert above Los Angeles, no MX missiles, so to speak. We haven't really produced much, and yet the Soviet lines are still open.

If you look at the whole array of strategic weapons in the context of what can we produce rapidly and essentially get deployed, if we really consider that we are in a period of vulnerability, one of the few things it looks like we could do is perhaps move the bombers to the center of the country, and maybe ramp up production of ALCM's, particularly since we went to ACM, and Boeing has some production capacity. What do you think about that?

Let me ask one last thing. I am now in my third term. I am a master of getting all my questions in before 5 minutes, but you are such a neat guy I would like to throw this at you too. Do you think that the services are finally coming around and undertaking enough joint programs? And, last, could you comment on reorganization of the Joint Chiefs, and what your ideas are?

UNIFIED COMMAND

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would urge the Congress, I would urge the Pentagon, to look toward a more unified command structure. I think that we have got to recognize that we have not been efficient

in the prosecution of war, in part because of the division of responsibilities. If one examines just recently the command structure that was laid out by the Long Commission, looking at what happened in the Beirut bombing, one is not impressed by, what shall I say, the efficiency of the command structure.

But, more clearly, that was an incident, a short-term incident. We fought a war in Southeast Asia that went on, depending on your count, 8 years or 10 years, and MACV was never elevated to the point that it had control over all the forces within South Vietnam, let alone Southeast Asia, and that severely impeded, in my judgment, our prosecution of that war.

As one looks back at these issues, one, I think, must come to the conclusion that we could afford the luxury of a somewhat amorphous command structure in the period from 1945 to, say, 1970, when the United States was clearly ahead of the Soviet Union and no one was going to challenge us.

As the balance of power has gotten closer, we must be more effective in the use of our military resources, and in my judgment that means improvement in the command structure.

The penultimate question was about joint programs of the services. No, I cannot imagine that that has gone far enough. It has not gone far enough simply because it runs against the grain of service traditions, which is to keep programs more or less under each individual service's own jurisdiction. It requires continued hammering on the services from the Congress, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, even to be halfway successful in this regard. In some areas it is critical.

We have suffered an absence of common communications between the three services. We talk about the NATO alliance and the lack of common communications. We have got some problems within our own military establishment.

STRATEGIC BALANCE

You inquire about the strategic balance. The strategic balance, as you quite rightly say, has not improved in even the last four years of this military buildup. The strategic balance in 1985 is worse than it was in 1981, marginally worse, to be sure. The Soviets have improved the accuracy of their RV's and their ICBM's, and we have some programs that are starting up, but as yet we don't have significant improvement. The MX missile was designed to be the centerpiece of our strategic buildup to offset Soviet counterforce capabilities. In the last 4 years we have funded precisely 21 of them. We have some others with conditional funding, but the fact of the matter is that that has not redressed the balance of power.

The great lack of the United States is not weapons to attack soft targets in the Soviet Union. The great lack of the United States is the capacity to attack hard targets, and therefore generating an expansion of Poseidon missiles or cruise missiles does not give us the hard target kill capability that we lack. The great deficiency of our forces is in hard target kill capability.

I think that one must look very hard, of course, at the balance between strategic offense and conventional capabilities. There are

savings in conventional forces that can be obtained, but I believe that we can do a better job with our conventional forces, even with flat budgets, than we presently are doing. It does not require so much money as it does a redeployment of forces. This is particularly true on the central front in Europe.

The heart of your question, or the heart of the answer to your question, Congressman Hunter, is that while I may believe in the enormous importance of the conventional force buildup on the central front of NATO, the United States cannot accomplish that unilaterally. If we can obtain leverage by an investment in our own forces, to which our allies respond in such a way that we seriously improve the conventional capability on the central front, it is worth a great deal. But in the absence of an appropriate allied response, it is probably of low marginal utility, if it is only pursued by the United States.

The reason that the buildup of conventional forces is of such great importance in Europe is that the only way, the only way, that I can see a serious possibility of nuclear war getting started is if the Soviets thought that they had easy pickings conventionally in Europe, and were tempted in that direction, believing that we would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons when indeed we would not.

It is to strengthen that conventional capability, not to the point that it can match Warsaw Pact forces, but to the point that the Soviets can never be allowed to see easy pickings in Central Europe that I think that that buildup is so worthwhile.

Once again, we cannot do it unilaterally. Indeed, the United States cannot be the primary source of such an improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else?

Charlie Bennett, do you want to ask questions?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I think I just have two questions. You mentioned the MX. You said it was supposed to be the centerpiece, but the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Weinberger, said that it was too vulnerable and should not be placed in a Minuteman silo if that is all we had to place it in. When he appeared before us the other day he reiterated that. He said, however, that some hardening could take place.

I followed up on that and I found the hardening really wasn't so much hardening as it was communicatons and things of that type. But I also found out that there is no request for the money for the hardening. So I would like to ask you, what sense does it make, since the Secretary of Defense, our chief authority in this matter, has said they should not be purchased if they have to be put in the Minuteman silos? What sense does it make to purchase them for that purpose, particularly since the hardening is not even asked for?

SILO HARDENING

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I regretted Secretary Weinberger's comment at the time. I believe that if you had asked him that question today that he might have adjusted his views since.

Mr. BENNETT. I did, a week ago. He reiterated them. He reiterated, he said the only thing that happened between then and now

was the fact that we can harden them. He didn't make any request for hardening.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I guess I will allow the Secretary to explain his own views on this subject. Let me develop my own for a moment, if I may, Mr. Bennett.

I think that one of the regrettable aspects of the 1980 campaign was all of the emphasis that was put on silo vulnerability as the principal criterion in the selection of new missiles. The principal criterion should be other things as well as silo vulnerability. In particular, the great lack of the United States forces has been of a visible counterforce weapon in the face of an assymetrical deployment by the Soviet Union.

The role of that counterforce is, in principle, to threaten a response to the Soviet Union in the event that they should be considering an all out conventional assault against Western Europe. In my judgment, they would desist from such consideration if we had such a weapon. Moreover, there are other elements of the overall U.S. force posture that provide us with sufficient overall invulnerability such that the vulnerability of the MX by itself, does not preclude its deployment. I, too, would be happier by far if we had lesser vulnerability in the basing mode.

But we are considering the MX for two reasons, Mr. Bennett: One is in order to close that window of vulnerability, which was the original thing that was emphasized. But the other, which has received far too little emphasis, has to be to close the gap with respect to counterforce capabilities with the Soviet Union. Throw weight and counterforce are still valid reasons for purchasing and deploying the MX even though we have a basing mode that is less than wholly satisfactory.

In my judgment, the Congress should continue to explore improved basing, including, if that should be necessary, provision of funds for hardening, which we can do at the present time. I would also explore such other things as submersible barges for MX and postulate a hypothetical Soviet attack problem.

The greatest lack that we have had has been that visible assymetry in terms of hard target kill capability. I do not personally believe that we should have allowed the Soviet Union to develop that assymetry, and I would prefer to see the gap closed.

I would prefer, of course, that we have a more secure basing mode but silo vulnerability is not the sole criterion for the selection of ICBM's.

Mr. BENNETT. I understand, and I assume that you would, therefore, agree with me on two points, and that is that it is a pity that we are in a position we are in Europe with regard to conventional weapons since we have the ability, the money, and the personnel to win a conventional war if we really wanted to do so.

And I would assume you would agree with me also if we can develop other less vulnerable weapons, like Trident II, that that has some hope in it as well?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, indeed.

As you will recall, Mr. Bennett, the Trident II, including the hard target capability or the Accuracy Program, was introduced in the middle 1970's and you will recall the Navy has historically

been reluctant to assume a role other than city busting. I happen to be and continue to be, quite enthusiastic about that program.

With regard to who would win a conventional war in Europe, that is, of course, conjecture, and any response must be conjectural. I do think the Soviet Union can even now assume that it would necessarily win, but the odds in the eyes of our military commanders——

Mr. BENNETT. You realize General Rogers said it is a matter of days before they would win.

WARSAW PACT FIGHTING CAPABILITY

Dr. SCHLESINGER. He has said, to a large degree, because of his concern about the ammunition stockpiles, which we presume will be in the course of correction rather than the size of forces. The Soviet Union, if it moves to a fully mobilized position, a fully mobilized position, has great advantages over NATO. However, from a standing start, those advantages are less evident. So the surprise attack scenario is I think less worrisome than it is sometimes presented as being.

The reason for that is that we treat Hungarian, Czech, Polish forces as if they were the equivalent of Soviet forces, because we are measuring in accordance with firepower. As a practical matter, the Soviet Union will be quite worried about the fighting capacity of those forces, indeed the fidelity of some of those forces. We throw the Soviet divisions in Poland against the West. It is not clear that those Soviet divisions are not there to protect Soviet lines of communications rather than as advance posture against the NATO allies.

So there are many factors here. I do believe, as you stated, that if we were to use our resources correctly, we could win a war against the Warsaw Pact forces presently deployed in the absence of a total mobilization of the Soviet Union. That would—in response to Mr. Hunter's earlier question—suffice to enhance the deterrent value of our position in Europe.

Mr. BENNETT. I presume time is up. Can I ask one more question?

Wouldn't the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem be answered by the President acting as Commander in Chief and consulting the various branches of the service and making a determination for himself rather than relying on a military man to make such basic decisions?

REORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, I don't think the President should rely on a military man to make those decisions. The role of the Chairman, even in an enhanced role would be as advisor to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. I am not recommending radical change, mind you, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think that greater control of the Chairman over the Joint Staff itself would be helpful, that it would improve the procedures and paperwork which are part of the problem as we both know. And that I have looked on with favor in the past on a deputy chairman, who is in position so

that one can have continuity in the event that the Chairman is absent.

As you recall, Mr. Bennett, during the Mayaguez crisis, Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was out of town and, as a result, we lost continuity. The acting chief was the Air Force Chief of Staff and tended to use the Air Staff. There are those kinds of problems that I have seen which I believe are correctable with modest changes. I am not recommending any radical surgery.

[For further discussion of the reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff see Senate hearing 98-375, part 5, reproduced on p. 101].

Mr. BENNETT. I want to say America is lucky to have a fine man like you that is willing to come back and help us.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You are more than kind. Good to see you again, sir.

Mr. RAY. Thank you.

Are there any other questions?

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Secretary, I am so pleased and so honored to have you here today. I want to take one last opportunity to ask you one, maybe two questions.

You spent a great deal of time today explaining that SDI will force the Soviet Union to make a readjustment in their so-called military industrial complex. In doing so, you touched briefly upon a point I would like to pursue just very quickly here, which has to do with the points of readjustment beyond just the readjustment that they are forced to make in terms of expenditures of dollars and so on.

In your earlier remarks, if I am quoting correctly, you said these readjustments would cause the Army to recede and the Navy to come up.

The presumption I think being bandied about in Washington is that our development of SDI will cause or force the Soviet Union to respond with their own development of their own version of SDI. In other words, that they will attempt to fight us on our own grounds. That, we have established.

I find that improbable. In other words, let me draw upon a useful analogy. If I consider you to be a better bridge player than I am, that is probably true. That you consider that there was no chance for me to become as good a bridge player as you are, it is likely that I wouldn't spend my time attempting to improve my bridge game, but would instead learn pinochle.

With that kind of preface to my question, how likely do you think it is that the readjustments that would take place as a result of SDI will be strategic. In other words, that the Soviet Union will begin to divert—not only that they will begin to divert attention or not only attention but dollars to more conventional and tactical weapons, or will start diverting dollars into that part of their defense structure, leaving us to pursue the archaic doctrine of brinksmanship.

The Soviet Union decides we can't win at this game but we can win if we enhance and improve upon our tactical and conventional forces. Is that a likely scenario in your mind?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is a very attractive scenario from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. I don't know whether it is likely the Soviet Union has tended to be imitative.

Let me answer the question in the following way. I said the military-industrial establishment, I avoided the phrase, military complex by deliberation even in the case of the Soviet Union.

Mr. SWEENEY. I stand corrected.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The question of the balance of power—I think that the Navy would rise. It is not clear, however, that whomever is given responsibility for the Military Space program would not rise as well. What would be in decline in terms of power in the Soviet Union would be the strategic rocket forces. But it still has the same problem of shifting political power within the military establishment and the military establishment is likely to be eager to retain the status quo.

The last part of your question goes to the appropriate response of the Soviet Union. Might the Soviet Union follow what is a very intelligent policy of letting the Americans spend more and more on strategic forces while they improve their capabilities in the very area that they already possess advantages? I think that the Soviet military establishment and the political establishment should look very carefully at that.

One of the problems with going very vigorously in the direction of the President's version of Strategic Defense Initiative is that it would probably cost us on the order of $90 or $100 billion a year for the astrodome canopy and it would also cost us $40 to $50 billion a year to build a comparable air defense capability. That would gut much of our military establishment. That we would be forced to reduce investment and force structure elsewhere and that this would create the opportunity for the Soviet Union, under those hypthetical conditions that you are pointing out——

Mr. SWEENEY. Do you think——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Soviet Union under those circumstances might be emboldened to make moves around the periphery and I regard that as a sufficiently likely threat that we should be very attentive to it.

Mr. RAY. Dr. Schlesinger, and Mr. Sweeney, we do have a vote on the floor. We thank you for coming and wish we could continue this a little longer. I expect you have had enough.

The chairman regrets he had to leave for another appointment. We thank you so much for coming.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the panel was adjourned.]

S. Hrg. 98-375
Part 5

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 2, 1983

Part 5

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Quayle, Nunn, Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Bruce D. Porter, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Tamara L. Farnsworth, Jacquie S. O'Grady, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Frank Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; James Steinberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the fifth of a series of hearings on the organization decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense.

This hearing will follow the four previous sessions, all of which proved to be extremely useful. At the first hearing on July 28 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented his views on the organization decisionmaking procedures of the Department.

The second hearing was held on September 20 with outside experts, Lieutenant General Krulak, Richard Steadman, and Phil Odeen.

On September 2, Elliott Richardson and Graham Claytor testified on the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The fourth hearing, held on October 4, focused on the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Witnesses were General Vessey, General Jones, and General Wilson.

This morning the committee is fortunate to have a most distinguished witness, Dr. James R. Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger has had extensive experience in national security affairs. He served as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Strategic Analyst for the Rand Corp.

Is that correct, Dr. Schlesinger? I think you have held more jobs in government than George Bush. That must be something of a record.

On behalf of the committee, I welcome Dr. Schlesinger and express our sincere appreciation for the time he has taken to appear before the committee.

This morning's hearing was initially designed to focus on the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Schlesinger has, however, indicated a desire to speak to a wider range of issues including the need for structural changes in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I believe it will be most useful to hear Dr. Schlesinger, given his vast experience on those issues that are of concern to him. In this connection, I have provided Dr. Schlesinger for his consideration, a full range of issues that the committee currently plans to address in its overall inquiry.

Before I ask Dr. Schlesinger to proceed, let me yield to Senator Bingaman for any comments he might have.

Senator BINGAMAN. I really don't have any, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to Dr. Schlesinger's comments today.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, we have your prepared statement. You may proceed to read it in full or, if you choose, you may offer it for the record and we will incorporate it in its entirety and you may proceed to summarize it and then we will go to questions.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start by saying that I applaud the committee's courage in taking on this particular issue It is hoary, moss colored, and thorny. Your task is a formidable one.

I believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained in the performance of this military establishment if we proceed to a circumspect reform of some of its institutions.

I do not want to exaggerate, Mr. Chairman. Structure is not a substitute for well-trained forces and capable leadership. It is not a substitute for all of those elements that make up a fighting force. But improved structure does release energies and imagination which under the present system I think have little latitude to express themselves.

Mr. Chairman, I comment on the historical origins of the present structure of the Department of Defense which emerged after World

War II and with a good deal of concern, expressed that we not create something like the German General Staff. That was a fallacious reading, I believe, of the recent history of the German General Staff.

It is true that the Ludendorff in World War I acquired dominance in Imperial Germany over the civilian politicians, but in World War II the German General Staff's role was at best meager in terms of political atrocities.

Moreover, the German General Staff did not cover the spectrum of forces. It dealt only with ground forces. It had little control over the Luftwaffe, which remained the pet of Herman Goering. It was not able to substantially influence naval strategy.

In the German case, I believe, Mr. Chairman, this had remarkably little relevance as Germany did not, in the same way as the United States today, require unified forces. It was fighting a continental war. The United States has not needed to fight here at home.

Grenada was a small exercise. Our forces are structured to operate to protect the margins of the free world around the periphery of the Soviet Union far from our shores, and for that reason unified forces reflected in the Unified Specified Commands are of a particular urgency to us in this era, more so in this era than in the period of massive retaliation. In the earlier periods the United States could rely on its superiority in nuclear forces to deter most major threats to its interests. Today that is no longer the case. We have come, essentially, into an era of rough equality. Perhaps we have advantages in some locales. The Soviets and their allies have advantages in other locales. But the main point to bear in mind is that, in this era, we would benefit substantially by an improvement in the efficacy with which we manage resources and forces within the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, the central weakness of the existing system I fear lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have already had some testimony to this effect. Series of studies going back over the last three decades substantiate that testimony.

I do not wish to belabor this issue. Even less do I have any desire to criticize the performance of able men who are performing as well as they can within the constraints of the established system.

It is, indeed, somewhat unfair to criticize the structure which was established on the basis of one criterion, the preservation of latitude of the individual services on the basis of quite different criteria to obtain excellent advice, efficient war plans and well-designed force structures.

The existing structure of the JCS, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations in the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interest of each of the separate services.

The general rule is that no service ox may be gored. If, on rare occasions, disputes do break out that affect the interest of one or more of the services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome, Mr. Chairman, is a structure in which log-rolling, marriage agreements and the like flourish. I need not, I think, develop that point at any length up here on Capitol Hill. It will have a familiar ring to all of you.

The question that we must ask is whether a decisionmaking process designed to create a national consensus on political issues is the ideal one to replicate within the military establishment to deal with time-urgent military issues. I think the answer to that is probably no.

Mr. Chairman, I will skip over the budgetary issues. I think in a way they are subsidiary to our problem of obtaining efficient control of operations during crises.

I would suggest that the Nation proceed to practice with regard to its military forces what is taught in every military college in this country at the undergraduate or the graduate level. That is the need for unity of command.

Unity of command is flagrantly violated by the existing structure of the JCS. I, myself, while I have some hankering for the recommendations of General Meyer, would agree with Graham Claytor on the need for an evolutionary approach. Fix now only those things that really need fixing.

For that reason, I would support the more modest reforms suggested by General Jones, which are quite parallel to reforms recently instituted in the United Kingdom.

The Chairman, I think, should be the link to the Unified and Specified Commands. He should provide independent and crosscutting advice to the Secretary of Defense with full rights for the service chiefs to provide advice which is in contradiction of the Chairman.

The Joint Staff should be more responsive to the Chairman's unilateral requests. At the moment, the Chairman controls an office of five people. He cannot do the crosscutting that is necessary. He cannot effectively execute military operation. I would urge that the Chairman be provided with a four-star deputy.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to go into all of my own experiences within the Department of Defense. Suffice it to say that, in crisis situations, the Department was embarrassed on those occasions when the Chairman happened to be out of town because there was no structure that would maintain the continuity of planning. It is inevitable. I think, that in moments of the Chairman's absence when the responsibility devolves on an Acting Chairman who is a Chief of Service, he devolves on an Acting Chairman who is a Chief of Service, he will turn to his own service staff. Thus, we have a discontinuity that is created with regard to military planning.

Moreover, in each of the crises that I have observed, both within and without the Pentagon, the tendency is strong for each of the services to quite naturally demand a piece of the action as a result of which a service which may have the optimal forces for a particular action will not perform that action. Mr. Chairman, I have over the years seen suggestions that the Coast Guard be transferred to the Department of Defense. I think that is not likely, but if the Coast Guard were transferred to the Department of Defense, I think that the Coast Guard, too, would demand its piece of the action in any crisis that we face. I cite that simply to illustrate the natural tendencies that would exist within the system.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be a problem during crises because a wise Secretary of Defense will push to one side, gently, if possible, all of those civilian analysts, logisticians, scientists, and engineers who would be field

marshals on those occasions and will return to the professional military who have the expertise to handle the problem. The exception, of course, is international security affairs or at present the Under Secretary for Policy. He must be involved in the process in order to provide the political dimensions to any contest.

I should emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the military establishment is not particularly sensitive to political dimensions. I can cite some examples from my experience, if you will.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown substantially and has sometimes strayed beyond the appropriate boundaries of its authority. By and large, however, the growth of that office is a reflection of the weaknesses of the military command system.

The Office of the Secretary has provided the analyses cutting across service lines which the Joint Chiefs cannot now provide. It has provided the principal means for reducing military requirements, so-called, to the level of expenditures supported by the national consensus.

Somebody must perform that task. If the Chairman's responsibility, as I suggested earlier, for cross-cutting advice were expanded, the analytical arms of the OSD, the systems analyst's office, whatever it is called now, and the controller's office should be made available to him for his analytical work. This would prevent duplication. Yet, until such time as the uniformed military establishment is better structured to perform these tasks, it seems to me the criticism of the OSD staff must be tempered.

The activities of the OSD have expanded quite naturally. Much of the formulative thinking regarding nuclear strategy and arms control has come from outside of the uniformed military establishment.

It was natural that these matters increasingly were absorbed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but activities did continue to expand. Some were justified—for example, the planning-programing-budgeting system introduced by Secretary McNamara which remains his great monument.

But, without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micromanagement within the individual services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff.

It must be firmly borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities.

There must be continued responses to Members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office—all of which have expanded exponentially—as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size as opposed to the role of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have provided sufficient substance for the committee to chew on. I have not gone into the awesome question of roles and missions, a subject fraught with even greater difficulty and one which is perhaps best left alone at this time.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one final observation.

At the outset, I suggested that structural reform was no panacea, although it could provide for unleashing of imagination and energy within the military establishment, now unduly constrained.

An improved process for decisionmaking is no substitute for trained and ready forces, for high morale, for appropriate logistical support and the like. Nonetheless, an improved structure for decisionmaking will permit, though it cannot guarantee, enhancement of the effectiveness of this Nation's military forces.

In a political democracy, Mr. Chairman, unlike some totalitarian states, we must always be seeking ways of balancing the requirements of our military forces against the requirements of a flourishment civilian sector. I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this committee's deliberations will contribute to the achievement of that goal of a better balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to take any questions that you or Members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate this invitation to appear today before the Senate Armed Services Committee to examine the vexing problem of structural reform within the Department of Defense. I can only applaud the Committee's courage in tackling this hoary issue. The task is indeed a formidable one. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Committee not be put off from structural reform because of the formidable institutional obstacles in the path.

All institutions become ingrained and have ascribed to them virtues that in retrospect may appear laughable or even pathetic. Perhaps this is particularly so in the case of military institutions—for which the stakes are so high and the institutions themselves not subjected to severe test during lengthy periods of peace. In this regard, I need only cite the attempts in Great Britain at the close of the 19th century to eliminate the system of commission by purchase. In defense of the purchase system all sorts of economic and political rationals were elaborated, including authoritative support for that hallowed practice by the Duke of Wellington. While the United States has suffered from no such glaring systemic defects as those revealed in the Crimean War, I believe that the experience in recent years does demonstrate that substantial improvements in the performance of the military establishment can be achieved for the Nation's benefit.

I have no wish to exaggerate nor to suggest that structural reform is a panacea that can solve our many military problems. Structural reform is no substitute for capable leadership or for suitable, well-trained and ready forces. Cynics will point out that only a limited amount can be achieved by what is described as "tinkering." Nonetheless, in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the Nation.

Since the creation of the modern American military establishment in the aftermath of World War II, we as a nation have been ambivalent regarding the goals that we set for that establishment. We have been and remain ambivalent regarding the purposes of defense unification. We have sought to preserve a degree of Service independence which has precluded effective integration of our military capabilities. I am sure that you are all familiar with the history of the National Security Act of 1947. At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff—reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime propaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler's regime. Moreover, the issue was quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled

only Germany's ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era.

The net effect of the structure that we created in the postwar period was that the balance was tipped toward a preservation of existing institutional interests and against the efficient design of forces or execution of war plans. In the period of America's military pre-eminence, which ended during the decade of the 70's, perhaps such arrangements remained satisfactory, if not wholly suitable. As the overall balance has changed, however, and as the political outcome in a confrontation has become increasingly dependent on the impressiveness of initial performance at the outset of a conflict looking toward rapid termination, we are in my judgment no longer able to bear the luxury of arrangements which, whatever their advantages in preserving traditional institutional roles, militate against the effective execution of military plans.

All of my own experiences within the Department argue in favor of a further integration of the system that would result in a strengthening of both military decisionmaking in this country and the effectiveness of our forces.

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have already heard a great deal of testimony to this effect. Moreover, a series of studies going back for three decades has pointed to this problem. I have no desire to belabor the issue here. Even less do I have a desire to criticize the performance of able men who are performing as well as they can within the constraints of the established system. It is indeed somewhat unfair to criticize a structure which was established on the basis of one criterion—to preserve considerable latitude for the individual Services—on the basis of quite different criteria—to obtain excellent advice, efficient war plans and well designed force structures. The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat. This implies a built-in difficulty in formulating and executing military operations. All members of the Congress will recognize the earmarks of the system. It is the way that we formulate national policy. It is the way the Congress is run. The question is whether a system designed for long run political consensus is the appropriate one for making decisions regarding what may be time-urgent military operations. Our political system is designed to force compromise even at the expense of rapid achievement of certain national goals. In the nuclear age, one can only ponder whether a system for forcing compromise in such a manner is appropriate for our military establishment.

Perhaps—though only perhaps—of subsidiary significance is the impact on the formulation of budgets and the design of forces. The existing procedures, regrettably if inevitably, fail to engage with the national process of formulating the defense budget. What comes up from the Chiefs is a mutual endorsement of the individual desires of the several Services. There is no cross-cutting—nor, given the nature of the structure, can there be any cross-cutting. Since I myself have generally been a supporter of the top dollar for the military Services, I believe I can say that the dollar requests are invariably so high that they cannot conceivably be sustained by the national consensus.

The reality of the Nation's defense problem is that we seek to achieve security with an economy of force and an economy of national treasure. Little help can be provided through the existing structure. The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure.

Is this an outcome that those who would like to enhance the prestige of the Military Services or the effectiveness of the nation's defenses really want? In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of "unity of command" is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

My greatest concern lies not in the area of budget formulation, however important that may be. It lies rather in the efficient design and execution of military operations. In this area I personally believe that we can no longer accept the burdens of the existing structure.

While I have some hankering after the more radical prescriptions of General Meyer, I would agree with Graham Claytor and others that we are wisest to follow an evolutionary approach. I would move first to fix those things that now need fixing—and avoid the quest for an ideal military command system. In general, therefore, I would support the more modest reforms that have been suggested by General Jones for the strengthening of the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Those reforms are quite similar to ones recently instituted in the United Kingdom.) I believe that the Chairman should be the link to the unified and specified commands, that he should provide independent and cross-cutting advice to the Secretary of Defense, that the Joint Staff should become responsive to his (unilateral) requests, that greater flexibility and continuity should be provided in the Joint Staff, and that there should be a four-star Deputy Chairman.

These are very modest reforms. I think I can assure you that even with such reforms there will remain ample power to preserve the perspectives of the individual Services and protection for their interests. (Indeed, this last point may be the very issue about which General Meyer is concerned.)

Why do I suggest that such reforms are desirable, Mr. Chairman? Because I believe that these reforms would provide for greater coherence and continuity in the planning process and greater effectiveness in execution. Execution in my judgment should be the responsibility of the Chairman—not of the Joint Chiefs in its present form. The existing structure does impede planning, for each of the Services quite naturally wishes a piece of the action in any crisis—and the existing structure assures that all will somehow be fitted in, even if a Service provides less than optimal forces for dealing with that particular crisis. Coherance would also be enhanced by making the Joint Staff responsive to the Chairman rather than to a five-sided executive.

Continuity is also essential, and would be enhanced by the responsiveness of the Staff to the Chairman and by the provision of a Deputy Chairman. If the Chairman happens to be out of town during a crisis, as was the case in the Mayaguez incident, the acting Chairman, quite naturally, tends to lean on his own service staff. That causes a fair amount of turmoil in the system. The provision of a Deputy Chairman would eliminate that risk. Let me observe in passing, however, that to deal with possible protocol problems that the Deputy Chairman should be ranked sixth in order of precedence—although he would be empowered to act in the Chairman's name in his absence.

Above all, we must seek greater continuity. A less-than-ideal plan, vigorously executed, is better than endless debate.

Mr. Chairman, in so brief a compass I must pass on to other matters and cannot go into further detail. You have raised questions regarding the structuring of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At this juncture I should make one preliminary point. The OSD should not be a problem in crisis management—and, in this regard, may represent something of a red herring. A wise Secretary of Defense will turn for crisis management involving military forces primarily to the uniformed military. That is their professional responsibility. All those civilian engineers, scientists, systems analysts, logisticians and the like, who aspire to be field marshalls, should be gently cut out of the process during the handling of the immediate crisis. The principal exception of course will be International Security Affairs which may play an indispensable role in establishing the political dimensions for the engagement. This last, I might say in passing, is the principal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense—acting in behalf of the President—within the Department. The establishment of political guidelines is of major, potentially crucial, importance. It is not a subject to which the professional military are generally sensitive.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown substantially and has sometimes strayed beyond the appropriate boundaries of its authority. By and large, however, the growth of that Office is a reflection of the weaknesses of the military command system. The Office of the Secretary has provided the analyses cutting across service lines, which the Joint Chiefs cannot now provide. It has provided the principal means for reducing military "requirements" to the levels of expenditures supported by the national consensus. Somebody must perform this task. If the Chairman's responsibility for cross-cutting advice is expanded, the

analytical arms of the OSD should be made available to him. Yet, until such time that the uniformed military establishment is better structured to perform these tasks, criticism of the OSD staff should be tempered.

The activities of the OSD have expanded quite naturally. Much of the formulative thinking regarding nuclear strategy and arms control have come up from outside of the uniformed military establishment. It was natural that these matters increasingly were absorbed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But activities continued to expand. Some were justified—for example, the planning-programing-budgeting system introduced by Secretary McNamara, which remains his greatest achievement. But, without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micro-management within the individual Services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff.

It must firmly be borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities. There must be continued responses to members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office—all of which have expanded exponentially—as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have provided sufficient substance for the committee to chew on. I have not gone into the awesome question of roles and missions, a subject fraught with even greater difficulty—and one which is perhaps best left alone at this time.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one final observation: at the outset, I suggested that structural reform was no panacea, although it could provide for an unleashing of imagination and energy within the military establishment now unduly constrained. An improved process for decisionmaking is not a substitute for trained and ready forces, for high morale, for appropriate logistical support and the like. Nonetheless, an improved structure for decisionmaking will permit, though it cannot guarantee the enhancement of the effectiveness of this Nation's military forces. In a political democracy, Mr. Chairman, unlike some totalitarian states, we must always be seeking ways of balancing the requirements for our military forces against the requirements of a flourishing civilian sector. I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this committee's deliberations will contribute to the achievement of that goal of a better balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should be delighted to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger, for a very fine statement.

Your commendation to the committee for undertaking this task at the outset of your remarks reminds me of a little slogan we used to recite in the Navy, "If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs, you simply don't understand the situation."

I think there is a great deal we don't understand as we are trying to sort it out here. There is a general agreement that reform is desirable. Our task is to determine what form this reform should take. You skirted this issue.

I would like to see if I can get you to be more specific. In the headquarters of DOD there is no organization that is structured to reflect major defense missions such as defense of NATO Europe, defense of the Persian Gulf, and nuclear defense.

Only at the Unified Command level do we see a major mission orientation. However, unified commands have a limited input in DOD decisionmaking, particularly regarding resource allocations.

By contrast, resource allocations are most heavily influenced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organization of the Joint Chiefs, the military departments which are organized along functional lines, logistics, research and engineering, and so forth.

Should we have in Washington at least one organization which approaches issues with a major mission orientation and, to press that further, more specifically to the Joint Chiefs?

Should the Joint Staff be organized along mission lines?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to see that developed. I do not think that it can develop under the present arrangements because the JCS staff will reflect the structure of the services that have the responsibility for the organization, training, logistics, and procurement for the individual services.

I believe the direction that you cite is a desirable one, however. If the Chairman were made more clearly the link to the Unified and Specified Commands, if he acquired greater authority to direct studies without unanimity within the JCS structure, then that staff should be restructured to reflect our major mission areas.

I do not think that it can take place at the present time, but I think it is a desirable goal. Like all these matters, it is a part of the whole and unless one is prepared to transform the underlying premises of the JCS, I do not think that it will take place.

At the moment there is no satisfactory voice within the military establishment for these major mission areas. I think that is correctable, but it will take more than simply a directive to that effect from on high. Over the course of three decades we have had directives from on high that have been disregarded below, and that reflects, I think, the nature of this institution.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, in your view, does the Office of the Secretary of Defense overemphasize its responsibilities for resource allocation and program decisionmaking to the detriment of its responsibilities for long-range planning and policy direction?

If so, are there organizational changes that could be made to provide for a more appropriate balance between the policy and resource responsibilities?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that, indeed, is the case. The nature of any organization is that routine functions tend to absorb so much time that they drown out the strategic functions.

In part, that will reflect the interests and personality of any particular Secretary. But a Secretary who is interested, who is primarily interested in these larger strategic issues will have to fight for the time within the system that will provide him opportunities for day-to-day functions, for giving speeches and the like.

He will also have to fight a system that exists by edict of previous Secretaries of Defense in which we have a programing cycle and a budget cycle that are separate. The consequence is that something on the order of 8 months of the year are given over to the planning cycle. I think that could probably be cut in half simply by combining programing and budgeting into one review over a 4-month period. That would make it more efficient and more timely.

There is also, of course, the problem of responding to outside requests from OMB, pressures from the White House, pressures from the Congress. All of this tends to make the budget cycle loom larger and larger. Unless the individuals in the OSD fight to preserve time for these strategic issues, that time will slip away.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, I think that the thrust of your question is quite correct, that we have too little attention paid to these is-

sues in OSD and, for reasons I gave in my earlier testimony, too little attention paid in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is something that should be corrected.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, apparently 25 senior defense officials report directly to the Secretary. This includes 21 OSD and defense agency officials, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the three service Secretaries.

In your view, does this reporting structure violate the traditional management principles regarding effective span of control?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I can be very brief in my answer, Mr. Chairman. Sure.

Chairman TOWER. In your view, is dual-hatting of service Chiefs an advantage or disadvantage in performing their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think, for the reasons I outlined in my testimony, that that dual-hatting arrangement, combined with the way that the JCS is structured, is a disadvantage. I do not think that it is necessarily a disadvantage. At the present time, each Chief of service must fight for his service's interest or lose the support of his countless followers within the service. Therefore, given the way that recommendations and papers come up from the JCS, it is a formula for frustration. But the dual-hatting itself is a culprit only within that structure.

Mr. Chairman, could I go back to my prior answer which was very brief and perhaps even flippant?

This is a political organization, this is not a business organization. It is true that 20-odd people have nominal access to the Secretary of Defense, but those rights of access in 1984 are more equal in some cases than others.

More and more Assistant Secretaries are added over the years with access to the Secretary. When I was Secretary, I had two Assistant Secretaries that I did not request, who responded to pressures perceived out there in the land coming from various quarters with regard to the treatment of Reserves and treatment of medical problems. We had two additional Assistant Secretaries then. The Congress must discipline itself with regard to adding Assistant Secretaries, but if they are added, they are added for political reasons and they do not interfere with the performance of the system to the extent that one might conclude from looking at a business organization.

Chairman TOWER. I have one final question, Dr. Schlesinger.

You have been Secretary of Energy. Should the organization within the Department of Energy designed to build nuclear weapons be transferred to the Department of Defense?

I might add another question to that. That is, should the Office of Naval Nuclear Reactors be transferred to DOD?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The latter question is perhaps simpler, Mr. Chairman.

The Office of Naval Nuclear Reactors reflected an individual whom the Congress has recently honored once again with a gold medal, Admiral Rickover, who took great advantage of being dual-hatted and using his hat in the Department of Energy or AEC to force decisions in the Navy and vice versa, used his Navy hat to force decisions within the DOE or its Navy predecessor. I think that was a reflection of an

individual personality and perhaps the early circumstances in which there was substantial resistance to nuclear power within the U.S. Navy.

Those circumstances have now changed. I think there are clear advantages in simplifying the structure.

The first issue you dealt with is one that came to my attention when I was Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. We did a study during the Nixon administration and although the recommendations of the political scientists would have been to transfer that function to the Department of Defense, we decided that it would be an error, first, on the premise "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The Department of Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission before it handled that particular function with great dollar efficiency.

There is some question—I think that you gentlemen may share in those reservations—whether an equivalent level of efficiency in the performance of that function would be retained if it were moved to the Department of Defense. I do not see the advantages of moving that function since it is working extremely well.

There is a stronger argument for moving the funding over to the Department of Defense and for having the Department pay for the weapons. That would mean that nuclear weapons were traded off against other requirements of the Department rather than being essentially a free good to the Department. I think that deserves further consideration.

At the moment there are many problems in the U.S. Government. One of the least glaring of those problems is the handling of nuclear weapons production, test and evaluation, research and development. So, I would leave that one alone.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

My time has expired.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret being late because I think we have before us a witness with considerable experience in this area, and I think all of us value very much getting Dr. Schlesinger's views.

I am trying to catch up on the statement now. I will pose some questions and come back after others have had an opportunity to question.

As I understand it, Secretary Schlesinger, you are more or less endorsing the approach of Dave Jones and Graham Claytor?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. I would like to look at those matters in greater detail, myself, before I give it an unequivocal endorsement, but the general approach sounds correct and I am sure this committee will examine the details before it endorses any particular element.

Senator NUNN. The question I have relates to strategy and the formulation thereof. You have been there and participated, and you have been Secretary of Defense as well as having held numerous other positions in our Government.

When we get to the question of formulating strategy—by that I mean in the broader sense, not a tactical operation like Grenada, but rather the broad strategy that will drive budgetary decisions and priorities in our Armed Forces, and so forth—how does it work now?

Who is responsible for formulating strategy, in the overall government first, and second, in the Department of Defense; and what role does the Joint Chiefs play in the formulation of strategy that should at least theoretically drive budget decisions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. For reasons that I have indicated, the JCS will be at its best in dealing with operational problems rather than with long-range problems. Part of this reflects the internal workings of the JCS.

As I indicated in my statement, the structure now is such that there are severe penalties imposed by serious cross-cutting efforts within the JCS. Thus, the JSOP and other such documents come up from below with essentially mutual endorsement of the wish list of each of the services. Of course, that wish list is beyond the physical resources supportable by a national consensus.

The services all remember the squabbles between the Army and the Marine Corps back after World War II. We in the outside world may have forgotten those matters. They well recall the fight over the super carrier and the B–36 in the late forties that led to the resignation of Admiral Denfield.

I think at the present time it would be fair to say that there are reservations within the other services about the amount that is being spent on naval task forces by the Navy. There are reservations within the Navy and the other services with regard to, say, the B–1. These issues, given the nature of the system, cannot be addressed.

Senator NUNN. You mean they cannot be addressed by the Chiefs?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Within the Chiefs. Similarly, the long-run strategic designs tend to be an inheritance from the past because a change in concept or a change in strategy is very much of an uphill struggle.

Within the OSD, of course, there is a reflection of the attitudes and personality of the single individual and, therefore, change can come very rapidly; frequently, in my judgment, too rapidly. Institutions do not necessarily flourish under radical change.

For example, in the early 1960's Secretary McNamara supported a counterforce strategy. In or about 1963, he decided suddenly that counterforce was simply unsatisfactory, both, I think, on moral grounds and on budgetary grounds. He reversed himself and embraced the strategy of mutual assured destruction. That was, I think, too rapid a transformation and should have been more argued out before it reflected the changed attitude of a single individual.

But the Office of the Secretary of Defense, unlike the JCS, does provide the opportunity, sometimes misused, of bringing about strategic changes. Only those Secretaries who are interested in these broader problems will bring about this change.

You also mentioned the outside world. I think in the Nixon adminisration that many changes were initiated by Dr. Kissinger who, at that time, was the National Security Adviser before he became Secretary of State. He did not put together the structures to implement the concept that he was pressing upon the Department. The only reason for citing that, however, is to indicate that such changes, in the event that in the White House there sit individuals with clear strategic notions, can come from the outside.

Senator NUNN. Are you saying that the Joint Chiefs as they are now structured and as they now function, really do not participate in a meaningful way in developing a long-range strategy for our military forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is right. I stress, as I did in my statement, that I do not want to criticize any of the individuals in this system. They are able men, but the system constrains them.

For example, to take an area, Senator Nunn, with which you are familiar and have long been interested in, given the nature of the sociology of the Air Force in the fifties and sixties, given the nature of the role of SAC, given SAC's mission and its own interpretation of its mission, it was impossible for the JCS, reflecting the Air Force views at the time, to bring about alterations in strategic doctrine of the sort that we have had recently—by recently, I mean the last decade—because it would have caused too much turmoil with the social structure that is the Air Force and too much turmoil within the JCS.

Those changes had, in a sense, to come from the outside. Various Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have imposed changes in the system. But those kinds of changes have seldom originated within the system at the conceptual level.

In terms of implementation, they are frequently seized upon. For example, General Doherty, whom you well know, seized upon the changes in strategic doctrine of the mid-seventies and implemented them, but they would not have come from within the Air Force or from within the JCS.

It is for that reason that a Chairman or some such individual detached from service sociology and service interest must be available if there is to be major strategic change originating within the military establishment.

Senator NUNN. That is a big "if" at the end. You made it pretty clear, without criticizing any individuals now or in the last few years, that the Joint Chiefs really do not formulate strategy. They do not initiate strategy for our military forces. That has to come from the outside, from the Secretary of Defense, President, NSC, or some combination.

Should we be striving for a mechanism that would permit, perhaps not mandate, but permit, the Joint Chiefs to be an effective mechanism for changing strategy or for altering strategy?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely, Senator Nunn. I think the vacuum that is created by the frustration with the JCS system has drawn into it, to an undue degree, elements from the outside world, and strengthening the JCS system is the single thing that can best be done to increase the regard, the prestige of the military establishment in this country, and the authority of that establishment.

Senator NUNN. You are saying that they are really rather weak now in terms of making major changes in the direction of the U.S. military strategy or in terms of changes in the budget?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is right. I think they do not influence the budget submitted by the executive branch as much as they should.

I trust that I am telling no tales out of school when I say that the services do have ways of making their views known on Capitol Hill and that, frequently through the back door, they will in the long run achieve their own objectives, particularly with regard to weapons systems. Important areas tend to be neglected. Operations and maintenance, readiness and the like, tend to suffer.

Senator NUNN. If I could just have 1 second. This won't take a minute. I did not mean to use all my time, but I see I have.

You state on page 5, "My greater concern lies not in the area of budget formulation, however important that may be. It lies rather in

the efficient design and execution of military operations." I am using the word "strategy" in our dialog.

Is that synonymous to what you mean by "efficient design and execution of military operations"?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In that case, I was speaking of more limited operations which require both strategy and tactics. I think, at that level, the strategy frequently will originate with the JCS, but will be afflicted by what I referred to earlier, which is the natural desire of each of the services to feature prominently in any action and to have a piece of the action.

My concern there is that, increasingly in this era in which our nuclear superiority has disappeared, the United States will only be able to maintain deterrence effectively and fulfill its international responsibilities if it is believed to have forces that can perform remarkably well early in an engagement while looking toward a political settlement.

We had, of course, the benefit of a military engagement last year in which American military equipment handled by the Israelis had a shock effect throughout the Middle East and indeed behind the Iron Curtain. But if forces can perform well early on, you have created the circumstances for a political settlement that can protect the interests of the United States and her allies.

It is for that reason that I am most concerned about encumbrances on execution within the existing system. I urged before you came in, Senator, that David Jones' suggestion of a Deputy Chairman be considered favorably by this committee, and the reason is that we lose continuity if the Chairman is ever out of town. That happened during the *Mayaguez* episode. It was not costly in that particular episode, but it did cause undue turmoil. In other circumstances it might have precluded a clearcut win for the United States, and that would have affected the political environment.

I think, in this era, although I am very much concerned about budget, the budget question goes well beyond the question of the JCS structure. It goes into the whole range of the ASPR's, the armed services procurement regulations—the procurement structure of the United States. I think people from industry will tell you informally those regulations result in excessive costs per unit for military equipment. But that cannot be attacked simply within the Pentagon.

At the moment, I think you can resolve the issue of execution by military forces. That is, perhaps, the most worrisome single element because I do not think that we are going to general war with the Soviet Union. I do not think there is likely to be an outbreak of war in the NATO area. But we are going to have engagements of the *Mayaguez* and Grenada sort continuously, and performing well in those contests early on is immensely important in maintaining the prestige of the United States internationally—prestige which is so instrumental in preserving international stability.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, we are glad to have you with us. We highly value your opinion on these matters.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. I have a question on the structure of the Department of Defense. I believe you discussed that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the military departments are micromanaged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As I indicated in my statement, Senator, I think there are cases of that, even probably at the present time, although I do not know that for sure. But there have been instances, too frequent instances in the past, of such micromanagement.

But frequently that reflects a desire of the Secretary of Defense and, in that case, the staff cannot be blamed for such micromanagement. It may be a poor idea, but it is not necessarily the staff's idea.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, in your opinion, do the military departments, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, have too strong a voice in the formulation of defense policy or not?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Secretaries of the services, of course, the heads of those military departments have virtually no voice or at least hardly any voice. There are exceptions for a particular individual. Formally, they have no voice in the system.

The Chiefs of services have a sufficient control over the process of recommendations from the JCS that the strength of their position succeeds in the almost total neutralization of the voice of the military establishment. I think that the views of each of these services and the collective views of the military generally could be far more effectively expressed if we had a different structure.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, would you give us your views on the role of the Unified Commanders and your opinion about the possible need for strengthening their position?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that, with regard to the needs of the Unified Commanders, particularly with regard to the readiness of those forces but generally, the views of the CINC's should be strengthened. But there is a problem that we all understand. It is the normal budget problem. If you ask Cincpac, he will deliver the whole United States resources to the Pacific. If you ask Cinclant, he will deliver it all to the Atlantic. There are the usual problems of allocation of resources.

But, at the moment, their voices are too weak. I believe the Chairman of the JCS, who does not represent the individual services, should be strengthened in his role as the spokesman reflecting the views of the CINC's.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel the defense agencies are too many for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to manage adequately?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. My response will provide you with some suggestion of an answer, Senator Thurmond. I have little judgment on that. That suggestion did not come very close to the attention of the Secretary of Defense in bygone years. I would think, Senator, that you should turn to somebody more expert than I am in these matters.

Senator THURMOND. You have been Secretary of Defense in times past.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Management of those defense agencies, with the exception in my case of the Defense Intelligence Agency, were not sub-

jects that come frequently to the attention of the Secretary. Therefore, I think that you would have to dig down two or three levels in the Department before you get an informed opinion. I do not want to give you a horseback opinion.

Senator THURMOND. If you had the authority to mandate it, by the President or by the Congress, what would you consider the three most important changes that you would make in the Defense Department?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that reflects our earlier discussion, and this is an immediate response, Senators. So, I have not reflected on that at any length.

I would make the set of reforms of the sort—though perhaps not the precise reforms suggested by Gen. David Jones—of the sort which would make the JCS a more effective mechanism. I would include in that what the Chairman talked about earlier, turning the Joint Staff into a more mission-oriented institution, as opposed to a functional institution.

Second, I would create within the Department, with a mixture of OSD staff and military staff primarily from the JCS, but with representation from the services and possibly from the CINC's, an institution that would not be pressed on budgetary or routine matters from anywhere, but could think seriously about strategy on a continuing basis.

Senator NUNN. Where did you say you would put that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I did not say that I would put it anywhere, Senator.

Senator NUNN. I thought I detected some ambiguity.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There was some ambiguity. I think probably it would be under the egis of the Secretary of Defense, but that it might well be chaired by a military officer, perhaps the Chairman, but operating with the authority of the Secretary of Defense. In our system the formulation of strategy should be under a political purview that reflects the wishes of the man who is President of the United States and of the political forces and party he represents. It should not be a free-floating mechanism. Therefore, I put it under the Secretary of Defense.

The third thing I would attempt to do, Senator, is to create more time within the Department. I suggested earlier that the budgeting and programing system be rolled into one and take 4 months instead of 8 months of the year. At the present time, routine functions are squeezing out all the time that might be allocated to considering the longer-term issue, including strategy, that face the Department and face the U.S. Government.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel authorizations and appropriations should be made over a longer period of time than now or do you think the way we handle it now is preferable?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would like to see them stretched out as long as possible, Senator, given the views of Members of Congress. I don't believe that any particular Congress can bind a subsequent Congress. Moving to a 2-year appropriation cycle might be both defensible and a substantial improvement. Authorizations, I believe, can go for any period of time and do not necessarily bind a future Congress that would have to appropriate that money. But generally speaking, yes, indeed. The more we can get into longer term commitments the better.

We are run, of course, as you know Senator, by the continued gyrations in our programs. We will have a program manager, who on day one, appears to have $100 million. Then he may look as if he may have $20 million to spend. He has to begin to curtail operations. Then it goes back to $50 million. If we could stabilize these programs, we could substantially reduce costs. To the extent that the Congress arranges for that stabilization funding, it will have contributed substantially to the Nation's defenses.

Senator THURMOND. As I understand it, our position will be for the Congress to appropriate for as long as they have authority, which would be for 2 years?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That would bind one Congress for 2 years?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Bingaman?

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, it seems like the major thrust of what you are saying is that the organization of the Joint Chiefs is not conducive to pursuing the major mission objectives that we have to or consideration of strategic questions. You have made some recommendations to cure that within the Joint Chiefs.

Do you think similar recommendations are essential in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with regard not to just setting up a group to continually focus on strategy, but perhaps to have an Under Secretary arrangement which is focused more on mission than we presently have?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am not familiar—sufficiently familiar—with the present arrangements and I do not know what the new Under Secretary for Policy does in this respect. I believe that office does focus much more on mission and less on functions. In your deliberations you may well wish to examine whether or not the role of that office needs further expansion or further concentration on missions within the OSD.

Senator BINGAMAN. This could be outside the scope of these very broad hearings, but let me just ask you.

Your suggestion is that routine matters tend to crowd out consideration of strategic ones and, particularly, budgetary concerns can crowd out considerations of strategic issues.

Are there changes you could recommend in the Congress with regard to our committee system and subcommittee system which would make it more possible for us to focus on strategic issues and less on the routine and budgetary issues. I am talking about with regard to defense.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I thought you were going to ask a different question—whether Congress should do things that would facilitate the saving of time within the Department—and the Congress certainly can.

Senator BINGAMAN. I will ask that question next.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is a matter of self-discipline within the Congress. It is historically the case that the Appropriations Committee have not focused on mission, but have focused on whether or not the United States has paid too much for shoe laces, kegs of nails,

and the like. They have tended to focus on detail. To the extent that the Appropriations Committees can increasingly do their work in the context of mission, that would be beneficial.

It has been the historic function of the Armed Services Committees in the two Houses to concentrate on the broader issues of national policy which I think are the issues which the public would hope that the Congress will deal with. Where are we going as a nation? What are we maintaining our Armed Forces for? To what extent should we have commitments in these parts of the world or that part of the world? If we have those commitments, what, generally speaking, do we need in the way of resources to sustain those commitments. Historically, of course, the Armed Services Committees have done much more, as they should have, in this area than have the Appropriations Committees.

The Budget Committees have moved, I believe, or were tempted to move from their initial function—which was how much can we afford for defense—to getting into details that had primarily been the concern of the Armed Services or the Appropriations Committees. I think that the question for the Budget Committee is very simple. How serious is the threat and how much can we afford to provide for that threat. It does not have to get into questions of whether the B–1 is a satisfactory aircraft or whether or not we should have nuclear-powered carriers or the like.

I do not know that I have been particularly detailed in my response to your question. I am always timid, as one who served in the executive branch, in offering too much free advice to the Congress on its internal structure.

Senator NUNN. You have been less restrained than most.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask that next question.

To the extent you have not already answered it in your testimony, do you see other things that we in the Congress could do to increase the extent to which the Department of Defense focuses on the strategic issues rather than the routine and budgetary issues?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is again, a question of structural discipline within the Congress. As the chairman may recall—Senator Nunn perhaps recalls less acutely—what in the past have been issues that were primarily the responsibility of the Armed Services Committees or the Subcommittee on Military Appropriations have now spread over the entire Hill. Much of the senior staff, including the Secretarial level of the OSD, is responsive to demands from all quarters on Capitol Hill. That means that less and less time is left over for the senior members of the Department to deal with these issues.

I understand why the distribution of authority broke down in the post-Watergate period. I understand that historically. But it has not been functional in terms of helping this government department or any government agency preserve the time of its leadership for dealing with the longer-range issues affecting that department or agency.

There has been a proliferation, of course, of questions. Much invaluable time is devoted to fending off attacks from one quarter or another. I think, in a political democracy, that it is desirable and inevitable that those questions on what is happening within the Department come from Congress. But I would like them to be much more focused than they are at present.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask one other question here.

I do not know the history of this, but I gather that the previous arrangement had a separate deputy for research and development and for acquisition. It is my understanding they are now combined.

Would you comment as to whether you think the arrangement today is operating properly, I mean can one person properly oversee research and development and acquisition or should they need to be separate functions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think it may be a difficult emotional stretch for some individuals. It is ideal if you can find the right individual. In the past the logistics arm within the services and within the OSD has tended to be dominated by the development arm. That is the historical problem. As a result, we get a lot of ingenuous new equipment going into the field that has as its only defect that it does not work very well. It can't be maintained, it is not reliable, and so on. DDR&E historically has been the proponent of such equipment.

Conceptually, you would want to tie the logistics function into the development function to assure that the equipment that is developed does take into account that this must ultimately be used out there in the field and must work. For that reason, I think that it is desirable to put the two things together.

The problem is that you may still have within a single entity, the same domination of logistics by development because development is fun, ingenuous, stretching the state of the art. Logistics are boring, routine. Its only important asset is that it is indispensable. But mere indispensability does not mean that it will be attended to.

Therefore, if you can get the right man to put these two functions together, it is the best way. If the man does not have that emotional stretch, it has the same danger as the other system.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, Dr. Schlesinger. It is always a pleasure to have you before this committee to receive your ideas. I appreciate the contribution you have made to this committee and to the Congress as well.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you.

Senator QUAYLE. On page 5, you talk about the inevitable consequence as both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

Then you go on to say the real concern is the efficient design and execution of military operations.

I wonder about this duplication and ambiguity of command you talk about. In looking at the operations, you said in your statement that you do not fear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I hope I did not say that. I say that the probability is very low. I fear it very much.

Senator QUAYLE. The probability will be low, but your more acute attention would be in the quick operations, you mentioned *Mayaguez* and Grenada.

I wonder if you might amplify your concern a bit on the efficient design and execution of the military operation on the *Mayaguez* and also the rescue mission in Iran; and if we are not talking about how

we have this thing structured amplify where each one of the units is all for itself and we get duplication, we get into ambiguity.

Are those instances where we have seen some real problems, particularly the hostage rescue mission in Iran, a mission that failed as soon as we got on the land?

I wonder if this might relate to some of the problems you are talking about?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, you are right on the mark. Those are the very things that I had in mind. I should stress I am not dealing, however, only with those crises. They are perhaps the most glaring crises. We went on in the Vietnam war for years without ever straightening out our command structure satisfactorily.

In these operations, and others can be added—you have two kinds of problems. I mention the coherence, continuity, and also efficiency. At the present time, each of the services wants a piece of the action and, therefore, those crises responses are coupled together in an atmosphere in which each service is demanding that it have a piece of the action and is demanding usually that it control its own forces.

In the *Mayaguez* case—I don't want to overstate these things—the Air Force was gathering together air policemen in Southeast Asia for an invasion of Kota Island. They were lightly armed and were not equipped to deal with forces in Cambodia.

The Navy, for reasons unclear to me in retrospect, sent a refrigerator ship up there. I don't know whether they were hurling frozen steaks at the Cambodians or what. But that is "a piece of the action."

The greatest problem in the *Mayaguez* case, as I mentioned earlier, is that due to circumstances, the Chairman of the JCS was out of town. When the Chairman is out of town, the responsibility devolves to the Acting Chairman. There is never a complete resolution, in the eyes of all services, of the issue of who the Acting Chairman should actually be. There is a possibility for interservice turmoil under those circumstances. The Acting Chairman, whoever it may be, will naturally lean on those people he knows—that is, his own service staff. The problem will be taken away from the Joint Staff and you will lose continuity. I think that was a major problem in the *Mayaguez* incident.

In the Iranian desert operation—I observed that only from the outside. I suspect, Senator, you can get Admiral Holloway to declassify the study on this, which would probably be more detailed than any comments that I can make—you had the clamor for a mission. In that case we wound up using Navy choppers to operate off the carrier deck that had never been involved in any such mission before. The men who were flying the aircraft were not trained for that kind of mission. We had just emerged from a war in Southeast Asia in which that kind of mission had been repeatedly flown by the Air Force with Air Force choppers, with Army people aboard. Those two services had married together and in addition, those Air Force choppers were air refuelable. That was a major problem, as you recall, in the Iranian operation. For whatever reason within the system, we did not go back and redeem those existing capabilities from the Army and the Air Force for that operation. We did not go back and get the expert knowledge represented by those who had conducted the Sontay operation in 1970 which was, from the standpoint of execution, extremely well conducted.

My observation is that inter-service politics and the desire to have a mission played a substantial role in that. The command structure was never quite satisfied. There were multiple elements of command. This, of course, inevitably reflected the desire of each service to avoid putting its own people under the control of any other service.

Unity of command is indispensable, it seems to me, in such operations. I would say that it is generally indispensable, but if you can have the acme of indispensability, it is in such operations in which decisions must be made very quickly.

You have also, in several of these cases, the introduction of deus ex machina from the political level. As a result, we have built into such things political decision points in which an operation can be reversed. That is, in part, the cost that we bear for our own luxuries—to wit, a worldwide military command and control system.

When Chancelor Schmidt some years ago made the decision to dispatch forces to release that Luftwaffe aircraft down in Mogadishu, he did not have a worldwide command and control system. All he had to do was say to the commander, "You had better win. Go on out there. There are your forces. You get my aircraft and my citizens back." Perhaps he said, "You had better not come back to Germany when it is all over if you fail to do so." But he could not intrude in the process.

We, because we have this worldwide command and control system, permit a bunch of kibitzers, political kibitzers, to intrude throughout, and decision points are built in. With regard to building in of decision points, in the Iranian operation you had built in so many decision points that you had increased the hesitancy of the forces who were charged with the mission. Now, that is something outside the Department of Defense.

Senator QUAYLE. Do you think going along the lines of David Jones' recommendations on restructuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff would help clear up the ambiguities that were obviously there?

I am not talking about political ambiguities. I am talking about the Unified Command and some of the problems you brought out in the Iranian hostage situation and *Mayaguez*.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. Would it have helped in assisting in getting a clearer picture?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It would have clarified the problem in Washington. Whether it would have added to the success in the field, only circumstances would have told. But it would have eliminated those problems in Washington in which you have the services essentially approving a plan from below and being reluctant to approve if they don't have a piece of the action.

I think that all of those problems can go away. I think the resistance that is made to such suggestions in certain quarters is probably misguided resistance. For example, the Marine Corps, which is an integrated service in itself, frequently hints and more than hints that the responsibility for certain operations should simply be handed over to the Marine Corps. That rarely or never occurs under the existing structure. I think that many of these operations might simply be handed over—lock, stock and barrel—to the Marines if a chairman were in a position in which he had the simple responsibility for execution. He would say, "Go to it, Marines. I am not going to bother

to satisfy the Air Force or the Army or anybody else." At the present time he is under pressure and he is not free to make that decision. Even though the Marines resist moving in this direction, I am not sure that their objectives would not be best served.

Senator QUAYLE [presiding]. Senator Nunn, do you have any more questions?

Senator NUNN. I have a couple of questions.

Let me make a point here and then I will have a couple more questions.

I think our staff, as we look at this organization and as we address the very points that Secretary Schlesinger has brought up this morning, particularly the questions of *Mayaguez*, and so forth, should look at the Grenada operation and look at it in detail.

This was one that we obviously were successful in and we are not out looking for anybody as a scapegoat at all in that situation. Thank God, we were successful.

Yet, I think we have to recognize we had overwhelming military power and we had very weak opposition, although stronger than our intelligence had anticipated.

One question is why didn't we have better intelligence? That has to be answered. I think that is a very important question.

Another question is was it really as efficient as it could have been when, as I understand it, what we really had was the U.S. Marine Corps on one part of the island and Army on the other part; and they actually drew a line dividing the responsibilities. I think that raises questions. Is that really the way you should conduct an operation against a small island?

The other questions that comes to mind pertains to our having had a number of people wounded from our own aircraft. I know some of that is inevitable, and some of that is unavoidable in wartime. I don't suggest those are always avoidable problems, but I do suggest we ought to look at the structure of command and particularly communications, communication between the services, to determine if some of these mishaps could have been avoided by the right command structure.

The other question is, I understand the Marines could not have done this by themselves because they are stretched thin around the world. That is the preliminary information I have. It may have by necessity been a joint operation.

That is another question we ought to ask. Was there a single branch of service that could have done this or was this situation one that had to be done by both the Army and Marine Corps and to some extent by the other services?

The other important question on Grenada I hope our staff would begin looking at—and I would hope we would have it in the next 30 days through interviews because I think it goes directly to this organizational problem—is did we have two separate sets of commanders on the ground? Who was in charge of the ground forces? Did we have one chain of command or did we have two?

Again, preliminarily, my information is that we had two chains of command. Maybe they joined at some point. Certainly they joined at the White House level, but at what point did they join?

I think this Grenada situation could be a very, very important application of some of the things we are dealing with here.

Senator QUAYLE. I certainly agree with that. I would not just limit it to Grenada, though, because I think we can find some structural deficiencies within the command and operation and the ambiguities Dr. Schlesinger is talking about.

I hope we could incorporate them and make comparisons with Grenada, the *Mayaguez* incident and particularly the Iranian hostages, because I think we will find a lot of similarities. Even though you have three different administrations, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, I think from a structural point of view, we ought to look at that in a comprehensive way. I think it would serve the committee well. I think we ought to go back and revisit the Iranian and *Mayaguez* situations because I think you are absolutely right. When we get down to all the talk of structure, design and everything else, it doesn't make much difference. It is how we execute and some of our execution could be faulty.

Senator NUNN. I completely agree. Fortunately we have a very detailed record on the hostage situation. We have a report by Admiral Holloway.

We also had a committee staff that went into great detail on that. We had interviews with all the pilots, most of the pilots. We had interviews with not just the top people, but all the way down the line.

I think we need to do that with Grenada, too, again in the spirit of having a successful military mission, but looking at it from the point of view of what lessons we can learn about structure.

I think we ought to have a detailed process of interviewing. I will bring that up to the Chairman later.

The question I have, Dr. Schlesinger, and this will be my last one——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I make a comment on your observations, gentlemen?

Senator NUNN. Certainly.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You might want to spread your net more widely and add to the staff's work, not excluding a review of command structure for Vietnam, at least in a cursory way.

As you must recall—I think my memory serves me correctly, the B–52 strikes were controlled out of Omaha, SAC strikes. The Air Force was responding to a chain of command going up through the Pacific Air Force, through Cincpac, for its raids on the north. It was allegedly supposedly responding to General Westmoreland and later General Abrams in the south.

The Navy, through a separate chain of command was conducting its own air war in the north. If one wants to look at the problems of unity of command when we are employing multiple services in an engagement, I think that is a subject worth reviewing at the same time.

Senator NUNN. The one question I have is that there is a strong rumor floating around that the Navy and Marine Corps may not agree with Gen. David Jones' formula for restructuring.

Assuming there is some validity to that rumor, would you, Dr. Schlesinger, address the objections that you have heard from the Navy and Marine Corps and tell us which ones you think are valid, and if any come to mind that might not be valid, we would like to hear that. In other words, I would like your evaluation of the opposition because

if we do draft a bill, if we can get together on it, and if we can make it a bipartisan approach, I assume we will have some rather vigorous debate on it and I think your views on that would be valuable.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Navy has not been an enthusiastic supporter of unification now or in the 1940's. The Navy was reluctant to see the independent Navy Department eliminated and, of course, you will recall during World War II the Navy, under Admiral Cain generally, but in the Pacific, the split between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, tended to run its own war.

If you accept the Navy view of the world it is by and large that "you ought to give us an assignment and we will do the job. Don't let us be too crowded by these intruders who may have good will but have not been Navy trained and are not as competent as we are." But historically a great deal of surface argument has been superimposed upon that underlying belief, "don't fence me in." Fencing in may be the wrong metaphor for the U.S. Navy, but you get the idea. That is the underlying belief.

You get a great deal of utter tosh about the general staff. We do not want to allow a general staff to dominate civilians. I think that there is some element of disingenuousness in the worry about the civilians. The worry about the general staff is that it will dominate the Navy, not the civilians. Let the civilians fend for themselves.

The general staff issue, I think, is, by and large, a red herring for reasons that I indicated in the paper. If you press people in the Navy on unity of command—they teach unity of command at the Naval Academy, at the U.S. Naval War College, at the National War College, and so forth—or whether they really believe in unity of command, the answer is absolutely so, for the Navy, and if you want to assign additional forces to us under Navy command, that is perfectly fine.

Incidentally, that is probably one of the reasons you will discover that the Grenada operation went as well as it did. The Army and Air Force, if not willing, are less unwilling to place their forces under an admiral that the Navy or Marine Corps is to place forces under the command of an Air Force general or Army general. In the entire world there is only one carrier under the control of a general. That is the carrier in the Mediterranean which through the command system at Naples, goes back to Gen. Bernard Rogers in Brussels. Generally speaking, the Navy is not eager to see naval forces under the command of foreign parties. I think that is the heart of the issue.

If you ask the Navy about unity of command, you get essentially the same answer that you get about centralization. Over the years we have had great argument about centralization and decentralization. People who abhor centralization when they are at lower levels of command love it when they move up the chain of command. The fundamental law for decentralization is "decentralize down to my level. Centralize below that."

The same thing applies to unity of command, "we will have unity of command within my service. But, by God, don't impose it from above."

I think that the Navy attitudes are understandable and deep-seated. But, they run against what the United States requires in this period, which is to make the most of its forces with economy of force from unification.

The Navy has resisted outside help over the years. When I was Secretary of Defense, I pressed and pressed and pressed for Air Force assistance to the Navy under conditions of emergency—for the use of B–52's and other aircraft for surveillance or even for attack purposes.

It turns out that I was getting nowhere. I had discovered there had been a marriage agreement. "You stay out of our medium and we will stay out of yours." We could not get the Air Force to tear up that treaty, or it was difficult to get the Air Force to tear up that treaty. That was the case where you were giving to the Navy additional assets to perform its mission.

The Navy likes to have its forces under its own control. Historically all navies have felt this way.

The attempt of the German Army in the imperial days to acquire control over German naval forces—during the period of the buildup in the 1890's under Von Tirpitz—was fiercely resisted because the feeling was, "here we are a small entity and here is the giant military service, the Army. If you have unification, we are going to be crushed"—the case of getting into bed with an elephant.

All navies have resisted this. It was understandable when the demarcation between sea and land conflicts was more clearcut and when air was not an element. With air as an element, you need to be able to exchange sea-based and land-based air forces more interchangeably. That means unity of command.

I think when you press the Navy on this issue—when you press the point that military officers in all of their institutions are preaching responsible leadership and unity of command. How do you square that with defense of a five-sided executive—the answer is, "We would just feel less comfortable under those circumstances."

You notice, I think, that Admiral Train—after great misgivings in terms of his inculcation in the U.S. Navy—testified in behalf of the Jones' reforms before the House and said that he was having trouble with his old Navy colleagues. If you have been in Admiral Train's position, Cinclant, the need for greater unity is quite clearcut.

When I was Chairman of the AEC, I presided over a five-sided executive, the Atomic Energy Commission. With the support of members of the Commission, with the White House, one was able to nurse out of the five-sided executive some consensus agreement.

But the thing most to bear in mind is the time that it took. There was no command. There was some influence and authority. There was no command. When one is facing a crisis which is time urgent, one does not have the luxury, it seems to me, of permitting a five-sided executive to decide on strategic plans to handle that crisis.

I think if the Navy is pressed, they will come off all of this stuff about the German General Staff. Most of the heads of the German General Staff were removed with considerable rapidity. Some of them were executed by Adolph Hitler.

World War II is not a testimonial to the dominance of the German General Staff. The basic point is that, even with the disadvantages of sacrificing unity of command, which we defend in the abstract, the Navy can perform its mission so much better independently that we are prepared to see that principle violated.

I think that unity of command is indispensable, given the structure of the forces of the United States, given the fact that, in terms of sheer

force structure, the Soviet Union and its allies continue to dominate us in numbers. Therefore, one must achieve the best integration of what we have if we are effectively to indulge in combat and perhaps even if we are effectively to deter.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator QUAYLE. I have just a couple of quick questions on the Joint Staff.

On the Joint Staff, do you believe that these assignments should be permanent or should they be temporary assignments?

My thinking is on a permanent basis they may be more objective and they might not have any fear of retribution once they go back to their individual service, who would say, "You sold me out."

Do you think it should be permanent?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think there must be devised by the Congress and by the Secretary of Defense methods for protection of the careers of those who serve in the Joint Staff. For example, requiring at least as high a percentage and perhaps a higher percentage of promotions of people to particular ranks if they are serving in a Joint Staff capacity. That will encourage the services to send their better people to the Joint Staff.

I would be hesitant to move as far as you suggest, Senator, at this time. I am hesitant partly because of the concern that has long existed that we could create the equivalent of the German General Staff in which one had an elite that was separated from the mass of officers who were out there in the field. The staff officer was dominant.

There is concern. I think if you get Gen. Louis Wilson back up here, he will express this concern. This is the concern of a fighting Marine—we are getting too many people who earn their promotions through the staff system and too few who are actually able to lead troops in the field—have capability of this combat leadership. That is a concern you should very carefully examine.

At this time, all I think is necessary is greater flexibility in the system. The House passed legislation to extend the term of service on the Joint Staff from 3 to 4 years. It allows flexibility for the Chairman, with the permission of the Secretary of Defense, to extend beyond the 4 years for individuals.

We can reform by evolution. I think that if the Congress makes it clear that it believes in the jointness of the military establishment and it demands that the services respect that, you will get almost as much improvement as you can get by any other means—without having the risk of establishing an elite through a permanent staff.

Senator QUAYLE. Who best can make the determinations of length of service of the Joint Staff? Should it come from individual services or should you put more authority in the hands of the Chairman or election process?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would change that now. In that respect I don't remember precisely—I think the House legislation goes in the right direction, that the Chairman should have considerable authority, that he can tell the services how large a list he wants of available officers. For example, if you have 30 places and you get a list of 31 candidates, you are not allowing much latitude, you are imposing your own choices.

I think that at the present time the Joint Staff gets some very good officers. But, at the moment, the services or some of the services do hold back their very best officers from those joint assignments.

Senator QUAYLE. Why is that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think there are a variety of motives. If they are very good, if they are comers, you don't want to waste them on an assignment that the service considers less good.

If you have a structure such as the JCS in which you have four or five rights of quasi-veto in the system, you don't have to have your best officer over there to say, "Well, we are not going along with this plan unless you increase your recommendation for weapon system *X*."

That is a very simple message. You can have an ambassador who is not your optimum man. The service will have the feeling that they may want to retain the very best people. This varies by the service.

Historically, for example, the Army has been much more willing to provide its best people for these kinds of joint functions. The Army historically has been joint minded, as it were much more so than the Navy. That comes out of World War II and before.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you.

I always find you a most interesting witness. We appreciate your time.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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MX MISSILE AND SDI POLICY ISSUES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 12, 1985.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:45 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This morning I would like to welcome all the people here to the meeting of the Defense Policy Panel which is continuing its deliberations on the MX missile and the strategic defense initiative, focusing on the impact these systems might have on the arms control negotiations that are beginning today.

On Wednesday afternoon, tomorrow afternoon, at 3:30, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Secretary of State George Shultz were scheduled to appear, but because Secretary Shultz is in Moscow for the funeral, Secretary Weinberger will be here and Ambassador Nitze will be here.

Tomorrow afternoon at 3:30 we will have Ambassador Nitze and Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger. And on Thursday we will have a panel of individuals who have specialized in Soviet studies.

So there will be a panel of witnesses who are experts in the Soviet Union; Americans, who have studied about the Soviet Union and will be here to talk about the arms control talks, SDI, MX, what is going on in Moscow, et cetera.

Today we have a very special guest, somebody that I thought would offer a very different perspective regarding the upcoming negotiations and would be very helpful to us in talking about the impact that MX, SDI has in the process, how they look at the process, how they look at those weapons, how they make their decisions, what their negotiating stance might be, and questions of that nature.

We have Mr. Shevchenko, who had extensive experience in the Soviet Union. He was an adviser to Foreign Minister Gromyko from 1970 to 1973. He dealt with such issues as United States-Soviet relations, SALT I, and disarmament. Prior to that position he participated in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

He was an expert on disarmament with the Soviet delegation headed by Nikita Krushchev at the 15th session of the General Assembly in 1960.

It is a great pleasure to welcome you here. On behalf of the panel I take great pleasure in welcoming you.

Bill Dickinson.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, would like to join in welcoming you, Mr. Shevchenko. It will be very beneficial to us to get the opinion of someone looking through the other end of the glass, so to speak.

I think your insight into the Soviet mind, having worked as long as you did in the area of national defense, and your adviser observations to us will be very helpful. We do appreciate your being here, particularly at this time when, on the 20th of this month, before the end of this month, anyway, we will be voting on whether or not to unfence the money that is presently fenced for the continuation of the building of our MX missiles.

So I have read the excerpts of your new book in—I believe it was Time Magazine, one of the weekly news publications. I am looking forward to reading the entire book. And I do think that what you have to say can have a very serious impact on what action the House might take.

So thank you for coming.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shevchenko, why don't you begin with an opening statement or whatever, and then we would like to ask you some questions.

STATEMENT OF ARKADY N. SHEVCHENKO, FORMER AIDE TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I would like to express to the members of this panel and particularly to the chairman, Congressman Les Aspin, my gratitude and appreciation for inviting me to give this testimony. I am very proud to participate in the work of the committee and will do my best to answer all questions as completely as possible.

Today, March 12, marks the resumption of negotiations in Geneva—or as the Soviet leadership describes them, the "new negotiations" on a "complex of questions concerning space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and intermediate range," as was agreed upon last January when Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko met.

I am neither pessimistic nor optimistic about the final outcome of these negotiations. After all, we are now at an initial stage of negotiating with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet leadership's willingness to resume negotiations is in itself a welcome turn toward

more constructive conduct after the breakdown of negotiations following the Soviet walkout from the previous talks.

SOVIET POLICY NOT AFFECTED BY CHERNENKO'S DEATH

In my view, Constantin Chernenko's death and the selection of Gorbachev as the new party leader is most unlikely to affect the Soviet position because there has been collective leadership in the Kremlin for a long time.

We should not be misled by recent Soviet attacks against United States policy in arms reduction. Regarding foreign policy generally and disarmament in particular, the Soviet Union has always taken a double-track approach: propaganda bluster on one hand, coupled with realistic talks on the other.

The Soviet Union is certainly attempting to split NATO and put the President, the Congress, and the American people at odds. Soviet leaders know that negotiations tend to have a calming effect.

There are already demands to stop some or all military programs because some people believe that we have to make unilateral concessions even before coming to the negotiating table. This approach is wrong and even dangerous.

I know from my own experience in the Soviet Government that it sees this attitude very clearly and has become expert at playing upon fears that feed so naturally upon other fears.

While I participated in the elaboration of Soviet policy, I learned that it has never been Soviet strategy to make concessions at the beginning of negotiations. The U.S.S.R. would traditionally set a nonrealizable objective and later try to sell any compromise for the highest possible price.

There are now both domestic and external pressures on the Soviet leadership to enter into serious negotiations on arms reduction. I believe that any opportunities for verifiable agreements on arms reductions between the U.S.S.R. and the United States that are in the best interest of our security should not be missed.

As I learned over many years, the Soviet Union believes that one of America's weaknesses is that it is very difficult for the U.S. Government to develop a bipartisan policy toward negotiations with it on arms control and disarmament. In the past, the Soviet leaders have turned this to their advantage. They will attempt to do so again.

I think that we have to at least try—within the framework of our free democratic society—to elaborate tactics and strategy with the broadest possible support of different political forces in the country under the leadership of President Reagan and the Congress and the participation of those who have had experience in negotiating with the Soviets. Such support may be difficult to organize but it is worthwhile to make the effort.

HOW TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS

According to what I know, anyone seeking to negotiate with Moscow on arms control must bear in mind the following two considerations:

First, if we make unilateral concessions, the Kremlin will simply escalate its demands. Therefore, we should not make concessions up front.

And second, if we try to impose something on the Soviet leaders, this tactic would probably result in a stalemate. It would likely push the Soviet leaders into a fortress mentality that may lead them to both greater repression at home and more dangerous adventures abroad.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me start out the questions by asking one that I think everybody would be curious about, particularly on the topic—it is not particularly on the topic of the subject today. But, sir, do you know Mr. Gorbachev? What do you know about him? And in what way do you think that the Soviet Union might be a different place under his leadership than previously?

GORBACHEV IS A DYNAMIC PERSONALITY

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. There is no question that Gorbachev is one of the most dynamic personalities in the Politburo, which is reduced now only to 10 men.

The man is very well educated. He has good experience as a manager of the economy and agriculture. He later had quite substantial experience for several years in Moscow as a secretary of the party and a member of the Politburo.

Of course, he looks impressive compared to years, years and years of the invalids. We have seen sick men ruling the Soviet Union from the late seventies, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, have been not able even to speak properly. And then they disappear without any kind of public explanation. As a result, it is natural that a person like Gorbachev is impressive when he speaks or appears in public.

In what way he can be a different—different from other Soviet leaders—he is younger. There is no question about that. He is the youngest man in the Politburo. He is the person who I think will be able to do quite a lot of things in the future.

But what we have to understand—there are two things which are very important at this moment to keep in mind.

One, that selection of Gorbachev as the new party leader of the Soviet Union doesn't mean that he immediately becomes the sole leader with full authority.

In the Soviet Union, authority which Lenin had, Stalin had, Brezhnev had at a certain period of his time, or Krushchev had. He is a person at the beginning of his real big political career. Still, in the Politburo, the majority are the persons who are in their middle seventies, if not older. Still Gorbachev has to share power with them.

The selection of the General Secretary of the party doesn't bring him automatically power like the power of the President of the United States, to compare—also, the comparison sometimes are wrong. Not at all. It is still a collective leadership in the Soviet Union.

It remains to be seen how the power sharing arrangements will be done in the Soviet Union—whether Gorbachev, like Andropov and Brezhnev in the past, also will become President of the Soviet Union, who would be the next Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. Tikhonov is still there, but he is almost 80. So that these questions have to be decided. And it is not only the question in the Politburo itself. There now is a collective leadership and as the Soviet calls it, Gorbachev now becomes first among the equals—a few equals.

Some of these equals, I would say, perhaps have more power than he does at the moment in certain areas. There is no question that Gorbachev would deal with the internal party affairs of the Soviet Union, as a party leader, that he would deal with a number of economic problems, and so on and so forth.

But when it comes to foreign policy, who now is more important as a force in the Soviet Union as far as foreign policy is concerned. Does Gorbachev, can he be compared with Andrei Gromyko? Gromyko is not just a bureaucrat. There are some experts in the United States—I don't like to mention their names—who just consider that there is an ignorant respect for Gromyko because he survives so long.

I think these experts are ignorant, because Gromyko proved to be one of the most sophisticated leaders in the Soviet Union who became from a bureaucrat a major political figure of the Soviet Union, a symbol of stability of the Soviet system.

His consistency is not only the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry. His constituency is the party apparatus of the Soviet Union and the Soviet elite. He has enormous power and respect of the whole population in the Soviet Union and in the whole world.

There is no question in my mind that Gromyko will continue to be a dominant force in deciding the matters and shaping the Soviet foreign policy as far as the arms control is concerned or any other matter.

Gorbachev must likely concentrate at this moment all his efforts in consolidating his power within the party apparatus, in putting his persons in the central committee, in key positions of the central committee of the party, in trying to help to add new members of the Politburo, because the Politburo is reduced now only to 10.

And I have no doubt that very soon it will be increased. There are persons like alternative members of the Politburo, secretaries of the party, who for sure will in a few months be full members of the Politburo, a very important member of the Politburo.

He is 60 now, relatively young man for the Soviet Union. So that if we talk, or the subject now before the committee—I would say that I can hardly see that Gorbachev even will devote too much attention to the forthcoming negotiations on arms control, because he has to deal with so many problems in the Soviet Union.

And he trusts Gromyko. They have good relations. It is Gromyko who becomes now unusually strong force in the Soviet Union because at the moment there is a period when Soviet military influence and role, which is always very substantial in shaping Soviet foreign policy, particularly in the arms control area, is less than at any moment which I remember.

Now, we have in the Soviet Union after the death of Ustinov one of the key members of the Politburo, half civilian, half military—after dismissal actually of Marshal Ogarkov, who I think in the view of some civilian members of the Politburo got too much public visibility, and too much influence.

After that what do we have among the Soviet military? We have Marshal Sokolov. He is 73. All right. Some of the politicians also at this age are very able and dynamic still. There is no question about that.

But Marshall Sokolov is a very ordinary man. He never has been outstanding, neither during the Second World War or later. He is more a "yes" man to the civilians in the Politburo than any of the Soviet defense ministers have been before, in the last, I would say, two decades.

Marshal Grechko was a personal friend of Brezhnev. And besides, he was one of the leading marshals in the Second World War. Who was Sokolov at that time? A minor commander of something.

So that we see now actually there is no military in the Politburo. None of the members of the Politburo—and the Politburo decides everything, military—they are instruments of the party, of the top party leadership. And at this moment Gromyko concentrated enormous power in his hands because of the decline of the influence of the military.

Naturally he will consult with the military, with the general staff, with Marshal Akhromeev who has a great deal of experience in dealing with the negotiations, strategic or others. But Marshal Akhromeev, you know, can hardly be considered equal to Gromyko when they talk on something. And Gromyko has himself personally enormous experience in all the arms control negotiations and knowledge.

If in the past, in the Khrushchev period of time or something, he was more an implementer of the policy of the Soviet Union, he is a creator of the policy now.

Before that, the military would hide from him some details or information concerning the Soviet military programs. Now they can no longer do that. There is no question about that.

And look at who has been appointed as the Soviet top negotiators in Geneva. They are all Gromyko's men, all from the Foreign Ministery—Karpov, Kusinsky, Oberov. These are all Gromyko's men.

All people who have been bureaucrats, diplomats in the foreign ministry and appointed by Gromyko. And who would report to Gromyko first of all. And it was Gromyko who even before these men would report anything to Moscow, it was Gromyko who would scrutinize all this information before anything even reaches the Politburo.

So, to sum up, the selection of Gorbachev as the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should not be underestimated in any way. We have a dynamic person, with charisma. He charmed some ladies in some countries already. He is a good looking man, very intelligent.

I think that the Soviet party apparatus, especially the people who for a long time awaited the moment when the old geezers,

would finally give them a chance. It is a welcome thing in itself, I think.

SOVIET UNION NEEDS NEW BLOOD

The Soviet Union needs a new strong leadership, new blood. The question is how much time it will take for these new people to establish themselves, not only in the Politburo itself, in the central committee, but in general in the whole party apparatus of the Soviet Union.

I am also convinced—it is clear from what Gorbachev has been saying from his first statement—it is economy and the social program which exists in the Soviet Union, and party affairs. That is that in which he is interested.

There are a lot of Kremlinologists, Sovietologists in the United States, who missed and never understood what drove the Foreign Ministry. What role the Foreign Ministry and particularly under Gromyko plays now in shaping the Soviet foreign policy.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for that statement which I find very interesting. I am sure all of us will find it very helpful.

Going back as far as Khrushchev, he found it very interesting to take the measure of President Kennedy. I think he formed a bad judgment initially. And perhaps the Cuban missile crisis might have been averted if he hadn't misjudged the man.

But going up through Nixon, which I think was viewed as a rather strong leader, and then Carter later—could you give us some feel for how President Reagan is viewed?

Is he viewed as a war monger? Is he viewed as a cunning man? Is he viewed as a man of integrity who will keep his word? Could you help us as to what your opinion is as to the Soviet view of President Reagan?

SOVIET VIEW OF PRESIDENT REAGAN

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I think that the Soviet leadership have a mixed feeling as far as President Reagan is concerned. It is a mixture of hatred with respect. Hatred because they saw him as a very strong leader of our Nation who learned how to deal with the Soviet Union.

I ask forgiveness of the President—perhaps at the initial period of the administration, he had to learn a number of things. But there is a clear cut evolution in his thinking and understanding of the nature of the Soviet leadership and how to deal with them.

I think that now he is one of the greatest leaders of the free world who understands how to deal with the Soviet Union, and in addition to that he revitalized the spirit of America, the belief of Americans in themselves. And the Soviet leadership sees, they understand that.

And if we go back to history, we also know how the Soviets hated Richard Nixon when he had the reputation of one of the strongest anti-Communists and so on and so forth, and turned later to con-

sider him as one of the greatest Presidents of the United States. They never understood Watergate.

They have Watergate every day in the Soviet Union.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me ask you one other question. We read occasionally, there have been some books written on it, the media gives space to the Soviet Department of Misinformation. We have a number of newspapers in our media, stories appear which were Soviet inspired, but without the authorship being known. To what extent is this true?

Is it an ongoing, extensive effort on the part of the Soviets, this Bureau of Misinformation? How prevalent is it?

DISINFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Of course, there is a special department in the KGB which is called Disinformation Department. It used to be in the Foreign Ministry, also, which was abolished in the Foreign Ministry. In the Central Committee of the Party, there is a department which is called the International Information Department headed by Leonid Zemek.

There is an International Department of the Central Committee headed by—Secretary of the Party. But, of course, the disinformation activities of the Soviet Union are enormous. Enormous.

I tried to describe in my memoirs the role of people like Arbatov and others. And there is a misunderstanding in the academic community of the United States and other countries about his real actual role.

He was called a senior advisor to Brezhnev on American Affairs and so on and so forth. Let me tell you. I have firsthand experience—in the kind of role Arbatov had in the decisionmaking process of the Soviet Union. He was not on the distribution list of the code cables which had been sent by Ambassador Dobrinin to Moscow.

He was a senior part-time fellow of his institute at that time. Arbatov never has been any kind of adviser to Brezhnev on American affairs. Gromyko never received him.

For my 3 years, which were crucial for Soviet-American relations during the first summit meeting in 1972, Arbatov never came to the Foreign Ministry. Gromyko never received him. And it was Gromyko at this period of time with Brezhnev who had been deciding the most important matters.

But people like Arbatov, Zagladin and Zamyotin and some others, they have been really doing quite a lot of disinformation, unfortunately, which was accepted by a lot of people in the academic society of the United States. I understand their position, because how can they learn something about the Soviet Union?

They have no access to the members of the Politburo. There are people in the Soviet Union who are talking with them. Arbatov deliberately sometimes get some minor detail which is not very important to give to some people in the United States to establish his credibility, which means very little.

So all in all the disinformation activity of the Soviet Union, of course, is enormous.

I think that one thing also should be noticed. Recently in the last several months already, or even I would say a year ago, the spokesmen of the Kremlin, as they are called, who before was Zamyotin, Chief of the International Information Department of the Central Committee, or Zagladin—their role is diminished so substantially that actually now the chief of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry, Lemayto, has a press briefing at the Foreign Ministry, and he becomes a much more important spokesman for the Soviet Government, including on the matters which are not only foreign policy matters, which also shows a shift of responsibility and increasing role of Gromyko as Foreign Minister.

Let me add also a few things which the press will not like. But let me tell you there is a lot of things which are going on in the American media. Some people pick up some of the sensational stories.

I don't like to blame anyone for that. This is the way the mass media operate in the free world. But very often, without—I don't think that is done deliberately, with a few exceptions—there is no question in my mind that some people have been brainwashed, some of the correspondents, some of the American mass media who are correspondents in Moscow, they are brainwashed by the Soviets, there is no question about that.

Either they realize that or don't realize that, it depends on their ability. But as I see very often how the international issues have been handled in the American mass media, it is a great help for the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet Information Department cannot do such a good job, because the Soviets don't understand very well the mentality of the West.

Yesterday I was at "Night Line," the show with Ted Kopel, and Henry Kissinger. And Dennis Healey was there, who is one of the leaders of the Labor Party of the United Kingdom. And he met with Gorbachev.

But what he said was ridiculous nonsense, because he actually said that Gorbachev has now become a leader of the Soviet Union who controls everything and that there is a kind of alliance, as he said, among younger people in the Politburo, like Vorotnikov, Romanov, and so on and so forth.

This is ridiculous, because Romanov was one of the rivals of Gorbachev for power. Vorotnikov is more a Gromyko man than a Gorbachev man in the Soviet leadership. You know, to say such things about the Soviet leadership without a clear cut understanding, that we deal with the Soviet system.

We do not deal with one sole leader of the Soviet Union. Even Stalin was a person who was a dictator, still even in Stalin's time we deal with the system of the Soviet Union. And Khrushchev, who went a little bit beyond some of the limits which was not acceptable for the party apparatus of the Soviet Union, and who was ousted at the moment when no one in the whole world including Khrushchev could imagine such a thing happening to him.

So at the moment we have to realize the importance of the new leader in the Kremlin. I think it is a very good thing that Vice President Bush is going to the Chernenko funeral, and will have a conversation with Gorbachev.

I don't think that the President of the United States has to go to Moscow for such occasion, for essentially in my view, for two reasons. One, it is nobody is prepared to substance to talk with Gorbachev.

Second, Gorbachev is not even yet in a position to represent fully the views of the Politburo or of the Soviet leadership. And second, why should the President of the United States go to the funeral of such a personality like Chernenko who was a person who was the least able leader of the Soviet Union, who was the worse party apparatchik in the Soviet Union, who didn't have respect of the other members of the Politburo, and was selected just as a transitional leader of the Soviet Union?

He was known as a man who participated in crude propaganda. He never had any kind of serious experience ever.

A meeting of the President of the United States and the Soviet leaders is very important. There is no question about that. Let's wait, let's see what kind of positions develop in the course of negotiations.

As I mentioned, I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about that. But I see the possibilities because there is a serious problem in the Soviet Union, not only with the economy, not only the economic performance in the Soviet Union, below any expectation. I disagree with the view of a lot of the people who try to claim that the Soviet Union is in crisis, that they are almost on the verge of collapse. There are a lot of people who predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1984. I doubt that it will collapse even in 10 or 20 years from now.

But there are serious problems in the Soviet Union. There are serious discrepancies in the Soviet economy. There is a problem of allocation of resources in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership understands very well that what they have achieved, and what they call military strategic parity, has cost them very dearly during almost the last two decades.

It led to a disruption of the structure of the Soviet economy. And it meant a serious neglect, not only consumer goods, but other sectors, because priority was given to military programs.

The Soviet people also understand that there is improvement in the standard of living in the Soviet Union, no question about that. But the promises and expectations have never been fulfilled.

There is a tremendous failure in the promises which have been made to the Soviet population, and not only to the Soviet population, but to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Whatever they call or might call Khrushchev, in 1961 a program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was adopted.

And the fulcrum of the Soviet party of the Communist Union is like the constitution for us. All right—it is no more in circulation for a few reasons. And the essential reasons why this program was withdrawn, even from the political system of the Soviet Union is, one, that in this program is written black and white that by 1972, 14 years ago, the Soviet Union was supposed to surpass in production, all production, industrial, agricultural, the United States.

Where does the Soviet Union stand now? It was supposed to be 14 years ago. By best estimates of any experts, the production of the Soviet Union, compared with everything, is at maximum 60

percent of the United States—14 years after the promise was made in the program of the Communist Party.

Second, in this program the goal was set that by 1980, 4 years ago, the essential elements, official, of the Communist society should be constructed in the Soviet Union. Where are they now?

They themselves have to correct all the things and develop a new idea that the Soviet Union now in a stage of so-called development of socialism.

I don't like to take too much of your time on all these things. But we have to understand what is going on in the Soviet Union. These promises has not been fulfilled. It is really major efforts are needed to move the Soviet economy. I doubt we can expect a transformation of the Soviet Union into the kind of free enterprise society as far as econmy is concerned.

But there are a lot of things which can be done within the limits of the system, of the Soviet system. Of course, the means of production will remain in the Soviet state. But there is a lot of room for improvement.

Better planning, some experiments in less centralized economy, give more authority to the managers, try to invent incentives for the population of the Soviet Union to work better, because there is a lot of truth in the jokes which are an expression of the Soviet—the only way the Soviet people can express themselves, there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, but nobody works. And they have to do something with all these things.

Pricing is ridiculous, and has nothing to do with demand and supply. Especially Gorbachev, with his fresh and much better understanding of the reality of the economy, knows that.

So that I think we can expect the Soviet Union to make more—could make more concessions in the forthcoming talks than we even believe. They will never tell that at the beginning. In my introductory remarks I mentioned that. But we can expect from the Soviet leadership perhaps much more than anybody believes.

The CHAIRMAN. Bill Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to talk a little bit about the MX. As you know, in a week or so we are going to be faced with a vote for releasing the moneys for the MX program.

Would you discuss with us how the Soviet leadership considers the MX as a major threat to the Soviet Union; and if the MX should be deployed, what responses would you expect the Soviet Union to take?

Finally, what impact will the U.S. decision regarding the MX have on the current round of talks in Geneva?

SOVIET VIEW OF MX

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I think at the present moment it is not MX which is the major worry of either the Soviet political leadership or Soviet military. It is the strategic defense initiative. That is something which really worries—it is a grave problem for the politburo and the military. It is a grave, if not a nightmarish problem.

Because the Soviet Union comes to a situation when—which is called rough—strategic military parity exists now with the United

States and the Soviet Union. Let me tell you a few words about this parity.

There is a little bit sometimes nervous debate in this country about who is ahead, who is behind. Of course, we deal here—and I think that Kissinger once—Dr. Kissinger once mentioned—he is absolutely right—that comparing two strategic arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, we have to understand we deal with weapons systems which have never been used. They have been tested; that is true. But they have not been actually used—if we talk about the strategic weapons systems.

There is, of course, no question that in some respects the Soviet Union has been ahead of the United States during the two last decades or more. Secretary Weinberger I think yesterday, and several times previously, mentioned that the Soviet Union, in recent years, produced at least two generations of heavy Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile systems. There is no expert in the world who would deny that the Soviet blockbusters, as they are called—SS–18's and SS–19's—they are one of the best operational strategic weapons systems which exist in the whole world—the very accurate missiles which are a real big threat to the United States.

Second, the Soviet Union achieved—there is no question about that—what I would call superiority in the area in Europe by deploying the large substantial number of the SS–20 missiles. By the way, at the beginning it was not very much noticed what the Soviets have been doing. It was considered initially just replacement of some old Soviet medium-ranged missiles. But it evolved into an enormous threat, and changed the whole balance in Europe.

The Soviets achieved the capability to destroy Europe in a matter of 10 or 15 minutes. This is a very substantial change in any kind of a balanced relationship.

We are ahead of the Soviet Union in other components of the strategic force. There is no question about that.

Now, the direct answer to your question again, MX program or stealth technology, or the other—Minuteman or the other American programs which the United States is now discussing in the Congress—certainly the Soviet leadership doesn't like the United States in the process of doing that. Their major interest is to freeze this balance which exists now.

But the most important preoccupation of the Soviet leadership now is the strategic defense initiative, commonly called star wars—I don't know who invented this. Somebody just took it from the movies, I think, because it is not a star wars, in my view. But it is considered by the Soviet leadership to be a real serious threat, in a sense that it can eventually—if it can be implemented or some elements of that program could be implemented—because I think no one knows now what exactly we can expect from the initial stage of research and so on.

It remains to be seen what has to be done in this respect. But the Soviet leadership are afraid of two things: One, that the American lead in producing, in research, and later in the implementation of some of the elements of the strategic defense could destroy or change drastically the existing balance.

If you read all the statements which have been made by all members of the Politburo during the recent election, the Soviet—

the Supreme Parliament of the Russian Federation all of them, without exception, stressed the importance of keeping the present military balance. They said: "We are not seeking superiority over the United States, but we also will not accept American superiority if the United States will try to do that."

And they see that the competition with the United States, with the technological advantages of the United States, they can lose in this competition as far as defensive systems are concerned.

RESPONSE TO MX

I have no doubt what the Soviet response would be to that. It would be a response in two directions, actually: One, that they would continue to increase the sophistication of their offensive systems; and second, they would try to catch up with the United States, because the Soviet Union—they talk a lot about the American strategic defense initiative. But they are silent, at least in the Soviet Union, and don't like to talk very much.

What do they have? They do have an operational ABM system around Moscow. It is not, of course, a 100-percent proof ballistic system, which is allowed by the ABM treaty. The United States opted not to have anything like that.

Second, the Soviet Union already has an operational antisatellite system, weapons system. We are in the process of doing something better than this. But they already have, and they already have the capability to destroy the satellites at some altitudes. They cannot do anything with some of the satellites at the high altitudes. But they do have this capability.

There is a question of what the Soviet Union is doing in general. Are we sure that the Soviet Union, in their research program is already engaged in their own star war program? Do we know what is going on in the Soviet laboratories, what they are designing, what they are doing?

What we know, there is a great radar station in Krasnaryask which is, in fact, at least in my departure, if not a violation of the ABM treaty—and, of course, the Soviet leadership as usual is trying to interpret it in its own way. They tell us it is just a satellite tracking station. But why not ask us over, to allow us to see it? Why not the Soviet themselves—it is the Soviet leadership, which asks the United States to stop unilaterally all the efforts in all respects. But are they prepared to stop the construction of the Krasnaryask radar station?

There was no answer, as far as I know, from the Soviet side in this respect. And I doubt very much that the Soviet Union—and Gromyko was absolutely clear in one of his talks with the Soviet journalists in January when he said, oh yes, if we talk about research in the field of defensive systems, we have a big problem—we have a big problem. He was by implication almost saying no, we will not allow any international expansion of the American inspection in the Soviet laboratory or other facilities of the Soviet Union.

So if we don't know what they are doing, we mistrust them. Of course, they mistrust us also; there is no question about that. But we face a serious problem here which will be decided by the Con-

gress of the United States, by the President, by the experts in this country.

So I think MX and other things are of concern to the Soviet Union. But let me repeat again—and let me repeat what I said in my introductory remarks—and I would repeat it again—that if we negotiate with the Soviet Union, and I repeat again—if we make unilateral concessions—and I mean if the Congress of the United States at this moment just decided to stop some or all programs which are under discussion, just thinking that it might help facilitate the forthcoming Geneva talks, then the Kremlin will simply escalate its demands.

It is not in the Soviet mentality to think in a way that the more concessions you give them, the more conciliatory they become. We should not forget historical lessons. Some of the leaders in Europe tried to appease Hitler before the Second World War, and we know what happened and how much it cost humanity. So to appease the Soviet leadership would be a big mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, wish to welcome you here. I found your discussion to the point, and your responses to be extremely interesting. You have covered many of the questions I would have propounded.

But one thing more: You mentioned the media. We live in a free society, of course. We don't have the same rules that prevail in the Soviet Union. I think that is to our benefit.

But could you tell us, as much as you can, what is the effort made in this country by the Soviet Union, both through espionage and open channels, to secure information that could lead them to an equal parity with us in the strategic defense initiative, and other areas as well?

We read some of this in the press. But do you have any information as to what the Soviet Union's effort is in ferreting out industrial secrets, military secrets, what they read in the New York Times and other media? And how is that put together?

SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. You mentioned we have a free society. And I don't think that the American people will ever change this society. I think it would be wrong to change this society.

But comparing what, let's say, the American intelligence can get from the Soviet Union—they can do very little. But the Soviet Union can do a lot in this country. I never have worked for the KGB, but I had quite a lot of knowledge about their operations, because as a high Soviet official both in Moscow and in the UN, I read the KGB cables which were on the table, of Gromyko. The residence of the KGB in New York or Washington—they have sometimes asked me to help them, to put their people in the UN Secretariat, or so on and so forth.

I can distinguish here who was a real diplomat or who was just sent under the cover of diplomats, because I had been serving in the Soviet Foreign Service for more than 22 years. And someone who is coming with a biography, and they say he was a diplomat in such and such department of the Foreign Ministry, I know he was

not. And especially under Andropov the major objectives of the Soviet intelligence operations in this country were reoriented. It is no longer something of just a James Bond espionage activities. Because I think that Ambassador Dobrynin, and the other people can get whatever political information the Soviet Government needs.

But the main focus of attention of the Soviet intelligence, both KGB and GRU, Soviet military intelligence is, of course, to know and to learn about the American military programs, what are the initial stages, what is going on—how many people have been discovered as cooperating with the Soviets either for money or other reasons. The Soviets have an enormous amount of the people in this country.

And there is no reciprocity, for the simple reason if we have only the Soviet Embassy in Moscow, then we can control the number of the people in both embassies. But there is no way to control the number or the personnel in the Soviet mission to the United Nations. There is no rule there. And it is beyond the control of the American Government.

Moreover, the Soviets have more than 300 employees in the United Nations Secretariat. There are a lot of other people—journalists, a lot of other people—and at least at minimum half of them are professional KGB or GRU people, very well-trained people.

During the Andropov period, a lot of real scientists, real engineers, who knew a lot about modern technology, have been recruited, sent to the KGB school, and come to the United States. And when you talk with them, or an American scientist talks to them, they will see that these people are really very knowledgeable about the subjects which are being discussed. It is a big threat for the United States' security.

I know that the Congress, it is natural to cut the budget and to save money and all kinds of things—one of the preoccupations and the responsibility of the Congress of the United States. But I think it would be the wrong thing to try to save money and not to give enough funds to the FBI to properly follow the Soviet intelligence activities in this country, which is a real great threat to our security.

The CHAIRMAN. Nick Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the gentleman for coming before us.

You mentioned before that Gorbachev is a charming individual. I might say, you have those same mannerisms. We appreciate your appearance here this morning.

The MX missile, as brought up by my colleague, Mr. Nichols—I appreciate your candor in your response to him.

Is there any question in the minds of the Soviet leaders that perhaps the resolve is not there on the part of the U.S. Congress, along with the President of the United States, in view of the fact that during the last 4 years we have given to this President about 95 or 96 percent of all that he has asked for relative to arms and weaponry and the military—and under Mr. Carter, as a matter of fact, his last 2 years, we gave to him almost everything that he asked for—so I think if I could just briefly get from you an answer

to a question—because I have a number of others; we are only limited to 5 minutes.

Will the MX missile make or break the arms control talks that are going on in Geneva today? Will that one particular weapons system destroy the arms control talks as some people in this country would have us to believe? Could you answer that briefly?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Yes, as briefly as possible: No.

Mr. MAVROULES. I appreciate that very much.

And let me share with you a conversation that disturbed me somewhat that I had with Ambassador Israelyan. You are probably familiar with him. He negotiates the chemical warfare. He is the Soviet leader in that area. When I visited with him 2 years ago in Geneva, with other members of this committee, as a matter of fact, he said to me—and this is a quote—that, "You came just in time; I just got through writing to my granddaughter, and I am saying to my granddaughter I have been unsuccessful in my attempts to reach an agreement with the U.S. on chemical weapons or the elimination of chemical weapons."

I said to him, "I, too, have grandchildren. And I think we have an obligation to do all that we can to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the earth." And he hit me with something very strange—when he felt that the United States Government tries to impose our will on the Soviet Union, which I really resented, to be quite honest with you.

Then, of course, my retort was--we referred to Afghanistan and Central America, Latin America and other parts of the world where the Soviet Union certainly has taken the initiative.

The problem that bothers me, however, is what he said to me. He said, "You did not lose 20 million people in World War II and more in World War I. We lost 20 million people." It is that mindset that disturbs me, because, quite honestly, without the United States, maybe Russia would not be there today. I don't know. We were able to be successful in unison and allies at that time.

Is this one of the problems that we have with the Soviet bureaucracy, that they never again want to be weak; they probably want superiority? Is this one of the problems in breaking through with the Soviet leaders?

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. You ask me not one question but a number of questions. Unfortunately, I cannot give you such a brief answer which I gave on the MX, because you ask a question about the chemical weapons, about the mentality of the Soviet Union, their feeling about the losses in the war. It needs some more elaborate answer from me, which I will try to give.

To begin with, as far as the chemical or biological and toxic weapons are concerned, I have a first-hand experience. I was present—not only participating as adviser to Gromyko in the convention on the elimination of biological and toxic weapons, but I was present at the meeting of the politburo when this question was discussed. And I know the position of the military in this respect.

As you are, I am sure, aware, this convention doesn't contain in fact any provision for verification. If there is a suspicion on any

side of this convention, they can go to the Security Council of the United Nations, where the Soviet Union has a veto power. So there is no provision in this convention for onsite inspection or something like that.

The Soviet military never intended to stop research, production or eliminate any biological or toxic weapons. They continue to do that. And we have evidence even, indirect evidence, that they did that. There is no way for us to verify it.

I think that the conclusion of this convention just was simply a mistake, because to have any kind of agreements with the Soviet Union which are not verifiable, it is just a useless international instrument, which doesn't stop the Soviets from doing what they want to do.

Now, we have under discussion chemical weapons. The Soviet Army is the best prepared army in the whole world to conduct a chemical warfare. If we compare—and you are the Armed Forces Committee of the Congress—ask the military experts how the Soviet Armed Forces are prepared for the conduct of the chemical warfare, and compare that, what we can do as far as that is concerned, the expert will give you the answer about the Soviet superiority.

Now, as far as the verification of a convention to stop production, eliminate the stockpile of the chemical weapons—I think everybody who was involved in any kind of arms control negotiations understands how difficult is this problem.

We have—the Soviet Union has to open even their industry which is involved in the production of medicine or whatever it is—how and where we can distinguish what they are doing for the preparation of chemical warfare if the Soviet Union is not willing or ready to accept a real international inspection. If they would be, that would be another question.

But we have evidence—and I think direct or indirect—I agree, I believe that the Soviet Union used the toxins in Afghanistan. It is a violation of the Geneva protocol of 1925. They will, of course, never recognize that. There is no question about that.

ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANY

The second part of your question is about how the Soviet population feels about what happened in the Second World War, with 20 million people who lost their lives. We have—and I am talking now as a former Soviet—we have a strong feeling about that. I lost my brother, I lost my grandmother and uncles, and also I was young. But I have been in a situation where I saw what the Germans have done to our country. We have a strong feeling about that.

But does Germany or Europe now pose a threat to the Soviet Union? I don't think so. The Soviet Union has other problems besides the military balance, strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yes, they do.

Gorbachev, in his speech before he was selected the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stressed that the world is a wider place than just Europe or United States or the Soviet Union. He meant not only Africa or Latin America. The hint was strong. China, where the Soviet Union has maintained a large force along

the border with China—and it is quite understandable that the Soviet Union and the Soviet people support the efforts by the Soviet Government to maintain a strong force which can defend the Soviet Union.

But what is going on now? There is a question whether the Soviet Union went beyond the legitimate interests of the Soviet security. Oh, yes, they did. They are going very far. Why is the Soviet Union constructing aircraft carriers—deploying them south, thousands of miles from the Soviet territory? Is it really a defensive measure by the Soviet Government?

Victor Israelyan, I knew him for decades. We lived in the same apartment house. He lived just two floors down in the same house with me. Actually, we worked together in the Soviet mission at the United Nations.

Now I will answer your question about my feeling for the Soviet Union. I have always maintained my feeling for my motherland. I make a clearcut distinction between the regime, Communist regime which exists in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union as a country—Russia, if you wish to call it—with its enormous contribution to civilization of the world.

But if I were in your place, I would also ask Israelyan another question: How many more people during the existence of the Soviet system have been killed—not in war but exterminated in gulags, in forced collectivization, which led to hunger in the Ukraine and other places of the Soviet Union? Did someone count them? How many dozens or millions have been killed by the Soviet system and the Soviet regime? I wonder what kind of answer Mr. Israelyan will give to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much, Mr. Shevchenko, for being with us today. It is most important for us to hear this. We can read it. We can hear it in college lectures. But to hear it from someone who speaks with such deep emotion, we appreciate it.

I am concerned, sir, about the Soviet Union and its designs regarding Central America. I wish you would—if you would take a few minutes to give us your thoughts and your recollections and your impressions beginning with the Castro regime, how it took Castro into its camp, its relations with Nicaragua, and its goals in Central America by means of the satellite of Cuba and Nicaragua and other means, I would appreciate that very much, sir.

GOALS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. The Soviet goals in Central America or Latin America should be viewed within the context of the global strategy of the Soviet Union, which is called geopolitical designs or interests of the Soviet Union.

We know the ultimate objectives of the Soviet leadership. We know very well that—and it was in the old program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—it will be in the revised program which will be adopted at the next Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—they see that there is a competition between two opposite social political systems—decaying capitalism, or imperialism, which they call, which contain elements of self-de-

struction--as Marx put it, the economic crisis, and so on and so forth.

So the ultimate objective of the Soviet leadership is to win in the historical competition between the two systems. They don't mean that they will win in this century.

There was an interesting discussion among some of the Soviet ideologists, or futurologists, on this matter. And it is a recent phenomenon, how openly they started to discuss this matter. And recently, some of the Soviet authors on this matter—they tried to predict what might happen in 2017, which would be the hundredth anniversary of the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in the Soviet Union. And what they say is that not only the Third World, which they mean Africa, Asia, Latin America, but as they say, several major industrialized countries of the West will by that time have a system which exists in the Soviet Union. They are so realistic that they understand in such a distant future, which is 2017, they will not win.

And the question also is whether they only think that historical competition is a development which is historically determined, or they should help by exporting revolution. They always deny that they export revolution. But it is not true that they don't do that, because by helping what they call national liberation movements—and they themselves describe who is a real national liberation movement, who is not—if any national movement somewhere is not ready to obey or to cooperate with the Soviets, they just do not call them liberation movements.

How many thousands of the Soviet military experts are in many other parts of the world? The Soviet Union is a major supplier of the arms to different parts of the world. Cuba becomes a Soviet base in Latin America.

Initially, the approach of the Soviet leadership was cautious because—I remember in 1960 when Nikita Khrushchev—and I was with him in 1960 when he met with Castro. I also had myself a meeting with Che Guevarra. And at this period of time, the Soviet leadership even cautioned Castro. They wanted him initially to consolidate his power in Cuba, and not to go too far.

At that moment, the Soviet leadership was more interested in establishing diplomatic relations, state relations with Central American and Latin American countries, and warned Castro that you don't go too far too fast in Central America, or Latin America.

Che Guevarra was the person who openly criticized this approach and complained about it directly. He was very disappointed because the Soviet Union only wanted Castro to consolidate the Communist regime in Cuba.

What happened later? The Soviet Union changed its attitude. After Castro more or less established his regime in Cuba, now the Soviet leadership is encouraging him to change his attitude from being careful—now they use him and encourage him to go further.

Now we have Nicaragua, where a dictatorial regime, was replaced by the Sandinista revolution. You know how many leaders of the Sandinista revolution are disillusioned now of what happened in Nicaragua, which is more and more coming to be—if not still a satellite, then an of the Soviet Union or ally of Cuba. And

Nicaraguan territory has been used to supply weapons and personnel to Salvador.

Cambodia is also a serious problem. How much happened there? We know what happened in Africa when we decided not to intervene; don't do anything in Angola; leaving the Soviets a free hand to do what they wanted to do. The Cubans volunteered themselves to send their troops to help establish a regime, which is an ally of the Soviet Union.

Now we have to assess very clearly what we can expect in Central America. All right. If we want to adopt the same attitude, if we want to disengage from any kind of actions in Central America, like we did in Africa, then what can we expect next?

OK, Nicaragua will become as much a satellite of the Soviet Union like Cuba. Next on the agenda would be Salvador; and perhaps next would be not a small country in Central America but some big country which is a neighbor of the United States.

We remember that—not to have a shortsighted view of this situation—but really seriously have a long-range view of what might happen in this area and what it will mean for our security in the future—if not for us, for the children of the Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Mr. Shevchenko, for coming. I have enjoyed very, very much your answers to the questions so far.

The rules, as you know, are such that we have 5 minutes, and you have as much time as you would like to take. I would like to ask you a series of four or five questions in my 5 minutes.

The Soviets have violated agreements. What does that say in your mind about the Soviet view of arms control agreements? We believe they are important because they will eliminate and reduce tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, and they will reduce strategic or chemical arsenals. I am wondering, in view of a pattern of Soviet violations, what they feel is important in arms control agrements. That is No. 1.

No. 2, do you believe that the Soviet Union has abetted or aided or engaged directly in terrorism, international terrorism as an instrument of their foreign policy.

No. 3, do you believe that the Soviet Union thinks that the correlation of forces in the world is moving in their direction or in our direction or is stalemated at the present time?

Also another question. What is the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence?

Next to last question: Is there in your mind a relationship, a connection between the KGB and the peace movement in the United States?

And finally, what do you think the Soviet Union would do if the United States by force removed the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua? What would the Soviet Union response be?

Thank you.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. You want me to answer these questions in 5 minutes?

ARMS CONTROL AND THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES

I think that the Soviet Government is interested in alleviating the burden which they have as far as their military programs are concerned. That is why I mentioned I do believe it is possible to have an agreement with the Soviet Union, a verifiable agreement, which would reduce the level of strategic arms, and it might be in both interests of the United States, in the best interests of our security, and the Soviet leadership would also consider it in their interests. So they can in my view, in a long bargaining process, make substantial concessions.

As far as the general attitude of the Soviet Union to disarm or to nuclear disarmament, I would say that the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership will never agree with the complete nuclear disarmament, for several reasons. One is that without the nuclear strategic weapons, the Soviet union will cease to be a superpower and would not be able to influence world affairs as they are influencing them now. I tried to describe that in my memoirs, one of the sessions of the Politburo, and how this matter has been discussed.

So we can discuss with the Soviet Union some arms reductions agreements which are verifiable. And there are a lot of things which could be verifiable, you know. There are quite a lot of means of national detection at our disposal. And it could be reasonable agreements.

I hope that something will come out of these negotiations. But we should not expect a quick result.

As far as the Soviet ultimate objectives—I mentioned that the Soviet Union will never agree with complete nuclear disarmament—but it is also not a view of the Soviets, at least as far as I know, from my experience with the Soviet Government—they are not going to achieve their goal by using the nuclear weapons. The only instance when we see the leadership just toying with the idea of using nuclear weapons was not against the United States or the American allies in NATO.

It was China, when the late Marshal Mikhail Grechko was terrified by what was going on with the border incident with China. Anyway, they were reasonable enough at that time to realize to start even the local nuclear war and even not with the United States but with China would have such a serious consequence as it would be self-destructive for the Soviet leadership.

That is the view of the leadership, of the Soviet leadership, as I understand it.

Now, terrorism.

TERRORISM

The main problem is how do we define terrorism. There is no understanding whatsoever between what we call terrorism and how the Soviet leadership understands what is terrorism. They support somewhat they call the liberation movements or some organizations, the Middle East, or whatever it is—is that they are not terrorists, they never call them terorists. And there are training camps in the Soviet Union, where they train these people who later engage in terroristic activities. So this is something which we never can come to any kind of understanding with the Soviet lead-

ership, because what we define, and I think rightly so, often as terrorism, and the Soviet leadership define them as a liberation movement and are helping them.

Certainly their training of these people helps terroristic activities in the world. So that the problem of terrorism is extremely complex. I myself have no answer how to deal with that. I am not an expert in these matters. But that I tried to explain my views. In my view the Soviet Union is helping international terrorism. There is no question in my mind about that.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Now, peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence is a policy which the Soviet Union alwasy considered as a temporary policy, historically temporary. Because I already mentioned about the final objective of the Soviet Union. So there is inconsistency. If they believe that Soviet-style socialism and communism would be victorious in the historical process, how then can we combine that with peaceful coexistence, which means peaceful coexistence is something which they view as a policy which would last perhaps several decades or much longer, but it is a temporary policy historically.

Second, they also view the policy of peaceful coexistence, or détente, a manifestation of this policy, not as an universal policy, because they would like to keep their hands free to do whatever they want in the Third World. There is a basic difference between our attitude and the attitude of the Soviet Union.

They want a normal—even good relations with the United States, economic, even cultural, they have credit, and so on and so forth, with the developed countries of Western Europe or the United States and other countries. But they would like to keep entirely their hands free to do what they want in other parts of the world. This is something which is—all right, if they call it peaceful coexistence, I think that we have here what Adam Lund in his book mentioned—peaceful coexistence and expansion. This is how the Soviets understand peaceful coexistence. It contains elements of continuing expansion of the Soviet Union, where they would like to expand and project their power.

KGB INFLUENCE IN PEACE MOVEMENTS

Now, the connection of KGB with peace movements in Europe or in other parts of the world or in the United States. In my view, the KGB, of course, is one of the enormous organizations which at the same time—CIA, FBI, police, or whatever you call them—one of the most ruthless, terrible organizations in the world. But they are not powerful enough to be able to organize all these peaceful movements in the whole world. They cannot do that. They can penetrate these movements.

There are a lot of organizations which are called front organizations—the World Peace Council, which is entirely controlled by the Soviet Union. They try to penetrate as much as possible all pacifist or peaceful movements in the world. And I am amazed about one thing. And it is always a question in my mind. Why do all these pacifist movements criticize only their own government, but not the Soviet Union.

And another thing. Why are the slogans of these organizations, the ojectives of these organizations almost the same as Soviet policy. Is it just some kind of coincidence or what? I think it is both. There are a lot of people who are concerned for the future, for the future of their children, grandchildren, and really want peace.

We all want peace. And they participate in all these movements. But there are a lot of people among them that just don't understand what kind of influence the Soviets have, how they can influence their goals and how they can do most of the things they are doing, with almost no criticism of the Soviet Union.

And the last question—if the United States would invade Nicaragua, what would be the response of the Soviet Union. I think it is a highly hypothetical question, because no one to my knowledge in this administration ever suggested we invade Nicaragua.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just followup and get a clarification to one question that Mr. Courter asked, that you did not really address. Why is it that the Soviet Union does—when an agreement is signed, why is it that they run those agreements right up to the limits and in cases go beyond the limits? What is it that drives the Soviet Union to kind of always be pushing their deployments and other things up and over beyond the level of the agreement? What is it that prevents them with following the spirit of the agreement even at the point of sometimes going over the letter of the agreement?

SOVIET VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. It is the mentality and nature of the Soviet leadership to use any possible opportunity to their advantage. Unlike the United States and the Western countries—the Soviet leadership consider Americans and the Western countries to be naive. They consider all Americans are good if they serve their purposes. So they always try to interpret to their advantage any kind of ambiguous formulation in any kind of agreements, or what we can call the gray area to their—always to their advantage. They know the limits, some certain limits.

Sometimes they go even beyond these limits, and why they do that, they think get these advantages and still both public opinion in the United States or the West, or the Congress in the United States will tolerate that, so they use it to their advantage. But I don't think—except for the Biological Convention of 1972—that there were major breaches in the agreements which we have with the Soviet Union.

Essentially, I would say they stay more or less within the limits of SALT I or even SALT II. They did what could be permitted by the SALT I agreement. And it is the U.S. administration who opted not to do for a long period of time anything. So that we always can expect that the Soviet leadership will continue this attitude, and it is always essential, and I think it is important for both American negotiators and for the Congress of the United States to be very careful about the formulation of any agreements with the Soviet Union. They should be not only verifiable, but there should be very

clear-cut language, which would not allow the Soviet leadership to interpret this agreement to their advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Dave McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join my colleagues in commending the Chair for having Mr. Shevchenko as the witness today. I think this panel has learned a great deal. I think it is a wonderful opportunity for us to hear you.

Sir, I follow the lead of Mr. Courter and ask a series of questions. But I wanted to get something clarified first.

In your prepared statement you—in your conclusion, you made two points about the negotiations and what the United States should be careful of in dealing with the Soviets. First of all, regarding unilateral concessions. Second, you said we should not push the Soviet Union into a corner because of the fear that some might develop a fortress mentality.

Are those two statements somewhat contradictory, or conflicting? Where is the balance, and what is in the Soviet Union's best interests to give up in exchange for some like return from the United States? And what is worth bargaining for from our position? That is the one question.

Second—you made an interesting statement about Gorbachev and his concern for internal economic and internal issues as opposed to the arms control negotiations in foreign affairs which you believe will be Mr. Gromyko's domain for some time.

What impact does the current poor state of the Soviet economy have on any Soviet decision to further expand their military capability?

You also indicated with the demotion of Marshall Ogarkov that the Soviets—the fact they don't have anyone on the Politburo, military, at this point, that the Soviet military is probably at its lowest point in influence within the Politburo. Recently Marshall Ogarkov, in September, had an article in the Red Star, I believe it was in May 1984, where he stated that due to the quantity and diversity of nuclear weapons, neither side could carry out a successful first strike, and therefore a further buildup of nuclear forces was senseless.

My question is, Do you see Ogarkov's statement as an indication that the present Soviet military leadership is rethinking its long-held belief that strategic nuclear weapons are effective instruments of war fighting?

I understand that is a lot of question there. But I would appreciate if you would clarify the points you raised in the context of these questions.

MILITARY VIEW OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. First of all, I don't see any contradiction between the two points which I made. That we should not make any unilateral concessions, but at the same time we should not push the Soviets to the wall. Because in any negotiations there are two sides. It is a process of mutual concessions. Otherwise we cannot have any kind of agreement.

If we just put, like the Soviets did, unrealizable goals, and just stick to them, there would be no agreement. I don't think there is any contradiction here. My point is not to make any concessions before negotiations. But of course, naturally, through the process of negotiations, we should try to find a mutually acceptable agreement.

Second, Gorbachev and Gromyko. I don't like to suggest that Gorbachev would not be interested at all in foreign policy. But let's remember some historical precedents. At the initial stage, when Brezhnev became the First Secretary, which it was called at that time, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he concentrated his efforts on the party affairs and on domestic problems of the Soviet Union. And at that time Kosygin, who was Prime Minister, played even a more important role in foreign policy.

I think that Gorbachev still doesn't have enough experience to deal wth the foreign affairs. His experience is largely domestic. The old original party leaders of the Soviet Union, they know quite a lot about the party affairs. They know about the problems of the economy and other things. But they are entirely ignorant about foreign policy until they come really to Moscow and become members of the Politburo.

In fact, they don't know much more than what is printed in the Communist magazines or Pravda before they come to Moscow. So it takes quite a lot of time for anyone who comes from some region of the Soviet Union to become a member of the Politburo and to learn about the foreign policy. And it has already been mentioned that when he came to Moscow Gorbachev was initially a secretary of the party, he was in charge of agriculture for quite a long period of time.

Only lately he gained some experience in foreign affairs, in attending some of the Congresses of the Communist Party or the other countries, and paid his first visit to the United Kingdom. But could you compare that with the experience of Gromyko? This is something which is beyond any comparison. Gromyko was the foreign affairs mentor of Brezhnev for a long time, and was behind developing the policy of detente.

Gromyko now will be a Gorbachev mentor in foreign policy. It doesn't mean that Gorbachev is not interested. After all, Gromyko is 76, he might die soon or even, retire. And naturally Grobachev eventually will take much a more active role in the foreign policy.

And I would not be surprised that even the initial stages, or soon, he would be willing to be invaluable in foreign policy and have meetings with leaders of Western or other countries, so that again I don't see any kind of contradiction.

Now, talking about the Ogarkov and Soviet military influence——

Mr. MCCURDY. Sir, the question I asked about the Soviet economy—is that going to have an influence on the Soviet military buildup—the state of the economy, whether that influences Gorbachev?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Yes, I will elaborate on this. Yes. The state of the Soviet economy I think it is a factor which is affecting Soviet policy in arms control, because they understand the need to reallocate resources in the Soviet Union.

And Gorbachev, not only Gorbachev, but priorities of the majority of the members of the Politburo in domestic affairs of the Soviet Union will be influencing Soviet arms control policy. And that is why we should not miss this opportunity, I think, because it is a good opportunity. The Soviets at this moment are interested in that. We can achieve something which of course they will never admit, but we just have to keep that in mind in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

The influence of the Soviet military, as far as arms control is concerned, for a long period of time was absolutely dominant. Actually, before the beginning of SALT I, before 1969—and even in the initial stages of the SALT I—the foreign ministry played almost no role even.

Grechko was more influential than Gromyko in advising the Politburo as far as the Soviet arms control policy in the SALT II agreement. And then the situation started gradually to change.

Initially, the Soviet military even didn't want to reveal to diplomats, or even to super diplomats, details about their programs. Whenever, let's say, they would be advising him on any kind of draft or change in the position, they would just tell him, "No, you should not do that." We asked them why. They told him, "No, we will not tell you. You are a civilian. You are not supposed to know about our military programs," and so on.

The situation in recent years changed substantially with the growing influence of Gromyko, with the growing influence of the Soviet civilian negotiators, and their involvement in all these discussions.

The military in the Soviet Union no longer can do what I described to you saying: "You are not supposed to know" or something like that.

Moreover, with Gromyko's position now, who is actually a major figure as far as the negotiations are concerned, and with the weakening, I would say, of the military leadership at the top—let's say if Ustinov was alive and if still Ogarkov would be in the defense ministry, then even Gromyko's influence would be more limited. After all, Sokolov is—I don't like to even use this word—no match to Gromyko as to his political influence. But I don't think that the Soviet military are very happy with this situation.

They definitely will try to correct that, and they would try to restore as much as possible of their influence. And there eventually will be a new, younger defense minister, who will become a full member of the Politburo, and there will be a balance between the military and the civilian leadership again.

Now, your last question was about whether really the Soviet military—you referred to Marshall Ogarko. First of all, that is the last we know of Marshall Ogarko. Marshall Ogarko was dismissed.

Actually, some people are telling that he is still occupying an important position, because he is now what might be called the political commissar, or even deputy, not the chief. Anyone who lost his position in the general staff is actually out of the process of really making decisions on military matters.

What he said is practically irrelevant. It is no longer important. Besides, there should not be any kind of misunderstanding, that—who can win a nuclear war or a major confrontation between the

West and the Soviet Union? It will never be decisions which belongs to the military.

The military perhaps plays a decisive role in an affair like shooting down the Korean airplane, because there were standing instructions to shoot down such a plane and it went through the military chain of command, Moscow and so on. But any kind of a decision concerning nuclear weapons or nuclear war is a decision which will be taken by the civilian leadership of the Soviet Union, by the Politburo.

I don't think that the Soviet Politburo, old people and young ones, believe that nuclear war is winnable. They consider a nuclear war unthinkable. It is only a last resort in a situation when there will be no other alternative for the Soviet Union.

And if they felt that such a threat to the Soviet Union exists, they would believe there is no other way to escape. It is sometimes said that the Soviet leaders are predatory, but they are not mad.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shevchenko, it is a pleasure to listen to you today. I apologize for dropping out for a few minutes from the conversation.

Let me ask you a question that my friend from Massachusetts asked. Let me follow up on it briefly.

He talked about the MX missile. Mr. Mavroules asked you if it would be fatal to the arms talks if the Congress killed the MX missile, and your short answer was, no.

And I would ask you simply if you think that it would be a mistake in your personal judgment for the U.S. Congress to give up the MX missile unilaterally.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Yes. I think, why do we have to do this?

The discussion in Congress about the MX has made a decision on financing. That doesn't mean that in the course of negotiations, in the further negotiations, if the Soviet Union would be prepared to make serious substantial concession, let's say reducing their number of SS-18 and SS-19's, that the MX would be negotiable.

Why should we not remember the historical example when there was a discussion in the Congress of the United States, the ABM system. The Congress made appropriations for that and it was very cleverly used by Kissinger, or by American negotiators, later in getting the concessions from the Soviet Union.

Mr. HUNTER. You mean when the Congress decided to go ahead with the ABM system.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Exactly. They decided to go ahead, but never did later. But in exchange for that, substantial concessions were obtained from the Soviets.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you another question.

You spoke of one of the key things from my point of view, when you said that the Soviet Union would never agree to total disarmament, because strategic systems have made them a superpower, if you will.

We have had a great deal of discussion in the Congress, particularly in this committee, concerning the prioritization and the balance between conventional arms and strategic weapons. And the tradeoffs that we have to make.

We, as you know, the Reagan administration has attempted to upgrade almost every area, conventional as well as strategic.

If, in fact, the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States essentially drives foreign policy, and it looks to me like it does, I see a relationship between their adventurism worldwide and their buildup of strategic weapons, not necessarily a buildup of their navy or imbalance between ground forces or any other areas.

But if in fact that is a critical driver of foreign policy, doesn't it make sense for the United States to achieve, if it is economically possible, reasonably possible, to achieve strategic superiority rather than parity?

STRATEGIC BALANCE

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I don't think that we have to try to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union. And I don't think—I never heard the President of the United States ever say that we want superiority over the Soviet Union.

What we have been talking about before was to correct some imbalances which have been developed during the last decade, both in the field of strategic weapons and conventional forces.

We have a big problem there. If we talk about a possible confrontation in some area of the world, and if we proceed on the assumption that it neither side, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, are not going to use strategic nuclear weapons because they understand that it means mutual destruction, then these local confrontations, in which some other country could be involved, would be a conflict in which the conventional forces would be used.

There was a lot of disparity here. The Soviet efforts to modernize its conventional forces are absolutely enormous.

I already mentioned, however, that they want to improve their bombers, to improve their tanks, to improve their artillery, which has always been superior over the Americans, and have made an effort to have a rapid deployment force.

You know, they teach a lot of officers foreign languages. They teach them French. They teach them English. And there are a lot of people in the Soviet Armed Forces.

We already mentioned the chemical and toxic weapons they have been using. They are making major efforts to improve their submarines. They are now embarked on the construction of the aircraft carriers.

And we may face a situation in a decade or so, when they will have more aircraft carriers than the United States. They will develop a capability to engage in some of the local conflicts with such enormous conventional force that we will be no match to the Soviet Union.

And we should also not forget that we have a voluntary army in this country. The Soviet Union has a draft. Almost all the Soviets in their 30's or 40's, went through military service for 3 or 4 years. It depends on what kind of armed forces they join. Almost all Soviets, including diplomats, have a rank in the military reserve. I was twice in a military camp.

There are millions and millions in the Soviet Union who can, in case of emergency, be immediately drafted in a matter of hours, or days to increase their army to such an extent that the United States and the whole Europe would be at a disadvantage.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to have you here this morning. We enjoyed your lecture very well.

A couple of questions. There has been a serious effort in this country to reduce our NATO forces. I would like to know if you have some comments on what effect that would have.

Second, would you point out in your opinion any serious weak areas that we now have existing in NATO defense?

REDUCTION OF NATO FORCES

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. As far as NATO is concerned, of course the problem is very complex there, because neither the Congress of the United States nor the American administration can impose any kind of decision on our major allies.

But it would be an enormous mistake to underestimate what the Soviets have. They perhaps cannot rely entirely on their Warsaw Pact allies, but they have enough themselves—enormous capability there.

I think it would be the greatest mistake for, first of all, for the United States to disengage from Europe. And I think that the Soviets maintain their force in East Germany as it has always been, and any kind of withdrawal of the American force from the Federal Republic of Germany would only help the Soviets to achieve their goals in central Europe: initially to try to have a neutral Germany, withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO; and to weaken NATO to such an extent that they would have not only the capability which they acquired with the SS–20's, but will gain an enormous political advantage there as well.

Also, we should not forget that there is a Communist party in Italy and in France. They are even cabinet members there. So they would have a lot of political means in Western Europe.

So this is something which we should also have in mind, a weak area which we have.

I think that at the moment, and it might become one of the weakest areas, is Central America, because public opinion is strong in the United States feeling that we have to leave the Central Americans and the Latin Americans alone, not to be involved.

It is something which might be called the "post-Vietnam syndrome," or whatever. And this is one of the things which I already mentioned, which potentially would be so much used by the Soviet Union and could become an enormous threat to our security in our own backyard.

The second potential serious area where we have to look and watch very carefully, besides Europe is the Middle East, where of course the Soviet Union will use every opportunity to increase its influence.

I don't think, as some people suggest, that at the present, the Soviet leadership really realistically think that they can have access to warm seas in the Indian Ocean. This was an ambition of even the Russian tsars and so on. They are more realistic.

They understand that if they took such a step they would be giving a strategic area, and that the United States and its European allies will not permit the Soviet Union to go that far. But we also should be aware of the possibilities of the Soviet Union, what they can do, and how they can use this.

The Soviet Union had both successes and failures in the Middle East. We know what happened in Egypt. We know Soviet influence, let's say even in Syria, is not as great as some people can suggest.

But they use all these opportunities. They use events in the Middle East. They use this unfortunate struggle between the Arab countries and Israel—I don't want to blame anyone.

It is a second major area where we have to watch very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shevchenko, I will not add to my colleagues' very sincere expressions of appreciation for you to be here today, except to say that your answers have been so thorough that you leave me very little new ground as the youngest member of this panel to pursue.

Fortunately, your answers have also been very provocative. So each answer has provided new and more fertile areas for discovery.

I would therefore like to thank you for that. And also pursue a new line of questioning and thinking.

You made three earlier statements, the first having to do with the Soviet Union's final objective. You went on to say they will allow very little to stand in their way in achieving that objective.

Second, you said that the United States is perceived as an obstacle in that progress.

And third, that the Soviet Union considers nuclear war unthinkable.

Now, as you know, in this country, we rely upon a doctrine of mutually assured destruction to deter nuclear conflict. The Soviets presumably have a dual deterrence aggression policy or doctrine of their own.

Our policy is based upon the presumption or, perhaps more accurately stated, the fear that the Soviets may strike first. Therefore, we take steps by building the MX missile, by commencing research for the strategic defense initiative, to prevent or discourage the Soviet Union from in fact striking first.

My question to you then is, With that background, under what circumstances would the Soviet Union initiate a nuclear strike?

FIRST STRIKE POSSIBILITY

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I don't think at the present moment the Soviet political leadership or even the military are considering the possibility of a first strike. But the situation might change in the future. In my view, the Soviet leadership could consider a first strike only if they acquired such an ability as to reduce to a very minimum the point of retaliation by the United States. To reduce it to such

an extent—that it would be no longer present unacceptable risks. In case of the first strike, let's say, at this moment, or even next year, or in a couple of years—they know that Moscow would be destroyed. Leningrad would be destroyed. Most industrial areas of the Soviet Union would be destroyed.

They are more advanced than the United States in civil defense programs. But still with all their possibilities to protect some of the strategic command or even some of the elements of the party apparatus and everything, I think they realize that even if they strike first, still they all would be living like rats in holes, with all the territory of the Soviet Union radioactively polluted, and how long they can survive in their shelters?

Because the submarine based strategic capability of the United States is so strong, for the Soviet leadership at the moment a first strike is an unacceptable risk. But if we abandon all the efforts to maintain this ability to—for retaliation, then in the future I would not exclude that both civilian and military leadership might be more inclined to take such an administrative step.

Mr. SWEENEY. One final question. Another topic, Mr. Shevchenko, that has stood on the periphery of some of the earlier questions, and in fact I think was touched upon generally by Mr. Courter's third or fourth question, in his line of questioning a few minutes ago, has to do with the whole understanding on our part of whether the Soviet Union considers the formulation of policy, foreign policy in this country, provincially, distinctly, separately, separate from a more Western collective process, or whether in fact they consider it part of a larger whole.

Let me ask you very specifically, to what extent in your experience as a high-level Soviet official, to what extent did the policies of the NATO member countries affect American foreign policy? In other words, your perspective on that.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. This is a question which I don't think should be addressed to me. I don't belong to the American administration, American Government.

Mr. SWEENEY. I guess I intended that question to mean to you, from the Soviet standpoint.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. From the Soviet standpoint. From the Soviet standpoint—as far as the Soviet standpoint is concerned, they would like very much to use disagreements which exist within NATO to their advantage. And I think that the Soviet leadership understands that the United States does not consult our allies in Europe enough. And they can use it to their advantage.

One problem was insufficient consultationseven heard some ambassadors or some of the people, Europeans, ask why the United States does not even brief properly about the SALT I in the course of the negotiations. So we knew and the Soviet leadership knows that in some of the cases there is not enough consultations or information be given to the European allies. And they use that and play on that, in bilateral relations with the French or with others, they say, "Look, you see that the Americans even don't want to tell to you what we talk in Salt negotiations or some other negotiations."

I think the more closer cooperation is necessary.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shevchenko, I want to congratulate you on your courage in testifying before this committee so frankly about your own views and your experiences. I am also delighted that most of your remarks have jibed with my own perception of the Soviet Union. I want to say that as soon as this hearing is adjourned, I intend to go out and buy your book.

I would like to raise two questions with you, primarily with regard to the MX issue. I am not sure that you are entirely conversant in exactly where that stands. You responded to Mr. Mavroules that if the Congress voted down the MX, it would not bring an end to the arms negotiations. And you said to Mr. Hunter that to turn down the MX on the eve of these negotiations would be unwise.

But it seems to me that there is a little bit more to it, and I think you have pretty much outlined what is the problem in your own opening remarks.

The purpose of these negotiations, as I see it, is to achieve a meaningful, verifiable, equal settlement on arms and weapons on both sides. If we who have only one hard target missile, which we haven't perfected yet, were to—when the Soviet Union has in the SS-18 and the SS-19, 800 MX type hard target missiles, this would demonstrate, would it not, to the Soviet negotiators a major rift between the President of the United States and the Congress of the United States when the Congress of the United States was willing to destroy, throw away the only hard target missile that we have in our entire inventory at the time when the Soviets have got 800 of these missiles. Would that not really represent, particularly when we are getting nothing in return for dropping the MX, a realization that the American people were not united, first of all, on the subject of a strong defense and, secondly, that apparently we did not realize that that kind of thing was a massive concession at the outset of the arms negotiations.

In fact, you said that we ought not to concede anything at the beginning of the arms negotiation. And it seems to me that this would really convince the Soviet Union that they did not have to press too hard because we could somehow be rolled over by our own Congress.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. What you said, I think, overall entirely coincides with my position. I stress that if we make—we will make unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union on MX or any other program, of course they would be only happy that we, as you use the word, throw away the programs even before negotiating anything.

And I entirely agree with you when I mention that we need, we really need the land-based system which would be equal to the Soviets, there is no question about that. And I mentioned that in the course of negotiations we can find some kind of agreement. Let's say just hypothetically for the sake of argument, that the Soviet Union would be ready to reduce its SS-19's and SS-18's, let's say in half or three-quarters of them, then we can look at what we would be doing.

So, it is something which really should be considered in the negotiations. I consider that just to abandon any program, an essential program which we have would be a very serious mistake.

Mr. STRATTON. If I could ask one other question. Do you have any information or any idea of what it was that led to the dismissal of Marshal Ogarkov? This committee met with Marshal Ogarkov in Moscow back in 1978. We spent 4 hours discussing with him and some of the members of the general staff and foreign ministers—deputy foreign minister Kornienko the military problems. We came away with the impression that Marshal Ogarkov was a truly professional military officer. He spoke straight from the shoulder. He seemed to have a minimum of ideological baggage to throw in, as would somebody like Mr. Arbatov, for example.

It seemed to me to dismiss an officer of that experience and the capability must have been a very serious problem.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Marshal Ogarkov is really and truly a very experienced man with the thinking of a real strategist, very experienced man, an analyst in many things. There is no question about that.

Why he was demoted, I think he was demoted primarily because the Soviet political leadership didn't like him to succeed Ustinov.

Because his high visibility in the Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the shooting of the Korean airplane and a lot of stories in the western press about him—we have to understand the Soviet mentality. You know how it affects the Soviet politicians in the Politburo, to read all these articles about the influence of Ogarkov in all this press, and all kinds of other things. That is something which is always present in their minds.

Second, whether they really suffered a great loss in demoting Ogarkov or not—I don't think so, because there are other people in the Soviet military equal to Ogarkov. Marshal Akhvomeev has as much experience and a man of almost the same ability as Ogarkov. As in the political leadership in the Soviet Union, there are a lot of individuals who wait to be promoted and to replace the senior leaders. They are not yet marshals, but perhaps have abilities and knowledge even better than Ogarkov. So that is my answer.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a couple of more questions, if I could.

In followup to a question Mr. Sweeney asked about the theory of mutual assured destruction, the theory in the United States that peace is maintained if both sides can annihilate the other, even after absorbing a first strike, still has enough to retaliate to such an extent to destroy the other side, if that is the best way to maintain peace. And it really was embodied in the SALT I agreement, where we banned defenses on both sides.

What is the Soviet Union's attitude toward that? What do the people in the Soviet Union think about that whole theory? There has been a question always in the United States, even though the Soviets did sign the ABM Treaty and the SALT I, that they never really accepted the premise that the best way to keep the peace was to have the ability on both sides to destroy each other. And therefore nobody would start the war.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. No; I think that it is not exactly so.

The Soviets never publicly admitted the mutual destruction theory—this is a strange brief discussion, which is a little bit confusing. But in fact, in the reality, they always based all their assumptions and policy decisions on exactly this presumption. I think that what has been said by the Soviet political leaders, and military leaders recently, just confirms exactly this assumption. Also, for propaganda purposes or otherwise, they don't like publicly to recognize that.

That is exactly why the Soviet leadership now is so much concerned about the possible change in the strategy of the United States, and as far as the strategic defense initiative is concerned. As far as the strategic initiative is concerned, I do not think anyone knows to what it will eventually lead. Even the President recently mentioned that we still don't know. At the initial stage of research—there are two sides of this problem.

One, we don't know what the Soviet Union is doing in research—they already have an ABM system. They already have a competence which we stronglysuspect they are already constructing for r own defensive system. They are watching what is going on in the United States. But I think that essentially the Soviet Union's strategy and the thinking of the Soviet leadership remains mutual assured destruction.

This is the premise on which they base their policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask then why in the Soviet Union is money spent on defense? Why do they proceed with the research on the ABM? They have air defenses, a lot of money spent on trying to defend against bombers, and a lot of money spent on civil defense. The question has always arisen in this country, if they had cemented the idea of mutual assured destruction as a theory and underlying basis of the peace, why spend all this money on defensive systems.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. There are several answers to this question. First, in general the events ofthe Second World War are a legitimate concern over what happened with the country when they were not prepared—leaving aside the mistakes which were made by Stalin, including the elimination of so many military officers, and his neglect of some of the military programs. There must not be a repetition of what happened in the Second World War.

Second, they base their assumption on the mutual assured destruction theory. But the Soviet leadership is very much mistrustful in general over what they see is going on in the imperialist world. They do not exclude the possibility that, let's say, that some lunatic in the West, could start a war, either a conventional or nuclear war against the Soviet Union. So that is one side also of the question.

Another thing is China. The Soviets also believe that they are somewhere between Europe, the West, and the East. And they seethreats from both sides. On one side there is NATO, which, of course, without the United States, cannot present a real threat to the Soviet leadership, and second, they watch very carefully what is going on in China. All right, China at the moment doesn't have really the strategic nuclear potential which could represent a serious threat to the Soviet Union. But what will happen in 5 or 10 years, or 20 years? The Soviet leadership—let's give, you know, the

devil its due. They have a very long-range view of what might happen from now to come—which is unfortunate sometimes in the United States there is no more thinking beyond one term of the Presidency, or which new administration, new strategies have been developed.

The Soviet leadership have a long-range view of the possible global development in the world. So that is, I think, an answer to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me ask on one other subject.

Can we believe when they tell visiting delegations what it is that they are worried about—let me give you some examples. During the INF talks, when we were deploying the missiles, the discussions leading up to the United States deploying the missiles in Europe, there was a lot of talk back about how the Soviet Union, whenever a delegation went to the Soviet Union, they came back and reported what they were worried about was the Pershing II missile, and a lot of discussion about that.

Now, the delegations come back and they report that what the Soviet Union is telling Americans that they are worried about is SDI. It is interesting what they mention and don't mention. I have never heard a delegation come back and say what the Soviet Union is talking about is MX.

And most recently apparently they are no longer talking about the ASAT capabilities that they were talking about. I guess my question is in two parts.

One, what is it that they are really worried about, and second, can we believe when they tell delegations what they are worried about, can we believe that, or is that part of an overall campaign?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. Whenever any Soviet delegation, either the supreme Soviet or the people from the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, whenever they say something, they do that after they receive instructions, which are approved by the Politburo.

In different periods there are different priorities, and there are different decisions. Some time ago when the Soviets had been waging a campaign to prevent deployment of the Pershing II or the cruise missile, that was the priority. So naturally all the Soviets who had been in contact with whatever way with Americans or westerners, they stressed this point. Now they see a situation now that is irreversible.

It is no longer possible to dismantle, to force the United States or Western European or Federal Republic of Germany to dismantle this missile. They recognize its reality. And that it is irreversible, it is a fact, so it has ceased to be on their priority list.

As far as the MX is concerned—what is the real concern of the Soviets? I repeat again. Of course, there is a concern. But it is not a priority. That is why my answer was it will not really affect the Soviet negotiating position if the United States will approve these programs.

And their priority at this moment is strategic defense initiative, which they view as something which will eventually lead to a change, a drastic change in the strategic military parity which they would like to maintain.

The CHAIRMAN. A final question, sir.

In leading up to these negotiations now that are starting today, reading between the lines of the statements on both sides, there is a question in my mind as to whether the two sides are going to be able to come about with an agreement or not. I would like your judgment.

It seems to me that the administration would very much like an agreement in these talks to cover the offensive systems. In other words, maybe some kind of a deal on the offensive systems, where we would maybe vie up MX and try and get them to reduce their offensive systems, at the same time leaving both sides free to pursue research on the defensive systems with the ultimate decision not to be made immediately, but wait and see how the research develops, and indeed, even get the cooperation of the Soviet Union in making maybe adjustments to the ABM Treaty along the way so that we could conduct the research on defensive systems and maybe do a few tests and things to see if it works.

Is that consistent—it seems to me that is what we would like as our position, the United States would very much like to pursue that kind of an agreement with the Soviet Union. Is that consistent with what you think the Soviet Union's objectives are in this negotiations, and could an agreement along that line, is that possible?

NEGOTIATION OBJECTIVE

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I don't think the final position of the United States even can be devised at the present moment. There are some initial ideas. Before going ahead, a number of issues should be clarified with the Soviet Union. To what extent is the Soviet Union ready to go ahead and make concessions in areas of our concern before making progress. My experience in any such negotiations is that the Soviet Union only made these final decisions after they were underway. At the initial stages of SALT I—the Soviet delegation had no idea to what would come out of the talks. There were exploratory talks for months and months and months before even the Soviet leadership—started to form its position, changing its position and so on and so forth.

If you remember the main preoccupation of the Soviet Union for a long period of time was American ABM systems, and—they didn't like to talk about their offensive weapons. Then they finally, in the process of the long negotiations, decided that both the ABM and the offensive system should be discussed.

And I don't think that at this stage that—I don't want to talk to the administration, I have no information what is the position of this administration—but just my personal experience in negotiations would tell me that at this stage it is just simply impossible to find any kind of a final solution, and that we have to go through the exploratory stage to see what is going on, what is what. And as far as the research is concerned on a strategic defense initiative, there again is a major consideration—can we trust what the Soviet Union is doing or not. And to what extent would the Soviets be ready to provide information what is going on in the Soviet Union.

Let's hear the explanation about the radar station, let's hear from them to what extent they would be ready to show what they

are doing in this field. And then in the process of this discussion something would emerge.

I doubt very much that at this stage neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can define a final objective of negotiations, because what Gromyko and Shultz discuss in Geneva is generalities. It doesn't say much.

It says that the issues of nuclear—offensive weapons and outer space weapons should be considered and should be considered in three sets of talks.

This is largely a procedural arrangement. Second, general goals. Everybody agrees we have to have an agreement in nuclear offensive weapons and in other fields.

But it remains to be seen, and I think it will take—I disagree with some experts, some predictions that we can expect very quick results from these talks. First, we have to go through the long exploratory talks.

Eventually, I am sure this administration and President Reagan will keep the Congress informed, which is unlike in the Soviet Union, the Soviet parliament and the Soviet academic institution have never been informed—only the Politburo members know.

Here I think there is this information. So I think we should be—that is why I mentioned I am neither pessimistic nor optimistic about the negotiations, because I think neither side has set final objectives, and let's wait and see.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it in your experience setting the negotiating on the Soviet side, does the Soviet Union go in with a fairly well defined set of objectives? Your previous discussion kind of implied that they go in and kind of see what turns up in the talks. Or do they go in with an objective that they have worked out among the various players in Moscow, that they go in with an objective and they say, all right, here is what we would like to achieve, and here is a fallback position.

Because they are not as, you know, very forthcoming in these negotiations with ideas of their own. But do they operate with a pretty well defined agenda or do they go in and kind of as it develops maybe develop the agenda as it goes along?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I think now they have an agenda. At this moment they have an agenda. But it doesn't mean that they know what would be their ultimate position. Their agenda now, with what the Soviet delegation is in Geneva now, it is what they call a freeze.

First of all, to try to stop research on the strategic defense initiative. Second, I think that they have some ideas, to what extent they can make concessions as their offensive strateigic weapons is concerned. They have some ideas that it could be discussed.

That is where for the time being they come. And they will see whether it is—whether these initial goals are attainable or not, and then they will go further. I don't think at this moment they have any set final objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

In any case, you don't think as Henry Kissinger said on the show last night, he thought they could conclude an agreement in 18 months.

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I think that is too optimistic.

Mr. SWEENEY. As a followup very briefly, could you tell us which areas of regional hostility, which kinds of threats, would most incite or agitate the Soviet Union to a first strike?

Let me give a couple of examples. Would they be theoretical, meaning the failure of the Soviet Union's own plans, the thwarting of their so-called final solution? Would they be tactical, the conventional buildup in the United States, more men, more ships, more intelligence gathering, more surveillance?

Would they be geographic, threats along the Soviet's own borders, incursions into China? Would they perhaps be strategic, strategic defense initiative?

Could you categorize those on a scale of 1 to 10 that would pose the greatest threat to the Soviet Union?

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. There are limits there. We say that they consider the American strateigic potential to be a serious threat to the Soviet Union, and that American retalitory capability is a serious threat. But the most provocative thing I would say for the Soviets would be something going on along their borders. That is really I would say more of a direct concern to them.

In the field of strategic military balance, their main concern is the strateigc defense initiative. On the other hand, it is their very serious concern what is going on along the borders of the Soviet Union. And you can imagine why.

China—Afghanistan, they are engaged for such a long period of time—which, of course, they never anticipated. They thought it would be resolved by using military force much sooner than it happened.

The situation in Poland. This is some of the things which the Soviet Union have to take in mind. Because let's say if there is no Poland, from the Soviet standpoint, the situation would deteriorate. Then they have to occupy Poland, and they will.

At the present moment they have to keep enormous large forces in western Russia, to be ready. So that if something will happen in Poland which drives the Soviets to a situation where they consider it unacceptable for them, they cannot lose Poland as a member of the Warsaw Pact—and all the major strategic communications between the Soviet force which is stationed in East Germany, going through Poland.

So that that is something which we also have to take into account.

Mr. SWEENEY. How, then, does the militarization of space pose a threat to the achievement of the final solution; that is, the creation of a socialist world order, and why wouldn't tactical considerations—men, weapons, ships, tanks—be of more concern, surveillance, counterintelligence activities—be of more concern to the Soviet Union if their ultimate design is to achieve this as you call it final solution.

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

Mr. SHEVCHENKO. I tried to explain, what they call the militarization of space, they, first of all, mean the strategic defense initiaitve, which would drastically change the whole balance. That is their main preoccupation.

They have to compete with the United States. And it will cost them even more dearly than what they have done before. And they would not be able to do anything which they intend to do internally now, with the Soviet economy. It will have a drastic effect on the future planning of the whole Soviet economic planning and everything.

So—but as far as conventional forces are concerned, and why they spend so much money, the Soviet Union never abandoned their ideas of ultimate—global ideas of winning in this historical competition. They deny that, but they export revolution.

And they consider that conventional forces, the tanks, rapid deployment force and everything, as something which can be used to export revolution, and achieve their ultimate objectives.

There is no big contradiction. Because they will continue to spend quite a lot of money on their conventional forces. But they would like to reduce a little bit the present expenditure for military programs.

But the problem is that if they will be involved in a competition with the United States on the strategic defense initiative, then they have to spend on both things, both in competing in defensive weapons systems, and by continuing to spend money on conventional forces, which the Soviet leadership considers now as something which is very difficult to continue, unless they would wish to do something with the Soviet economy, and to move the Soviet economy.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Shevchenko.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shevchenko, thank you very much for a very interesting morning. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m. the panel adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MX MISSILE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE POLICY ISSUES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 13, 1985.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This afternoon, we would like to welcome our two witnesses to come and speak before our Defense Policy Panel. But before I do that, I would like to point out to the committee members the proposed schedule for dealing with the MX in the House and in the Senate.

As you all know, we had an agreement with the Senate that the Senate would vote first on the MX releasing the money. It looks like they are going to do that next week. Possibly on the 19th, they would have their first vote—but, more likely, on the 20th—followed by the appropriations vote on the 21st.

It is my hope that our committee will meet next week, on Wednesday, to vote on this issue. We are having a hearing in the morning. We have a panel of former negotiators, people who were involved in negotiating previous treaties with the Soviet Union who will come and testify on the MX and the SDI issue. But on the morning of the 20th, after that hearing, the panel will vote on the issue of releasing the 21 MX missiles.

We will have then a full committee meeting of the House Armed Services Committee at 1:30 in the afternoon on the 20th, and we will have a vote of the full Armed Services Committee on the issue in the afternoon next week.

We are then going to have the vote. It will occur on the House floor, I would anticipate, on the 26th, followed by the appropriations vote the 27th or the 28th.

I would anticipate, I point out to the gentlemen, that I think we are going to have a general debate on Monday the 25th. We do have, under the rule—this crazy rule that this thing is going to be considered—we do have 10 hours of debate allowed. I don't know that we are going to need it all, but we don't know how much less we are going to need at this point.

I would anticipate we would have a long debate on the issue on Monday the 25th, followed by a vote on the authorization bill on the afternoon of the 26th, which is a Tuesday; and then go into the appropriations bill, the appropriations issue, again, right away, and have that vote on the 27th or the 28th.

So the Senate is going to vote probably the 20th and 21st. The House will vote probably on the 26th or 27th.

Are there any questions about the schedule?

As far as our committee goes, the Defense Policy Panel will vote on the issue following the close of the hearings on Wednesday morning, the 20th; and we will vote—have a full committee meeting of the House Armed Services Committee at 1:30 Wednesday afternoon, on the 20th—and vote on the issue.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I have a question at this point.

What other witnesses do you have coming before this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a panel on Thursday morning. We have a panel of Soviet specialists. And then no more hearings except Wednesday morning on the 20th, a panel of negotiators, people who have negotiated treaties.

Mr. MAVROULES. The reason I asked the question is, up to this point we have had before us witnesses who have been pro-MX. We have yet to hear from a witness who opposed the MX missile system.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe the Secretary of Defense has changed his mind. No?

We do have some witnesses—I will tell the gentleman from Massachusetts, we do have some witnesses coming up both on Thursday and on next Wednesday who are opposed to the MX missile.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, what did you say the dates would be when we have those two votes in the House?

Mr. ASPIN. On the 26th and 27th, Tuesday and Wednesday. The 27th, we have no control over. That is Joe Addabbo's. Maybe it will come the 28th. I don't know, but our vote we would anticipate on the 26th.

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman, might I ask of the gentleman from Massachusetts who he would recommend if he is——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Tell the gentleman from Massachusetts if he has some people——

Mr. MAVROULES. We have already made recommendations. I just wanted to make sure that if we are going to be a committee sitting here and taking testimony, that we take testimony from both sides so we can evaluate and analyze this thing correctly.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's suggestions have been incorporated in our plan.

Mr. DICKINSON. Is there any way we can appeal the ruling for that 10 hours of debate?

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid only by unanimous consent. But maybe if we do it on Monday, everybody will get worn down and get it out of the way.

Are there any other questions on the procedure? If not, let me welcome our two witnesses here this afternoon.

I am very pleased to welcome the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, and Ambassador Nitze, and would like to let both of

you proceed with a statement. I guess we would begin with Cap Weinberger.

First of all, Mr. Dickinson, do you have any comments?

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we are delighted to see you and the Ambassador here. I haven't seen the Ambassador now for almost 3 weeks. We flew back immediately from Munich together—at the conference there. We are all very pleased to have you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, go ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are very glad to be here and appreciate very much the opportunity to testify again on the MX. It is always a little difficult to know how to open because we have been debating this 12 years, and I gather you have 10 more hours, even after we finish, of debate.

There is not a great deal you can say after 12 years, but I think one thing I can say—perhaps two new things. One is that the Soviets have never stopped but have always increased adding to their strength; and that the MX, which has been debated 12 years, has been—actually, during that period of 12 years, the Soviets have deployed two new generations of missiles beyond the Minuteman and are working, testing, and ready to deploy a third new generation, a mobile missile that we will have a very considerable additional difficulty to locate. It will add greatly to their capabilities.

The other new thing is, of course, that we are meeting in Geneva and meeting on a negotiation that involves the attempt by the United States to bring about very sharp reductions in the strategic intercontinental range missile, of which the MX is one. And we can't imagine anything that would give the Soviets less inducement to sign an agreement reducing their heavy missile, if they know that the Congress of the United States has already reduced the United States unilaterally without any kind of compensation being exacted.

Those are two new points, and they have perhaps not been in the debate over the past 12 years, although almost every other point has certainly been mentioned.

I will try to speak as briefly as I can and make a few of these points. I have a statement which I would request, Mr. Chairman, be printed in full in the record, and that will spare us listening to all of it here. But we do have a couple of points that we think are very vital to make. And I am, of course, very honored and delighted that Ambassador Nitze can also testify with me today to present his views, to you.

BACKGROUND

In 1972—I think we should go back to when the debate began—in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the SALT I Treaty. We were in the process of completing the replacement of 550 Minuteman I missiles at that time with the Minuteman III.

The Soviets were contemplating—actually, were completing the development of the SS–9's and SS–11's, at that time.

Many in the United States believed and hoped that the treaty and the impending termination of both sides' ICBM programs augered an era of nuclear stability. But within several years, it became apparent that the Soviet leadership was not satisfied with that situation. New Soviet missiles were being developed; new techniques for silo hardening were being explored, and since have been used. And we began drafting and debating possible responses at that time, in 1972.

By the mid-1970's, the Soviet missiles were being flight tested extensively. We continued to debate.

By 1976 and 1977, the Soviets began major deployments of three types of new fourth generation ICBM's—the SS–17's, SS–18's and SS–19's. These missiles were housed in newly modified silos, which were far harder than our Minuteman silos, and which were quite able to withstand retaliation by our ICBM force, the same force we have now. With the exception of a very small program to replace the warheads of about half of our Minuteman III missiles, we continued to debate.

Today, there are 808 SS–17's, SS–18's and SS–19's, and almost 6,000 new warheads deployed. Two of the new Soviet ICBM's, the SS–X–24 and SS–X–25, their fifth generation missile, are in flight testing. And our response, the Peacekeeper, the MX, is still in the flight test stage after 12 years of as yet inconclusive debate.

Our Peacekeeper flight tests have been highly successful. We are achieving accuracies that are far better than even our stringent defense and design specification. And yet, despite this, and despite our cumulative investment of almost $13 billion in the Peacekeeper program, despite the Soviet strategic programs, some still counsel that we should stop preparations to deploy the missle and continue to debate it.

DELAYS HAVE CAUSED IMBALANCE

Mr. Chairman, there really should have been enough debate by now for everyone. The earliest IOC of this much needed modernization of our triad is now December 1986. We can't afford to wait any longer. Our delay has contributed to the current strategic imbalance that we now face, and which we must correct.

If deterrence is going to remain effective, we must be certain that the Soviet leadership understands that our retaliation will raise the cost of aggression to unacceptable levels. It is not an easy task. While we were congratulating ourselves in the seventies that we had persuaded the Soviet Union to accept the concept that nuclear war was not winnable, during that same period the Soviet leadership was embarked on a massive program to undercut our deterrent. Viewed in its totality, that effort is now clear.

By modernizing and expanding what was already the world's largest and most sophisticated air defense system, the Soviets sought to blunt the bomber leg of our triad. By building a limited first strike capability in their SS–18's and SS–19's, they sought to develop the ability to preempt U.S. retaliation. By hardening missile silos and launch control facilities, by proliferating and dispers-

ing and hardening hundreds of command and control facilities, the Soviets sought to create an ability to absorb a retaliatory blow and nevertheless maintain their military power—political and military control was also sought to be retained—and war supporting potential necessary to the Soviet state's continuance was also protected.

If, because we failed to respond to these efforts, the Soviet leadership convinces itself that the risks inherent in threatening or actually using military force against the United States or our allies are reduced to an acceptable level for them, then deterrence would be jeopardized; indeed, many would say had failed.

Fortunately, we are now responding. We are rebuilding our triad. We have deployed air-launched cruise missiles on the B–52's. And the first B–1B was delivered last year. And they are continuing to come off the line under budget well ahead of schedule. And we have corrected all of the problems we found with the Trident submarine program, and we have a steady support effort under way there.

But a strong triad has to have three legs. You can't have a two-legged stool. And we do not yet have a modernized ICBM force. We do not yet have an ability to threaten prompt and credible retaliation against those key hardened Soviet assets.

It was in light of these somber facts that the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the so-called Scowcroft Commission, reviewed all of our strategic deterrent in early 1983. It was in light of these facts that the commission proposed, and the President submitted to Congress, a phased plan for the modernization of our ICBM's. And to redress these important near-term deficiencies, the plan called for the deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles, which is our program, to put them in existing Minuteman silos, which is our program and has been since 1981.

PEACEKEEPER NEEDED FOR DETERRENCE

There is no other available system which in the near term can demonstrate so convincingly that, despite their investment in hardening and proliferation, the Soviet leadership cannot expect to win a nuclear conflict. So we need the Peacekeeper for deterrence.

We also need the Peacekeeper program in order to have a successful small single warhead ICBM. Many of the important components of the new small missile will be derived from the Peacekeeper, including its guidance and its control hardware, its computer components and software, its ordnance support systems, and its warhead. And, as a result, our plans for evolving into what we hope can be a more stable strategic environment, not only for the late eighties but for the early nineties, depends crucially on the actions the Congress takes this year, now.

Furthermore, the Peacekeeper will encourage the Soviets to begin to reduce their reliance on large, heavily MIRV'd ICBM's, and that would contribute to the survivability of our new small ICBM, by reducing their ability to mount barrage attacks, and to further increases in stability in the strategic area.

As the committee knows, yesterday we resumed negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. We are seeking significant

mutual and verifiable reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides.

As Ambassador Nitze will indicate, a continuing Peacekeeper program is vitally important to our ability to achieve the deep reductions we seek. There are two obvious—and crucial—reasons for this. First, if we indicate that we are not going to correct our current deficiencies, the Soviets have little or no incentive to negotiate seriously. Why should they seek to reduce their arsenals, if we have signaled we are going to permit them to maintain, and perhaps even expand, advantages they currently enjoy, which are very considerable?

Second, if we should half or slow a program we ourselves recognize to be critically important, we will convey unmistakably a message to the Soviet leadership that we lack the will, the resolve and the ability to achieve our goals in the world. Why then should they believe we are committed to reducing arms—or maintaining a balance of power in the absence of any reductions by them?

The Scowcroft Commission addressed this point very specifically. They said:

> It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade * * * Abandoning (Peacekeeper) at this time in search of a substitute would jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing and equitable agreement.

Thus, the Scowcroft Commission. To succeed at Geneva, we must show the same steadfastness and determination, which encouraged them to change course today and to come to the table.

I want to make it clear, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that we don't regard the Peacekeeper as a bargaining chip—whatever that expression might mean. We regard it as militarily essential and necessary for our own offensive deterrent to maintain that capability and that credibility.

But as far as Geneva is concerned, while we don't regard it as a bargaining chip, we know that if it is turned down and defeated by the Congress, the Soviets need not make any kind of concessions for reductions in their strategic system because the Congress will have done it for them on our side, and they will have won the negotiation before it starts by enabling themselves to keep a situation which continues an imbalance in their favor.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES EXPLORED

I would like to look just a little bit farther into the future as I conclude. The President and Ambassador Nitze and I are committed to exploring new technological possibilities which may permit us to eliminate the whole threat posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges. We are encouraged by the results of our initial studies and of our research thus far. I am very optimistic that these technologies can be developed and that fully effective cost-effective survivable defenses can be created.

But while we perform that research, we need to continue effectively to deter attack. We don't know whether research will be completed or what it will bring. Once a decision to pass beyond research to development is made, then we will still need to deter ef-

fectively. And as defensive systems are deployed over a period of years, we will need to ensure that the transition period is a stable one.

A strong and modern triad will provide the deterrence we need to move down this road. A strong and modern triad must have a strong ICBM. And a strong ICBM must include 100 Peacekeepers.

I urge the committee to take the lead in moving the Congress to remove the restrictions placed on fiscal year 1985 Peacekeeper procurement funding, and to approve our request for fiscal year 1986 Peacekeeper production, which is before you in the budget.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention just one thing very quickly, because it has come up recently and it contains some dangerously wrong misinformation, and that is a suggestion that you can still be for the MX and leave this fence up. That there really is plenty of money and you don't have to do anything by March, and so you can have it both ways. You can say you are for the MX but vote against taking the fence down. That, unfortunately, is very dangerously wrong.

The $1.5 billion that is now fenced is absolutely required to continue missile production and to keep the contractor infrastructure intact and productive. Without the $1.5 billion that is fenced, the beginning of the production line would shut down, and this shutdown would most seriously affect subcontractors and the small suppliers and vendors who make the bulk of the raw materials and supplies needed.

If this $1.5 billion is not unfenced, there would be no funds to carry the program beyond the end of fiscal year 1985 at all. And during the discussions of the Senator Baker-Speaker O'Neill agreement last year, $1 billion was determined to be sufficient to fund the program through the end of March of this year, and to retain complete production capabilities.

And as our schedule proceeds, 95 percent of the authorized 1984-85 production funds will be obligated by the end of March 1985. And, as you know, obligation means the amount of money to which the Government is now liable. Requirements differ and sometimes exceed the actual liability. The remaining 5 percent is required for anticipated liabilities for any proposed change proposals or change orders, and is required to satisfy the full funding requirements of missile procurement.

Expenditures are, of course, funds that are transferred out of the Treasury to the contractor when the billing is received and the work is done. Obligations identify the money the Treasury will need to pay and satisfy negotiated commitments. And the status of obligations is of paramount importance.

But the high obligation rate, and therefore the liability of this program, means that there is insufficient funding to carry the production passed the end of March 1985 unless the fence of the $1.5 billion is taken down. And I can elaborate that answer at much greater length, but I much prefer to have you hear Ambassador Nitze, and then we will be glad to try to take your questions.

Thank you very much.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the committee to address the subject of ICBM modernization.

In 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the SALT I Treaty. We were in the process of completing the replacement of 550 Minuteman I missiles with Minuteman III. The Soviets were completing deployment of SS–9s and SS–11s. Many in this country believed that the treaty and the impending termination of both sides' ICBM programs augured an era of nuclear stability. Within several years, it became apparent that the Soviet leadership was not satisfied with that situation. New Soviet missiles were being developed. New techniques for silo hardening were being explored. We began debating possible responses. By the mid-1970's those Soviet missiles were being flight-tested extensively. We continued to debate possible responses. By 1976–1977 the Soviets began major deployments of three types of new fourth generation ICBMs—the SS–17, SS–18, and the SS–19. These missiles were housed in newly modified silos which were far harder than our Minuteman silos—and which were quite able to withstand retaliation by our ICBM force. With the exception of a small program to replace the warheads of about half of our Minuteman III missiles, we continued to debate possible responses. Today there are 808 SS–17s, SS–18s and SS–19s—with almost 6,000 new warheads—deployed. Two new Soviet ICBMs—the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25—their fifth generation are in flight-testing. Our response, the Peacekeeper, is still in the flight-test stage after 12 years of, as yet, inconclusive debate.

Our Peacekeeper flight tests have been highly successful. We are achieving accuracies far better than even our stringent design specification. And yet, despite this, despite our cumulative investment of almost $13 billion in the Peacekeeper program, despite the Soviet strategic programs, some still counsel that we should stop preparations to deploy this missile and continue to debate what to do.

Mr. Chairman, there should have been enough debate for everyone. Now the earliest IOC for this much needed modernization of our Triad is December 1986. We cannot afford to wait any longer. Our delay has contributed to the current strategic imbalance we now face, and which we must correct.

For deterrence to remain effective we must make certain that the Soviet leadership understands that our retaliation will raise the cost of aggression to unacceptable levels. This is not an easy task because, while we were congratulating ourselves in the 1970s that we had persuaded the Soviet Union to accept the concept that nuclear war was not winnable, during the same period the Soviet leadership was embarking on a massive program to undercut our deterrent. Viewed in its totality, that effort is now clear:

By modernizing and expanding what was already the world's largest and most sophisticated air defense system, the Soviets sought to blunt the bomber leg of our Triad;

By building a limited first-strike capability in their SS–18 and SS–19 force, the Soviet leadership sought to develop the ability to pre-empt U.S. retaliation; and

By hardening missile silos and launch control facilities, and by proliferating, dispersing, and hardening hundreds of command and control facilities, the Soviets sought to create an ability to absorb a retaliatory blow and nevertheless maintain the military power, political and military control, and war supporting potential essential to the Soviet state.

If, because we failed to respond to these efforts, the Soviet leadership convinces itself that the risks inherent in threatening—or actually using—military force against us or our allies are reduced to an acceptable level, then deterrence indeed would be jeopardized.

Fortunately, we are now responding. We are rebuilding our Triad. We have deployed air-launched cruise missiles on B–52s, and the first B–1B was delivered last year; we have corrected the problems in the Trident Submarine Program and have a steady effort underway there. But a strong Triad must have three strong legs. We do not yet have a modernized ICBM force. We do not yet have an ability to threaten prompt and credible retaliation against those key hardened Soviet assets.

It was in light of these somber facts that the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the Scowcroft Commission, reviewed our strategic deterrent in early 1983. It was in light of these facts that the Commission proposed, and the President submitted to Congress, a phased plan for the modernization of our ICBMs. To redress these important near-term deficiencies the plan called for the deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles in existing Minuteman silos. There is no other available system which in the near-term can demonstrate so convincingly that, despite their invest-

ment in hardening and proliferation, the Soviet leadership cannot expect to win a nuclear conflict. Thus we need the Peacekeeper for deterrence.

We also need the Peacekeeper program in order to have a successful small, single-warhead ICBM. Many of the important components of the new small missile will be derived from the Peacekeeper, including its guidance and control hardware, computer components and software, ordnance support systems, and warhead. As a result, our plans for evolving into a more stable strategic environment—not only for the late 1980's but for the early 1990's—depend crucially on the actions the Congress takes this year. Furthermore, Peacekeeper will encourage the Soviets to begin to reduce their reliance on large, heavily MIRVed ICBMs, thereby contributing both to the survivability of our new small ICBM (by reducing their ability to mount barrage attacks) and to further increases in stability in the strategic area.

As the committee knows, yesterday, we have resumed arms negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. We are seeking significant mutual and verifiable reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. As Secretary Shultz has just indicated, a continuing Peacekeeper program is vitally important to our ability to achieve the deep reductions we seek. There are two obvious—and crucial—reasons for this. First, if we indicate that we are not going to correct our current deficiencies, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate seriously. Why should they seek to reduce their arsenals, if we have signalled we are going to permit them to maintain—and perhaps even expand—advantages they currently enjoy? Secondly, if we should halt or slow a program we ourselves recognize to be critically important, we will convey unmistakably a message to the Soviet leadership that we lack the will, the resolve, to achieve our goals in the world. Why then should they believe we are committed reducing arms—or maintaining a balance of power in the absence of reductions? The Scowcroft Commission addressed this point specifically:

"It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM Program that could lead to deployment in this decade . . . abandoning (Peacekeeper) at this time in search of a substitute would jeopardize, not enhance the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing and equitable agreement."

To succeed at Geneva we must show the same steadfastness and determination which encouraged them to change course and return to the negotiating table. Their eyes are on us today.

Finally, let me conclude by looking a bit further into the future. As the committee knows, the President, Secretary Shultz, and I are committed to exploring new technological possibilities which may permit us to eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles of all ranges. We are encouraged by the results of our initial studies and of our research to date. We are optimistic that these technologies can be developed, and that fully-effective, cost-effective, and survivable defenses can be created. But while we perform that research, we need to continue effectively to deter attack. Once a decision to pass beyond research to development is made, we will still need to deter effectively. And, as defensive systems are deployed over a period of years, we will need to ensure that this "transition" period is a stable one. A strong and modern Triad will provide the deterrence we need to move down this road. A strong and modern Triad must have a strong ICBM leg. And a strong ICBM leg must include 100 Peacekeepers. I urge the committee to take the lead in moving the Congress to remove the restrictions placed on fy19 Peacekeeper procurement funding, and to approve our request for fy19 Peacekeeper production.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PAUL H. NITZE, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to supplement Secretary Weinberger's remarks in two regards: one with respect to the MX as an effective deterrent; and the other with respect to MX and foreign policy.

MX AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT

Two weeks ago, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I outlined the strategic concept that underlies and guides our efforts in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. To summarize briefly, our immediate goal is radical reductions in nuclear arsenals and a reversal of the erosion that has taken place in the ABM treaty regime.

Over the longer term—should new defensive technologies prove feasible—we hope to make a transition from the current strategic relationship, in which deterrence rests on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation, to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced and modern defenses play an increasing role. Our ultimate objective is the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

However, for the foreseeable future—even in the first stages of a possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance—offensive nuclear forces and the threat of nuclear devastation will remain the key element of deterrence. It is therefore essential that we maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

Deterrence, as you know, requires that a potential aggressor perceive that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh any gains he might possibly hope to achieve. We must have confidence that deterrence will function effectively, not only in peace but especially in periods of major tension and crisis. Deterrence is relatively simple in peace; it is a crisis situation that poses the harshest and most trying demands.

Effective deterrence necessitates that we deny the Soviets any possibility that they could successfully prosecute a war-winning military strategy, or even the perception that they could successfully do so. We thus should have roughly equivalent nuclear capabilities, and should be able to hold at risk the full range of targets valued by the Soviet leadership, including hardened missile silos, command centers and other military facilities.

Unfortunately, the combination of the massive Soviet military buildup over the last 15 years and relative U.S. restraint has resulted in inequalities in certain critical measures of the strategic balance.

Our strategic deterrent force is aging and much in need of modernization. This is especially true of the land-based ballistic missile element. Since Minuteman III—our most modern intercontinental ballistic missile—was deployed, the Soviets have added three new types of ICBM's to their arsenal: the SS–17, SS–18 and SS–19. And they have two more ICBM's—the SS–X–24 and SS–X–25—under development for deployment in the near future. The SS–18 and SS–19 pose a major threat to the entire range of U.S. targets. We currently possess no comparable capability.

As the Scowcroft Commission noted in 1983:

> A one-sided strategic condition in which the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the whole range of strategic targets in the United States, but we could not effectively destroy a similar range of targets in the Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable over the long run [and] would clearly not serve the cause of peace.

Deployment of MX would help to redress this serious imbalance in capabilities. Indeed, we must proceed with deployment of MX as it is the only way that we can, in the reasonable future, begin to

redress this imbalance. I would note, by the way, that the planned deployment of 100 MX missiles is far too small a number to pose an effective first-strike threat against the nearly 1,400 Soviet ICBM silos.

Critics of MX have focused on the issue of its proposed basing in relation to its survivability. Let me offer some comments in this regard.

As a result of a research program started about 2 years ago, there are new concepts for super-hardening missile silos to levels that were previously unimaginable. Initial scale model test results offer promising prospects in the future for greatly enhancing the survivability of MX in silos.

Moreover, as the Scowcroft Commission pointed out in its report, the survivability of MX must be considered in conjunction with the other elements of our strategic triad. If the Soviets were ever to contemplate a major attack against the United States, the three legs of the triad—submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers, and land-based ballistic missiles—would severely complicate their attack planning.

The security rationale offered by the Scowcroft Commission was and remains wholly valid. MX is a necessary element of the modernization of the U.S. strategic triad.

MX AND FOREIGN POLICY

I also regard MX as important to carrying out our basic foreign policy goals, to western cohesion, and to sustaining our leadership position with our allies.

American military power and diplomacy cannot be artificially separated. Our ability to pursue our fundamental foreign policy objectives—to protect ourselves, our allies, our values and interests, and to build a safer, freer and more prosperous world—is intrinsically linked to our military power.

I would note that an examination of the last 15 years reveals that Soviet perceptions of their military capability in comparison to U.S. determination and capabilities has had a bearing on the Soviet challenge to our interests around the globe. A strong U.S. military posture, coupled with demonstrated U.S. resolve, helps to discourage and curb the Soviets from attempting to exploit regional instabilities.

As the leader of the West, we must also be mindful of the impact of our actions on our allies. I believe a decision to continue production of MX will demonstrate to our alliance partners an America that is resolved to maintain the strategic balance as a solid basis for its commitment to peace and international security. Conversely, if our resolve is seen to be flagging, we only invite allied uncertainty and weaken their confidence in our ability to lead.

Let me note an example from my previous experience as an INF negotiator. At the end of 1983, our European allies—in accordance with the 1979 NATO dual-track decision—began to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles on their national territories. In several cases, the decisions to proceed with those deployments were taken in the face of significant domestic opposition. In every

case, the decisions were taken in the face of an unprecedented barrage of Soviet propaganda.

Accordingly, these decisions were not without political costs. But the concerned governments went forward in view of their commitment to NATO, and out of a shared recognition that the alliance had to take the steps necessary to ensure itself an adequate deterrent.

Their decision to go forward with deployments has paid off. There is no doubt in my mind that NATO's determination to proceed with deployments of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile in 1983 and to continue with those deployments—as originally had been agreed in 1979—was a critical factor in the Soviet decision to return to the negotiating table this month.

Were we to back away from MX—a program that has been supported for many years by four successive administrations—we would place ourselves in a most awkward position vis-a-vis our European partners. They recognized the necessity of maintaining a modern and effective nuclear deterrent. As the leader and most powerful country of the West, should we do less?

MX AND ARMS CONTROL

New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms have begun in Geneva. The United States is pursuing these negotiations in a serious and constructive manner. We are prepared to address the full range of issues and to consider and take account of legitimate Soviet concerns.

While we recognize that the negotiations will be complex and most probably will require patience, we are hopeful they can lead to equitable and verifiable agreements that radically reduce the number and power of offensive nuclear arsenals.

As Secretary Shultz told Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva, we believe that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

At the same time, however, fundamental to our chances for success at the negotiating table is United States determination—and Soviet recognition of our determination—to maintain an adequate deterrent for ourselves and our allies, with or without arms control.

The Soviets will pursue their objectives in the talks with a dual strategy. On the one hand will be tough Soviet bargaining at the negotiating table; on the other hand will be a hard-nosed Soviet public propaganda campaign aimed at undercutting support for the United States approach and trying to force unilateral concessions. They pursued precisely such a strategy in 1983 with regard to INF; indeed, they gave their public propaganda campaign priority over their efforts at the negotiating table. Fortunately, they failed.

One can already see the Soviets cranking up their campaign with regard to the new negotiations. And it is not illogical for them to do so. If they can—through their public campaign—contribute to bringing about unilateral Western concessions, why should they ne-

gotiate when they would have to offer up restraints on their own programs?

It is vital to the success of our negotiating effort in Geneva that we convince the Soviets that, as a country and alliance, we stand united. We must bring them to conclude as early as possible that their public campaign will not bear fruit, and that they should get down to serious bargaining at the negotiating table. Congressional support for the MX will send just such a message to Moscow. It will send a strong signal of national resolve and will greatly strengthen our hand in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the continuation of the MX program is essential for the maintenance of a strong deterrent posture, for the support of our fundamental foreign policy objectives, and for the chances of success at the Geneva arms control negotiations.

It would be unwise to reverse course and curtail our commitment to the strategic modernization program and MX. To do so would deny the United States and our allies a needed and important military capability, and would send a signal of weakness and lack of resolve to the Soviet Union—as well as to our friends and allies—at precisely the time when we must show our strength of commitment and unity of purpose. I therefore urge your support for the MX program.

Thank you.

TALKING POINTS ON SDI

Mr. Chairman, I would like to supplement my remarks with a few comments on the Strategic Defense Initiative program.

As I stated earlier, the Administration's long-term goal for strategic deterrence—should new defensive technologies prove feasible—is to shift from the current regime, which relies on the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation, to one that will be based on the dominance of non-nuclear defenses.

The SDI research program supports this goal.

Whether the research program will indicate that such defensive technologies are feasible, and thus that our goal is attainable, is a question we will be unable to answer for several years.

The criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of new defensive technologies will be demanding.

The technologies must produce defensive systems that are survivable. If not, the defenses themselves would be tempting targets for a first strike and stability would be decreased rather than enhanced.

Moreover, new defenses must be cost-effective at the margin. That is, it must be cheaper to add additional defensive capability than it is to add the offensive capability necessary to counter it. Otherwise, the defensive systems could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses instead of a redirection of effort from offense to defense.

If the new technologies cannot meet these standards, we would not deploy them. Instead, we will continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation.

However, we have high expectations that the scientific community can respond to the challenge. I might add here that my own discussions with distinguished members of the scientific community have reinforced my expectations in this regard.

Now there are several myths with respect to the SDI program that I would like to dispel.

First, the SDI program does not represent US initiation of a defensive arms race. The Soviets have been conducting SDI-type research for years.

For example, they were the first to begin particle beam research and the first to conduct high energy laser research.

In fact, Soviet proposals which would block the US SDI program represents nothing less than an attempt to maintain a Soviet monopoly in this area of technology.

Second, there is no evidence that the SDI program has prompted any increases in the Soviet offensive arsenal that would otherwise not occur. The development pro-

grams for the two new ICBMs, the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, predate the SDI program. Moreover, the experience of the 1970s indicates that Soviet modernization programs proceed unabated, with or without restraint in US programs.

Third, the SDI research program is not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Not only will the research be fully within treaty limits, we will also be working simultaneously in Geneva to strengthen those limits that the Soviets have eroded over time.

If research indicated that defensive technologies were feasible, we would want to work with the Soviets to manage a stable transition to a defense-reliant relationship. The ABM Treaty provides for such consultations. We have offered to begin discussions with the Soviets now, in the new Geneva talks, as to how this transition might be accomplished.

Finally, I believe it is helpful to examine carefully the likely consequences of the options that face us.

Without the SDI research program, the best we can hope for is a continuation of the current state of deterrence, reliant upon the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation. The worst would be a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, to which the US would have little or no effective response.

If the SDI research program is continued, we would, at a minimum, have a hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limits. At best, we would create the basis for a new and more stable system of deterrence—one based on mutual assured security rather than mutual assured destruction.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank both of you.

Let me reserve my time for a little later in the process.

Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I thank both of you for very good statements, and especially Mr. Nitze. Well, both of you. I couldn't separate one from the other in terms of saying that.

If people would hear and objectively listen and receive the message that both of you have brought us today, I think that we could all march forward together and successfully go to defend, I think, this country. But unfortunately, there are people whose visors have just come down. They won't see; they won't hear. Nothing reaches them. No matter how persuasive the argument or what the facts are, we can't reach them. And there is nothing we can do about it. So we will just hope that the majority will be able to prevail when it comes to more decisions.

I have two short questions for you, Mr. Secretary; and one for you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Secretary, of course you wouldn't be here and wouldn't have made the statement you made if you did not strongly support the MX missile. Up until a couple of years ago, my good friend—and I mean that sincerely—the gentleman from Florida, and I, were on the same side of the MX missile. But the gentleman from Florida, who is sitting in on this panel today, has changed his mind and has taken a position opposite mine, which is his absolute right to do.

He has quoted you on several occasions, on every occasion in debate, as saying that you, Mr. Secretary—he says even Cap Weinberger says that he opposes the MX missile.

Now, did you make such a statement as this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. I would be wasting an awful lot of time if anybody would think I would oppose the missile. I have been strongly for the MX ever since it was first proposed.

Mr. DICKINSON. I hear this every time he and I——

Secretary WEINBERGER. What I opposed was the previous method in the previous administration of deployment, but not the missile itself. I have always known we have needed the missile. We have to

regain that kind of deterrent. I have never even seen that quote, although I have seen a tremendous number of misquotes on other subjects.

Mr. DICKINSON. OK. The second question——

Mr. BENNETT. Will the gentleman yield?

First of all, with regard to my opposition to the MX missile, it is true when we were R&D'ing it and trying to find a better missile where we hadn't found a place to place it, I supported going ahead with that study to accomplish it. I only turned against the missile when I met with people who were on the Scowcroft Commission who virtually told me they had been ordered to come up with a program which could pass Congress to put these missiles in silos that Mr. Weinberger had said about a year or a year and a half before that were so vulnerable that they shouldn't be placed there.

He went on to say—and the Secretary of Defense quoted himself about this, that I am now going to refer to—he went on to say that they couldn't be hardened sufficiently to contain the MX missile.

Now, the Secretary of Defense——

Mr. DICKINSON. Will the gentleman from Florida let me reclaim my time? You will have ample opportunity. My 5 minutes will run, and you are using my time. I am reclaiming my time, and let you use your time to make your statement.

Now, the second thing I want to ask you, Mr. Secretary: Is the Minuteman as accurate a missile, or will it be, as the MX?

ACCURACY OF THE MX

Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, no; the Minuteman is very inaccurate. That is one of its problems.

Mr. DICKINSON. Would 10 of those be equal to 1 MX?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. DICKINSON. Would 10 Midgetman, or Minuteman, either one—the mobile or the Minuteman—be equal to 1 MX?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We don't know about the small single-headed missile at this point, because we haven't developed it. We are trying to get the degree of accuracy in it that would be in the MX.

Certainly, there is nothing remotely resembling that accuracy in the Minuteman.

Mr. DICKINSON. All right.

You can't say at this time whether 10 Midgetmen would be equal to 1 MX?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, they might be equal to it if we can get the same degree of accuracy. It takes 10 of them to get that equality, yes, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. For you, Mr. Ambassador, in the short time I have left, let me ask you this: Our best shot at going forward with the MX Program is to succeed in the unfencing of the money which we fenced in conference last year.

Looking down the road from that, if we don't unfence it—and we are more likely to be able to unfence it than we would even the succeeding vote—could you tell us—and you have been involved in this business for years, negotiating with the Soviets—could you tell us in your opinion what would result if we failed this month on the

vote to unfence the money for the MX; what might we reasonably expect in terms of negotiation with the Soviets, if you didn't kill it? What might we reasonably expect insofar as our ongoing negotiations with the Soviets?

EFFECT ON SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador NITZE. I think the Soviet Union—the decision-makers in the Soviet Union take many factors into account, and they are really quite conservative on how they estimate what is going to happen in the United States.

If it were not to be unfenced, I think they still would believe that it will be unfenced somewhat later. So I am not sure that it would make an immediate and dramatic difference. But I think it would convey a greater hope to them that there would be opposition in the United States against the very thought of maintaining an adequate deterrent against real opposition, and that it would encourage them to increase their opposition, increase their propaganda campaign, play upon the divisions in Europe, and try to defeat us indirectly.

I think it is not correct to say that we would see an immediate direct correlation.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank both of you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Nitze and Secretary Weinberger. I would have to add at the outset, say that I am somewhat disappointed that because of the time constraints and the fact that we have a vote coming up on the MX that our first meeting with you on the Policy Panel would be regarding SDI and MX specifically, because I think in many respects we end up talking about just research and development and procurement issues, and the concept underlying this panel, Policy Panel, is to talk about the broader policy decisions, and based on the defense guidance and some of the prioritization of our overall defense needs. But I think we will be getting into that as time progresses.

Secretary Weinberger, as you know, I have supported the MX and will vote to unfence them this month. That is based on the policy of deterrence and not on the question of what impact it might have on our mom-and-pop contractors and subcontractors on the procurement end. And I think most of us are concerned about the current negotiations and that we do so out of our belief that the MX is a part of the total picture of deterrence that we as a country believe in.

Mr. Nitze, my question to you, I have read with great interest the speech you gave to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on the 20th of February. In it you established what I consider one of the most definitive criteria that has yet come out as to what the administration believes, how the administration believes we should proceed with SDI, and you are to be commended in my opinion for making such a substantial contribution to the current debate on SDI. I would hope that if other members of the panel haven't seen

that speech, that perhaps the committee can get copies of it and furnish it to them.

But in your speech you state that "If the technology proves feasible, any deployment would have to be in a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets," and that "arms control would play a critical role."

My first question is this: As a former arms control negotiator, how would you approach the challenge of convincing the Soviets to move to defense-dominated deterrence? Second, would you be more specific as to the role you see arms control playing in a deployment phase? Third, can we consider the points made in your speech to be the official administration position on how to proceed with SDI or not? And lastly, how do you, from your position, see the ability of SDI to defend against the air-breathing threat vis-a-vis sea-launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles with low observable technology? I will repeat them if you need it.

Ambassador NITZE. I have gathered three questions. One, the transition, the other was, Is my position consistent with the official position. There are four. The last was the SDI and air breathers.

Mr. MCCURDY. And what does the role of arms control play in the deployment phase.

DEFENSE-DOMINATED DETERRENCE

Ambassador NITZE. Let me deal with them in that order.

The ABM Treaty had contemplated the possibility of systems based upon what are called other physical principles. It was the basic components which then at the time we negotiated the ABM Treaty that were part of an ABM system, where the ABM radars, the ABM interceptor missiles, and the launchers for those—and those were the three things which were limited by the ABM Treaty, but then one could foresee that there might be new types of defenses that could be developed from lasers, or partical beam accelerators, or this or that or the other thing.

And so we did include a provision which was agreed to by the Russians, that in the event such systems were ever deployed, developed, then the side developing them should consult with the other side, with a view to working out control arrangements which would assure that these systems would then contribute to the security of both sides, not just to one, and that if we could work those out, those would be incorporated into the ABM Treaty by amendment to the treaty. And we proposed to abide by the ABM Treaty.

Concerns about the ABM Treaty are many, and we believe that the Soviet side has fully exploited the permissions that are given them under the ABM Treaty and have in fact gone beyond that. But it is our intention to abide by the ABM Treaty and to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty that has taken place, so that under it we propose to operate under the ABM Treaty, so that if the research turns out to be successful in developing what the Secetary called cost-effective and survivable systems, then we would propose to negotiate with the Soviets about how those would be introduced into the forces of both sides.

The President has gone beyond that, and has said we are prepared, we will at some time discuss with the Soviets how one might

go about this even in advance of having actually developed the system. One can't really negotiate about it until one knows what the systems are, but we are prepared to discuss this transition phase with the Soviets. When? Right away.

Now, you ask what the relationship is to arms control. I think that is clear from what I have said. We have proposed to enter into these discussions pursuant to the ABM Treaty, which is an arms control agreement. Is my position, the position that I have outlined, official? Yes. What I said in that Philadelphia speech was reviewed by Secretary Weinberger and his agency and by the State Department, by the White House, by everybody else, and so I think it is a statement which expresses official policy.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS

Now, you ask what is the relationship between SDI and air-breathing systems. When the SDI Program was created, its charter dealt specifically with systems which would counter ballistic missile reentry vehicles, so it's task, the research task of the SDI Program, is specifically addressed to ballistic missile reentry vehicles, so it does not deal with air defenses.

But that does not mean that, quite separately, we are not interested in developing along with defenses against ballistic missiles, reentry vehicle defenses against air breathers, but in the past it has been, I thought that if one didn't have any defense against ballistic missiles, you know, it was unwise to spend great amounts of resources in developing a defense against—developing air defenses, because you would be vulnerable in any case to the ballistic missiles. But if we do develop it, if we do succeed in developing defenses against ballistic missiles, we certainly ought to reinforce that with defense against air breathers. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. I think we have to make very, very clear that the strategic defense initiative is not going to end war. It is not going to stop conventional weapons, artillery, ground-based missiles, or things of that kind, ground-to-ground missiles or things of that kind. But it will deal with—if we can get it, if the research works, it will deal with the weapons that have terrified the world since they came into existence, and that is the intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missile reentry vehicles or the missile itself, and it is, we think, absolutely vital and the best way to proceed to go ahead with it.

But it is a curious thing, a lot of people seem to think that when we proposed it that somehow it was a cure-all against everything. And when I was asked abroad if this was going to deal with all manner of conventional aircraft and cruise missiles that fly at much lower levels and all, and I said no, absolutely it would not, we would have to work out defenses to those, the headline in the London paper was "Now He Wants Radars," as if this was some great disclosure and admission that we had made. It will not deal with that type of system. It isn't designed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much for coming. When I have town meetings in New Jersey, I always get a laugh when I talk about the legislative process in Washington, DC. It is slow and a lot of times you have a yes vote which is a no vote, and a no vote which means a yes vote, and you debate things repeatedly, often in subcommittee, then full committee, then on the floor, then year after year, and I get a laugh when I talk about the fact that it reminds me of an old expression by Bismarck: If you like laws or sausages, don't watch either of them being made. And I think that statement has a great deal of applicability to the MX missile.

I have always been in favor of it. The debate that we are going to be having, I understand, on the 25th of this month in the House of Representatives for 10 hours is the debate on the missile that we debated last year. It is the same 21. And of course when the authorization bill comes to the floor, then we will be debating again for the umpteenth time new procurement buys. But it is a rather slow and tortuous and very expensive process.

I have three questions I would like you to address, if you could. First of all, there has been a great deal of discussion on strategic defense initiative. One of the arguments that I have heard over the years about the reason we should not deploy MX is that it is not in a survivable or the vulnerable basing mode, the old Minuteman II and II silos and therefore they are vulnerable so don't build it. I think the Scowcroft Commission answered well that argument such that it would give credence to the importance of going forward with it.

But nevertheless I wonder whether there has been serious discussion in the Pentagon, Mr. Weinberger, about the possibility of looking into research and development on point defense of MX, even in the context of nonviolation of the ABM Treaty.

As we all know, there is an ABM Treaty that does permit defending something. The Soviet Union does utilize that around Moscow. It seems to me that it is eminently reasonable to consider the possibility, even in the context of a nonamended ABM Treaty, to defend the MX and utilize that concept.

Second, there has been a great deal said by Soviet violations of arms control agreements, and this question is slightly different than the MX question. It really has nothing directly to do with it. I am wondering whether the Department of Defense is going to come forward with a report that addresses the question of the military significance of all these violations of arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is now a growing consensus, I believe, in the United States, among even very doubtful critics, that the Soviet Union has in fact indeed violated some arms control agreements, and I wonder whether the Pentagon will be giving to the Congress one day a report that addresses the question of their military significance.

And finally—and this goes back to MX itself—there are some people who are saying, well, we should deploy MX, but 100 seems rather a lot. Maybe we ought to stop at 50. And also the 100 and some odd, 120-odd test missiles and spares seems rather much, because the whole buy would be 200 and some odd, and isn't that a lot considering the great success that the missile has had. I wonder if you would address the numbers question as well.

POINT DEFENSE

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. Thank you for the questions.

On point defense, yes, a great deal of work has been done. And the Soviets have deployed a point defense system, what I call a traditional ABM, a ground-based system of missiles that, by nuclear means, attempt to destroy incoming nuclear missiles, sometimes shortly before they hit the Earth.

The problem is that it is only about 50 percent effective at best. It is capable of being overwhelmed and saturated by a very large number of offensive missiles directed against the system or the silos.

It is not a thoroughly reliable defense at all, but the Soviets have put a great deal of money into the one around Moscow and they will be able to protect some of the silos around Moscow as a result.

It gives the lie completely to the argument that you shouldn't consider anything in the nature of defense, because they obviously have, just as they have spent a great deal of time and effort on research on the strategic defense.

So point defense has been considered, but point is not what strategic defense is all about.

Strategic defense is something new and different, and it does offer the opportunity, if the research proves out, of having a thoroughly reliable defense that uses non-nuclear means to destroy Soviet missiles outside the atmosphere and gets us completely away from any consideration or discussion of whether we are trying to protect a particular target or not. We are not.

We are trying to protect the entire nation and Europe from this kind of attack. You can't protect it from artillery, but we can protect it from this kind of attack, and that is what we are trying to do.

So, yes, we have considered it but it isn't a reliable, effective defense.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS

On the report on the military significance of the Soviet violation, we have turned in reports that I believe address that subject. We can certainly do it in more detail, if you wish.

Just to pick up a couple, the Krasnoyarsk radar that has been constructed is, we think, a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. It is a radar designed to work with a kind of defense, the strategic defense that we are talking about, that we say if we get the research, if it has to be deployed, we would have to revise the treaty to do it. But they have gone ahead and put it in.

We think it is a violation and has military significance. We think their encryption constitutes a violation of a significant military character and a great many more.

On the numbers of MX, 100 is half the number that the previous administration thought they should deploy. It makes it, I think, clear that it is not a first-strike weapon, that it does not have the capability to destroy the number of targets that a first-strike capability would have to have. But it does add enormously to deterrence because of its accuracy, because it is in the ground; and because it is there and able to be used in a very accurate way, it would put at

unacceptably high risk, we think, a number of Soviet very valued and cherished targets.

As far as the test programs on the other missiles are concerned, of course you have to have tests. We are still testing the Minuteman. You have to keep that going all the time, because in this kind of business and with these equations of deterrence, you cannot afford to be very wrong. Your margin of error is extremely thin and you have to be sure that what is there works and what is there deters.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me try a question here because you mentioned it in answer to Mr. Courter's question and Mr. McCurdy's question about it would not protect against artillery.

How far are we willing to go with the system?

If you develop a defensive system against missiles, and let's assume that it works, that we can do it, which we don't know yet, but are doing research to find out, assuming it works, then we would also have to protect against the air attack by bombers and planes.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is why I said we also need radars.

The CHAIRMAN. What next? It seems to me, let me lay out my concern.

The concern is, it seems to me that the offense never lays down and says, "We quit; we give up; we can't do it." The offense is always looking for some other way around it.

First we spend I don't know how much to build a defense against missiles; then we spend I don't know how much to defend against planes. And assuming we can do that and are effective, isn't the other side going to think about ways to get in?

What options do they have? I would think one option is to try to sneak nuclear weapons in by surreptitious means and plant them in cities with devices that they could detonate from someplace else. I think we would have to go to a big defense against that.

The point is that the defense—I don't know of a case in history where the defense has put up such convincing defense that the offense says, "I give up."

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two parts to your question, and one of them is, is there going to come a period of time when we don't have to have any military strength or defensive deterrent capability? That is one.

I guess the answer to that has to be, I can't conceive of any until the Soviet behavior changes so dramatically that none of us could quite see it at the moment. Even then there might be other countries that could get nuclear weapons or enough force to cause some problems.

I guess really the answer comes down to what value you place on defending the country. I can't think of any higher priority. I think you have to do it.

I want to make the point that I would love to come to a period where we can say, "That is enough, we can stop." I can't foresee it.

SDI CAPABILITIES

Let me say this, that the defensive capabilities of the SDI, if it works, are quite different from anything we have talked about

before. I don't think it is a system that is capable of being overrun or saturated.

I think it is the kind of system that if we can solve the technical problems, trying to pick out the Soviet offensive missiles and differentiate between decoys and real, and aim a destructive force at those missiles and track and follow them and launch the force, that it can't be overwhelmed.

The CHAIRMAN. The point is, we are not going to know that and that is what we are doing the research about.

Let's assume that it works and that we do have that defense. Up until now, all the offensive capability of the United States and the Soviet Union has gone heavily toward ICBM's.

And if both sides erect a defense against ICBM's—let's assume one that cannot be overwhelmed and assume one that countermeasures are not there—if that happens, it seems to me that the natural thing is that you channel the offense into some other area, and the first place it would be channeled into would be the air-breathing leg. Then we erect a defense against that.

Say we got a perfect defense against that. It seems the offense says, "What are we going to do now?"

Secretary WEINBERGER. As we said, the SDI is not going to end war. It is going to remove, if it works, if it fulfills the President's hopes, it is going to remove the shadow and the terror of these most destructive weapons of all, but it will leave other weapons of a conventional nature that you will have to defend against if you want to preserve the country.

The CHAIRMAN. But the problem is, the reason these are the most terrible weapons that we have now is because there is no defense against them. Put some defense up against them that works, then other methods are going to be found, and that is going to be the most terrible thing.

If we are going to say we need to expend $1 trillion—Secretary Brown says; I don't know if he is right—$1 trillion to defend against missiles, but then we are going to have to have, I don't know, how many billion dollars against bombers, and then somebody says, remember terrorist attacks, then it is going to be billions more.

The question is, there is never going to be a way to do it. The reason people use missiles now is because there isn't a defense against it. Throw a defense up against missiles, and the most potent attack will be something else.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Something else is available now, with very heavy conventional strength——

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about nuclear.

Secretary WEINBERGER. All right, but you have got air-launch cruise missiles that fly at lower altitudes and smaller, and we are working on a defense against that, as are the Soviets.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you to think as your DDR&E will think.

The other side has air defenses, ballistic missile defenses. Are they going to say, "Gee, we can't think of anything"? Of course they are not. They are going to be thinking of some other ways to deliver those messages.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Where does this lead us? What is the alternative?

The CHAIRMAN. The alternative is you want to rely on mutually assured destruction as the basis for keeping the peace, which is what we have had for 40 years.

Secretary WEINBERGER. But it doesn't, and look at what the Soviets are doing. They aren't relying on that. They are working just as feverishly as possible to develop a strategic defense initiative. They have been doing it for close to 20 years.

If they should succeed, they have made no slight suggestion of revising the ABM Treaty or made no slight suggestion of sharing it with anybody. And you would really have a dangerous world then.

We would love to get verifiable agreements that would reduce the level at which we can safely have deterrence, but we had at one time another safeguard, total and complete, absolute military superiority in the early 1950's. Nobody even suggests that we return to that.

And what the President is trying to get is another way, through the SDI, of dealing with the most destructive of all weapons, but it isn't all of them. And the fact that there are other weapons available or other means of destruction, to my mind, is not a reason for working on other means to destroy and make obsolete nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is going to be a tough sell if we have to sell the American public on a big expensive program that is geared toward missile defense and then the next step is say to the public, "By the way, this isn't doing it. We need an air defense." And then after that, "This isn't doing it either. We are going to have an enormously complex system to make sure they don't sneak them in by boat at night or bring them in in suitcases through Kennedy Airport."

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, either you should or should not ceaselessly work to get the means that can assure the security, the peace and freedom of the country.

I come down, when faced with that dilemma, with a very simple response: We have to do what is necessary to keep our peace, freedom and security. If we give up and say it is too expensive or not possible scientifically, then we have surrendered ourselves, and I don't favor that option.

The CHAIRMAN. You have an alternative: mutual assured destruction?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That does not solve any problem connected with the air-breathing, slower flying cruise missile.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't solve anything except that it is aimed at protecting the United States and the Soviet Union through the possibility of mutual destruction. It is an uneasy thing.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is a strategy of a balance of terror, and it has worked, because there aren't alternatives. Now we think scientifically we are on the verge of the threshold of getting something very much better than that.

The idea that both sides are perfectly safe if they are both totally vulnerable is not a philosophy that I subscribe to. I think you have to bear in mind that the Soviets have spent close to 20 years trying to develop an SDI. They are ahead of us in some important particu-

lars, and if they should get it first, you would then have a really dangerous situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Nitze?

MX MOST COST EFFECTIVE FOR MAINTAINING PEACE

Ambassador NITZE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that you have made a strong defense of the MX program. It is clear that for the next 10 years and beyond that, if the MX program is not successful, we will have to continue to rely upon the threat of massive and devastating destruction for deterrence, and we propose to maintain that position. We don't know that we can get away from it.

Therefore, by all odds, the most cost-effective system in maintaining deterrence, based on the threat of massive destruction, is the MX system. I don't think there is a better system in the world.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is no suggestion that we get away from any offensive deterrent capability unless and until we have a thoroughly reliable strategic defense.

We have all said repeatedly that we don't know if we can get it, but we should work on it, because if we get it, it will give us something much better. And if we don't work on it, we will face the day almost certainly when the Soviets will deploy one and we don't have it, and you don't correct that overnight.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Ray.

Mr. RAY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, I propose a hypothesis to you. Assume that yesterday morning we woke up to find that the Soviets had made a major breakthrough themselves in the sort of technology we are calling the SDI, that they had tested in the upper atmosphere a system that would indeed take out a base-phased missile of ours.

Would you not be here saying to us, we are behind and we need therefore to accelerate our R&D for SDI and also to augment our offensive forces so we can bridge the gap?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No; I would be before you praying.

If you let one side get ahead on anything as significant as strategic defense, you will not have very much time to do R&D and consider 12 more years of debate and whether or not you should have one or 2 or 5 or 10.

That is what we are here today trying desperately to persuade the Congress, that we have to have a deterrent capability maintained, unless and until we can get something better.

Knowing that the Soviets are working on something better and knowing that it is indeed much better from our point of view, we have to have the funds necessary to go ahead and try to get that strategic defense capability first.

Mr. SPRATT. I am suggesting that if the Soviets perceive that they are behind us and inferior to us in the technology necessary to develop it, that their logical response is to build up their offensive capabilities.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They have done that. They retaliated against the MX in 1979.

That is the way they retaliated against the Pershing and the ground-launched cruise missile. They did it 6 years before we started to get those in. Lucky that we have been given 6 years of time.

Mr. SPRATT. I understand and don't question the position that you are defending, proceeding with the R&D for SDI.

I am saying, how do we avoid the Soviet response of a massive offensive buildup in order to counter it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It has already taken place and we have to try our best to maintain a deterrent on offensive credibility and to block and convince them that they must not launch an attack and that it is very dangerous to try to do that with the equipment that is obsolete and not as accurate as it should be.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there any proposal to include a two-for-one billion dollars down of something comparable to it?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We would love to get a kind of arrangement in which we would have an agreement that is verifiable with the Soviets that would permit us to have deterrence maintained at much lower levels.

We also plan to take out some of the older and obsolete missiles so we will not have a net increase necessarily in numbers, and numbers are a very poor way to measure this. We need effective numbers.

Mr. SPRATT. General Scowcroft testified a few days ago and he was asked about missile silo hardening. He offered the opinion that in the race between hardening and accuracy, accuracy will eventually win.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is a viewpoint and I respect that.

On the other hand, we have developed and are testing now things that I call, I think fairly, a breakthrough in the ability to harden and we can get enormously increased hardening that would require a degree of pin-point accuracy that, thus far, the Soviets don't have. If we keep on selling them or letting them steal our technology, they may get it.

The hardening is down the road a bit, but it is a substantial increase in magnitudes of the ability to secure hardened silos.

Mr. SPRATT. General Davis was before us also, and he indicated that we have reassessed hardness of our existing silos and upgraded that somewhat.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have indeed.

Mr. SPRATT. He also indicated that we have reassessed the accuracy of the SS–18 and downgraded it somewhat, such that the CEP of the SS–18 and the CEP of the Mark-12A tipped Minuteman III are roughly similar now.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would not be able to go into detail in an open hearing, but I wouldn't think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank both gentlemen for coming this afternoon.

I might surprise you, but I kind of like your ideas on SDI, and I will be supportive. I want to get back——

Secretary WEINBERGER. That shows the advantage of only having one kind of testimony before the committee.

Mr. MAVROULES. I think it also indicates to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that we are all good Americans here and we

can disagree on certain issues. But I think when the chips are down, that we all pull together, and I think that is the message that we are trying to get to the Soviet Union.

I agree, Mr. Ambassador, that even if the money were fenced, they know if they didn't cooperate, the money would be unfenced. We have differences here.

Mr. Shevchenko was here yesterday. I asked the question, do you think the MX missile will make or break the arms control talks? He responded, no, it will not.

In fairness, he said, continue with the production of the missile—let me give an honest reference to his statement.

It has now become perception, I believe, as to what the MX missile will or will not do for arms control talks. Let me ask a couple of questions.

When we talk dollars, we are not talking 100 MX missiles when we talk total program; we are talking 223?

Secretary WEINBERGER. You have to have a test program. A hundred deployed requires close to the amount you have said for reliable credible tests. There has been no slight suggestion to the contrary, but they are test missiles, not to deploy.

Mr. MAVROULES. I don't agree with that, but it is 223 missiles?

I think we are talking something like $17 billion for the total program of 223 missiles?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have already sunk $13 billion into the program; $13 billion is already expended of whatever total amount it takes.

We are under budget and ahead of time, so I can't give the precise total amount, but it would be reasonably close to that.

Mr. MAVROULES. The precise total amount is $16.6 billion.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It could be even better, because it is getting lower as we come in under budget. But, yes, we have to have test missiles.

Mr. MAVROULES. Let me ask a hypothetical question. If indeed the Soviet Union has greater strength than we do in the ICBM's, greater throw weight——

Secretary WEINBERGER. By a 5-to-3 ratio they are ahead of us in throw-weight.

Mr. MAVROULES. If indeed that is where their strength lies, what will force the Soviet Union perhaps to take down some of their powerful strategic weapons if indeed we are building in turn 1,000 nuclear warheads?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Exactly the idea that that is a very repugnant thought to them and something they want to avoid.

And they can avoid it in two ways: By an agreement that will be verifiable, which we would be delighted to sign, or they can avoid it by waiting another 12 years and have the Congress not fund this program and therefore not modernize and not put in the kind of incentive they need.

It is easy to say if we don't do it 1 year, we can do it another. The problem is that you do two things with that. It isn't just 1 more year. The whole production line runs down. You have to reassemble the work force. It makes it much more expensive than $16 billion.

That is why we don't think there is all that margin of time.

Mr. MAVROULES. I only have 5 minutes.

The point I am trying to make is this, that if the Soviet Union were demanding that we take down our strength, our part of the triad, or to reduce our part of the triad to weaken our own position to reach an arms control agreement, do you honestly believe that we are going to listen to the Soviet Union and take down our strength when we in turn are asking them to take down their strength?

Secretary WEINBERGER. What we want are fair, verifiable agreements that reduce us to quality levels. We are not asking them to dismantle everything while we build ours, but we are asking them to reduce the tremendous imbalance in their favor.

We are not asking them to reduce it to zero, although that would be the ideal solution. We are asking to get both sides down to much lower, but quality, levels.

Mr. MAVROULES. If they have that advantage in their favor, let's assume that we have the advantage in two other areas. That is the point I am trying to get across here.

I know what they have on the books for the future. Why would they want to take down their strength when in turn we perhaps have more strength in the other two parts of the triad?

Secretary WEINBERGER. The part to understand is that before the negotiating teams are proposals and provisions that would recognize the precise point you have made and would equalize on an overall basis.

The other point is that it isn't enough to be all right on two legs or one leg of the triad but way behind on the third, because there is a mutually reinforcing strength that the triad gives to each other. That is why we have had it all these years.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The last question reminded me of the statement that was made by Mr. Shevchenko when he said that unilateral concessions on our side would probably result simply in exacerbated Soviet demands, and essentially, in his estimation, in Geneva would produce very limited returns for the United States.

You have talked about hardening. Are you saying essentially that the 100 MX missiles that we are moving to produce now will, in your estimation and your judgment, be rendered more and more survivable through hardening programs?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; if the decision is to go ahead with the hardening programs which are showing such enormous promise now, yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Do you feel comfortable right now that if we place these 100 MX's in silos, a substantial portion of that deterrent force would survive a Soviet first strike?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; I think enough to constitute a major increase in our deterrent credibility.

Mr. HUNTER. Ambassador, it looks to me like in the early part of the decade when we were negotiating SALT with the Soviets, they were the party that had the problem. They had an inferior strategic force. We essentially gave them a license to build.

They have built since 1972 808 SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's—in fact, built far beyond what we felt they could do in terms of both quality and quantity.

Today we have the problem and that problem is survivability of our land leg of the triad, our ICBM force. It looks to me like the only way we can come away with any type of agreement that we could sign in Geneva is if they agree to allow us some way to allow us to follow a path of negotiation that will allow us to retrieve the survivabilty of the land leg of the triad, either through mutual reductions or perhaps through a defensive system.

It would appear to me that they had no reason to want to allow AMB defenses in the early part of the decade because they didn't have the big missiles at that time. Now that is the centerpiece of their program, and I would think they would want to protect those missiles.

So I guess the bottom line is, do you see a situation in which we might amend the ABM Treaty to allow both sides to protect the deterrent land leg of the triad, for them to protect their big missiles, and for us to protect our Minutemen and ultimately our MX missiles?

Ambassador NITZE. Back in 1971, they proposed exactly such a provision in the ABM Treaty.

The difficulty with it was that it was very hard to draw a definitive dividing line between a missile system, which is able only to defend a hard target, and one which could also be used to defend cities and soft targets and be of general utility. So at that time, both sides moved away from it in 1971.

There has been some talk by—I don't necessarily think they were well informed—people on the other side who said the Soviets might raise this again. So it isn't excluded that they might want to raise the possibility of an amendment permitting hard-site defense.

I am not sure that it would be to our interest, because we may have greater difficulties in getting all the environmental permissions and so forth. It would be necessary for a widespread defense.

While they don't have terminal defense, they wouldn't have any such difficulty. So if it were to be done, I should think it would have to be done very carefully and pursuant to a much broader program.

I am not sure one would exclude that from the kinds of things one would consider if one got to this transition period where we would work out mutually acceptable ways of introducing defenses concurrently with the reduction of the more dangerous offensive systems, defenses with reduction of offense in any such cooperative program.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. First I wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Nitze, for being with us today. This is a very important subject and for you to personally come over, we appreciate it.

I want to replow some old ground, if I may. First let me tell you I have already had your briefing on the SDI, which I thought was excellent.

One of the issues that I got out of it, however, was that should we develop the three-tiered SDI defensive layers, the Soviet Union

would probably do what they did in the early 1960's, late 1950's: Steer away from additional missiles like they steered away from emphasizing the bomber force back in the 1950's and 1960's because of our then air defense, and go to conventional type production.

I question that premise. I will not ask you to comment on it, but I do question it.

What I do question, sir, is the SDI, as I see it, is only one of the three—as has been well stated already—one of the three types of defense that we need.

Suppose we have an excellent SDI; it works 0.2 percent, would get through. We still need a good air defense because that is there. We still need a good submarine-launched cruise missile defense because that threat is actually there now.

Where do we come up with the funds, the program, and the plans for all three of these?

My question is, If we have just the SDI, what do we really have? Don't we really need some coordinated simultaneous research and development and defensive position? Why single this one out?

SDI R&D TO CONTINUE

Secretary WEINBERGER. We agree, sir, and that is what we have before you in the budget. We request that the strategic defense initiative research continue.

We certainly are asking for funds that will help us with the defense against the submarine-launched or air-launched cruise missiles that fly slower and much more slowly, and we do have, as you know, provisions in the budget that improve the early-warning network and a number of other things.

I think basically I would answer your question that because each one is a large and a difficult task does not mean we shouldn't try to do it. I think a world without the nuclear missile, intercontinental and intermediate range, would be a better and safer world, even if airplanes are unconstrained.

If you had a world without missiles and without airplanes, that might be safer yet. If you had a world with verifiable agreements that provided we could do this at much lower cost at much lower levels, fine.

The real risk is that we have had agreements which haven't reduced. We have had agreements which permitted expansion. We have had agreements which are not verifiable, agreements which have been violated by the Soviets, and none of that is a reason to stop. Because, to my mind, it is a reason if we want to, as I know we do, keep our freedom and peace, it is a reason for trying to be more effective and unhappily to do more.

I mentioned we had a period when we felt much safer. We had a period in the 1950's after World War II when we emerged with enormous superiority in every possible category of military ways it could be measured, including monopoly of nuclear weapons, and we did not use that for any improper purpose. We didn't use it to get anything we shouldn't have had. We didn't use it to threaten or intimidate. And it was lost because we deliberately didn't follow the Soviet attempt to get an even larger force.

But because one is difficult or because one is expensive or because one may not even be possible, it is not a reason for abandoning others or it is not a reason for recognizing that you do need others.

Mr. SKELTON. I would like to follow through just a second.

It seems that the SDI is receiving much more attention and, I am sure, proportionately much more funding. Be that as it may, what about an attempt to defend against terrorism, against ships sailing into New York Harbor and the like?

I think those at least potentially carry just as much threat as incoming missiles, planes or cruise missiles.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think they do carry a threat, and I guess there is no limit to the number of ways in which you can lose your freedom, but it is essential to do things about that.

We are taking the steps we hope are going to be able to deter and weaken the thrust of such attacks. There are a lot of bank robberies going on, a lot of ways you can get shot crossing the street, but, again, I think we have to work on all of them.

And I don't minimize the terrorist threat, but we feel that if we allow our deterrent credibility to erode before we can get a strategic defense capability, then we are subjecting ourselves to a peril of perhaps nuclear destruction or nuclear blackmail in which we would have no alternatives.

So we have to work on all these threats, and it is a very big and very expensive and basically unpopular task, but it does have to be done.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate the opportunity to comment although I am not a member of the panel.

I would like to say that I was tremendously impressed with the clear, straight logic presented by the Secretary and by the Ambassador, and I think it is the kind of thing that one could expect from two outstanding honor students from Harvard University.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, that those of us who have supported your views and are continuing to support them and are trying to line up the appropriate number of votes for the MX when those two votes come, that we are working against what might be called the Vietnam syndrome.

I think one of the biggest problems we have in the House of Representatives is that anything that is connected with defense, whether it is high technology or low technology, is regarded by many Members as just being beyond the pale. You don't do anything for defense; you just explain about it.

But one of the things that I think has been rather enlightening to me, I got from your office a document that went into considerable detail about the economic impact of going ahead with the MX missile, and in connection with its production. And while there may be many Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate who are opposed to defense, I haven't found any of them who are opposed to jobs. And the document that was made available to me demonstrates that there are enormous economic benefits that would accrue if the votes go ahead.

In fact, the surprising thing was that in States where some of the strongest opponents of the MX live, there are large jobs, within the thousands, as a matter of fact, that would result from the approval and the construction of the MX.

I think California, which has a fairly large number of opponents, there are some 12,000 jobs, I think, on an average over the next 4 years. Even in Florida, where one of the distinguished opponents of the system comes from, there are some 1,200 jobs. I would imagine that they wouldn't be turned down in Florida either.

Simply, in Massachusetts, I think there were some 16- or 1,700 jobs available, and even in my State of New York, where I am one of the few members of my party who supports this system, I think there were some 2,000 jobs, again over the next 4 years.

I put those statistics in the Congressional Record, and I hope that if we can't convince them on the basis of Harvard logic, maybe at least the possibility of some jobs for those who are unemployed could swing the balance.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Beverly Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, in response to the remarks just made, we all have different ways of looking at our job, but I didn't come here to this job of being a Congressman with the idea that this would be a telling thing with regard to deciding on what kind of arms our country should have to survive. I think that is a very important thing, to think about what is best for our country.

I am sure the gentleman from New York is conscientiously in favor of the MX, and I am conscientiously opposed to it largely because it has never found a good place to be placed.

You asked where that quotation came from, page 20 of your confirmation statement. I will read what you said when you were confirmed. The date is January 6, 1981.

You said, speaking now in answer to Senator Exon:

> I would feel that simply putting the missile into the existing silos would not answer two or three of the concerns that I have; namely, that these are well known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be to be of sufficient strategic value to count as strategic improvements of our forces.

Now, you were not alone in that. The head of the Air Force, General Allen, and quite a number of others said, "Don't put these things in these silos because they are so vulnerable, they really aren't a valid part of the triad."

You can call a thing a triad, but if it doesn't really have the effect of being very damaging to the enemy, it really doesn't have much place in a triad.

I have identified where you said it, and I would like to remind you that several weeks ago, when I quoted the first part of that statement, I left out the part that you said "nor could they be sufficiently hardened."

Your reply at that time was that now they are going to be hardened. You left me with the impression that you had a plan for hardening them and you had funds in the bill to do it.

I found out later, to my astonishment, that they don't have a plan for this. They have researchers working toward this and the

estimate is about $15 billion to take care of the missiles, which means that the figures cited are a little illusory with regard to the cost of the program.

I am speaking rather than asking questions because it is like asking a mother whether she likes a child, in your circumstance.

I would like to say that most of us that are opposing the MX are opposing the MX, at least the people I am associated with, because of another thing that you referred to, the question of the conventional danger we have.

According to Gen. Bernard Rogers, the allied commander in Europe, he said our allied command in Europe currently, the conventional posture does not provide our Nation with adequate deterrence and it needs the nuclear threshold at a disburbingly low level.

We have mortgaged NATO's defenses to the nuclear response. In a matter of days, we would have to go to nuclear war. I don't favor a program which leaves us that prone.

Today the Soviets have three times the number of tanks we have in Europe, two times the artillery, two times the anti-tank, two times the armored personnel carriers. We can afford to buy those things; we just have not done it.

I think the greatest thing that faces this country today is not the budget, bad as the budget is. The greatest thing that faces our country today is that we are plowing our way with all certainty toward an unnecessary nuclear war.

If you want to comment, it is all right. But I think that is what we are doing, because we have said within days we would have to go to the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. And I think it is absurd for a country of our strength to put ourselves so prone to the Russians as that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I would be happy to comment.

SILO HARDENING

With respect to the hardening problem, we do have, and in 1981 we had a situation in which we didn't have any capability of getting a hardening to the extent that we even have now, let alone believe we can develop, and we did have a situation in which we had a suggestion that these MX missiles simply be dropped in existing silos with no reconstruction.

The President's ultimate decision in 1981, October 1981, was to put them in reconstructed existing silos. That does add some hardening, and we have now found that we will get an even harder degree of protection in those reconstructed existing silos.

But you must bear in mind that the Congress turned down that suggestion and told the President in effect to find another method and the President looked at a number of different methods and suggested one that a number of people recommended at that time, which was closely spaced basing on the ground, that this would prevent not necessarily through hardening but through fraternization of the Soviet missile, would self-destruct a great many of them and allow many more of the MX's to survive, and Congress didn't like that.

Then the Scowcroft Commission said, "You need to have the MX; you have to have it. You ought to deploy it in the most immediate mode in which you can do it," which is the existing Minuteman silos and not new reconstructed and hardened silos.

And about that time, we also found that we could get this engineering breakthrough. And if there was a desire, and I don't know how anyone could have gotten any different impression, but if there was a desire to put additional funds in as we worked on this new method of hardening, we would hope very much to have an ability and believe we can have an ability to develop a hardness that is many magnitudes harder than even the improvements that we have now. And that, of course, would be up to the Congress.

With respect to your last point—let me finish on the other one.

The important thing to bear in mind is that having the MX missile in the ground available for use, should it have to be used, is an enormous increase to our deterrent capability.

We are talking about having a system which the Soviets would then never be quite sure as to whether the destructive capacity that that system is capable of would be something that they could or should absorb; and that doubt, the pretty clear conclusion that it would not be absorbable, would help prevent and continue deterrence.

If they know, on the other hand, that we have in the ground an inaccurate missile that couldn't destroy their most cherished targets, then deterrence is weakened that much.

So it is vital to deploy it as quickly as possible, and after 12 years, the quickest system is the one that the President suggested in October 1981. And I hope we will be able to proceed as a result of the vote of Congress to get the operating capability needed by at least the end of next year.

STRONG CONVENTIONAL FORCES NEEDED

With respect to conventional forces, yes; we need strong conventional forces. That is why our budget is before you. Our budget is 87 percent for conventional forces and if you regard it as too high and demand that it be cut back, as many do, then you are going to have a weakening of our conventional capability.

The strategy of NATO for years has been that we would have a conventional exchange if a war came and that it might indeed be necessary to escalate to battlefield nuclear weapons or other kinds of nuclear weapons, and that is not a very satisfactory kind of way to keep the peace. It does require that we strengthen our conventional forces and that other NATO countries do, too. That is why we have pressed so hard for them to do so.

That is why I was so pleased when they voted $8 billion, three times what they have voted before last fall, unanimously, to expend this amount for NATO infrastructure to help with reinforcing of NATO.

But 87 percent of our budget goes for conventional, 13 percent for strategic, and only 13 percent of our strategic because we went a full decade and longer without strengthening or modernizing the strategic triad. And that is what unfortunately our heritage is, to have to do all three of the legs of the triad at once, and it is expen-

sive but it is only 13 percent of that budget. So we are not neglecting conventional and shouldn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me address another question.

We have already discussed one problem that I see with the SDI Program, and that is the one that Ike Skelton also talked about a little bit, about his concerns, which is, namely, that the number of ways offensive can use to get nuclear weapons into this country is very, very broad, maybe infinite, near infinite.

The problem is that every time we move to defend against one of those ways, it is going to cost a lot of money, and even if we are 100 percent successful in every single one of them, at the last analysis, that what we are going to end up with is the only reason that we are sure that the Soviets are not going to do it to us, is the retaliation, which is deterrence, which is where we have been all along.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Which we don't propose to give up.

The CHAIRMAN. But the difficulty, then, is if in the end we are going to rely on deterrence, why are we spending all the money on all these other defenses?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Because you can't go down to the corner hardware store and order up a strategic defense system. It takes a very, very long time to decide even if it is feasible.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I am raising is, whether it is a wise idea to do it——

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is the fundamental issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking essentially about a population defense. I do see the defense of missiles might have some prospect to the future, depending on how things play out.

Let me raise a second concern that I have about population defense as opposed to missile defense.

Does it apply in the case of Europe—maybe I ought to ask the Ambassador. Is this defense also supposed to defend our European allies, our NATO allies, against the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will it work as well to protect them as it does to protect us?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are told now on the basis of very preliminary studies, if it will work, it will be somewhat easier to work it on the intermediate-range weapons, the SS–20's and so on, than it would on the intercontinental. But the feeling is that it can do both and the research program is designed to produce the ability to do both, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And assuming, of course, that the Soviets have it too, as we have always assumed. The President even suggested that we give them the technology—the Soviets have it too and we have it.

What are we going to use to defend Western Europeans against a conventional Soviet attack on which we have always planned to use nuclear weapons?

DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have always planned to use nuclear weapons because during the time the plans were formulated, we

had a very clear advantage in tactical battlefield as well as other types of nuclear weapons. And the idea was that you would have this conventional exchange and then we would have to escalate it to nuclear and we would prevail and that would end things.

I suggest that we do have to make sure that we have a very strong conventional ability to defend, and you can do a great deal with different kinds of tactics and with different kinds of weapons systems, with new technologies to defend against conventional attack even by overwhelming numbers. And we are developing that. That is one of the things we have under way at NATO now, a study of the way emerging technologies can enhance your defensive capabilities.

But I think that you cannot say that you have at this point an ability to rely on a strategy that in effect says we will escalate to nuclear weapons and that will end the matter.

The Soviets have an enormous capability here, and they have built it up during a long period of time when we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. But our threat was to do it. We didn't say it would end the matter.

The point is, if you escalate the war, the threat was that it would mean nuclear war——

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is right, but now we have a situation in which they are able to determine, and that is why we have to maintain that capability.

Nobody is suggesting abolishing that capability at all. We need to maintain it and modernize it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am suggesting that our conventional forces, at least the administration, at least in arguing—the argument against no first use that I heard the administration make was I thought at times a very cogent argument against no first use, that we did not have the conventional capabilities and until you had the conventional capabilities, a policy of no first use made war itself much more likely because it would mean that the Soviet Union, if they believed it, would find a way perhaps to use their conventional advantage, if they believed it.

It seems to me that SDI, if it applies to Europe, is in a sense an equivalent of no first use. If we both have defensive systems, we have no first use, no second use, no early-first use, no use, and therefore, what is it that we are going to use to defend Western Europe?

It seems to me that applying the SDI population defense to Europe as well as to us raises enormous questions about the whole issue of extended deterrence on which our policy of defending NATO has rested for many years.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I don't think so. I think you are saying that we should make sure that the only way to defend Europe is by the threat of nuclear weapons, battlefield, tactical or intermediate range, and that that has to be our final solution.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I am saying that is our current solution.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is a current solution. There is no suggestion that it be abandoned or that we weaken it. Quite the contrary.

We are asking you to strengthen it and it cost a lot of the budget that we are talking about, as it should. But there is a better way, at least as far as intermediate- and intercontinental-range missiles are concerned. If we can find that better way, then that will improve somewhat the security.

It is not a panacea. It doesn't end war.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a better way of what?

Secretary WEINBERGER. A better way of dealing with a very real part of a very large part of the threat.

The CHAIRMAN. The threat in Europe is a threat from a conventional attack by the Soviet Union.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The threat in Europe is made up of a number of things. That is part of it, but the threat in Europe is over 400 SS–20's.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to the SS–20's, the question is, If you eliminate on both sides the ability to use nuclear weapons through a defensive system, what does that say about our ability to defend NATO against a Warsaw conventional attack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, there is no suggestion that the SDI is going to eliminate, for example, 155-millimeter nuclear artillery or anything of that kind. It is not a panacea, but it is an improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. But then it does not give the Europeans the same defense that we do.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes; it does, because the Soviets can now come off San Diego and shoot a submarine-launched cruise missile into the country.

We aren't talking about a strategic defense that will defend against that, but other things, because we don't think any threat should go unnoticed.

But what the SDI gives Europe is a protection against intermediate-range nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union and intercontinental-range Soviet missiles, and that gives the United States protection against that, if it works.

We don't say we are going to cast aside everything in a hope. We say we have to do the things like the MX and all the other things to make sure we do have that capability.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

What I am asking about, if you take away our ability at first use of nuclear weapons, which is our last best way of deterring war in Europe, if we remove that either by fiat, by declaring a policy of no first use or by erecting a strategic defense initiative which eliminates the possibility of it, then the question remains, it is the same under no first use as it is under SDI, how are we going to protect Europe from a conventional Warsaw attack?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have to strengthen our conventional defenses and we have to make them more effective. We have to use new tactics such as the follow-on forces attack and the attack on assembly areas, and we are doing that.

We are getting better helicopters, better antitank equipment and all the rest. But we still can deliver a very substantial amount of defensive power and we are trying——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Have we discussed this with our allies? Do our allies understand that?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Of course. I think many of our allies now are expressing the feeling that we have to have nuclear weapons, because if we got anything that abolished nuclear weapons, we would be in very grave danger.

Now, this is a very novel twist to the thousands of demonstrators who marched through Europe, no nukes, nuclear power out, no more U.S. participation, United States out of NATO, Weinberger go home.

But now when we propose a defense against nuclear weapons, some people are saying—fortunately not all, not even a majority—"No, no. We have to have nuclear weapons."

Mr. STRATTON. Will the gentleman yield to me? I think the chairman put something in there that I don't think is really part of the picture, and that is that we are really literally going to give this to the Russians. I don't think that was meant, very seriously, during the campaign, and I think that if we have developed the technique, we are probably not going to give it to them.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the President has said many times that if we can work, Mr. Stratton, we would be glad to share it with the world. I think you also have to bear in mind how rapidly the Soviets acquired the nuclear weapons, even though they weren't shared with them, but what the President wants more than anything else is to render obsolete and useless and impotent nuclear missiles of the intercontinental and intermediate range variety.

We are not because of that going to stop working on defenses against other weapons, or conventional strength necessary prevent war, or indeed until we get it, the offensive deterrent capability to maintain the peace under the deterrent theory.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we have spent a great deal of time today debating the MX issue which is going to be coming before us within a short amount of time. We have also spent a lot of time today talking about SDI, and where we are going with that. There is one more player in that puzzle which no one has seemed to mention in my understanding today. Do we no longer need Midgetman? Are we no longer concerned about that aspect?

Secretary WEINBERGER. No——

Mrs. BYRON. We have talked about current and future.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. There is supposed to be a middle ground somewhere that Midgetman was committed on.

MIDGETMAN

Secretary WEINBERGER. Midgetman, the small single-headed missile, Mrs. Byron, is in the budget. It is in our plans. It is coming along very well. It was designed to have a more stabilizing force. The Soviets have a somewhat smaller missile. It isn't as small as the one we are working on. Theirs is mobile. We are working on a

mobile capability for ourselves, but it is not abandoned or overlooked. It is there and we are working on it.

Mrs. BYRON. What concerns me is there are many that are advocating the elimination of the MX who say that they would be in favor of the Midgetman, but I think when we sit and start to look at the cost of Midgetman, the personnel, intent, and operational cost, and the fact that we are talking about a 1,000-silo or 1,000 missiles as opposed to 100 or whatever number is the magical number on MX, I am curious to know where those same people are going to be when we start talking about the dollar issue.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, Mrs. Byron, because there is no question whatever that the small, single-headed missile is a great deal more expensive than the MX, without any question whatever.

Mrs. BYRON. But in the current talk it is sort of one that has not been—I haven't seen in many of the hearings or in many of the news media lately and I just wonder if they sort of forgot about it.

Secretary WEINBERGER. There is a great popularity and attraction in the missile systems that aren't here. And it is not here yet, and we are working on it by direction of the Congress. The Scowcroft Commission recommended all of those recommendations and they were adopted, and we are working on it. It will be well into the 1990's before we get it. And when we get it, to deploy anything comparable to the MX capabilities would be vastly more expensive. There is just no question about it.

Mrs. BYRON. SDI isn't here either but it certainly has become the glamour issue.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, strategic defense we do think offers a great deal of hope, if we can get it.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in regard to Congresswoman Byron's question about Midgetman, I have some concerns about it, too, and I think I sent you over a letter. You sent back an answer which arrived today. We would like to ask you, just to make sure that everybody is still committed to that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Absolutely, totally committed, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Single warhead?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Single warhead. It is still as light as you want it to be. There is no change whatever. Read my letter. It sums up the whole thing.

Mr. BATTISTA. Mr. Secretary, I did read your letter. In your opening paragraph you state, "The unsettling information that the committee has received with regard to the small mobile missile is totally false."

I might point out that much of this information came from the participating contractors, subcontractors, and, indeed, the Air Force——

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are not the Secretary of Defense and they don't make policy.

Mr. BATTISTA. That is right.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They are not even the President.

Mr. BATTISTA. I realize that. But these are the people who are implementing the Secretary's decision.

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is not correct, sir. The people who are implementing the decision of the Congress, which we have adopted and which we are following, are people who are given contracts by us, and if they want to come up here and testify that what they are doing is useless that is certainly their freedom under our system and they are perfectly able to do it. But that should not be taken as any change in our commitment to the missile.

And when you get a letter that says you have received a lot of unsettling information about whether we are going ahead with the single warhead missile I have to reply to you I don't know where you get that from but it is as wrong as a lot of other reports that float around here.

If you want to know what our policy is, I have to tell you in all modesty you have come to the right place, and I have told you what our policy is and that is happening. That is why there is a large request in this year's budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is a good, strong statement. Let us submit a couple of questions for the record, if we can, on this last issue.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Certainly. But it has got to be funded, Mr. Chairman. It is not free.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Let me ask before we quit here, let me ask Ambassador Nitze, because it is getting late, but let me ask him to address the concern about the European issue. Let me lay out my concerns for you, sir, and see if you can address it.

It seems to me that either the SDI, defensive systems, the defending population, it either applies to Europe or it doesn't.

If it doesn't apply to Europe, and then you have made the world safe for a nuclear war in Europe, then we have a decoupling problem of enormous magnitudes that make our problems in the late seventies look simple. But if it does apply to the Europeans as well as us, it seems that we have an extended deterrence problem of some considerable magnitude. So what worries me is either the defensive systems apply to Europe or they don't. But it seems to me we have got problems either way.

DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Ambassador NITZE. I think what is necessary in order to understand this problem is to go back to what the President's proposal is. The President's proposal is a three-phase program, three different time periods. During the period until the SDI research program has demonstrated that it is possible to have cost-effective and survivable SDI, up until that time there is no way in which we can get away from the current method of deterrence, which is partially deterrence by denying the enemy, the potential enemy, any hope of being able to aspire to a successful military strategy, and in part a threat, an ultimate threat of devastating nuclear destruction, in the event he nevertheless were to try such a strategy.

Now, at the present time we don't know how to get away from that. We have always tried to build away from excessive reliance upon the totally unacceptable threat of devastating universal nuclear destruction. That is why our policy with respect to Europe

has been the flexible response policy, in which one puts one's first emphasis upon trying to maximize the capability of denying to the other side any possibility of a successful military strategy, and only insofar as we have been unable, generally for economic reasons and our allies' economic reasons, to fully implement the denial strategy, we have had to rely upon a final residual threat of massive nuclear destruction.

OK, but that applies to the first period. That first period may extend not only for 10 years but for a longer period of time. Now we get to the possibility of a transition period which would begin after we have demonstrated the possibility of negotiating with the Soviets and tried to make this a joint program to increase the security of both sides through a combination of radical reductions of offensive systems combined with the introduction of effective defensive systems, but still during this process of transition, one would still need to maintain a reliable devastating retaliatory capability.

And so during this entire transition period, one would still have a component which is the same as our current component, and you would increase the reliability of the denial part, but you would still have this residual part.

I think your problem only arises in the event one finally gets to the third stage of the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the goal set by the Soviets, and which the President also shares. I think there is a difference in the way in which the President shares this goal, because he takes it seriously, and he wants us to do everything we can to build toward that step by step.

The Soviets have generally used this goal as a pure propaganda effort, but let's say that we have gotten to the final third stage, the total elimination of nuclear, of nuclear weapons, accompanied by a very competent nonnuclear defense, in which event you are quite right, that the opportunity for backing up security of Europe through the threat of nuclear devastation would not be present, but if it is possible through a cooperative effort to deal with the major threat, the threat that is presented by ballistic missiles and their tremendous capability, if we can work out the elimination of that threat, it should concurrently be possible to neglect mutual reductions in the defensive, not the nonnuclear field. It should be possible to work out an entirely different basis for security.

Now, if one can't do that, still it should be possible in the absence of a nuclear threat, for the Western World to supply a competent nonnuclear defense. We are not that badly off. You know, in 20, 40, 50 years, my goodness, who can say that we can't do that. It seems to me it is a very pessimistic, defeatist attitude to say it can't be done. It is a different problem, but it can be done. And why just take a negative attitude that none of these things are possible. I don't see the sense of it.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing, what worries me is the growing cost. It is a defensive system not only against missiles but also then we have to have a defensive system against the air-breathing. Then we have to have a defensive system against the terrorist or other kinds of attacks, running nuclear weapons in the way they run in drugs now. And then on top of that, if we are going to apply it to Europeans it is going to have to mean an increase in conventional forces.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. You have talked a lot, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, referring to SDI about the use of nonnuclear capability or nonnuclear means to destroy missiles, and it is probably a fairly well-known fact that at least in the short term we have our best chances with in fact nuclear devices that would be launched pursuant to a Sprint-type missile that would——

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is what you have now, Mr. Hunter, but that is not what we are talking about at all.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand that is not what we are talking about. But I have a problem with the administration's position, that we absolutely—and I think a lot of it has been done for public relations purposes—rule out the use of using nuclear devices to in fact stop an incoming missile.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We have certain design specifications and requirements for everything we do, and one of the things that we wish to do with the strategic defense initiative is to be able to destroy by nonnuclear destructive power Soviet incoming missiles outside the atmosphere before they get near any target. That is what we are working toward, and we have said possibly 50 or 60 times today, I guess, at least, that we don't know whether we can do it or not. We don't have it yet.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand that completely.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We don't want a simple continuation of a ground-based nuclear Sprint or Spartan or ABM type of system.

Mr. HUNTER. My point is, I guess, Mr. Secretary, that if in fact we can't achieve—and I agree we should do everything we can in the research area. If in fact we achieve something between that perfect system and what we have now, I think it is still in our interest to pursue the defense of our land-based deterrent, even if that requires a device that would utilize a nuclear explosion to render impotent the incoming missile. That is the point that I would make.

Ambassador NITZE. Just one comment on this. Back in 1969 when we designed the ABM system which we later deployed, that Spartan missile was a very high-quality missile. It was a much more expensive missile than the Minuteman missile. The front end of it, as I remember, weighed 2,000 pounds. It was a very complicated nuclear device that was on the front of that. So these were very expensive missiles.

Now what we are looking for now is a defense which would be cost effective. Clearly, that kind of a defense is not a cost-effective defense. The cost per intercept is just too high. You have got to get something better than that.

Secretary WEINBERGER. And you did miss a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much——

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For a very interesting afternoon.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the panel adjourned.]

THE MX MISSILE AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE [SDI]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 14, 1985.

The Policy Panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome to this morning's hearing.

We continue our hearings that we have been holding on the issue of MX and SDI.

This morning we are having a panel of people who have various perspectives about the Soviet Government. We are very honored to have such a distinguished panel here this morning of people who have, from one perspective or another, been following the activities of the Soviet Union and what the Soviet Union does, what the Soviet Union thinks about things.

We would like them to share with us some thoughts that they might have and be able to answer some questions that we might have about just how the Soviet Union is looking at these upcoming talks; how in particular they look at weapon systems that we have; what they might think is the negotiating strategy; what we might think is going to be their negotiating strategy; what they are going to achieve at this session of the talks, the talks that are just beginning; and how they perceive what it is that we are about.

We have a distinguished panel. Let me introduce them to you.

We have Bill Colby, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Dr. Robin Laird, formerly with the Center for Naval Analysis, who served as Special Assistant to the Director with the Defense Intelligence Agency, and he is currently at Georgetown University. We have Dimitri Simes, who is the director of the Soviet and Eastern European Research Program at Johns-Hopkins. We have Marshall D. Shulman, who used to be Cy Vance's Adviser on Soviet affairs. And we have Dr. Ted Warner, who is a defense analyst at the Rand Corp.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming.

Bill Dickinson.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to join with you in welcoming such a distinguished panel here. I think there is a great deal of interest in this.

In our panels for the past few days, we have been having very distinguished guests such as yourselves, and getting pretty good media coverage. So I assume that evidences some interest on the part of the public at large.

I feel sure whatever input you have and others appearing before us will really have an impact and will help fashion the product of this committee.

I want to thank you for coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Any of you like to have an opening statement? It is not necessary. But if some of you would like to lead off.

Start with Bill Colby.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. COLBY. I have a short paper I might submit for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you summarize it. You don't have to read the whole thing.

Mr. COLBY. I can summarize very quickly.

With respect to the MX, first, I think we should not build the MX and the Congress should not unleash this payment now, for three major reasons.

First, it is ineffective. We have tried many basing systems. It doesn't work. I don't need to go into the details of that. It certainly adds nothing to our retaliatory capability.

Second, it is dangerous. It can only be interpreted by the Soviets as an effort by us to move toward a superiority and even a first-strike capability. We are concerned about that possibility on their side.

The reason I say it is dangerous, Mr. Chairman, is that we have scrubbed through a lot of false alarms of possible Soviet launches, and we have scrubbed through them and not retaliated to any of them. I am not worried about our ability to scrub through false alarms. I do worry about theirs. And if we go into a weapon which has first-strike capabilities, you just put us on much more of a hair-trigger basis.

Third, the weapon is not a bargaining chip. The administration states that it is not. Therefore, it is not a point to be considered as we go into Geneva.

Here the administration is making the same arguments that the Scowcroft Commission made, that the reason to build it is to show our national will in these meetings. Well, I think we should show more than our national will. I think we should show wisdom.

And really what we are talking about here is the American proclivity for a technical solution to some of these problems. And by

spending money on a new weapon, to think we have made ourselves more secure.

The President the other day referred to a Biblical passage to emphasize the value of prudence in the face of an enemy. I think he might well have referred to another one, and that is the story of David and Goliath. Goliath overarmed, muscle bound, over-armored, was defeated by David who had the right weapon and aimed it at the single point of vulnerability. I would think we would have learned that from our experience in Vietnam.

Our focus on the MX indicates that there are some doubts that we have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. COLBY

Once again the MX albatross hangs around the neck of Congress and the nation as the Administration calls for the lifting of congressional restrictions on building 21 more of these monster weapons and looks ahead to more in the coming year. The protagonists — and antagonists — are almost equally exhausted by the reiteration of the standard arguments on each side about the missile. All admit that the weapon is of little substantive value to the nation's arsenal, is unacceptably vulnerable, and that the sole reason for going ahead with production is to show U.S. will and determination as we enter the Geneva negotiations with the Soviets. But to decide against building more MX's would show something even more important than national will — wisdom. A show of wisdom is in the interest of all who hope for positive results from the Geneva talks.

The reasons for dropping the MX are simple:

The MX is ineffective.—Thirty-six basing systems have been studied for the missile, including the Carter Administration's Rube Goldberg race track in the Utah and Nevada deserts. All basing proposals have been found wanting by the Pentagon or Congress. The MX is less effective at what should be its primary function — certain retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States — than the present mix of missiles on land, at sea, and in the air.

The MX is dangerous.—The MX's size and accuracy suggest to the Soviets that its real purpose is to give the United States the capability of a devastating first strike' against the Soviet Union, since the weapon adds little to our retaliatory capability. Thus the MX can only generate the implementation of procedures by the Soviet Union that will' enable its forces to react instantly to indications of an MX launch. The likelihood of an accidental nuclear war, then, is increased, as the Soviets may respond with real weapons to false indications of an MX attack.

The fact that the Soviets currently have weapons of equal or even greater power than the MX is not a reason for the United States to build the MX if our present retaliatory capability is absolute. And it is. The test of need for a weapon is whether it accomplishes its mission without counterproductive effects, not whether it is the same weapon one's adversary has.

The MX is not a bargaining chip.—The last refuge of the arms advocate, if no other reason can be found to justify a weapon's acquisition, is that it could be traded for a concession by the other side. This poker game analogy is only valid if the other side values the chip, as strategic weapons do not have agreed colors of blue for high value. The most recent expressions of Soviet concern do not even mention the MX; for example, the definitive Pravda editorial of February 9, carefully reprinted at advertising rates in the Washington Post of February 26, was designed to send a message to the Washington political community. The editorial made plain that the real bargaining chips the Soviets respect are elements of President Reagan's star wars plan, a plan the President has proclaimed non-negotiable. Thus the search for an effective negotiating chip must focus elsewhere if we are to attract the Russian bargaining instinct. Indeed, experience in these negotiations has established a simple rule: A weapon is valuable as a negotiating chip while it is on the drawing boards, but once it is deployed, it cannot be traded away. Thus if the Administration wishes to use the MX as a bargaining chip, it is in our interest to keep it as a prospective weapon, not an actual one.

The cost of the MX is the least of the arguments against it, since the cost should be borne if the weapon were a necessary one. But the budgetary deficit our nation faces does force our citizenry and our government to choose carefully those weapons

truly necessary for our security. We must not mindlessly purchase every device, without consideration of cost. The more important contributions to our national security in the fields of conventional weapons, readiness, training, and logistic reserves far outweigh the MX in their importance to our safety, as does the vitality of an economy unencumbered by an unconscionable deficit.

President Reagan recently cited a biblical passage to deliver a lesson on prudence in the face of an adversary. He might have turned to a more opposite passage, the study of David and Goliath. Overarmed, musclebound, and heavily armored, it appeared that Goliath had all the advantages. Yet he was defeated by David, who had the right weapon and a tactic aimed at his enemy's vulnerable point. Our experience in Vietnam should have sensitized us to this comparison. Our fixation on the MX calls into question whether we have indeed learned that lesson.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Laird.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBIN LAIRD, RESEARCH STAFF, STRATEGIC FORCES AND RESOURCES DIVISION, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Mr. LAIRD. Just two brief points. I think the first point I would make is simply that I think the Soviet military leadership certainly will not respond to the single United States weapons deployment. It will be the mix of what we put in the field over the next 10 years.

So that when one thinks about the kinds of responses the Soviet Union will make, one has to think of the combination of MX, D-5, plus SDI, and so on, rather than a single, unilateral response to a given weapons system. That is just the way they operate.

The second point I would make is very simple. It seems to me that a realistic goal for United States planning vis-a-vis the Soviets is to try to achieve the highest degree of strategic stability at the lowest level of strategic offensive deployment necessary.

We should think of that as a goal toward where we want to work. And I don't think the Soviets are inextricably opposed, unalterably opposed to such an effort. It is a difficult one at best.

The CHAIRMAN. Marshall Shulman.

STATEMENT OF MARSHALL D. SHULMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY OF THE SOVIET UNION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Mr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go as directly as possible to your questions and those of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Dr. Simes.

STATEMENT OF DIMITRI K. SIMES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. SIMES. I intended to do exactly what Marshall suggested. But my friend Bill Colby provoked me. So let me give you three reasons why I believe the committee should support the MX missile at this point.

First, four Presidents have supported this missile. The Soviets are well aware of this. Rightly or wrongly, this missile has become a symbol of American resolve.

Several years ago, I had an argument in my office with a Soviet colleague of mine who told me that American rhetoric is a lot of hot air, much hostility but little resolve. He predicted that the MX missile would not be deployed. I hope you will prove him wrong.

Second, I am sure you remember the B-1 bomber precedent, when President Carter acted unilaterally outside the SALT framework. At that time the Soviet chief delegate said reciprocal Soviet concessions in return would not be forthcoming.

If the committee is interested in killing the MX, a proper place to do so would be in Geneva, where appropriate tradeoffs can be discussed.

Finally, of course I agree with those who suggest that there is nothing magic about the system. If you kill it, I am not sure it would mean a collapse of the talks in Geneva. If you support it, I don't think it would undermine strategic stability.

So on balance I think that, taken into account the many other weapon systems about which you have legitimate doubts, starting with SDI, it is wise to support those systems to which the United States is already committed.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. WARNER III, SENIOR DEFENSE ANALYST, RAND CORP.

Mr. WARNER. I would echo generally the line that Dimitri Simes has articulated.

I believe if the United States exercises unilateral restraint in the arms competition—a competition that is bound, in my view, even with future successes on arms control to continue—we undercut the possibility for reciprocal constraint by arms control negotiations. The right place to be bargaining about MX is with the Soviets in Geneva.

On the question of destabilization, I think the Soviets have anticipated for well over a decade that the United States was going to field highly accurate ballistic missiles that would put at risk even the super-hard silos of their ICBM force. And in anticipation of that eventuality, they have already undertaken a number of steps to diversify their strategic arsenal in a way that is basically stabilizing for the interrelationship between the two sides.

They are increasing the numbers of weapons carried on their submarine launched missile force. They are on the verge of substantially increasing the capability of their intercontinental bomber force for the first time in almost three decades. They are going ahead now with the production and deployment of the revived Bear-H bomber, and arming it with their version of the air-launched cruise missile.

Finally, with regard to their ICBM force itself, they will continue for the foreseeable future to have a large number of their strategic warheads based in silos. But they are also, with some versions of the SS-X-24, and the SS-X-25; moving toward mobile ICBM deployments. In the case of the SS-X-25, road and off-road mobility somewhat along the lines that we envision for Midgetman.

Thus, on balance, I believe that the signal that deployment of the MX will help send regarding our resolve, our willingness to keep up our end of the strategic arms competition is worth it—even in

light of the fact that its planned basing mode is not as survivable as I personally would prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me begin the questions by asking anybody who wants to comment about the subject, to talk a little bit about what you see as the Soviets' objectives at these negotiations. What is it that they are trying to achieve?

And in particular, when delegations go over to meet with the Soviet Union, they come back reporting that the Soviets are worried about various weapons. For a while, delegations would come back and say the Soviets are talking about the Pershing II. Now all the delegations that go come back and say they are talking about SDI.

Can you believe what they are saying to us in these delegations?

Interestingly enough, no delegation that I know of has ever come back saying they are talking about the MX.

First of all, can we believe what they are saying that they are worried about?

And second, whether you can believe it or not, what do you think their objective is?

What made them decide to start seriously talking now? And what is it they are going to try to achieve?

Marshall, you want to start?

NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS

Mr. SHULMAN. There are three questions there you posed, Mr. Chairman.

The first is, can you believe what they say to you? Second, what made them come into the talks now? And third, what do they want out of the negotiations?

On the first one, can you believe, that depends very much on who is talking and who is listening, the experience and judgment of the people who have the conversations, and how they evaluate what they are told.

There is a good deal that is said simply for propagandistic effect. But there is some significant information that has been carefully sorted out by people who have been back and forth many times, who know the scene and can judge it. I will come back to this point.

Second, what made them come back into the talks? My judgment is there are three factors. The first is they clearly realized they made a mistake in 1983 when they walked out of the talks.

They had hoped that this would have the effect of putting the onus for the failure of the negotiations on the United States. Instead, it put it on the Soviet Union. And it clearly was a disadvantage. I think they were looking for a way to get back into the negotiations, to recover from their previous mistake.

Also, there was the talk of the space-based defense beginning with the President's speech, and this concerned them greatly, primarily because it adds further to the bind they are in on their resources.

The costs of this program will be phenomenal, and they feel futile, except to keep up with the United States. And that is a matter of deep concern to them.

The third factor is that beginning in January 1984, there was a change of tone on the part of the President and the United States. In his speech on January 16, in his General Assembly speech, and other utterances, there was an indication that the harsher rhetoric would be replaced by a tone of conciliation.

The President said that he was interested in improvement of relations. I think there was an interest on their part in probing whether that was just atmospherics or whether it went any further.

The last question you asked had to do with what they hoped to get out of the negotiations. My feeling is that there are strong incentives, strong pressures on the Soviet leadership now, largely resulting from the state of their economy, to avoid having to face an increase in the flow of resources into the military sector, or if possible, even to get some reduction.

There have been serious declines in the rate of growth of the economy, resulting from very low productivity in agriculture and industry, and serious lags in advanced technology. In addition, the problem that they face is that if they go up the scale in the military competition with us, and they will, no matter what it costs, it will draw down the very resources they most need to repair their industrial technology: the labs, the scientists, the alloys, the computers and so on.

And that is what has created a powerful incentive on their part to try to get an agreement with us that would make it possible for them, on acceptable terms, to reduce the flow of resources into the military sector, or at least not to have to increase them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Does anybody have anything to add or to disagree with, with what Marshall said?

Mr. WARNER. I would like to add a couple of things. I think those are all very appropriate points.

I don't think we should lose sight of the fact that one of the reasons the Soviets are in strategic arms control talks is because they share with us a determination to do the best they can to lower the risks of nuclear war.

There is an underlying cooperative interest between the two of us. It is further amplified by all of the considerations that Professor Shulman spoke about.

Moreover, I think they understand that they had made a mistake, that their walkout from the INF and START talks was proving politically counterproductive. I think a decision was made last spring, during the Chernenko period, which I believe Gorbachev is likely to continue, that a return to some kind of engagement with the West in general would be more in the Soviet interest as they pursue their cooperative and competitive interests vis-a-vis the West.

Thus, a return to their version of hard-headed détente is a policy that they find generally, serves them well.

I want to hasten to add, I am not saying that this is due to any benevolent interpretation of the goals pursued by the Soviet Union.

They will remain hard, tough competitors, politically and militarily. But I think, on balance, the Soviets find it worthwhile to conduct that competition in the context of a better overall state of United States-Soviet relations, and of Soviet-Western European relations.

In those circumstances, the Soviets can try to play upon possible splits within the Western camp, a policy they have followed in the past and one that they most certainly will pursue in the days ahead.

Mr. ASPIN. Bill Colby.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, you are right. They have not stressed the MX. They have stressed SDI. That is obviously an enormous preoccupation for them.

They have such awe of the American effectiveness, that while our scientists may say that the thing won't work, they cannot be sure of that. This country can produce things that startle people. And they also have all of the economic reasons not to do it.

I would add one additional factor that has come out in the last few days, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gorbachev has finally gotten into office. He is a fairly young fellow. He has to establish himself. He has to get a political base under him.

Now, he has been in charge of agriculture, which is no great success. He is facing the job of getting Russia moving again, getting the productivity, getting the industry moving and all the rest.

An objective observer can only say that it is not going to work very well. It is going to run into the fundamental inconsistency that any kind of liberalization of decisionmaking, reward getting, is going to mean a dilution of political control by the apparatchiks, and they are going to fight it.

Therefore, Mr. Gorbachev has one other area in which he could show some real progress, and this is in negotiating with the West and reducing the fear of nuclear war.

If he is able to make some progress in this area, and his initial statement indicates he is prepared even to discuss major reductions in forces, limits in the future, and all the rest, then he can compensate for some of that failure and release resources for the use in the civilian sector.

If he does not make some progress in his negotiations with us, or if he faces people in this country who won't take yes for an answer, and there are a few, then he is going to be frustrated in that area as well. And there are a lot of wolves out there behind the sled. One of them is Mr. Romanov, and he is a good, tough, old-line, internal guy.

So I would say that we, in a surprising sense, have a small contribution to make to whether the Soviets develop along the lines of a pragmatic, rational sharer of the world or whether we go back to another period of hard Stalinism. It is a factor that we should be considering.

We shouldn't give up anything in hopes of this. But we ought to face these negotiations very positively with the idea that we can get real benefits out of it. But we are going to have to give up some of our dreams, too. A contract is only going to be valid if it is in the interests of both parties.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Laird.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

Mr. LAIRD. I think there are four basic objectives the Soviets are following currently in the negotiations. One is clearly political, and that is the question—it has already been suggested—the failure of walkout.

But in terms of the political impact, I would remind you that the INF negotiations, which led to tremendous public conscientiousness on theater nuclear weapons in Europe, is now gone.

And where I see the major political pressures the Soviets are going to place is pressuring the relationships between ourselves and our allies on European theater deployments as well as the strategic defense initiative. You can expect them to play political cards in this context.

A second is technological. That is, the Soviet military overestimates our technological virtuosity, and hence worst cases our ability to do things. The strategic defense initiative is a case in point.

I also remind you that the Soviets have a continental system, not unlike the French. They assume that if we announce a research project, we are going to deploy it.

So there is a concern that the United States is very serious about SDI deployments, way before we are. So there is a fundamental misperception which we could use as a useful bargaining chip, I would argue.

The third is military planning. That is, and this is where the MX would fit in, there is concern on the Soviet military side to have an appropriate planning framework. That is, what is the nature of the United States strategic threat I am going to face and how do I plan to deal with it? And this is particularly apt now because the Soviets face the 5-year planning cycle, where major decisions have to be made in terms of responses, appropriate mixes.

Ted Warner has mentioned the series of systems the Soviets deploy. We don't know what the mix will be. And the Soviets have to make that decision within the context of competition with the Americans. I think negotiations can be a useful mechanism to reassure them or to pressure them in one way.

And the fourth is the pressure on military resources. I have never been overly persuaded by the argument that economic crises will force the Soviets not to respond militarily. It is a greater cost.

But there is one part of this picture that I think is true, and that is the Soviet military clearly don't want to overspend on nuclear weapons. They would much prefer following the course of improving its conventional power, including power projection, and not overspend on nuclear weapons beyond that necessary for their own security. So that these negotiations are nuclear weapons issues, but there is a real question of saving money so that you can put them in more usable forces.

And so I think those are four major objectives that guide them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is interesting to get the dichotomy of views here. I might say, Mr. Colby has provoked me, too. A couple of questions.

Mr. Colby, you were director of CIA appointed by Mr. Carter.

Mr. COLBY. No, Mr. Dickinson. I was appointed by Mr. Nixon and continued under Mr. Ford.

Mr. DICKINSON. Under Mr. Ford.

Mr. COLBY. 1973 to 1976.

Mr. DICKINSON. I remember the occasion, but I didn't remember the time span in which you served. And you did not serve under Mr. Carter.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. How fast we forget.

Mr. COLBY. Time goes very fast.

Mr. DICKINSON. Stansfield Turner—that is right.

You know, it bothers me to think, having access and the background and so forth that you do—I am directing this to you, Mr. Colby—that you would discount everything that the Soviets have done and say, "Well, you know, you know it would be perhaps destabilizing if we went forward with the building of an MX because it is not an adequate deterrent due to basing," or whatever.

We look at what the Soviets have done. They have the SS-18 and the 19. This is a fact. These are a newer generation than our Minuteman-III is.

Plus they have two ongoing ICBM developments. Evidently, they think it is important. Whether it is important or not, the perception in politics is very important.

Plus they have ongoing now the deployment, building and deploying of the SS-20s, each of which has three warheads. They have over 400 of those deployed. As a matter of fact, they have been deploying an average of one a week since about 1978. This is ongoing.

It would seem to me, in view of their attitudes in the past of breaking off talks, see what political impact this would have, agitating for a freeze, to see what influence this would have, that to say, well, they are building and deploying and we should not build and deploy, but to continue to talk when we have been talking for all these years, and it has done no good. What good would the continuation of talking be without any resolution on our part to build or deploy?

That has been their scheme. That has been their way of doing. They keep holding out the carrot, and saying, "Let's talk, talk, talk." All the time they are deploying, which is a fact. Nobody can deny that. So they want to talk more.

You would advocate that we talk more, but not deploy, don't build. What plus comes out of this? How does this strengthen us or show our national resolve to the point where the Soviets are convinced we are serious?

What plus is there in it for us to cancel the MX, show once again our inability to come to a national consensus, our vacillation, and they continue to build and deploy? What pluses are there for us to do that now?

Mr. COLBY. I just looked at it from the point of view of our national security, Mr. Dickinson.

I spent a long time worrying about that. And frankly, as I see these various steps by the Soviets proceeding and all these different weapon systems, as you say, they increase the threat to our country.

Mr. DICKINSON. That is true.

Mr. COLBY. On the other hand, the Scowcroft Commission very clearly set at rest the idea that we were vulnerable. We are not vulnerable, because we have an absolute retaliation. There is no question about our ability to retaliate.

Now, if the Russians thought they were superior to us today, they would use that, and they are completely stalemated by our retaliatory force.

Mr. DICKINSON. Which we think the status quo will remain indefinitely?

Mr. COLBY. The status quo in the sense of our retaliatory force in the triad is certainly going to be around here for a long time. And it is not going to be increased by the MX.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me ask you, because I want to develop this, and my time is limited.

Do you see not a diminution of the capability and the deterrence of the Minuteman-III as a destabilizing factor when—it has a finite life on the shelf. At some point it has to be replaced. We know what lead time it takes.

And if we lose this leg of the stool, so to speak, you don't see this as any way destabilizing?

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, the MX doesn't trundle over back country roads. It sits in silos where it can be very carefully taken care of. It is not liquid fueled; it is solid fueled. And it is going to be around for many, many years.

Now, the Soviets have indicated they are prepared to go ahead and stop the further development of these weapons that we are concerned about through negotiations. And I say call them, see them.

Now, they are going to ask for something on the other side, of course. They are presently consumed with the SDI as the thing they are going to ask about. The President has said it is nonnegotiable in its present research stage, which I am not sure we will stick to that. But if we are talking about a bargaining chip, this is a great big bargaining chip which can stop the further development of a whole series of Soviet weapons.

I don't see why we go ahead and build more. That has been the history of these. We left MIRV out of SALT-I because we had it, they didn't. They went ahead and built it, and today it is the biggest concern we have for our vulnerabilities, because they have the MIRV. They built more of them and bigger ones.

They will build more and bigger MXs. They are in the process of doing it. There is no question about it—if this arms race continues. If you stop it, then you stop it.

Now, I don't believe we stop it unilaterally. Don't get me wrong. We have to stop it in a bargain with them. But they have indicated they are prepared to do it.

Mr. DICKINSON. I have a great deal of confidence in them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all five gentlemen for appearing before us. We are getting different views here, and I think it is quite healthy to do that.

I would like to just key in on one or two areas, if I could.

While we realize the Soviet Union, certainly they are developing, researching and developing new major weapons systems, and with their bomber force, their submarine forces, their ICBMs, let's not give the impression that the United States is impotent by any means.

You know, we talked about a triad. And of course a triad is land, sea and air. I don't think one nation, at least in my judgment, must have superiority in all three areas to have a clear deterrent force—a clear deterrent force.

And I think you are all correct when you state that the MX missile is not a bargaining chip. It is not a bargaining chip. It has been stated by Mr. Weinberger, by the President, and many others.

They want to build that MX missile. They want to build 223 missiles. They will have 1,000 warheads—100 missiles are in the silos. There will be 1,000 warheads. It is another buildup.

We don't want to give the impression that while the Soviet Union is building this huge military complex, that we are standing still. We are developing also.

If I were to place any faith between two nations qualitatively and technologically, I will come down on the side of the United States, because we have proven that over and over and over.

Let me just throw out a scenario so we can get into discussion—whether we agree or disagree about the MX.

By the way, let me make it very clear I have opposed the MX missile. I think it is destabilizing. I think we have enough of a deterrent force.

But if we are going to build the darned thing, don't give them away. If you feel that you need it for deterrent force, don't build a weapons system that you are going to give away. Build it because you need it.

And I feel very strongly about that, because you are talking anywhere from $20- to $40 billion. These are not a couple of nickels that we are talking about the taxpayer paying.

If it is a known fact that the Soviet Union has more strength or perhaps a better deterrent force or offensive force in their ICBMs as part of their triad, should we have the qualitative edge in the other two areas?

I am talking about air and I am talking about the ocean. And, yes, we are building a B–1 bomber. We are in the Stealth technology. We are building D–5's. We are building all around.

How can we force the Soviet Union to cut back on the one strength that they really have? How can we ask two fellows who are going into a ring to take away their best punch for survival.

How will the MX missile in the present silos, without hardening, vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union—they could probably destroy 90 percent of them—why would they want to cut back on their one strength that they might have superiority over the United States, and yet we continue to build in the other two parts of the triad?

Are we willing to give up our Trident submarine, which is a great strength? Are we willing to give up the B–1 bomber, or perhaps the Stealth technology, which is a great strength?

Can someone play around with that scenario?

What will force the Soviet Union to give up their strength while we give up nothing?

Mr. WARNER. I would like to respond first.

I think you are most certainly right in pointing out that the momentum of arms efforts is quite similar on both sides. I think when we talk about a START agreement, we ought to have an agreement which would impose an equal burden on both sides.

I agree with you, and I think in fact the proposal of the Reagan administration in the first term, that was heavily prejudicial against land-based ICBM's, was unrealistic and unnegotiable. And the Soviets clearly thought so as well.

But I still believe that we can seek equal reductions in ballistic missile reentry vehicles. The total number of those on both sides is roughly equal. They have many more reentry vehicles deployed on ICBMs; we have many more on SLBM's.

If we posit a reduction from current numbers of around 9,000 such weapons to numbers like 5,500 or 6,000, I would argue that we equally bear the price to come down to that level if we have no prejudicial sub-limits.

And I think in order to encourage the Soviets to do this one of the things we should hold out to them in a classical bargaining chip sense is the possibility that we have can limit our bomber weapons potential. The United States has the potential to greatly expand the weapons carried on its bomber force due to the B-1B and "Stealth" bomber programs now under way, if we don't retire any B-52's, which is our current plan. But were we not to phase out the B-52's, by the mid-1990's we could have up to 500 bombers carrying some 7,000 to 8,000 bombs and air-launched cruise missiles.

The key to an offer that I think could make a START proposal reasonable is to show the Soviets that we are prepared to stop short of building up to that kind of number, and that the air-launched cruise missile component of our bomber-carried weapons might be decidedly less than the possible 5-, 6-, or 7,000 that could be deployed.

I think we can strike a deal that will allow both sides to cap and even reduce modestly their strategic arsenals, in the context of the deployment of the MX, because, remember, the Soviets showed us no sympathy with regard to halting the accuracy improvements for their SS-18's and 19's. They have a capability in those nearly 670 weapons systems to severely threaten our ICBM force.

I think that both sides must be responsible for their own diversified and survivable forces. But I think due to the arguments made earlier, the MX can be added to the United States side and one can simultaneously seek to negotiate a useful agreement along the lines I just described.

Mr. SIMES. You mentioned quite correctly that the United States has some superiority in other legs of the triad.

However, while we are deploying Trident, the Soviets are deploying Typhoon. While we are developing the B-1 bomber, they are developing their Blackjack bomber. While we are arguing about MX, they are testing SS-24 and SS-25 missiles.

So if you are seriously concerned about the MX and do not believe that it should be a bargaining chip, you should take into account that we have already, rightly or wrongly, perhaps foolishly,

provoked the Soviets into their current new ICBM effort. This effort is already underway.

It seems to me that it is a remarkably bad idea, at first to send a signal of belligerency to your opponent, which prompts them to develop a new weapon system, and then when they start deploying it, to say to them, "We changed our minds." I just don't think that is the way to act.

There is one final point about Soviet succession, which was brought out by Bill Colby. I think it is important to take into account that the transition of power is likely to affect Soviet negotiating behavior in Geneva. The succession is a constraint on the Soviet ability to be truly flexible.

I am not aware of a single instance during Soviet successions, when Soviet arms control negotiators or Soviet decisionmakers in Moscow were in a position to overrule the military. Once the leader consolidates his power, it is a different story. But Mr. Gorbachev is not in this situation yet.

And I don't know what kind of arguments, if any, there are in Moscow between the Gorbachev's and the Romanovs. I assume there are differences, but no outsider can be sure how deep they are and what is their meaning.

Let me say this: If the Soviets come to the conclusion that we are going to cancel our systems unilaterally, it would not encourage them to be more modest in their planning, or to be more agreeable in Geneva.

Mr. LAIRD. Just a quick comment.

It is obvious that the thrust of U.S. programs, D-5, MX and cruise missile program, is very simply understood by the Soviets, and that is to abandon overreliance on the fixed silo ICBM force.

In other words, how they are going to respond, whether they in fact go to mobility or rely more on their SLBM force, or rely more on a bomber force, that is open to debate.

But I don't think there is any question that the Soviets have already drawn the conclusion that their 1970 force is obsolescent from that point of view.

Mr. MAVROULES. If I may pursue this point. The question I did ask—and I tried to give you an example, I think you have answered it but not in detail—is, if indeed I might have qualitative superiority in two parts of the Triad—and I think we do, and I have a great amount of admiration for our technology and what we can do in this great country—how do you force a person to give up part of their strength unless we are willing to give up part of our strength?

You know, we cannot ask two fellows to get into a ring, and you tie my right hand while you have both your hands. I think that is where we have to break in negotiations.

And I am not sure that is the way we are going. I don't know. I am not an expert in this field. It is something I am thinking about.

Are we willing to give up part of our qualitative strength? That is the question.

Mr. WARNER. I think the proposal, as we understand it, that the U.S. Government put forward in the previous round of START was very much along the lines you have described.

That is, it asked for reductions down to 5,000 reentry vehicles, and moreover, only half of those could be in the ICBM force. So it said to the Soviets, "You must pull your ICBM force down by more than half." And moreover, we said, initially, as far as bombers are concerned, the United States is not even going to limit them. And then when we proposed to include them, each side would be allowed to have up to 400 bombers, and they could all carry up to 20 air-launched cruise missiles.

If the United States is going to stick with that negotiating position, I echo your criticism. I think it is one sided. But there are other negotiating positions that are not that unreasonable that could protect both our interests.

Mr. MAVROULES. I appreciate that.

Mr. COLBY. I think also the SDI has come into this as part of the bargain. And clearly the Soviets, knowing that they have many more land-based capabilities than they really need for their retaliation, would be willing to swap some of those for an agreement not to go into the star wars competition.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to direct two questions. I will start with Dr. Shulman, if I may, somewhat replowing old ground.

We have a new generation of leaders in the Soviet Union. As we study our history, there seems to be insecurity, paranoia, and uncertainty, as to where they are in the world.

Do you see any change in this attitude that they might have which might cause them to be more willing to negotiate and cooperate as a result of the new generation of leaders such as Gorbachev coming on line?

The second question I have deals with the military leadership that they have, the professionalism, the ability of the highest levels of the Soviet leadership.

A few days ago, Mr. Shevchenko described Marshal Ogarkov as a thinker and a real strategist.

What about the entire system of their military leadership? How good is it?

Those two questions I would appreciate answers to. Doctor, I will ask you first.

CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE

Mr. SHULMAN. Mr. Skelton, it is a mistake to throw out questions like that before a crew of people who work in the Soviet field. You would get discussion all day long on them.

On the first question, it is obviously too soon to tell whether and when Mr. Gorbachev, because of his age, is going to be able to make a difference in the system. We simply don't know. And most of what we have been hearing and reading about the last couple of days is simply guess work. And guesses reflect people's temperaments more than their knowledge.

Now, it is possible that he may, because of his vigor, give more activism to the system than before. It is very clear that the Soviet

Union is in need of some changes, in its domestic economy and in its foreign policy as well.

Now, whether he will be able to do that, we simply don't know, because the resistance to change is also very strong. Logic is on the side of those who argue for modernizing the administration of the economy and for greater restraint in foreign policy. But whether logic will prevail against the resistance, we cannot guess.

What we can say is this: When a new administration comes in, they clearly are going to look over all their options and their priorities. They are going to have to make some decisions about domestic policy, about foreign policy.

If it is their disposition to try to reduce the enormous drain of resources in the military sector, at least we ought to make it clear that if they move in that direction, we would welcome it, and we would not stand in the way of it; that we are prepared, along the lines of what Ted Warner was saying, we are prepared to consider appropriate situations that protect their security and protect our security and enable us to operate at a lower cost.

Mr. WARNER. If I might comment on the military leadership, Mr. Skelton, I believe that there is a high degree of professionalism in the Soviet military establishment. They have a general staff-oriented system, and a system that places a great deal of emphasis on study of how to conduct war, should war ever occur.

Marshal Ogarkov has fallen from his post as the chief of the general staff, but he remains in a very important position, by all indications, as the commander of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops opposite NATO, central region, in what the Soviets call the Western theater of military operations.

His replacement, 61-year-old Marshal Akhromeyev, is a man who has been in the general staff for the past 10 years. By all indications, he is another man of considerable talent and creativity, although perhaps not as talented and perhaps not as ambitious or assertive as Marshal Ogarkov, attributes which may have led to Ogarkov's removal as chief of the general staff.

But I think we should have great respect for the professional qualities of the Soviet officer corps, of the professional examination of modern war—conventional and nuclear—which the Soviet defense establishment engages in.

It does not mean, by the way, that Soviet military men are prone to want to start such wars, but it means that when charged by the party, as they most certainly are, to make preparations for a variety of contingencies or types of wars, conventional and nuclear, in various theaters along the periphery of the Soviet Union, that they go about that business with a deadly seriousness of purpose.

The Soviets have, in the last several years, introduced a number of innovations—new organizational arrangements, weapons systems, and concepts for combat. They are a professional group and to deter their potential use of the Soviet Union's considerable military power, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States and its Western European allies must demonstrate similar professionalism and commitment.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you both.

I would like to pose another question. I am not sure to whom I should direct it.

As you know, the great debate continues in our country over the production of binary chemical gas. We think we are pretty well aware of the capability of the Soviet Union in the area of chemical warfare.

What do you see as the facts, and what advice would you give us in the Congress?

Anyone like to grab that and run with it? Dr. Laird.

Mr. LAIRD. Just two points to start with.

CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY

First of all, it is clear from looking at how the Soviets think about chemical warfare and how they might actually use it in operations that, by and large, they possess this force to deter any aggressor's use of it against them, simply because they would rely so heavily on a high-speed conventional offensive.

And second, there are cases where they might use it, such as against Norway and so on, against areas of denial to the West in terms of conflict.

Now, if the Western alliance has no capability to counter this Soviet arsenal, there is a major problem in terms of deterring use. This is a weapons system you will not use unless the other side has no capability.

If there is a credible capability, and it can be limited, then there is no way the Soviet Union would want to use it first, because you just slow the offensive down. You just have to walk around in one of those suits for a couple of hours and you know you are not going to move very quickly in a chemical battlefield.

But you do need some credible, although limited, capabilities so the Soviet Union could never assume that it could fight risk-free in a chemical battlefield.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Skelton, this gets back to the mirror image of weaponry, which I think is a very false way to approach the job of weapons.

Certainly the Soviets have various chemical weapons and so forth. Certainly there is a remote possibility that they would use it, although the weapon is really not a very good weapon, and we went through all of World War II without any of the nations using it because it really is not a very effective weapon, and it causes a lot more trouble than it is worth.

I think that is essentially the case today.

But if you have stocks in the Soviet Union and a record of their using them against some unprotected tribes up in Afghanistan and Laos and Cambodia, then the question is, what reasonable steps should you take to protect yourself against the possibility that they will use it?

Now, for years they have had their armored personnel carriers and their armored vehicles and so forth protected against the entry of chemical weapons. Now, a proper defense is to protect ourselves, not to threaten to use it—if the threatened return is as ineffective as the probable use.

But the return to attention to the defensive against chemical, which we pretty well have ignored for the last 30 or 40 years, certainly would be appropriate.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Anyone else wish to comment on that?

Mr. WARNER. I think the deterrent threat is important. I think the United States needs both retaliatory capability and protective measures. You certainly need to take the steps to operate in those environments with protective clothing and all the other design of equipment, shelters, et cetera. But I think you need to have a reasonably sound, modern retaliatory capability, as well.

And the question really turns on how maintainable and credibly effective are the current U.S. stocks of chemical weapons as compared to what the binary stocks might offer. And I think that is what has to be weighed precisely.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased, gentlemen, to have this opportunity today to hear your testimony.

I am reminded a bit of President Kennedy's old quote whereby he said, "I have not seen as much talent assembled in one room in the White House except with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone." I appreciate having the chance to talk to an equally distinguished group and present my questions.

The greatest thing, I think we all agree, to the Soviet Union is the United States and, more specifically, the unparalleled destructive military power of this country.

We heard last week from Mr. Shevchenko, who offered that the Soviet Union's final objective is nothing less than the achievement of world socialist order.

Picking up with that, and submitting first a question to you, Dr. Shulman, I would like to know, in achieving this objective, do you think the Soviet Union considers military power necessary for defending the socialist cause or for advancing the socialist cause?

SOVIET NEED FOR MILITARY POWER

Mr. SHULMAN. In the first instance, I have no doubt the Soviets see the function of their military power to protect the Soviet Union.

With regard to Mr. Shevchenko's observation to you, as you reported, it ought to be added in the same breath that they have in fact been very cautious in assessing the risk and potential gains in any confrontation. Even in the time of Stalin, they were extremely cautious.

Whatever may be their ultimate aspirations or the aspirations of their ideology, the fact is that they have been very conservative in the use of force wherever there seemed to them to be a risk of engaging the forces of their own country in direct confrontation with the United States. The primary concern they have manifested is the danger to their own security as they see it.

Now, that does not mean their military force is wholly defensive in function. But you asked about its primary purpose, and I think that is its primary purpose.

Mr. SWEENEY. Don't you think the Soviet Union views their military strength, their nuclear arsenal, as an instrument for attaining their objectives, their goals?

Let me direct that question to Dr. Warner, if I may.

Mr. WARNER. Well, I think it is a mix. My first reaction when you asked that question is that it is both.

I agree with Professor Shulman. I think the underlying, fundamental Soviet concern is to protect the gains of socialism. Those gains of socialism these days mean not only the Soviet Union itself but also protecting their dominance in Eastern Europe.

But I think there is no doubt that the basis of Soviet superpower status in the world today is their enormous military capability—nuclear and conventional. They are more than willing to try to trade on that military capability to advance the interests of the Soviet state on the world scene.

They are willing to apply it most brutally if they are unopposed. We need only remember the peoples of the Baltic States in 1940, when they were occupied, and the peoples of Eastern Europe who have been held in subjugation since the end of World War II.

But yet, I would still echo with Marshall Shulman that I think Mr. Shevchenko's comment overstates the matter. It may be that their optimal preferred goal would be a world dominated by the Soviet Union, a world of socialist complexion. But I think they have much more realistic operative goals in the world we live in.

And in that case, they include a curious mix of defending those positions which they currently occupy, and advancing in a cautious manner, both through just the shadow or presence of their massive military force, and its possible use in order to buttress Soviet diplomacy and the other foreign policy instruments they employ on the world scene.

Mr. SIMES. One should make a clear distinction between slogans and practical foreign policy agendas. The United States wants to make the world free for democracy and political pluralism. The Soviets are dreaming about a world Communist community, probably directed from Moscow.

But what does it tell you about their real goals? You have to ask: What are their priorities? What price are they willing to pay? What risks are they willing to take?

And if you focus on this question, you will discover that world domination is probably on the very bottom of a rather long, long list.

Because the United States stands in the way of their world domination, and because since World War II they have demonstrated to my satisfaction that their great preoccupation is to avoid confrontation with the United States, I would dismiss world domination as a practical Soviet objective, especially among those objectives which can be pursued by force.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Sweeney, your question, I think, is a very appropriate one for a Subcommittee on Defense Policy, because I think it gets to the heart of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

I think the proper answer to your question was both, that they think of it both to defend themselves and to expand their authority.

Lenin, indeed, made a prediction that world communism would come as a final result of the growth of the movement. But it seems to have slowed down fairly substantially in the last couple of decades.

The important thing is that the Soviets do not look only to their military force as a way of expanding their influence. And I think this is something that we on our side have given too little attention to, that they have indeed been cautious in the direct use of military force.

But they have been very vigorous in their support of forces of national liberation, to use their definition of subversion, and support of various subversive groups around the world, to develop their allies and use their proxies in different parts of the world, such as in Africa. Their focus on the Third World is an attempt to expand their influence through political influence, political and irregular approaches, rather than the direct use of military force.

So you can say that the Soviet Army, the direct responsibility of this committee, may not be the major offensive threat. There is another very substantial threat that we have to learn to meet and meet better than we have in many areas in the last few years.

Mr. SWEENEY. I have one additional question, Mr. Chairman.

I would just surmise out loud that I view, if the Soviet Union abandons at any time their objective vis-a-vis Third World countries or the United States, that they are in turn abandoning the entire ultimate objective of having a socialist world.

But let me go on to another question, or follow up on those earlier questions.

If I am to accept the wisdom of your answers here, please explain to me, if you would, why it is that the Soviet Union in times of relaxed United States defense efforts, would mount one of the most massive military buildups in alltime?

And why is it that the Soviet Union presumably or arguably violates strategic arms agreements or treaties? And, ultimately, what does that tell us?

I guess there are three questions here—about the Soviet's reading of the United States' motivations.

Mr. WARNER. I think the image of a Soviet surge against the background of total United States quiescence is inaccurate. I think there have been various cycles or surges in our respective buildups, particularly in what we have been focusing on, the central strategic, intercontinental range strategic forces of both sides.

The United States went through a very substantial surge in the early 1960's, partially motivated by a Soviet deception that went wrong. Khrushchev bluffed as though he was building up Soviet ballistic missile strength very rapidly. The United States, for a time, was unable to accurately assess that and a political momentum grew at the time of the Kennedy-Nixon election and led to a series of U.S. missile programs.

The Soviets then went through a compensating buildup for a period in the late 1960's. In the early 1970's, the U.S. opened a new round of competition with the deployment of multiple-independently targeted reentry vehicles [MIRV's], on the Minuteman III and on the Poseidon.

I was surprised to see the President's report on MX that was recently sent to the Congress has a graphic that shows the strategic force developments on both sides over the past 25 years. Its mode of presentation, apparently pegged to the initiation of missile flight testing, shows nothing in the 1970's of the U.S. deployments of Minuteman III ICBM's or the Poseidon C–4 SLBM.

They were both deployed between 1971 and the mid-1970's, and they multiplied our number of warheads or ballistic missiles from approximately 1700 to a number that is in excess of 8,000.

The Soviets then surged in response just a few years later with the MIRVing of their ICBM and SLBM forces.

The net result, as my calculations indicate, is we find ourselves today in a position of rough numerical parity in reentry vehicles, though it is worth noting that the Soviets have larger, heavier missiles. So the weapons they carry are larger, heavier, and in many cases, have higher explosive yields. This accounts for the so-called throw weight or megatonage gap favoring the U.S.S.R.

But the point I want to make is that that Soviet buildup of the mid-1970s was, in fact, in response to a previous surge on the American side. And we stand at the edge of another surge, in this case, a surge that seems not to be so much out of phase. Perhaps for the first time, both sides, with their relatively similar technologies, with close observation of one another, are in the process of introducing, nearly simultaneously, a new set of modernized systems.

What the overall quantitative limits might be will depend critically on what kind of arms control regime is maintained in the years ahead.

Mr. SIMES. Mr. Sweeney, it is important to realize that there was absolutely nothing unprecedented about the Soviet military buildup in the 1970s. It certainly was a much slower buildup in terms of the rate of military expenditure than that of the Germans before the war, the continuing buildup of nations in the Middle East, and even that of the United States right now.

I completely agree with Ted Warner that both nations have their own cycles of military procurement and deployment, that sometimes the United States is ahead, sometimes the Soviets are ahead. And according to the CIA, as you know, in the late 1970's the Soviets opted to slow down the rate of their defense procurement.

But let me say I completely agree with at least the thrust of your question. The Soviets do believe that military power is a very important component of what they call the "global correlation forces." They take the military instrument very seriously. They use it on their periphery, and in places like Angola and Ethiopia, very far away from their periphery.

What entitles the Soviets to be a global power?—Primarily their military might. And they are proud of it. And they feel very strongly that as they become, militarily speaking, second to none, they deserve to be and will be a power in world affairs (or-their status as a world power is justifiable and they will continue this role).

I do not think this amounts to a plan to achieve world domination. But it certainly amounts to a determination to improve their

global situation, very often in ways which would be perceived as threatening and unacceptable by the United States.

VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Sweeney, we didn't answer your second question about violations.

I think what you can say there is that you are dealing with a used car salesman here. He is going to go as close to the edge of that contract as he possibly can. He is going to flim-flam you to the degree he can. And it is up to you to be alert, to catch him at it.

I think we do a good job of that. We do catch them. They claim that we violate. This is the natural kind of "you are another" kind of answer that you get out of this.

There is no way of having these agreements without being sure that they are verifiable. I think they are. But you have to keep your eye on it and watch it. That is what it means.

They are not going to, out of good feeling, restrain themselves. They are going to only restrain themselves in compliance with a fairly specific deal that we make with them. But in that area, they have generally complied, with some exceptions on the edges.

Mr. SWEENEY. I still am having a little difficulty separating the two doctrines that we are struggling with, or at least I am struggling with.

Let me say that I find it difficult to believe that the Soviet Union can selectively apply this use of military power toward achieving a step-by-step, toward attaining the step-by-step socialist overthrow of countries or socialist occupation of countries or socialist control of countries in the world, without also running to risk of direct nuclear confrontation at every step of the way.

Back to Dr. Warner's point about Mr. Khrushchev's bluff. It was indeed a bluff that almost led to an outright nuclear conflict between the two superpowers.

My proposition is that a small fire can very quickly become a conflagration. If that be the case, how then can we say that the Soviet Union really intends their military power for uses that are primarily defensive, defending their world order, and defending, let's say, the status quo at a time when the status quo itself is totally inconsistent with the notion of achieving something beyond the status quo?

Mr. Laird.

Mr. LAIRD. Let me comment on this.

There can be a fundamental confusion between the question of making cutting deals on nuclear weapons competition and the question of usable military power outside of Europe. The Soviets look at those as different propositions as we do.

Frankly, we have acted outside of Europe in ways using military power and the Soviets hope that they can act the same way. This is a different proposition than the question of nuclear competition.

NUCLEAR COMPETITION

The question of nuclear competition, it is very clear that the Soviet Union, A, wants to stay in the race, and, B, will counter U.S. capabilities, and to have margins of superiority if they can get

away with it. But that is a different proposition from the question of playing outside Europe.

Without nuclear equivalence, they cannot play, they feel. That is the bottom line. So they will act aggressively against our interests outside of Europe.

Mr. Colby's point about the other non-nuclear factors, that is the primary game that—arms transfers, KGB operations, military advisers, that is their preferred mode of competing with us.

We should never expect, even if we cut our nuclear arms deals with the Soviets, to expect them not to continue competing with us outside of Europe. That is an important point.

I want to add one thing about the U.S. capabilities. And that is we tend to forget that we have instituted an SIOP, and a force structure designed really for the first time to counter Soviet military power as we understand it. That is what we call counterforce. It is designed to go after Soviet forces.

The Soviets will respond to this. We forget we have about a 15-year program to do this. They are going to respond in ways they think can take away certain advantages to us in terms of counterforce doctrine and capabilities.

We tend to forget that when we characterize the 1970's as a period of standing in place, we did not stand in place. We were not the primary procurers. We are this decade. And the Soviets now respond to the mid- to late-1980s.

The concern of all of us is the procurement cycles are out of phase. We just don't want them so out of phase and threatening to one another that you have an endless unregulated arms race.

I don't think the Soviets have a vested interest in an unregulated open-ended strategic nuclear competition, and certainly they have no interest in getting world domination that way.

They are just not going to get it. That is the bottom line. We are not going to stand for it.

Mr. COLBY. I might add that the least useful way of talking about our competition with the Soviet Union is to talk about how much money we spend. If we spend a lot of money and they do something very wise, they are ahead. If we spend a lot of money and do something very intelligent, and they spend a lot of money and do something stupid, we are ahead.

During the 1970's with a relatively minor expenditure of additional funds we put a new warhead on the Minuteman and a new guidance system for it, and substantially increased its effectiveness at a very minor sum.

Now, you look at the money spent and you say, we didn't keep up with them. You look at the actual weapons, and we did.

Mr. LAIRD. There is a very important point there. When the intelligence community makes a judgment on Soviet missiles, if they were making the judgment on U.S. Minuteman, they would calculate many more than Minuteman-IIIs.

If the Soviets are doing what we are doing, we would be to five or six generations of ICBM's.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Shulman.

Mr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I made a mistake at the beginning when you asked about opening statements. I had hoped to have a chance to give you a reaction to your letter in which you

referred primarily to the Soviet response to the SDI and the MX. I would like at some point, when you think it is appropriate, to have a few minutes to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to raise that question. Why don't you go ahead and start?

Mr. SHULMAN. All right.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO SDI

First is SDI. Entirely apart from the question of whether the system proves feasible or not over time, it is going to have certain effects both in the short and long run. I don't think there is a great deal of debate about this or shouldn't be among people who follow the Soviet Union.

In the first instance, it seems to me very clear that if we are committed, as part of our defense posture, to go ahead on a fairly large scale with research on the SDI, it is clear that the other part of our negotiating position with regard to START, reduction of strategic systems, will not work. There should be no doubt that those two things run very much against each other.

Moreover, it is clear that in spite of the present somewhat more conciliatory climate, that isn't going to last long if, the negotiations are not productive, and both countries go into further production and deployments, along the lines of what Ted Warner was talking about.

It seems to me inescapable that this is going to lead to a period of higher tension, because when we are both in a mode of moving into higher levels of weapons systems, and systems that are more unstable, and less verifiable, this is going to beget tensions, and the secondary discussions about opening new consulates or talks about the Middle East, are not going to stand up against the tensions that will result from a higher level of military competition.

Now, I believe that the question is going to come down to a judgment on the part of the Soviets in response to what the Congress decides on the level and kind of research that is funded.

That is, the practical question will be, will the research for fiscal year 1986 be funded at somewhere near the present level of $1.4 to $1.5 billion, or closer to the $3.7 billion that the administration has been asking?

I think the Soviet response is going to be different, depending on what the answer of the Congress is. If the level of funding is at the high end, closer to the $3.7, then what that means to the Soviets is that we are committing ourselves to the whole strategic purpose expressed in the Star Wars approach, SDI.

If, on the other hand, the research continues more or less at its present level, $1.5 or something close to it, and if the content of that research centers more on the terminal phase and on sensors rather than on the boost phase, then negotiations are entirely possible.

I don't think that necessarily knocks out the prospect of negotiations on other things. In Gromyko's television press interview, he made it clear there was a possibility of tradeoffs. He didn't spell it out.

I believe tradeoffs could come about if the funding is at the lower end, and if the research is on the terminal rather than the boost phase.

MX AS A BARGAINING CHIP

With regard to MX, I gather from the papers that the argument has been made on the Hill that it is important to fund the next 21 of the MX in order to show resolve, in order to have beneficial effects on the negotiations.

Now, I doubt that the MX itself is going to have a big effect on the negotiations. I think the negotiations will be affected more by other factors than by the MX issue.

But it seems to me that if you really are concerned about how to handle the MX issue in a way that, if anything, helps rather than hurts, I would think that the best way would be to postpone acting on it.

A bargaining chip begins to lose its force once it has become realized, once you begin to build it. We have already funded 21 and may go on to more, and clearly the Russians have to consider whether we will go on to more. The time when it has maximum impact is when it is a possibility in the wings, not yet acted upon, not after the vote has been taken.

Then it begins to lose its bargaining chip value. Then they know we are not going to back off from something that we have already funded and begun to build.

Now, there are other questions, such as those that have been raised about whether it is a good weapons system for us or not.

I am inclined to think that in its present basing mode, it doesn't make much sense; that it is a mistake for us to move the military competition in the direction of more vulnerable and more destabilizing systems. This a matter of our own interest, not because we want something from the Russians for it.

But the question is, what kind of weapons systems make sense for us? That one does not.

We can show resolve in other ways. I think one way that would make a lot more sense would be to pay more attention to our conventional capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask each of you to address that same question that Marshall Shulman addressed. We did talk a little bit about the MX earlier.

But two issues: No. 1, yes or no on the 21 MX's; and secondly, what would you do with the SDI program which, as Marshall said, is an R&D program, the request for which is $3.7 billion, up from $1.4 billion last year?

Start with Ted and work down the other way.

Ted, what would you do with the MX?

Mr. WARNER. Let me make a couple of comments on the general background that underlies the bottom-line judgments on these matters—the votes that you people will have to take.

I think with regard to the SDI that the Soviets undoubtedly are greatly concerned for reasons that have been indicated earlier. Due to the high-technological challenge associated with the SDI, the opening up of that avenue, which they decided in the very late

1960s was generally not in their interest to follow, the Soviets would prefer to avoid such a competition.

That is what brought them to the AMB portion of the SALT-I negotiations in the late 1960s. It was not some great doctrinal revolution, but just a pragmatic judgment that it was not in the Soviet interest to open the possibility for large-scale ballistic missile defense deployments, for nationwide defense, that led to their signing the AMB Treaty in 1972.

By all indications, particularly with the high-tech content of the apparent kinds of systems that are being considered for the SDI, that judgment is almost certainly reinforced today.

The Soviets themselves have undertaken basic research and made substantial deployments in a variety of strategic defenses. They have deployed air defenses in great numbers and sought to improve them. They have deployed to the limit of the ABM Treaty the missile defense system around Moscow, and are in the process of upgrading it. They have spent a great deal of money on passive defenses, in particular civil defense.

They are also investigating both traditional and new technology ballistic missile defense. Some of their newer concepts, as best we understand them, are of the star wars variety.

The United States appears to be unwilling to surrender the possibility of investigating this area in the years ahead. That is probably a good judgment on two grounds: First, the Soviets themselves will most certainly continue to investigate such defenses, and it is only prudent for us to do so as well; second, there is enough technological promise here that I believe we ought to pursue at least a modest program to investigate these possibilities.

Given that, let's turn to the negotiations.

I don't really agree with Marshall Shulman that the Soviets will fine-tune their willingness to reach agreement according to the precise dollar level that the Congress gives the administration in this year's appropriation for SDI research.

I think the presence of the SDI, backed by President Reagan's personal enthusiasm for it, is such that the Soviets now are unlikely to agree to any very deep cuts in their strategic forces.

It just doesn't make sense for them to deeply cut those strategic forces when the possibility is there that we are going to open this new area of defensive competition and the Soviets are going to prudently want to plan for a variety of offensive countermeasures as well.

So given that, my sense is that the U.S. SDI effort drives them off receptivity to the ideas of deep cuts and puts us in an area of possible marginal or modest reductions in the arsenals of both sides.

MILITARY PLANNING

One final word about Soviet prudent military planning in this context. I think the Soviets will simultaneously now be investigating in parallel, one, improved strategic offensive forces to counter those defenses, should they emerge, to try to avoid or evade them, to come in the side door with cruise missiles or bombers, and the like. Two, I believe they will continue and step up their own inves-

tigation of strategic ballistic missile defenses. And, three, I think both sides will investigate a somewhat new area of defense suppression forces.

Now, it is not yet clear to me that it is in the American interest ultimately to go past development into the very important decision to begin testing and, most importantly of all, the deployment of these strategic defensive systems. The case remains to be made. The analysis of this question must continue in parallel with the technological work.

In sum, I believe the United States should proceed with an SDI program although I'm not sure what the precise appropriations should be, whether it is the $3.7 billion proposed by the administration or all the way back to $1.5 billion or so that was approved last year.

I think the Congress ought to investigate the subelements of the various SDI programs, see which ones seem to make the most sense, and make your appropriations on the merits of the internal character of that research.

I also believe you should very strongly send a signal to the administration that the Congress, even as it supports the technology program, has not yet come to the decision that it will be in the Nation's interest to go past technological development to testing and deployment.

With respect to the MX, as I said earlier, I believe, on balance, you should release the fiscal year 1985 funds, although I think that the system could have been even more beneficial had it been linked with somewhat more survivable basing, whether it was back to the multiple-protective structures or even to the rapidly thrown out idea of closely spaced basing. Either one of those would have extracted a greater price to attack on the part of any would-be Soviet attack planner. But politically those are not in the cards.

Given the choices you have today, I think you should approve the fenced funds and should examine again, and probably approve as well, the funds for some additional missiles when you consider them this summer.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Simes.

Mr. SIMES. Mr. Chairman, let me make four points.

First, SDI: I do believe this is a genuine Soviet concern. Traditionally, throughout the history of arms control negotiations, the Soviets have been much less preoccupied with so-called crisis stability or arms control stability and have been more concerned about what one may call the stability of the arms race.

In short, the Soviets have never seriously believed in so-called windows of vulnerability. The marginal counterforce capabilities of American forces, which could be enhanced by MX, have never really frightened the Russians. They assume leaders in Washington and Moscow are prudent people and would not be able or prepared to do something foolish because of a marginal force capability.

Yet, the Soviets are afraid of new technology because this is one area of the Soviet military competition where they are least self-confident. And they are afraid that forces in which they have invested so much, which they have planned for years, could become irrelevant and obsolete.

That is why the SDI is a major, genuine preoccupation for the Soviet Union. It is the one area of military competition while they believe they are on the least safe ground.

Second, however, there is no question in my mind that when the Soviets launch a major propaganda complaint against the SDI, they are also playing a game. It is not only a game, but it is also a game.

We know very well that after 2 years of complaining about American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, the Soviets today pay very little attention to them. In a way, SDI is a propaganda opportunity for the Soviets, is the son of INF.

In short, the Soviet concern is genuine, but considerably overstated for political propaganda reasons as an effort to scare audiences both in the Capitol here and primarily in Western Europe.

Third, SDI rhetoric: The Soviets, of course, have known about the United States strategic defense research efforts for years. Anyone who reads Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine would know that. And, as Ted Warner observed correctly, the Soviets were involved in similar and even more ambitious efforts.

What has changed? Not the amount of money allocated to this research effort. Whether it would be $3.7 billion for this year or less, I would say that an increase from $18 billion to $27 billion over 5 years is not the kind of extravagant increase which would frighten the Soviets.

What has changed is the administration's rhetoric. What has changed is the new suggestion to kill deterrence and replace it with some completely different kind of concept, some kind of defense—and the Soviets don't even know what it means.

So, clearly, when the Soviets look at the United States research efforts, they cannot separate them, they cannot insulate them from American rhetoric. Rhetoric is relevant because it provides the prism through which the Soviets interpret our efforts.

So I slightly disagree with my friend Marshall Shulman that the amount of money allocated to research is crucial. To put an end to this rhetoric, from my point of view, is very important, especially since we do not know what the SDI research program can eventually produce.

A final point: I do not think that deep cuts in Geneva would be easily negotiatiable with or without SDI. As we know from the history of arms control, over the years both sides—I don't particularly blame the Soviets—both sides were much more concerned with protecting their own forces than reducing the forces of their opponent.

It would be rather out of character for the Soviets to accept deep cuts in their most modern weapons. They have weapons which are becoming obsolete, and are unreliable; they are not important anyway. And the Soviets are ready to get rid of them.

If you take all this into account, my two conclusions would probably be clear to you. Yes to the 21 MX missiles. I am not concerned about them being deployed, not in a very survivable mode simply because I do not believe that the Soviets would ever seriously contemplate going after them.

Second, SDI research program: Yes to the SDI research program but with strong suggestions to the administration that it should

think very clearly about articulating this program both to the Americans and to the Soviets in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Laird.

Mr. LAIRD. You are dealing with two very different issues. MX versus SDI, from the Soviet point of view, are very different issues.

MX

Let me deal with MX briefly. I think everything we know from the arms control record in the START talks is that the main concern the Soviets have had is with D-5, not MX.

And the main reason for that, I think, is twofold. One is the relevant vulnerability of the Trident. Second, the numbers, projected numbers, to be deployed in Trident.

And the less attention to MX has simply been that the numbers contemplated for deployment are not threatening enough to the Soviet ICBM force—if the size of the force is going to go up. If it were a serious force that could decapitate the Soviet ICBM force, then the Soviets would be concerned about it. So that is one issue.

So you can vote 21 missiles. It will have a marginal impact on the Soviets. That is my basic judgment at this point.

But if it is the precursor of a serious program, which I don't think they think it is—I think they much more believe we are going to go to mobility eventually, because it is the only thing that makes sense.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

SDI is a totally different issue. And the amount of time my other colleagues have spent on this issue shows that.

The bottom line is what the Soviets can do in this area can clearly complicate the benefits of this program to us. That is the bottom line.

They have all kinds of potentials for countermeasures to projected programs. They have the problems of numbers of offensive warheads.

For example, if there are no arms control regimes to control the number of offensive warheads, then it becomes very difficult to contemplate what in fact a strategic defense system is.

Put bluntly, I find it very difficult to understand how we have a strategic defense system deployed someday without some sense of some arms control regime that makes it more rather than less threatening.

But here you are dealing with a qualitatively different issue, a new world. Dimitri has said this. I think they are frightened primarily because it is a new world. Bureaucratically, it is very difficult to know what this world would look like, what weapons do you want to develop, what commitments do you want to make fiscally.

The bottom line of that is that perhaps strategic defense at this point might be a useful pressure on the Soviets for some controls in space, perhaps ASAT. Perhaps it could be useful if we were willing to abandon certain programs for deep cuts. But, as Ted Warner has pointed out, it is very difficult in this environment, because the expectation is that an American system will be deployed.

It is not just a research program. But you are dealing with a very different kettle of fish, from the Soviet point of view, on the strategic defense initiative. And it is no question it is a major motivation to get to the table.

Mr. COLBY. I think the MX ought to be stopped because it is ineffective and dangerous. That is the main reason.

If I thought the Soviets were particularly concerned about it, I would say, well, at least keep it on the shelf and use it as a bargaining chip at the negotiations. But I don't think it is worth much as that.

So I say just hold it where it is, stop it, keep this 21 in suspense. If some reason came up in the future to release it and keep it going, you could do that then.

On the SDI, I think it is potentially a dangerous direction, but it clearly has caught the imagination of the Soviets and it is a very substantial bargaining chip.

Now, it is very hard to argue against research into this field, because you need to do some research just to keep up with the state of the art. What we are talking about is the difference between keeping up with what is happening at a relatively minor sum in order not to be faced with some breakout problems some day, but at the same time, not having a grandiose program in mind.

It seems to me that the Congress might usefully just suspend some of this, indicating that we would go ahead with a reasonable degree of research but we would hold hostage a larger effort in the SDI area if we do not obtain some positive results in the Geneva meetings.

Therefore, it really would become a bargaining chip. They would ask, if they could not get the administration to go with it, they would look to the Congress to carry out our side of the bargain, and hope that that would put some pressure to justify their giving us the kind of deep cuts that we are looking for.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask one other question, or approach one other area. That is—Ted Warner touched on it a little bit. Let me ask this question.

Reading between the lines—I guess I want to know whether you are pessimistic or optimistic about this round of talks. And in particular, from what I can tell by reading the newspapers and other accounts, the Soviets are coming in looking for kind of an offensive/defensive trade of some kind.

Our side is going in looking for an offensive-versus-offensive trade, and hoping that the Soviets can be convinced not to insist on a defensive change.

And indeed, it may be even that we are going to need their cooperation on the defensive side as we come—bump up against the ABM Treaty. There is talk, witnesses we have heard in the last few days are talking about, well, we would have to get a small adjustment to the ABM Treaty here, in order to do this.

I guess my question is, what is the prospect of that? And given where the Soviets are, or where you understand the Soviets are, and where the administration is, a couple of questions come to mind.

Is the administration likely to get the cooperation of the Soviets in minor adjustments to the ABM Treaty so that we can see whether an SDI Program is feasible or not?

Are we likely to be able to get an offensive-for-offensive trade and be able to just continue the research in the defensive area without any concession on the defensive area—holding that question open for a decision sometime in the 1990's, I guess.

Ted, why don't we just—anybody who wants to answer.

Mr. WARNER. First, I think the trade will still involve some defense and offense. What I would say could make me a qualified optimist, perhaps only a Pollyanna, is that what the Soviets desire, of course, is to place maximum obstacles in front of the United States SDI effort.

Their unofficial spokesmen have even talked of the possibility of limits that would intrude into the research and development process as well as prohibiting testing and deployment. I don't think such limits are very plausible in light of the problems of intrusive verification.

But regarding the question of testing and deployment, I think the main thing that we can, and for our own reasons should be offering the Soviets is a commitment to restraint—not to move precipitously in the next few years to test or deploy any components that are beyond what can legally be done within the ABM Treaty.

What we really should be bargaining over is the duration of this commitment. The administration's own spokesmen indicate in many cases they don't believe flight testing of SDI components will be available until the late 1980's at the earliest. There will be some pressures, however, to test as early as possible by those who favor transition into this brave new era as rapidly as possible.

But I think we can reasonably talk about an assurance to the Soviets to prohibit the testing and deployment of SDI systems that lasts into the 1990's, perhaps to as late as 1995. That way the Soviets would be getting not their maximum goal of stopping SDI research in its tracks, fundamentally an impossible pursuit; but an agreement that at least reassures them that if we are to make the transition to large scale BMD it is not going to occur until sometime in the mid-1990's.

One could combine this deal regarding the SDI with offensive dealt of the kind I already described. I think you can have restraints on both offense and offense, and a reasonable compromise on strategic defense that could be sufficiently reassuring to the Soviets.

And in the interim, as I said earlier, we need to examine, in a clear-eyed and hard-headed manner, whether long-run movement into this new era of mixing defense with offense is really worthwhile.

I think that on the whole, the only chance of attaining the ambitious objective of assured survival on both sides, will be in the context of mutual and significant constraints on strategic offense arms.

The Soviets are not ready for that combination now. In many ways, we are not ready for that either. Perhaps we will both be ready, according to Paul Nitze's scenario, sometime in the mid-1990's. That is very hard to tell.

But we should press on with a reasonable research program on large-scale strategic defenses, investigate the possibilities of transition, both within our own country and in discussions with the Soviets, and perhaps it will prove possible.

OBJECTIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL

Mr. SIMES. Mr. Chairman, in order to answer your question, one should establish criteria. I would suggest three objectives for arms control.

First, the political stability of the United States-Soviet relationship, from my point of view, is and should be the most important objective.

Second, helping both sides to avoid building systems which they really don't want anyway, but which they may be forced to build in absence of agreements.

And third, depriving sides of systems which they want to have.

As far as political stability of the relationship goes, I think that arms control has already delivered a lot. Our relationship with the Soviets had become less polemical, more civilized. I think there is much less excitement in Moscow and Washington alike than a year ago.

I think it is very important to have an extension of the SALT II Treaty, because if this agreement is allowed to lapse, I suspect its absence will result in many mutual recriminations and suspicions. I think it is possible to negotiate minor amendments to the SALT II Treaty which really would be very useful to boths sides. Specifically, we need a provision which would allow the United States to build the Midgetman missile.

Incidentally, if we get this provision, we extend the Soviets a right to have a second mobile ICBM. The controversy over the SS–25, in short, the one major potential dispute in the United States-Soviet relationship, would be taken care of.

Second question: Those systems which we don't want anyway. I think we have been quite successful, as the ABM Treaty indicates, in dealing with these systems. There are several of them right now, and we should talk about them.

And the MX, incidentally, is one of them as far as I am concerned. I am not sure it is a bargaining chip. But certainly it is something worth discussing in Geneva when we talk to the Soviets about numbers of their SS–24 deployment.

Third question: Is it possible to deprive yourself and your opponent of systems which you want badly? I am very pessimistic about that.

The record of arms control suggests that as a rule, what is meaningful in terms of deep cuts is nonnegotiable. Those deep cuts which are possible are relevant, and what is relevant and possible is unverifiable.

In short, I think what we should try to do with the current round of arms control is provide assurances to each other, put a cap on the arms race, contribute to the stability of political relationship, and not to try to achieve some very ambitious tradeoffs between existing and formidable forces and our dreams about defense. You cannot trade dreams for existing weapons systems.

As a result, I think that those who argue for something great and magnificent in Geneva are performing a disservice to arms control. Those who want to may end up with nothing.

Mr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, I guess the thrust of your initial question was whether we think something is going to come out of the negotiations at Geneva. And my own position on that is to be very doubtful about it.

If the positions of the two countries more or less stay the way they are, they are pretty irreconcilable. And it seems to me that unless there turns out to be more give in the situation than is now apparent, my guess is that there will not be productive negotiations. And that as a consequence, we will both go ahead with the systems that we have in our pipelines.

As I suggested to you earlier, I think that an atmosphere of conciliation that Dimitri depends a lot on is not going to last very long. Now, things could change.

It is not just a question of tradeoff of offense for defense, though. I would like to rephrase the way you put the problem.

From the Soviet point of view, obviously the problem has changed from March 1983, the President's speech about the SDI. Because it is not only that they worried about what we might do with our technological advantages and the cost to them, but it raises questions about what our own strategic thinking is, what our purposes are.

And it means that we are substituting something else for the balance of deterrence that they have come to understand and we have been operating on in the past. And they are not clear what is going to be substituted for it.

They also see that the purposes of the United States, as they understand it, are to try to regain superiority, and they are determined not to let that happen.

So the prospects that they face, I think, are for a continuation of a very substantial level of military competition.

Now, if we were willing to use the Star Wars as a bargaining chip, and the President is very clear that we are not, but even if we were, in order to get a deal, in order to get some sort of an arrangement out of Geneva that would increase our security, it would be necessary to ease the pressure of the Star Wars program, which would mean that the Soviets will build up their offensive missiles, as Ted says. It, also means that in dealing with the third part of the negotiations, which has to do with the strategic balance, we have to talk to them in more equitable terms than we have.

It has become a dirty word around town to talk in terms of negotiability. That is attacked, and people say that you are negotiating with yourself.

But the fact is that if you want productive negotiations you have to think what is within reason, what can the Soviets reasonably accept, without capitulation. And that means that we are going to have to talk to them in terms of levels of warheads and delivery vehicles across the board, including the systems that are our main reliance as well.

It is going to take both of those things if we hope to have a productive outcome.

It is a mistake, I think, in dealing with the Soviet Union, to predict too much. There are too many variables. So I would not say flatly that these are not going to go anywhere. But present trends are not very encouraging.

Mr. LAIRD. I think one of the great paradoxes of watching U.S. arms control positions is that in the old days, people who supported arms control wanted comprehensive agreements, and those who opposed them wanted verifiable subpackages. Today it is the reverse. People who don't like arms control want comprehensive packages and those who want arms control want chunks of the problem solved.

Now, if one is asking, is it technically possible to cut deals with the Soviet Union at this point in time on discrete problems, the answer of course is yes. But if the goal is to have a comprehensible, verifiable, whatever, it is possible.

So the question is, if there is political will on both sides to cut deals on certain specific problems that each side faces, whether it be nuclear testing, whether it be to improve crisis stability, can one then think of a ladder of increasing probability?

It is certainly possible for the United States and Soviet Union to strike deals on some rough number of offensive warheads on each side, simply to aid in planning. But it would require exactly what Ted Warner said; it would require some commitment about—not on moratorium, but simply putting forth the ABM Treaty, continue it for a period of time so that the Soviets would be comfortable with the fact that we are not trying to break out, which we are not trying to break out yet, anyway.

The least likely possibility, it seems to me, involves the question of theater nuclear systems in Europe, which again, nobody is paying any attention to.

This is going to be a major problems in the years ahead, with the British and French nuclear forces coming on line, with the question of United States nuclear modernization of short and medium range, and Soviet medium and longer range systems which will have increasingly difficult impacts on central balance. That is going to be a tough one. There is no way to negotiate that in this agreement.

So I think the most likely thing is some agreement on numbers of offensive warheads, to allow both sides to plan the effects of forces and with the commitment to go into strategic defensive deployments deeper than we have for this interim period and then sort out what we would like to do down the road.

That seems to me very conceivable, but difficult politically.

Mr. COLBY. I think the direct answer to your question is, it depends in great part upon us.

If we go into these negotiations on a damage-limiting approach, that we want to give away as little as we possibly can, then we are not going to get very far.

I am a bit of an optimist, though, because I think we will hear the concrete cracking around the feet of the President at some point—after that approach has reached a total impasse, sometime in the next year or so. He will become interested in his position in history, and want to achieve some proper arms control arrangement.

And about all he has to do is call up Mr. Nitze and say he wants an agreement, and Mr. Nitze can go out and get it for him.

Now, the question is whether that will be a limited agreement which will just be another one of these sad steps in the history of arms control, or whether we can take advantage, can develop public opinion in this country to demand a really major shift in this foolish arms race that we are in with these terrible weapons.

We had the freeze movement a couple of years ago. It looked as though that was building up a head of steam. There is a lot of sentiment in this country still insisting that we make a substantial change in this contest between us.

And I think that if that pressure from the public can be built up over the next year or so, the President is the first one who could pick up and lead that parade and lead it very effectively. And if he came in with an agreement, it would not have any problem getting through the Senate.

Mr. WARNER. If I might add a couple of points.

I agree with Robin Laird. I failed to note earlier that these talks that reopened this week, or opened for the first time in their current conformation, have three parts. They include START restarted. They include INF again. And they include talks on weapons in space.

I tried to describe solutions to two of those—START and weapons in space, including SDI. Regarding the question of INF, it will be very, very tough to reach agreement.

There are serious differences on the British and French issue and on what bombers and fighter-bombers should be limited. And also about what restraints can be imposed on the most vexing of all systems, the sea-launched cruise missile.

It is not even clear in which part of the talk the sea-launched cruise missile belongs. During the previous round, the administration chose to exclude it from both START and INF. Now that we have combined those negotiations, the chances that the SLCM can continue to be exempted completely are very slim.

But I have yet to hear of a good solution, other than a total ban on sea-launched cruise missiles, and that possibility seems to have gone by the boards since the United States has now deployed both conventionally armed and nuclear-armed systems of this type in submarines and surface ships over the past 2 years. Without a ban, it is hard to craft a possible restraint that seems verifiable.

The final thing we might note is the question of qualitative controls. In SALT II, we tried for the first time not only to provide overall ceilings on offensive forces, but also to limit the introduction of new systems. We have had trouble defining a "new" ICBM.

The problem has involved the SS–X–25, the Soviet modestly small solid-fueled mobile missile, which they claim is the generational follow-on to the SS–13, a missile that was tested and deployed in limited numbers two decades ago. According to most reports, the United States doesn't find that explanation very convincing.

But in any case, we should at least entertain the possibility that in the new Geneva negotiations, we might try not only for quantitative, but also for some kind of qualitative restraint that says the upcoming deployments are going to be the last round of new

ICBM's. For instance, we could deply the MX and the Midgetman and the Soviets could have the SS–X–24 and SS–X–25, but no others. I might close by saying that the problem with such limits is clearly evident in the case of the SS–X–25, that is, defining what is a "modification" and what is a "new" ICBM.

The Soviets have demonstrated a historical tendency to modify missiles. As Mr. Colby said, we did it with the Minuteman as well. You can make certain changes in a basic missile that really change its character.

In order to successfully constrain the introduction of new systems, we will have to find some way to define a "new" system that is tighter than the way that we elaborated those restraints during SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much.

Has anybody got anything left they would like to say before we adjourn?

Thank you all very much for a very interesting morning.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the defense policy panel adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

MX MISSILE AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE [SDI]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 20, 1985.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome to our hearing this morning. We'd remind the members that this is the continuation of the hearing about the President's strategic modernization initiatives, and we would—are holding hearings in preparation, of course, for a couple of votes, important votes on the MX.

We've got to then vote on the MX issue again when we consider the 1986 authorization bill, and of course we've got to vote on some funding for the strategic defense initiatives, or star wars, and so this policy panel is looking at the whole issue of the modernization program, SDI, MX, in the light of the talks going on.

This morning we have three very distinguished witnesses, people who have had a great deal of experience in dealing with the Soviet Union as negotiators, as planning negotiating positions, et cetera, and it would be a very important point of view for the panel to have on these issues as we do these votes.

Our witnesses this morning are Ambassador Louis Fields, Ambassador Ray Garthoff, and Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt. All have had extensive experience in other administrations—are we going to vote or are we not going to vote? We're all right. We don't need to stop.

Why don't we then have a chance to listen to our witnesses, but before we do that, let me call on the ranking Republican member, Mr. Bill Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no profound comments to make this morning. I will save those for the end, but I do want to welcome you here. We're looking forward to your statements, and I do think that the product of this panel ultimately will be very beneficial.

We've had some very prestigious witnesses, including those appearing today. Thank you for your appearance. We're looking forward to your statements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we start with Ambassador Fields? Go ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LOUIS FIELDS, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Ambassador FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a special privilege to appear before your panel today to share with the panel some insights of a negotiator who spent the past 3 years engaged as the U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, seeking multilateral approaches to disarmament and arms control issues.

In the forum which I served we were one of 40 members. Those 40 members included the Soviet Union, as well as the four other nuclear weapons states, together with 35 other nations. We were intimately involved with the Soviet Union, both within the conference and on the margins of it, because of the special interests represented between the two states. We gained some insights which I am very pleased to share with you, but I would prefer to do by way of responding to your questions.

So with that I might invite other members of the panel to make an introductory comment.

Mr. ASPIN. OK. Ray.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, FORMER MEMBER OF SALT I DELEGATION

Ambassador GARTHOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also do not have a prepared statement. I would like to make a few brief comments and then also pursue the matter further mainly through discussion and questions. I think it's important that we bear in mind that the most essential element, the first element, in establishing negotiation in arms control and in other fields is the setting of objectives.

And the establishment of aims, not only in a very general sense, but somewhat more concretely, is really essential before one devises a negotiating strategy, and negotiating tactics, and considers questions of leverage in the negotiations.

I think our general aim should be to pursue and seek arms control accords of a kind that would serve U.S. interests, including a curbing of unlimited arms competition on general grounds, and more specifically with respect to areas of instability that might be prompted through unlimited arms competition.

The negotiations in the last 15 years or so have been most successful when the two sides have had common objectives. That's not surprising. But it is something we should bear in mind. For example, to take the most prominent example, the two sides both saw advantages in limiting a race in ABM systems in the SALT I negotiations in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and that of course was the basic reason that agreement was possible and was reached on the ABM Treaty of 1972.

Negotiations are less successful when there is a general feeling that arms control might be of some use, but when in concrete terms the aim of a side is to preserve its own options and to limit only those of the other side. We're talking about bargaining situa-

tions, and if one or both sides take that approach, the result is likely to be either no agreement or a very minimal agreement on minimal constraints.

And I'm afraid that that's the lesson from the negotiations on strategic offensive arms in SALT I, SALT II and START, either no agreement at all was reached as in START, or it was minimal as in SALT I, or was modest and has not been ratified by one of the sides in the case of SALT II.

Bargaining leverage comes when arms limitation is seen as a real alternative to some deployment. Simply having a program to pursue and deploy some new system in itself is no inducement to the other side unless they conclude that from a negotiated agreement that particular area of competition, or as they may view it threat, is limited.

Again, I think the ABM Treaty offers a good example. Both sides were prepared to agree on very severe constraints on their own future development and testing and deployment of antiballistic missile systems, and a treaty was reached. The story with respect to strategic offensive arms during this period has, I think, demonstrated that the two sides, in fact both, were more concerned with keeping open the main options for modernization and the major existing forces rather than being prepared to reduce or curtail them.

LEVERAGE PROVIDED BY CURRENT MX DEPLOYMENT

I'll just say one word at this point on the topical question of the leverage provided by our current program for MX deployment. It's my judgment that the leverage provided by MX deployment has been largely spent. Whether it's been spent effectively or wisely is another question.

But I think its time has largely passed, and for that reason I think that a decision at this point of the United States to deploy an additional 21 missile launchers or beyond that is not going to have a major impact on the outcome of negotiations one way or the other.

That is, I recognize, a point you may well want to discuss a bit further, but there are three reasons for that judgment on my part. One I've already tried to give, that is to say the question of whether MX is in fact available for bargaining.

The second reason is that at this point the United States has a series of other programs and deployments under way which are also providing essentially the same kind of counterforce capability that the MX will provide, and I think that for that reason the relative significance of the MX now is considerably less.

Even if it were to be curtailed or rolled back to nothing, that would no longer have the same impact from the Soviet standpoint, given all of the other systems that are well under way, and therefore they are less prepared to give up something of their own in order to effect that result.

And the third reason is that I think that the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the negotiations that are just beginning over the basic question of the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, given the position that the administration appears to be taking on the question

of whether it would be prepared to consider limitations on testing and deployment of weapons in space, is so wide that I think the otherwise important questions of trade-offs and possible agreed limitations within the category of strategic offensive arms is at this point, which is likely to extend for quite some period ahead of us, essentially secondary.

There will, I'm afraid, be no real progress in working toward agreed positions on strategic offensive arms at a time when the Soviet Union sees a wide-open competition being launched in strategic defensive arms. And because of the uncertainties as to the form and extent of such strategic defenses, they will be far less likely to be prepared to agree to reductions or constraints on modernization of strategic offensive systems which they may need in order to surmount or circumvent defenses in order to retain a deterrent capability.

I think I'll stop at this point rather than launch further, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Garthoff. Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

STATEMENT OF HELMUT SONNENFELDT, FORMER COUNSELOR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first of all take this formal occasion to congratulate you on your ascent to the chairmanship of this committee, and hope that you will continue to make enormous contributions to the country's security, as you have in the past.

Second, I'm pleased also that this Defense Policy Panel of the Armed Services Committee has been established for this kind of broad-gauged discussion, which I hope contributes to everyone's understanding of the real issues involved in our security situation and our security choices, and I'm particularly pleased that I have an opportunity to participate in the panel's endeavors.

If I might just make some initial comments, I will do so, very briefly. As you may know, I do so from a background of some 25 years of work in the executive branch in the Department of State, in the first instance as an analyst of Soviet affairs, and then subsequently in policy positions in the NSC Staff and the Department of State concerned with American security policy broadly, and American-Soviet relations in particular.

I take it your panel's concern is not exclusively with the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, but rather with the possible role that such negotiations may play in the protection and enhancement of our overall security situation.

I think that is an important point to bear in mind, because historically, great as the effort has been to achieve advances in our security situation through negotations with the Soviets, relatively little has been achieved.

PAST NEGOTIATION HAD LITTLE SUCCESS

The disarmament negotiations of the forties and fifties essentially were deadlocked, and the arms control negotiations, as they came to be known, in the sixties and seventies made some progress

at the margins at best, or else we would not have the dilemmas that we're facing today.

That is true, in my view, even of those accomplishments in arms control that were perhaps the most major ones, those in the early 1970's. The ABM Treaty of 1972 did not produce the sort of military balance that it was hoped it would produce.

The strategic offensive limitations that accompanied that treaty were at best marginal in their effects and even the nonratified SALT II Treaty would not have saved us from the most serious choices imposed—not by nature nor by some objective reality, but, very simply, by the military programs of the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that any Soviet leadership, including the new one now emerging, places principal confidence in negotiations with the United States for the protection of Soviet security.

I believe that Soviet leaders have always placed their principal confidence in their own military programs. While they see arms control negotiations as possibly making some contribution, they of course have always engaged in the most massive manipulation of public opinion in the West through propaganda and agitation in order to inhibit the military programs in the West.

But their basic reliance has been on their defense programs. I think we have very little alternative until events prove otherwise to place chief reliance on our own defense programs, hoping all the while that the effort to negotiate limits, restrictions and inhibitions leading to agreements with the Soviet Union might help us.

But that basically remains for the future rather than in the past. We are in an era where deterrence rests chiefly on the threat of punishment, that is, on the threat of confronting an attacker with the realization that should he attack, he will suffer losses disproportionate with the gains that he might achieve from such an attack.

I believe the present administration is attempting, over the long run, to add to the concepts and strategies revolving around deterrence by punishment, a stronger component of deterrence by denying an attacker the prospect of successful attack.

That is to say, the effort to explore the feasibilities of cost-effective defenses in the strategic realm would be designed, to the extent that those efforts bear fruit, to reach into the calculations of an adversary in stages well before the adversary has to consider what the consequences upon himself of an attack may be.

The intent would be to complicate the very planning for an attack on the grounds that that attack may itself become confused and blunted and ineffectual in the very early stages. I believe therefore the effort to explore the feasibilities of defense should not be seen as contrary to the basic concept of deterrence, but of adding components to deterrence in which the Soviets, moverover, have always been interested, even after the ABM Treaty, but about which we have had much more controversy in our own country, especially in the last 15 to 20 years.

It is for those reasons that I support both the programs pursued by the administration for the modernization of our strategic forces on land, at sea, and in regard to aerodynamic and bomber delivery systems, as well as the more systematic exploration of the feasibilities of missile defense.

We should not forget that we're talking about different timeframes. The MX, now once again for the I don't know how manyeth time since its inception over a decade ago in controversy and in debate—fits into the era of deterrence by punishment. This era in my view will continue for quite some time to come, and its basic concept in my view will continue to be valid even if it turns out that we can move into a transition in which deterrence by denying the prospects of successful attack becomes a more dominant component of deterrence.

SDI therefore should be supported in its present phase of research as a possibility for the longer run of changing the components and their weights in deterrence, not deterrence itself.

Now, it seems to me if we can be clear about those kinds of concepts we can be clearer about the role of negotiations. I therefore would not regard the MX as something to be traded away in a negotiation.

MX SEEN AS AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM

I would regard the MX as a weapons system that has considerable effectiveness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in any number of scenarios that one can think of, and therefore should be part of any limits that might be negotiated in the Geneva process or some other negotiating process, even limits on offensive weapons that would substantially reduce the number of warheads and delivery systems.

But it may provide some leverage, some encouragement for the Soviet Union to engage seriously in such negotiations for reductions. In any event, in terms of some of the questions put by your panel, I do not believe it is right to ask about the Soviet reaction to MX, because MX is itself the product of many programs which the Soviets have already engaged in for over a decade.

As regards SDI and the negotiations, I believe nothing in these negotiations should preclude our thorough examination of the feasibility of cost-effective defensive systems. The question of what happens later might be a matter of discussion and negotiation with the Soviets.

But there is no reason on the face of it to believe that the Soviets are subject to different laws of deterrence than the United States, even though they may have different approaches to it. Therefore, we should not ignore the possibility that whatever the fusillades of complaint, invective and anger from Moscow about SDI at this stage, the Soviets will themselves look seriously at a military situation in which punishment and the threat of destroying tens or hundreds of millions of people may initially be supplemented and eventually, gradually replaced by a form of deterrence that makes military attack and the contemplation of military attack itself a highly risky and complex matter for military and political planners.

In any event, my concern above all is with the ability of the United States to protect itself against direct attack and to continue to meet commitments and to satisfy interests that we have established as a nation through seven administrations on a bipartisan basis since the Second World War.

That above all must be the purpose of our military forces. This purpose must take precedence over arms control negotiations that do not contribute to our ability to protect ourselves and protect our interests beyond our shores. Our arms control negotiations may have some validity in a psychological and political sense, but as long as they do not in any real way contribute to the solution of our military problems. We must continue to grapple with the hard military choices which the committee is addressing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, all of you.

Let me just ask one question and then turn it over to the others.

The administration's case for the MX now is very heavily oriented toward the negotiations that are just beginning.

I mean, essentially, their case comes down to "Don't weaken the negotiating position of the United States by taking the weapons system off the table unilaterally."

In essence, that is their argument.

All of you have had extensive experience with negotiating with the Soviet Union, and I want to ask you, in the light of that pitch, basically, what do you think about it. Suppose—put yourself in the position of these negotiators. Suppose you were Kampelman or Tower or Glitman, and were about to, or just beginning the negotiations with the Soviet Union on this issue, what would your advice be to Congress on the MX issue?

Ambassador Fields.

RECOMMENDED TO CONGRESS ON MX ISSUE

Ambassador FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I may kick off a response to your question, which I think is a very poignant and important question.

In having the most, I suppose, contemporaneous experience in negotiating with the Russians, perhaps I can put into context how they reacted to these issues in the negotiations that I conducted in Geneva.

The Soviet position tried to decry the competition in nuclear weaponry, constantly attacking the escalating nuclear arms race; however they did not seem to be very troubled by the fact that we were seeking a modernization course. They seemed to accept that in a philosophical way because that has been the history, as Mr. Sonnenfeldt pointed out, of the last few decades.

They were, however, enormously concerned, almost to the extent of paranoia, over the issue of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

They seem bent upon thwarting that at all costs. This is where they concentrated their efforts in the Conference. This is where it has been my observation they have concentrated their efforts through their official visitors to this and other countries. They have seemed more bent upon trying to blunt further U.S. technology in the field of SDI than they have in anything else.

I believe that that was one of the main reasons that the Soviet Union returned to the bargaining table. The fact that we were willing to—and apparently we had established a resolve to—pursue this technology to see if there was not some alternative to the type of deterrence Mr. Sonnenfeldt described.

I personally feel that his characterization is the correct one: That deterrence based upon punishment is, indeed, the form of deterrence existing in the world today, and I rather like his style of deterrence by denial of reliability of their systems as a worthy successor to that philosophy.

I believe that this is something that the Soviets are bent upon trying to thwart at all costs.

They have a great belief that they can deal with these types of programs being developed in the West, not at the negotiating table, but in the arena of public opinion, or by changing the minds of governments and parliamentarians around the world.

Indeed, they have sought this in an active way. I saw this firsthand in travels throughout Europe, in speaking to audiences, including many of the peace groups in Europe. There is no doubt in my mind that they were waging a campaign of an unprecedented nature to try to change the European attitude with respect to intermediate nuclear forces. They were unable to do that.

In fact, their efforts in a way backfired, because they produced strong pro-NATO governments in, first, Great Britain, and then in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Their propaganda efforts brought greater resolve in Italy, even after a change of government. So, they have tried—and I believe they are still trying and will continue to try—to achieve what would normally be done through negotiations by taking the their show to the people and trying to change the minds of populations and governments through those populations. After all, this is the way it is done in Western democracies where the people do have a voice. I would that we had an equal voice in Warsaw Pact countries.

MX AS A BARGAINING CHIP

May I say just a bit in response to Ambassador Garthoff's comment about the leverage issue regarding the MX.

It has been described as a "chip," a "bargaining chip." I personally do not think it is a bargaining chip. Nor do I believe that we should characterize it as a bargaining chip.

If you want to make the poker analysis of what the MX is, it is certainly a "chip on the table." The question is not whether it will be played, or whether it has already been played, as Ambassador Garthoff might suggest, but the question is really what is "backing the bet."

I think this is the issue. The Soviets will be impressed if we can hold the line on this system; or they will be very pleased with their ability to discredit it through either their public relations programs or misinformation programs, or whatever you wish to call it, if we in the West deter ourselves. If we talk us out of our own program.

I think that it has a very important position to play in the Geneva negotiations, because it is a test of the resolve of the American people to modernize the system that is sorely in need of modernization, to address weapons systems which the Soviets have been putting in place over the last decade or so, and which have been unaddressed by the West. They will have to realize that, if we

hold our resolve here in the United States on MX, they will have to pay the price at the negotiating table.

To that degree, I fully support the administration's position, though I would not like to call it a "bargaining chip," as such.

The CHAIRMAN. Ray.

RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS ON MX ISSUE

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I think the Congress should make its decisions on the MX basically on the basis of whether it is concluded that it is a sufficiently useful element of American strategic deterrent power, and not on its impact on the negotiations.

I think it is important, and it certainly is appropriate, to consider the relationship to the negotiation, and, in general, I think that major programs such as MX do, indeed, have an effect on negotiations, and should be taken into account.

What I tried to suggest before is not that we have played the MX bargaining chip; I do not think we did. What I was suggesting is that the time, I think, has passed when we could either cash it in as a bargaining chip in negotiation, or continue to use it as the foundation of our strategic offensive forces without cashing it in.

I do not, by the way, quite understand how we would make the Soviets pay a price for this in the negotiation unless we were going to trade it in, but that aside, I think the effect on Soviet judgments of American resolve to pursue military programs, to meet our defense needs, will not be seriously affected by the decision made on the MX at this time.

I think, therefore, that the effect on our resolve as it has a further impact on the negotiations will negligible.

As I suggested before, that is mainly because I think the fundamental issue in the negotiations at this time is the strategic offensive/defensive relationship and not the question of whether the United States is going to proceed with an MX program of 21 or 42 or 50 or 100 missiles.

The Soviets have emphasized the linkage among the three parts of the package at Geneva. I think that to an important part, that is a question of bargaining stance, that if, for example—I do not predict it—but if, for example, some agreement of interest and acceptable to both sides on the intermediate range systems were to emerge in the negotiations in the next year or so, the Soviets might very well give in, so to speak, on their present bargaining stance of linkage of the three parts of the package.

What I do not think the Soviets will give in on is their own judgment of the real relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. To a substantial extent, therefore, that will be a determining factor in whether any major agreement concerning strategic offensive arms will take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS ON MX ISSUE

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that, from my experience, both as a person sitting across the table from the Soviets and serving back here fairly close to the decisionmaking center, I can think of nothing that would do more damage to whatever

prospects there might exist of progress in arms control negotiations if one program after another that is part of those negotiations is either swept away from the table, or severely curtailed.

The MX is at center stage at the moment, but you have a large defense appropriations bill which has in it many items that are a matter of negotiation or bear on the negotiations that are now resuming between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I believe we do ourselves damage in terms of whatever prospects we may have, and whatever the incentives we give—especially to an incoming Soviet leadership, which is gradually changing—to think a fresh about negotiations with the United States and about its own defense options.

That is, after all, what we would like to influence.

So I can think of nothing worse to do than to greet Mr. Gorbachev by the cancellation or decimation of a program that has been a matter of debate in this country since the mid-1970's. I think it would give him quite the wrong impression, not only of our resolve—but of our simple capacity as a government, as a body politic, to make decisions in the defense area.

I do not think that to give the wrong impression is a good idea in any case, but especially not in present circumstances.

I would like to refer in this regard to two past experiences. I do not believe that the very narrow vote in favor of the "Safeguard" ABM system—one vote in the Senate—15 years ago greatly helped our negotiating position. It was just enough to put it over the top, but we might have had a stronger hand if we had had stronger support.

And I believe that the very modest results on the offensive side that were achieved in 1972 were at least to some degree attributable to the relatively weak hand with which not only the American negotiators in Vienna and Helsinki sat at the table, but the President of the United States himself conducted his dealings with the Soviet Union.

We had no major programs that were or could get under way without grave controversy in Congress at that time, and from the Soviet standpoint, the very minimal agreement, safeguarding all their own programs, was all that they felt it was desirable and necessary to do.

It was not a happy experience for anyone involved in those negotiations to be dealing with the Soviet Union on the basis of the kind of division, controversy and bitterness—not just about defense but about our whole role in the world—that existed at that time.

And, in a sense, the marvel is how much it was still possible to achieve. Perhaps the Soviets' own problems were more severe than we recognized at the time.

So, the answer to your question, sir, is that I do not know precisely what the effect in Geneva would be of a negative vote; but I think in terms of our overall relationship and the ongoing negotiations, it would be an additional burden upon the American position to do away or truncate to an absurdly low level, programs that we have debated and debated and debated in the Halls of Congress and out on the hustings through innumerable elections, and simply sweep them away.

I think it would be bad for our security, and it would be bad for prospects of doing business with a new Soviet regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say to the three of you, we do appreciate your being here, and I think ventilating the idea and discussing it and getting all the points of view is healthy, helpful, and I feel sure that it will result in whatever action we take, we take on the floor.

I guess I just have a basic difference of opinion with Ambassador Garthoff. Ambassador Garthoff, you've said that the cancellation or an action of the Congress that would negate or cancel the production of the MX missile would have no major impact for or against—if the MX were not deployed.

It bothers me very much that I wonder how many more people in the State Department feel this way. It's just so common sense to me that if I'm sitting down to—across the table with someone to negotiate, and this is one of the items of negotiation, one of the major items, that if we just unilaterally get in with no quid pro quo, as we saw in the B–1's, when they told—when I was over there as an observer, and when one of the Soviets, general—I forget his name now—when we said, "Well, we gave up B–1, what are you going to do?"

And the reply was "Well, we're neither philanthropists nor pacifists." That was their attitude, and you tell this committee and you make the public statement as—very extensive background—that if we just unilaterally and with no agreements to the contrary—to any connection therewith say:

> We're not going to build the MX missile, and you go ahead with your SS–19, your SS–18, which is already in place and operational, you're testing the SS–24, 25, you've got over 400 SS–20's in place, each with 5,000-kilometer range, three independent warheads targeting every major target in Europe, and then going into Asia, they can target Taiwan, they can target South Korea.

And all of this is part of the total consideration you say—if we don't do anything—if we just throw out the MX it doesn't make any difference. It bothers me that you can come up with that conclusion, Mr. Ambassador.

Give me some more help.

EFFECT OF MX DEPLOYMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador GARTHOFF. First of all, let me make clear that I have not been at the State Department for 5 years—I retired from the Foreign Service 5 years ago. So whatever positions I'm expressing don't necessarily reflect any current views there.

I understand your question, and certainly the Soviets pay very considerable attention to our military programs, to what we are doing overall, and I do not mean to suggest that the MX is in any sense a negligible element in the overall program.

I used that expression in terms of what I believe to be the impact on the prospects for the negotiation in Geneva over the next several years. There is the additional——

Mr. DICKINSON. Excuse me.

Do you really think we're going to continue the negotiations over the next several years on the issues that are presently being negotiated? Do you really have a feeling it's going to take that long?

Ambassador GARTHOFF. Well, I consider myself an optimist in believing that the negotiations will continue over the next several years——

Mr. DICKINSON. I was hoping they'd be resolved.

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I believe the possibility of any substantial agreement is very low. I still think that it is desirable that we enter the negotiations, that we make the effort. But as an observer looking at the positions of the two sides and considering what the prospects are for reaching agreement, I think the prospects are extremely low.

And it is partly for that reason that I have suggested that decisions on the MX are not going to play a direct role. I think that whatever the outcome on the MX, the dismal prospect that I have outlined is going to remain for other reasons.

I think the Soviets have drawn a quite different lesson from the B–1. The lesson they've drawn from it is that a unilateral American decision by the Executive—or by the Congress—to forego some major system which is not embodied in a commitment, in a bilateral arms control agreement, is also unilaterally reversible.

The B–1 is back. Whether it was a desirable step to cancel it unilaterally in 1977 without trying to bargain for it is a disputable issue. But certainly the impact from the Soviet standpoint was that that decision gave them no assurance that the United States would not proceed with a comparable similar system or indeed with that very system at a later time, and the B–1 was restored.

Mr. DICKINSON. My time has expired, and I can't pursue it, but to say that we gave up and then they continue with the Backfire, they continue with the second-generation bomber, and then we picked up later after giving it up, that they on their—in their thinking said "Well, you know, you can always reverse your decision," they could have made a gesture, they could have locked something in concrete as a result of that, in my opinion, which they didn't intend to do and did not do.

I thank you for your response.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all three gentlemen for appearing before us this morning, and to you, Ambassador Fields, let me publicly thank you for the kindnesses and courtesies you extended to me and others when we were with you in Geneva a couple of years ago, and to congratulate you on your performance on behalf of this country. I thought you did a great job out there.

And I think arms control is a far greater issue than the MX missile. We talk about the MX missile, yet I think we sometimes fail to see some of the other things that are happening around us. No. 1, attitude, flexibility, on both sides, the Soviet Union and the United States, mind-sets on the part of negotiators or a government, perhaps, paranoia, I believe, plays a very important part.

Lou, I remember when I was with you in Geneva and we talked to the Soviet Ambassador, the paranoia that existed out there, that they lost 20 million people during World War II, and they—if you

recall the statement, he said "That will never happen to us again because we're unprepared."

That's a mind-set, and we have to deal with that somehow, somewhere. We've got to find an effective way to get through that. I don't think the MX missile will make or break the arms control talks, whether we have an advantage or disadvantage I don't know, I'm not an expert in the field, but all who have come before us, including all of you, including the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Nitze, have stated that the MX missile will or will not break the arms control talks.

It might have an effect upon them, and I want to make that very clear. Now, I don't want to give the impression that we're an impotent country. We're building at an enormous rate, as is the Soviet Union, and that is a dangerous, dangerous procedure.

We have qualitative edges in parts of the triad, and we should be cognizant of that. We have an effective submarine force, Air Force. We're building the B–1 bomber. And I might say to all of you that in 1978, or the latter part of 1977, we did reach a SALT II agreement, and right before that President Carter killed the B–1 bomber, right before that, right in the middle of negotiations.

Whether it was good or bad I am not able to make any judgment call. We're building bombers. We're building a D–5. Another MX missile is on its way. It'll be coming off the line sometime in the future.

And the Soviet Union, by the way, is reacting. Once we build or they build, it begets another weapons system, and we understand that. I think maybe a quick question should be asked this morning, and I ask you because of your expertise in the field, is that I think we're on a dangerous course.

In my judgment it's insane. But how can we create a breakthrough with the Soviet Union, how can we get through that mind-set, that paranoia that we have to deal with day in and day out?

Aren't we doing our job effectively? Aren't they doing their jobs effectively? That's the big question that we have to talk about. That's the question. And you know, we have those that say "Well, more power and we'll bring them to the table."

Well, it hasn't happened. Then there are others who'll say you try to bargain with them, and that hasn't happened. We've had some agreements, whether effective or ineffective only time will tell. Can all three of you perhaps share with us your views as to how we can break through this mistrust between both countries?

And it's there whether you want to believe it or not, it's there. It's a dangerous course, unfortunately. I remember talking with a Soviet ambassador relative to conventional weapons, and numbers of people, military people in Geneva, and I was very upset with his remark to me.

He said "Well, we're willing to talk about those things, and maybe set some limits." But he says "We'll talk about verification 3 years from now or 4 years from now." And that's wrong. How can we get them to agree to verification, because any agreement, at least in my judgment, about verification is totally ineffective?

Would you try to share with us your views on—I think on what I'm trying to say to you, aside from weapons systems, maybe attitude? I'd appreciate that.

DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS

Mr. SONNENFELDT. The issue of mistrust is of course a crucial and extremely frustrating one. Your very use of the term "paranoia," which means to be frightened of something that doesn't exist, makes it even clearer how hard to get at this is—because by definition you cannot cure a paranoiac by reassurance.

Perhaps you can only cure him by showing him that he genuinely faces opposition, so that he is no longer paranoid but understands the real world in which he operates and understands that a great deal of what he considers threatening exists because of the very real sense of threat on the other side.

The Soviets have had for four decades at least a definition of their security that spells essentially the insecurity of everyone else, and provokes reactions from NATO to weapons programs to any number of other actions, which the Soviets then in turn interpret as threatening them.

One of the most discouraging things about the Soviet Union is that while they have come to be quite self-critical and reflective about the domestic aspects of Stalinism, the terrorism, the repression, the arbitrariness, the capriciousness, and have been quite self-critical about some aspects of their own economic system, they have said literally not one word about the impact of Stalinism on the world at large, outside the USSR.

Perhaps they reflect on these things, perhaps they go through self-examination and are prepared to accept some responsibility in their innermost councils, but anyone who has ever dealt with the Soviets realizes how extraordinarily difficult it is to get any of them at any level, except conceivably in the most private of circumstances, and in the very outer reaches of their governing elite, to acknowledge what Stalinism meant to the postwar world.

How to break through that wall, how to induce the same kind of debates within the councils of the Soviet Union that we take for granted in our society, or even a fraction of those debates, is probably not something to which we could contribute very much.

It is something that they themselves have to bring themselves around to. If, as and when they do, they will perhaps understand that among the motivating forces for the military competition is precisely the kind of fear and suspicion they have instilled in the world around them by the way in which they came out of World War II.

One has yet to hear from the Soviets anything resembling self-examination. There is nothing even remotely comparable to what we went through even in our more dispassionate moments about Vietnam, or Central America, or our support for various unsavory and uncongenial regimes around the world. Nothing like that exists in the Soviet elite, at least that penetrates to the outside world.

And that, I think, gets very much to the root of the problem that you are wrestling with, and that anyone has to wrestle with in trying to see if we can break out of this cycle of danger and threat.

Therefore, I think we remain in a phase of relations, albeit with fluctuations, in which we attempt to treat symptoms. It is worth doing that, and one can perhaps improve matters somewhat by

treating symptoms. We make some agreements at the margins, not just on arms control but on human rights at Helsinki, economic relationships, practical matters like the Bering Straits, or civil aeronautical safety in the Pacific area, where the Korean airliner was shot down.

All such matters are quite important, but basically we are still dealing, in my view, with symptoms rather than the core of the problem—the nature of the Soviet system. My most positive and hopeful response to you is the hope that there will be adaptation and adjustment within the Soviet system as the generations turn over, as they face realities inside and outside the Soviet Union, and that there will be some cumulative effect in their external dealings that will gradually produce a change in their outlook and attitude.

In the meantime, it seems to me we have to rest on various forms of deterrence—my hope is on less cataclysmic forms of deterrence over time—and on treating symptoms in the relationship. That I think we should continue to do with vigor and imagination, and we can afford to do it, whatever the debates and controversies we have in our own society.

Ambassador FIELDS. If I could respond, first of all, to thank Congressman Mavroules for his kind comments, and to stress again the great importance that I attach to congressional visits to negotiating bodies, because it gives not only the negotiator and his team a chance to expose our negotiating adversaries to the importance of our political process, and the role of the Congress in our affairs, but to give that kind of exposure to both sides—the congressional interlocutors, as well as the negotiating adversaries.

And I think Congressman Mavroules got some very graphic insights into the Soviet mind, as represented by Ambassador Issraelyan, who is a rather erudite Soviet diplomat of great experience.

The point I think that is important here is the changing Soviet attitude as reflected on the one hand by Ambassador Issraelyan, who was a surgeon in World War II, and the new Soviet leadership on the other, which may perhaps be the key to what we can expect in the future.

I remember very vividly the opportunities I have had in Geneva to entertain Ambassador Issraelyan's two sons and to talk with them candidly about the issues that divide us and the things that we have in common. Their thinking is quite different from their father's, in the sense that he brings from the Soviet Union the kind of concerns that he expressed to congressional delegations reflecting the memories of World War II, the devastation of the Soviet Union, the serious loss of life; whereas the young people do not have the vividness of those memories. They were not living in that time.

Mr. Gorbachev is too young to have that kind of vivid recollection although he was a teenager when the Soviet Union was a victim of the horrors of World War II. I think there will be a slow transition.

Mr. Gorbachev represents a new breed of Soviet, but he is like a bright young executive who is put into the role of the CEO of a corporation; however, he is responsible to the same old corporate board. His imprint is not going to be seen immediately.

And there is a question of how long it will take him to make that imprint. Maybe he will have to lose a significant number of his board before you begin to see that, and this is something that I think we need to contemplate quite carefully. We must understand that there is not going to be a revolutionary change in the Soviet Union, even with the advent of a Gorbachev.

They are going to have to make very important decisions. There will still be that overlay of mistrust, a mistrust that was brought on, as Ambassador Issraelyan has said, "by centuries of intrusions into the Soviet Union." And that is the kind of baggage they are going to continue to carry.

As to how we can overcome this mistrust, this is an issue that is not easily resolved. As Mr. Sonnenfeldt very correctly said, it is something that only time can bring about. We have to continue to work at demonstrating first our readiness to meet with the Soviet Union and to negotiate with them.

But at the same time, we must maintain our dedication and complete resolve to maintain an adequate and sufficient defense structure. Indeed, I agree with Congressman Mavroules when he said that MX is not going to have a dramatic imprint on negotiations in Geneva, but it is an important underpinning to those negotiations. You cannot separate it out, anymore than I think you can compartmentalize the negotiations that you have going on in Geneva.

There are three areas within those negotiations, and the Soviets, as they invariably do in negotiations, will create linkages between them. That is a known Soviet negotiating posture. And we must see it in that context.

Now, you have to be careful that you do not fall into the trap that surely they are laying; that they try to bring simplified solutions to what appears to be a simple problem.

In other words, if you can draw a diagram where our objective is to reduce offensive weapons systems, and Soviets are to try to talk us out of our strategic defense initiative because of the significant technology lead that we have in this particular area. If you start looking at simplistic tradeoffs, then you are sliding into the very trap that the Soviets are setting for you.

And I think that we should be very careful to keep our focus on that kind of situation, when we look at the type of negotiation that is going on in Geneva today.

Forgive me for a long answer, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador GARTHOFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back briefly to one of the points that Mr. Sonnenfeldt mentioned earlier and take that as a point of departure. I very much agree with him that the Soviet Union has throughout placed its main reliance on its own military power, but I would emphasize that so have we.

This is a natural fact that no power, particularly a major superpower, is going to readily give up reliance on its own unilateral military programs. Military power is the essential basis of its security; and I do not think anyone is suggesting either that we should, or that the Soviets would, be likely to do that.

The real question is not only whether we will maintain military power to meet our security needs, but whether in addition it is possible to reach agreement of the two powers, to find areas in which arms control can also contribute to security. There have been be-

ginnings on this, although they have not been as impressive as I think they could have been, or then we should seek to make them.

We are going to continue to place, as a principal security objective, protecting the United States from attack and protecting American interests, just as they are for their interests.

But we also should recognize the additional objective of seeking to limit the costs and risks of an unlimited arms competition; and I think some beginnings have been made in that respect and that there are potential opportunities in the future for doing more.

The problem of mistrust has grown in recent years. It has been there underlying the relationship, of course, throughout; and I think that, as Mr. Sonnenfeldt said, we cannot expect to change the Soviet system, insofar as that is the source of the problem. What we can do is affect the interaction between the two countries on what can be important margins, in our overall political relationship and in our security relationships including arms control.

I think that the main problem as far as Soviet perception at this stage of what the United States is seeking to do is not so much a question of whether they doubt our resolve to defend ourselves, but whether there is in fact an interest here in seeking to reach arms limitations.

We need to proceed on the basis of our own necessary defense programs. We should at the same time make clear that we are ready for arms limitations that are in the mutual interests of the two sides. And we should seek to reach those agreements.

It has been commented here that the Soviets do not operate under different laws of deterrence than we do, and I think that is quite true. But I would note the inconsistency from that standpoint between statements that the Soviet Union should not have concern about American maintenance of increasing strategic offensive forces while at the same time pursuing strategic defenses.

The Secretary of Defense has also said that the United States should fear Soviet maintenance of strategic offensive forces if they added to that pursuit of strategic defenses. That, I think, can help to illustrate how, with the same general laws of deterrence applying, the whole question appears in a different light in the Soviet Union.

And that is why I think we need to consider further ourselves the whole question of relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces and therefore, if possible, arms limitations on strategic defense as well as offensive forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me say that we do want to give everybody a chance to ask some questions. If the panel members could keep your answers relatively shorter and give us a chance to make sure everybody can have a chance to ask.

Bud Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I found the discussion to be extremely interesting this morning. Of course, there is, I think, a difference in viewpoint with the panel out here itself, and I think that is very good, because it helps us focus our thoughts on this more serious problem that we are discussing here this morning.

But last week, I think it was, we had before this panel a Mr. Shevchenko, who made some observations that I thought were interesting, and I would like to bring up at this time.

One was that perhaps the initial change of leadership, and he happened to be here the day of the Chernenko funeral, was that Mr. Gromyko would set the course of foreign policy in the Soviet Union for the balance perhaps of his active public career there, and that Gorbachev, along with the help of the rest of the Politburo, would probably determine domestic affairs; and we pretty well know where Mr. Gromyko has stood in the past in relation to arms control, in relation to the arms race and things of this kind.

The witness went on to say that the Soviet Union, in his opinion, would never give up—the leadership of the Soviet Union would never give us nuclear weapons because it to them was a badge of being a superpower, the effect of being so important on the world scene.

Of course, we have heard President Carter and then President Reagan talk about a desire to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth, but the Soviet Union will never participate in that.

He stressed again that the MX missile should not be given up at the opening of the negotiations; it would bring nothing, and perhaps it might even bring contempt on the part of their negotiators toward us as a national institution on doing this.

I preface my remarks and questions with these comments because, based on that, as I was thinking about it, I could see a continuation in the future—we have had peace for 40 years by a policy of deterrence, basically; and I can see a continuation into the future perhaps for another 20 to 30 or 40 years of a similar policy as long as our forms of government remain as roughly the same and national commitments remain roughly the same, and I see no evidence that it is going to change at this time, even though we tried detente for a brief period of time.

But here is my question to you. Is it irrational that we seek some modernization of a force that has implemented a policy that has kept some stability in the world?

Are we not going to continue to live in a nuclear environment that we hope to control through arms control?

Or do you really, which I envision, and I assume that you do too, that will be long and lengthy; or do you envision some utopian breakthrough at some time in the future when perhaps nuclear weapons will be removed or that objects of the nuclear freeze or the peace movement can be achieved?

I would start with you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR FREEZE

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Mr. Chairman, I think we will continue to live in a nuclear environment for a long time to come. I hope that it will prove possible to rely less upon nuclear weaponry as we contemplate possible military options. But the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons, and the likelihood that they would be made very quickly in the event of a crisis or a war makes, I think, it

more than utopian, but probably unwise, as an operational matter, to consider the abolition of nuclear weapons as a feasible option.

I would never deny a political leader, a President of the United States, the vision and the need of a vision in this area or in any other area. All Presidents, not just President Carter and President Reagan, have expressed a hope or nostalgia for the removal of nuclear weaponry.

And the Soviets, of course, over the years, have been past masters in advocating propositions of so-called general and complete disarmament, the total abolition and prohibition of nuclear weapons and so on, and have managed to manipulate public attitudes, fears, and anxieties quite successfully with that.

But what I do think is a worthwhile objective is through modernization of all kinds, through adaptation, inventiveness, and creativity, to place less reliance on nuclear weaponry for the protection of our interests. That is true in regard to NATO, which already has underway programs to give greater emphasis to the sustainability of conventional forces, and I think it should be true in other respects as well.

What there might be at the end of that process is speculation. One can continue to hope to repeal the nuclear age, but I think for the most part what we have to attempt to do is to make the nuclear age less dangerous and to make it possible to protect our interests in the least dangerous and costly and the most effective fashion; and if that can mean over a period of time less reliance on nuclear weapons, I am all for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody have anything to add?

Ambassador GARTHOFF. Well, I—I very much agree with what Hel Sonnenfeldt has just said. I do not think that we can expect to escape nor at the moment do we see any attainable or preferable alternatives to continuing nuclear deterrents and that our main task therefore should be to work to make the nuclear age less dangerous.

I have a couple of additional comments, but should I—would you prefer that I hold?

The CHAIRMAN. No; go ahead.

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I want to go back for just a moment, because I think it is highly relevant to the present situation, to what we did and did not do a decade ago, differing somewhat with my colleague.

I think the United States was in a rather strong basic bargaining position in SALT I in 1969–72, not only with respect to attaining ABM limitations, which had been our principal initial purpose in proposing SALT talks, but also with respect to the possibilities for a much more effective constraint on strategic offensive arms.

We did not really pursue that possibility; and we instead proceeded to deploy MIRV rather than really seeking to ban MIRV before it had been fully developed and deployed.

Both sides preferred to agree on minimal strategic offensive limitations and I think the result was unfortunate. We would have been better off, if we could have done it, to limit MIRV then than to try to walk it back in the 1980's and later through very difficult unilateral or negotiated attempts to return to single warhead systems.

I think the strategic defense initiative has something of a comparable role in the general situation today. I think it would be in our interests to have a more effective limitation on strategic defensive and space weapons. The fact that the Soviet Union seeks that outcome I think does give us some bargaining leverage for getting constraints also on strategic offensive arms, if we are prepared to pursue limitations on both.

I would also note that the United States has not offered to limit the MX or any other major program of military modernization in SALT II or START. I do not know what the position at the present time is that we are offering in the talks, but I would doubt if that has changed, even in exchange for comparable Soviet reductions and constraints on Soviet military modernization.

We have offered reductions in older American systems, and more modern Soviet ones; but we have not proposed what is a difficult problem for both sides to face and grapple with, which would be efforts to work out jointly comparable limitations on our current first-line and future systems.

Military modernization cannot and perhaps should not be completely foreclosed, but efforts should be made short of that extreme. In our efforts to make living in the nuclear age less dangerous, we should be trying harder to find combinations of meaningful constraints on Soviet and American systems of a kind that might be negotiable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Next, Dave McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I'm going to ask you three questions and you might want to jot down some of them because I'm going to ask them rapid fire and then you can respond at your leisure, but——

The first question I have—and I'm very concerned about this and we started talking about it a little when we moved away from the MX and started talking about SDI.

I sit on the Research and Development Subcommittee and also on the Intelligence Committee and we've had—and as before this panel also General Abramson and the Air Force and discussion of SDI. And, yesterday, in our subcommittee, I asked General Abramson as far as the position of the negotiations or the outline, the guidelines for the Geneva negotiations vis-a-vis SDI in space defense, and in general terms they were in effect wanting to discuss the technologies to alert both sides as to the potential of each and to see if there is some future limitations on that and, again, trying to move the Soviets to a defense dominated deferrence which Mr. Sonnenfeldt was discussing.

But, at the same time, he continued to reiterate and make the point that we're exploring technologies and that there is nothing to negotiate. That there is not a deployed system or there is a system that is really something that can be traded. That disturbs me because from my impression in hearing a number of you as Soviet experts, everyone seems to agree, there's a consensus that the Soviets return to the bargaining table, negotiating table, because of SDI and if SDI is the driver and is the thread that has brought the Soviets back and they are concerned about some linkage and we are holding firm to a position that there's really nothing at this point to negotiate, what is the future of these negotiations.

And, is it possible to believe that the Reagan administration's goal of convincing the Soviets to move to a defense dominated deterrence is feasible.

That's my first question. That's a long one.

The other two are more on the Soviet system itself. I think the idea of this policy panel is to get a better understanding of the threat and to be able to make meaningful decisions as to our overall national security policy with a better understanding of the overall threat and to look at the broad questions.

My question is, with the death of Marshall Ustinov and the demotion of General Ogarkov the influence of the Soviet military seems to be at its lowest point in a number of years. Could you both—or the three of you comment on the current level of influence the military presently has in the decisionmaking process, particularly decisions on arms control.

Second, do you see any indication that the Soviet military is rethinking its long held belief that strategic nuclear weapons are effective instruments of war fighting?

Ambassador FIELDS. Let me, for the record, Mr. Chairman just say that I wish to associate myself with that last exchange with the views expressed by both Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Ambassador Garthoff. So, you have unanimity here on the issue of the long-term prospects for living in the nuclear age.

Let me also address the first question Congressman McCurdy put to us that is the question about possibilities of realistically going in this stage of the negotiation with it in mind that SDI can be traded for substantial reductions of offensive weapons on the part of the Soviet Union. That may be putting words in your mouth, sir, but this is a——

Mr. MCCURDY. I think that's a common feeling out there that—and I'm just I think verbalizing some emotional statements the press—a number of feelings are out there and I'd like for you to settle that or clarify that may be misconceptions.

Ambassador FIELDS. I wish I could settle it, sir, but I think you and I are together on the general attitude out there.

Let me say that predicated on my own experience in negotiations, I have never felt that you go into the first round of any negotiation—whether it's arms control or anything—with an idea of preemptive capitulation on a particular issue.

And, let me say that I don't believe that SDI was the sole basis on which the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. It was certainly one of the important reasons that they came to the table and I think that they have deliberately sought to make linkages here in the very hope that they could achieve, through the kinds of trade off that we've just been discussing, their ultimate objective in the talks.

While we have to assign to them some good faith in negotiating on reductions of nuclear weapons systems, it is my own personal belief that they are there principally to deal with the question of SDI because it's my perception that that's what they fear the most. I think that here again it gives us an opportunity in these negotiations to put forward our views on this important issue.

And, I believe in the long term that, assuming that our positions are clear and we articulate them well, we could, over a course of

time, perhaps influence the Soviet view with respect to the role of a defensive deterrence, if you will, to deal with the question of nuclear weapons.

But, I think it would be dangerous at this point to go in to them or to take a public posture with respect to them, that we are willing to make a trade off in very simplistic terms on SDI for significant reductions by the Soviets. We shouldn't fall into that trap based on Soviet artificial linkage between these three components of the negotiations in Geneva. I think that would be a very dangerous point at this stage of those negotiations.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On your first two questions, I don't know, of course, what the administration may have in its fall-back positions or briefcases in regard to these negotiations in Geneva. But, I think it's clear, first of all, that to attempt to constrain research by agreement is likely to be a very unproductive course because of the verification issues.

Moreover, I would remind you that despite what has been said about the ABM Treaty in many quarters, it specifically did not prohibit research and I believe that was due not only to the verification problem but because neither side was sure that it wanted to foreclose all options of re-examining the offense-defense balance.

The Soviets took that exclusion more seriously than we did at the time and continued very much to conduct research in various forms of defensive possibilities. We did it less so and with much more controversy and I may say, in an intellectual situation among our defense analysts, where anyone who was prepared to remain an advocate of strategic defense did not have a very easy time of it in terms of acceptability with his colleagues. It was not the fashion in the United States.

Let me make one other observation which relates to something that Mr. Garthoff and many other people have pointed out, I believe that the ABM Treaty of 1972 would almost certainly never have been negotiated if MIRV technology had not been coming along because it was MIRV technology that made the defensive technology of the late sixties and early seventies useless or, at any rate, highly ineffectual.

The advantage lay with the offense, both technically and in terms of costs.

If all we had had and all we would have ever had, whether by agreement or because technology didn't point the way, were single warhead missiles my hunch is that neither side would have gone as far as it did in the ABM Treaty and forego the promise of a defense.

The situation that we may be entering is that that balance conceivably might shift in the other direction. MIRV made an agreement on defensive weapons possible because the cost exchange ratio was favorable to the offense. If it turns out that the cost exchange ratios might come to favor the defense, then SDI may very well beget limitations, whether by agreement or unilateral, on offense just as in my view the MIRV technology and the technology of penetration aids begot the ABM Treaty.

I know it's a parentage that a lot of people would rather not acknowledge but it is in fact the truth, if one reflects on how these matters work.

Now, whether we—to take your second question—would ever be able to convince the Soviets of the advantages of defense-dominated deterrence, I would very much doubt. I don't think the brilliance of our arguments persuades them.

What will persuade the Soviets, if anything persuades them, are the cold calculations of their systems analysts, and of their politically responsible figures. Their political system has to make the decision of what in the end is afforable and effective for the Soviet military posture, and there is at least a possibility that they might come to similar conclusions as we ourselves would, if that is where the research takes us.

But, the brilliance of our arguments will not persuade them of that any more than the brilliance of our arguments persuaded them, defense minded as they are, that the ABM's of 1969, 1970, and 1971 weren't worth maintaining at the levels they were originally planning.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE SOVIET UNION

As regards the Soviet military and its role in the Soviet Union, there is surface evidences of a lessened role, at least of the uniformed military. I may say that the presence on the politburo of Marshal Gretchko, a professional military, was highly unusual and exceptional in the Brezhnev period. Ustinov was, of course, a civilian. He was the president of the Soviet military industrial complex, having worked in that field for over 40 years.

I don't know how that will work out in the future, but I would guess that the military-industrial complex, including both the uniformed military and the people involved in defense industry and defense technology, will continue to carry very considerable weight in Soviet councils.

Whether the Soviets have changed or are rethinking the role of the war fighting use of strategic nuclear weapons, I don't know. What one can say, and this is, again, controversial I'm sure, is that the Soviets have not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in warfare; nor have they ruled out trying to make certain, if that were to come about, that they would emerge more successfully than their opponents. I think that does remain the fundamental Soviet approach to these matters. I very much doubt that anyone would ever rule out totally the use of these weapons and I believe also that the Soviet military, industrial, technical and political people will continue their efforts to make the use of nuclear weapons in warfare feasible and limited in order to avoid cataclysmic consequences like nuclear winter about which we hear so much.

The CHAIRMAN. John Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, could—may I? OK.

SDI IS MAIN CONCERN OF THE SOVIETS

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I think that the main Soviet concern is the SDI, as Ambassador Fields suggested, and that that is therefore a priority objective of theirs. I don't think it is their only interest in strategic arms control, but I do not see it as posing a trap of artificial linkage.

We, of course, in 1971 and 1972 were the ones who were arguing about the need to take account of the inherent interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces at a time when we were then pressing on the offensive side. But the question of changing positions on the two sides apart, I think the essential point is that there does exist an interrelationship that both sides are bound to take into account in unilateral planning and programs and in arms control.

Whether they will become persuaded over time, I agree with Mr. Sonnenfeldt, is not really likely to be simply a question of whether the United States is effective in arguing a position. I think there is no reason indeed that research could not continue.

I think the bottom line proposition as it presents itself in the negotiations is whether the United States concludes that it would be in our interest also to agree on a verifiable ban on the testing and deployment of space weapons apart from those already banned under the ABM Treaty. And, of course, for the distant future it is open to both parties by agreement or unilaterally to withdraw from any and all of the treaties involved, the existing space treaty, the ABM Treaty, and any possible future agreement on space weapons.

I think the mere fact that the Soviet Union has proposed a ban on testing and deploying weapons in space should not be taken as a reason for us to oppose it.

We both say we want reduction in strategic offensive arms. I think our position—this is not the position we are presently taking, I recognize, but I think we should be taking the position—that we would also wish to see the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty extended by expanding the limitations that already exist to cover those additional areas which are left open at the present time, principally through advanced anti-satellite system development.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE SOVIET UNION

On the second question, I think we should distinguish between the influence of the Soviet military institution, and the question of Soviet military interests within their policy making system and military considerations in the thinking of the political leaders and of all the Soviet leaders.

I think it is probably an open question, for example, at the present time in Moscow, whether as a matter of institutional representation, the Minister of Defense should be made a candidate member of the Politburo or not. Marshal Sokolov has not been so far. But whether he is or not, I think that clearly the influence of both the military considerations and of military interests in all security questions, including arms control, will remain very high.

That tends to be a conservative influence on the development of their positions, but it does not preclude their agreeing to or, in some cases, taking initiatives with respect to arms control, and does not preclude in itself a mutually acceptable arms control limitation.

On the third question I think that the Soviet leaders have long ago concluded that nuclear war would be a catastrophe beyond contemplation and that they have not only as a general aspiration, but

as a real objective, the avoidance of any nuclear war. It is certainly true that the Soviet Union, again, as the United States, also has other objectives and that precludes making the question of resort to nuclear war totally excluded because it would depend on circumstances.

We, for example, have chosen to retain the option of first use of nuclear weapons, in a defensive context and to insure our deterrent, but the point is that we both contemplate contingencies, remote and extreme but nonetheless contingencies, in which we are prepared to contemplate and therefore to prepare for the possibilities of nuclear war.

I think the Soviet military establishment continues to see the question of preparing within the limits of the resources that are made available to them contingently to wage conventional or limited nuclear or all-out nuclear war should that contingency compel itself.

But, I think in that respect they have for some years now placed a greater emphasis on keeping any hostilities that might break out at the conventional level, and that they continue to see the threshold between the use of conventional arms and any use of nuclear weapons as being a more important threshold than any gradation of limitation of use of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. John Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for appearing.

Mr. Fields and Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you both told us that we must continue to rely on this deterrent by punishment for as long as it is the only available means of protecting ourselves.

And you have also advised us that at least at the outset of negotiations we should not vacillate or make unilateral concessions. This is not the only vote upcoming on the MX.

We shortly will have votes on authorization for 48 missiles for fiscal year 1986, appropriation funds for the same. If we indeed do approve the unfencing of these funds—fiscal year 1985 funds—and then subsequently in a very short time undertake to cut back severely—not severely but substantially the number of missiles that we procured in fiscal year 1986.

And if we also attach a rider to that appropriation to the effect that the missile system will be kept at 50 until further authorization from Congress, will we then be undoing—undercutting our own show of strength and will which we undertake to display at the outset of negotiations by unfencing this money?

EFFECT OF THE MX VOTE ON THE SOVIETS

Mr. SONNENFELDT. Well, Mr. Spratt and Mr. Chairman, I don't think one can calibrate this kind of a decision process too closely in terms of its impact on negotiations or in terms of the perceptions that the Soviets and others may have of us.

I think that a reversal of the basic MX decision, or its virtual reversal by not having at least the minimal numbers deployed and proceeding from that basis, would be a major sign that we just have no weapons program of this kind that isn't going to be subject

to the most drawn out and horrendous type of debate and controversy.

And that, I think, in general does encourage the Soviets to seek means of inhibiting our defense programs other than through mutual concession. At any rate it allows the Soviets to assume that sooner or later the Americans will have such disputes and that they can afford to wait before they consider throwing something of theirs in the negotiating pot.

But in my opinion, beyond that one can probably not be very precise in the interconnections. I myself would hope that the MX Program will go forward as recommended in this Scowcroft Commission report because I think over the coming years that would be the backbone of the land-based portion of our deterrent until we know for sure that we can supplement it by a lighter and more mobile single-warhead missile.

And therefore, numbers much short of 100—which incidentally do not threaten the Soviet fixed land-based missile force with a disabling strike, although they could threaten a portion of it—would not be a good choice in my view. But in my opinion that is more on military and overall bargaining grounds, and relates less to specific bargaining in Geneva.

Consequently, I would hope the Congress wouldn't do what you are suggesting it perhaps might do.

Mr. SPRATT. Ambassador Fields.

Ambassador FIELDS. I would like to say that I think timing is critical here in that how you play the equation in Washington is something that the Soviets will be carefully watching.

They are attuned to this debate. They are watching us very closely. They understand that they will have a continuing crack at the modernization program—I say they will have the crack. They will still have the opportunity to influence future decisions.

Again, I think that the numbers that are put forward at the present time are consistent with our desire to maintain the balance and will not be destabilizing in the minds of the Soviet Union.

And in that regard, I think that decisions will have to be made as they come along. But to make a decision right now at the very outset of the negotiations on the MX program would send precisely the wrong signal not only to Geneva but to Moscow, as well.

Mr. SPRATT. Ambassador Garthoff.

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I think that there is no risk that the Soviet leadership would see the United States as soft on defense if we cut off the MX Program today at 21 missiles.

And I think the differences between 21 and 42 and 50 and 100 from that standpoint are negligible. I think they see it now more as an internal political issue within the United States.

But even in that context it is one that is secondary in terms of the effects it will have on American defense posture overall. We make the argument that 100—as Mr. Sonnenfeldt has just repeated—that 100 MX's can't threaten the whole Soviet ICBM force and therefore they can't perceive it as threatening.

It may be that we intend that it not be seen as destabilizing and as threatening their whole force, but it certainly is not so perceived. They see the MX not as something—whether 100 MX or 50 or 21—that would be able to destroy the whole of the Soviet ICBM

force, but rather they look at the whole American arsenal as compared to the Soviet ICBM force. They may well attribute a higher kill capability to the existing Minuteman III with Mark 12A and NS-20 guidance which, depending on the hardness of Soviet silos, can threaten a much larger number of Soviet strategic warheads than they can threaten American strategic warheads, even if they could destroy the entire American ICBM force.

The D-5 will be a highly effective counterforce missile and is proceeding well along without being a controversial element of the American military program. The existing Trident I C-4 accuracy is also being improved considerably.

We have the air-launched cruise missile programs with high counterforce capability, although not prompt counterforce capability. And similarly, the B-1 with other penetrating armaments.

And there are submarine-launched cruise missile and, from the Soviet standpoint,the Pershing. In all, it is a very considerable array of existing, planned and proceeding American offensive armaments. This is the way in which they look at the threat, and not at MX alone.

I think it would be preferable in terms of our own interests not to deploy any additional MX missiles, in the first instance because I don't think they are necessary; and in the second instance, because I think they do not contribute to a stabilization.Deploying large—that is, ten warhead—missiles in vulnerable silos contradicts our own precepts on vulnerability of forces and the destabilizing effect of deployment of such systems, particularly when that is coupled with the high offensive counterforce capability of that very system.

The CHAIRMAN. Richard Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fields and gentlemen, it is very nice to have you here today and I appreciate your coming very much. It is very helpful to us.

As you know, Senator Sam Nunn was an observor in Geneva for the last couple of weeks I believe and in a press release last Sunday from Geneva he commented in effect that he felt that the administration was overplaying the strategic defense initiative.

In fact, that it was being very much overplayed because it could take as long as 30 years to develop. And he went on to say that for a number of years the liberal left has felt that the nuclear deterrent was immoral and now that we were laying the groundwork for the conservative right to also begin to believe that the nuclear deterrent was immoral.

I would just like to know what your thinking is along the lines of his thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fields.

NUCLEAR DETERRENT NOT SEEN AS A MORALITY ISSUE

Ambassador FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Ray, I don't see the deterrent as immoral. It is predicated on the prudent use of strength in defense, not as the underlying basis of our deployment of nuclear weapons.

It is not the issue of starting a war or an offensive situation or aggressive conduct, but rather to defend ourselves against aggres-

sion itself. So I do not see it is immoral nor do I think that people who have a prudent view of the strategic situation would deem the nuclear force as immoral.

As to the question of whether the strategic defense is 30 years away, I would think that perhaps that might be a little on the pessimistic side.

I think that research can be significant in this area. Clearly technology, or any technology thought to exist in 1972, was not sufficient for us to agree that we should proceed with our implementation of the ABM Treaty in the sense of deploying our own ABM systems.

This was clearly stated by Ambassador Warnke in his testimony during the ratification debate. But I think circumstances have changed. We are well down that road in the period of time that has intervened and technology—even on-the-shelf technology—is significantly ahead of where it was then.

And by marshalling our resources, marshalling the talent that exists in this country, the President has, I think, very prudently called for an examination to see where technology will lead us.

I believe that to assign times to when that technology can come to fruition, if indeed it can, is crystalballing on a very unprecedented scale.

Mr. RAY. If I might just emphasize that I think the point that he was making, Mr. Chairman, if I might, is that we are overplaying this SDI; that we are putting it out ahead of everything else and it is too far down the road. That's the point I was making.

Mr. SONNENFELDT. On overplaying, I don't know whether the administration or its opponents are overplaying it more. In any case,they seem to be reinforcing each other, if there is any overplaying.

I think the question of morality is one that has concerned decisionmakers who might face the choice of using these weapons since the outset. I myself have no problem with the morality of deterrence. But I can very easily see that someone who actually has to make decisions about what to do if deterrence should fail, persons like the President of the United States, his closest advisors and others down the line, would have moral qualms.

I can therefore also understand—and indeed we have seen it over the years—why an American President should be looking for alternatives—incidentally, alternatives, in the case of SDI, not of use to him but to his successors.

Until this President, most of the alternatives that have appealed or been available to Presidents are of a kind that might make nuclear war less destructive,should deterrence fail—e.g. neutron weapons, more precise weapons better controlled weapons, limited nuclear options and so on.

This is the first President who has has tried to take a longer leap by looking at what a nonnuclear defense might offer to his successors. I belive it reflects, at least in part, the moral burden our decisionmakers—I have seen it—labor under.

I have enormous compassion with Presidents who try to lighten that burden for those who come after them. I had wanted to make some comments on what Ambassador Garthoff said in the previous colloquy but I shall forbear for the sake of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Duncan Hunter has one question and then we would give you a chance to, if you want to, wrap up in any way and say something to make sure that something that you thought——

Mr. HUNTER. Just one question. And Ambassador Garthoff, I would address it to you. No. 1, with regard to the labeling of the MX missile in some quarters as a bargaining chip or not a bargaining chip, it seems to me that if you accept the proposition that we want to negotiate away nuclear weapons or at least want to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons, then by definition everything is essentially a bargaining chip.

Everything is negotiable, and that includes bombers and the big ICBM's and the small ICBM's and SLBM's and everything else. One problem that I have with your statement is that the message that I got is that the Soviets are largely in Geneva because they thought the Americans now wanted to talk.

And I can recall last year when the President by common wisdom did everything wrong. And I think you can remember some of the commentary. He went with SDI. That was a mistake. It was a meritless system. It would provoke the Russians.

He hung tough with the Euro-missiles and the Russians walked away and that was a horrible mistake and I think everybody liberal or conservative will concede the Soviets did in fact try to affect the American election.

I can recall one of Mr. Mondale's biggest coups being the fact that he saw Gromyko before the President of the United States could see Gromyko.

And yet, the President did essentially everything wrong by the common wisdom and the Soviets are at the table. And it occurs to me that whether you like the MX missile from a military standpoint or don't like it, this is Ronald Reagan's ballgame.

He did something that very few of us thought he could do. And if he needs that missile and particularly going into the first round with Mr. Gorbachev, who I think is very sensitive to the difficulty that the west has in organizing a consensus, wouldn't it seem to be in the best interest of the United States to give this President, who was right when everybody else was wrong, what he needs?

MX AS A BARGAINING CHIP

Ambassador GARTHOFF. I think there is a difference between systems which are part of our arsenal and because of their general contribution to our strength an indirect way contribute to bargaining leverage, and a question of systems which we are prepared to limit as part of an agreement.

In the START negotiations in 1982 and 1983, the United States sought a reduction by two-thirds in the existing Soviet MIRV large missiles, and other important constraints.

We did not propose, even if the Soviets had accepted our proposal, to curtail our own programs for deploying 100 to 200 MX missiles. We were not going to reduce that from 100 to 90 even if the Soviets made a two-thirds cut in their own SS–18's and 19's.

That is not offering MX as a bargaining chip. The Soviets are in Geneva, I think, because they believe that it would be in their in-

terest as well as ours if an agreement could be reached that would more effectively limit strategic offensive and defensive arms.

The SDI casts a long shadow forward; the fact that decisions with respect to deployment would not be made for many years does not alter the fact that the President of the United States has proposed that this system replace deterrence and make obsolete all strategic nuclear weapons.

The President's speech proposing SDI was in March 1983. And I think that that statement, plus the position we had taken in the START negotiations, contributed to the Soviet decision in November 1983 to walk out of START as well as INF.

The INF element was a separate and important factor in its own. I think the Soviets made a mistake, and realize that they made a mistake, in terms of the impact that their walk-out would have on western opinion.

I don't think that was the only reason, however, that they left what they thought were talks that had no basis for reaching agreement. The Soviet leaders are well-aware of and do very much take into account western opinion and attempt to influence western opinion in the positions that they take. They do want to influence decisions—defense decisions and the like—over here apart from agreements that involve bilateral commitments in arms control. I don't disagree with that in the slightest.

And we shouldn't let them make our decisions for us in that way. It is perferable to do two things. One is to make our own decisions on their own merits and not just because the Soviets favor them or just because the Soviets oppose them.

And second, it is better to do it in negotiated arms control with verified bilateral mutual commitments and clear balancing off of constraints on Soviet as well as American systems.

The Soviet Union, as they saw the effects of the SDI as they would develop over time, were led to propose talks on space weapons even at a time when that was believed to contribute to President Reagan's reelection success.

In their proposal first on June 29 for talks, and following a summer of private discussions in the renewed discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in September, they were prepared to do that, whatever its impact on the American election, because they wanted to have the issue of strategic defenses joined in arms control talks before the United States committed itself in some irrevocable way to a program that would then not be liable for negotiations in Geneva or anyplace else.

I think that, in that sense, SDI has contributed—that's not the only reason—but has contributed in a substantial way to the Soviet decision to go forward with the present talks.

If they conclude that the United States is not prepared to consider limitations—I am not talking about a ban on research; I am talking about verifiable restraints on testing and deployment of space weapons to cover the loopholes left by the ABM commitments already entered into—then I think they will conclude that the United States is intent on pursuing this program without regard for arms limitation. Their own position with respect to their own offensive systems and with respect to offensive limitations is bound to be affected by that judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We have a vote to do this morning so we thank all of you for coming and for sharing your thoughts with us. Very interesting morning.

Ambassador FIELDS. Thank you.

[Whereupon, there was a brief recess while the witnesses departed at 12:20 p.m.]

H.J. RES. 180

The CHAIRMAN. The panel will come back to order. Richard Ray.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, is a motion in order?

The CHAIRMAN. A motion is in order.

Mr. RAY. I move that the panel recommend that the full committee approve H.J. Res. 180 as well as a second required joint resolution referred to he committee on appropriations.

The effect of adopting the resolution is to make available for obligation $1.5 billion previously approved for fiscal year 1985 subject to the subsequent adoption of two joint resolutions.

This amount will permit the procurement of 21 additional operational MX missiles.

[H.J. Res. 180 is as follows:]

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99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. 180

To approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 5, 1985

Mrs. HOLT (for herself and Mrs. BYRON) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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JOINT RESOLUTION

To approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That subject to the enactment (after the enactment of this joint resolution) of a joint resolution further approving the obligation of such funds, the Congress approves the obligation of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for the procurement of additional operational MX missiles (in addition to the funds previously authorized to be obligated).

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The CHAIRMAN. Is there any discussion?

Mr. MAVROULES. Just one statement, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I am going to oppose the resolution and the motion put forth by my distinguished colleague but I will save my arguments for a later date, that later date being on the floor of the House.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other comments?

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, it was implied by Mr. Nitze, in an earlier hearing, that if the funds were not unfenced at this time, they would remain in an appropriated state subject to being unfenced at a later time. Is that in fact legally correct as a matter of fiscal law?

If this vote is negative on the floor and the Congress, are the funds still available at some later time to be unfenced?

The CHAIRMAN. That's a good question. I don't know.

How would the vote happen again?

Mr. MCCURDY. There has to be two votes, Mr. Chairman, an authorization and an appropriations?

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Mr. MCCURDY. And of course we are just going through the authorization. The appropriations committee voted this morning. But they still have both of those on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't matter what the committees do in that sense because this is a legislative—it is not like a normal piece of legislation where if the committee doesn't approve it it doesn't get to the floor.

This one gets to the floor whether we have approved it or not. It is just coming out of the committee with a recommendation one way or the other. But I don't know the answer to the question the gentleman has proposed.

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, the motion says it will have the effect of adoption, will have the effect of making the funds available. The question is what will nonadoption have the effect of doing.

Mr. DICKINSON. Well, if I understood your question, it is going to the floor either with or without——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. I understand. But the question is, the question that the gentleman raises is a good question and I don't know the answer. That is, if the Congress votes or the House of Representatives votes no, what does that mean.

And I don't know what that means. This was set up in the law as the way to settle this issue. The law that was set up under which we voted in the authorization bill last year, I think was looked upon as pretty much a one-shot yes or no vote.

And if it was no, it was no; and if it was yes, it was yes at this point.

Mr. MAVROULES. May I take a shot at that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. MAVROULES. I don't think there is anything in the legislation or agreement that would eliminate the funds, Mr. Spratt. I don't think there is anything here that says that the funds would be eliminated.

The question is do we unfence the funds and I think that is the resolution put forth by Mr. Ray. It is a good legal question that you

do ask, by the way. We should have that clear at least before we go back on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. No question about it.

Mr. MAVROULES. There is nothing there at this point that says that the funds would be eliminated. That is not stated.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying that even if we vote no, then it isn't a deficit reduction?

Mr. MAVROULES. Absolutely. There is nothing there that you are reducing the funds by, $1.5 billion. The funds I would assume would continue to fence the funds and perhaps at a later date recognize the fact and we act on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know the answer to the question of the gentleman. If the gentleman's vote on depends this, I would suggest the gentleman vote "present" until we at least can answer his question.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other question on the issue? Yes?

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, just briefly I would commend the chairman and the committee for the great deal of talent you have put before the committee over the last several weeks.

It is my opinion that the weight of the opinion of these very talented, knowledgeable individuals was essentially in favor of funding the MX missile.

I think it was a convincing argument. I appreciated Mr. Garthoff's exchanges, for example, in this panel, but I think over the last several weeks the weight of the opinion has been definitely in favor of the MX missile.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other comments or questions?

[No response.]

If not, let's have a vote.

Mr. MCCURDY. I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. Dave McCurdy seconds the motion. We will call the roll on a vote.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Aspin.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Nichols.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye by proxy.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Hillis.

Mr. HILLIS. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. No.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Courter.

Mr. COURTER. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Skelton.

[No response.]

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. McCurdy.

Mr. MCCURDY. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Sweeney.

Mr. SWEENEY. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Aye.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Present.

Mr. EMMERICHS. Nine ayes, one no, one present and one not present.

The CHAIRMAN. We will meet at 1:30. The full committee meets at 1:30 to vote on this issue again.

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Mr. MCCURDY. Could I make a motion? Could I ask unanimous consent that the vote be left open in order for Mr. Skelton to record his vote either by proxy to the chairman or to the committee directly?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. How many people did not vote? Only Mr. Skelton?

Mr. EMMERICHS. Yes. One.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the record is kept open for Mr. Skelton.

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The record—the vote on this is 9 ayes, 1 no, 1 present. The motion is carried. We will meet at 1:30 this afternoon.

[Whereupon, the panel was recessed at 12:28 p.m., the full committee to meet this same afternoon at 1:30 p.m.]

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